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PREFACE
Studies previously undertaken by scholars concerning the Mamluk 
period in Egypt concentrate on either military activities or relation­
ships with other countries. The Mamluk Sultanate was fundamentally 
a military regime, and the Mamluks were responsible for bringing the 
Crusade to an end. Few contemporary records exist with regard to the 
internal affairs of Mamluk Egypt, therefore any study shedding light on 
this subject covers new ground. For this reason the following 
dissertation was undertaken.
This study deals with aspects of the subject which so far have been 
subjected neither to academic research, nor to sufficiently practical 
analysis. There are historical writings concerning Mamluk history in 
general and articles on the Mamluk army, trade with other countries and 
the *Abbasid Caliphate at the beginning of the Mamluk period; but there 
is no comprehensive review of the internal affairs of Egypt during the 
third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad.
There survive a number of manuscripts either of contemporary 
chroniclers, or of historians who were interested in recording events 
relating to this period. Some of these manuscripts are of great 
value because they were written either by Mamluk emirs such as Baybars 
al-Mansuri, or by people of high rank such as Ibn Fadl Allah al-^Umari, 
the confidential secretary (katib al-Sirr), of al-Nasir Muhammad.
Those chroniclers witnessed closely events either at the royal court 
or in the governmental offices. At the end of this thesis there is
an introduction to the bibliography concentrating on the manuscripts 
written by contemporary chroniclers and historians, which have been 
the foundation of the evidence for this thesis. The subject we have
studied is new, there are substantial materials available, and
al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign was the golden age of the Mamluk period; 
there was a flourishing economy, internal stability, social security, 
progressive administration and advancement in studies, history in 
particular. Consequently with these three factors one might succeed 
in giving a convincing picture of the period, and this thesis attempts 
a detailed and comprehensive study of the internal affairs of Mamluk 
Egypt during the reign.
In this thesis there is an introduction followed by seven chapters; 
the introduction is a brief study of the political situation of Mamluk 
Egypt during the first and second reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad, the 
periods of usurpation by Sayf al-Din Kitbugha, Husam al-Din Lachin and
Baybars al-Jashnakir, then of al-Nasir Muhammad in power as sole
ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate and the beginning of his third reign, 
which has been studied in detail. Thus one achieves an historical 
survey of the Mamluk Sultanate during the preceding reigns of al-Nasir 
Muhammad and an understanding of the fundamental nature of the political, 
economic, social and religious aspects of the Mamluk Sultanate during 
the first half of the fourteenth century. Accordingly one comes to 
understand that the Mamluks had no respect for hereditary right
viii
jconcerning the elevation to the Sultanate, and the emirs desired 
competent authority; therefore there were conspiracies to murder 
the Sultan or to depose him. Moreover the events show the danger 
which might come from the office of vicegerent (na'ib al Saltana 
bi 'L-diyar al-Migriyya), as well as its extreme importance.
During those years al-Nasir Muhammad's power was nominal and 
the oligarchy of emirs enjoyed competent authority. Subsequently it 
was impossible for that -political situation to continue without causing 
dangerous dissatisfaction; therefore open conflict appeared and con­
tinued until al-Nasir Muhammad succeeded in establishing his authority 
and began his third reign with competent power.
After this review of the political struggle and rivalry which 
gyjrrounded the Mamluk Sultanate during the early years of the fourteenth 
cerntury we come to the subject of the first chapter which is the 
‘Ablbasid Caliphate, the attitude of the Caliph towards al-Nasir Muhammad 
at the beginning of the latter's third reign, the hostility of al-Nasir 
Muhammad to the Caliph, al-Mustakfi, and the position of the*AbbaSid 
Caliphate in Egyptian society. The *Abbasid Caliphs were respected 
neither by the Mamluk emirs nor by the people. There is also a study 
of the diplomas (*Uhud) submitted to Baybars al-Jashnakir and to al-Nasir 
Muhammad by al-Mustakfi. As a consequence of the part which al-Mustakfi 
played against al-Nasir Muhammad during the reign of Baybars al-Jashnakir, 
al-Mustakfi suffered from being placed in a critical situation especially
■if we compare it with the powerful position of al-Nasir Muhammad.
Nevertheless, al-Nasir Muhammad was anxious to obtain the diploma
( cahd) at an official meeting in the presence of the judges for purposes
of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the Caliph,
at the time of al-Nasir Muhammad, was not allowed the right to refuse
to confirm the coming of a new Sultan into power and that he had to
be satisfied with being a Caliph with no political or social influence
but only a head of religious authority. The chapter contains an
analysis of the reasons for the unfriendly atmosphere surrounding the
intercourse between al-Nasir Muhammad and al-Mustakfi. The study of
• • *
the *Abbasid Caliphate during this period sheds light upon the 
personality of al-Nasir Muhammad, who used both.force and diplomacy 
to accomplish his great expectations in both the political and the 
religious fields.
The second chapter contains a detailed study of the administrative 
divisions of Egypt during this period, the importance of these divisions 
and the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad towards the local administration. 
The chapter comprises historical discussion respecting the regularity 
of the division, the financial resources and expenditure of every 
province (niyaba), a study of the administrative division of Egypt 
after the speedy accomplishment of the cadastral survey of Egypt and 
the redistribution of lands (the Nasiri rawk) which was carried out 
by al-Nasir Muhammad’s order in 715/1315- It then analyses the
Xbasic-division, the local administration of the different parts, the 
economic importance of the Egyptian provinces (aqalim), the Nasiri 
reforms at the provinces, how the Mamluk governors, especially the 
emirs, were responsible for preserving order within the cities and 
provinces and how the administrative division of Egypt into separate 
units increased the productivity of the land.
The third chapter concerns the continuous struggle for power 
between al-Nasir Muhammad and the Mamluk oligarchy, and the plots to 
overthrow al-Nasir Muhammad, their reasons, details and consequences. 
Subsequently one might say that there were factors which made it 
necessary for al-Nasir Muhammad to build a strong foundation for his 
rule and his state, his co-operative clique and large personal fortune. 
By studying the political situation one comes to see clearly that 
al-Nasir Muhammad was working all the time to confirm the reality of 
his being the only ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate, to extend his power 
over the oligarchy of emirs and to exercise both the legislative power 
and the executive power. Thus al-Nasir Muhammad practised a new 
political policy towards the power and the position of the oligarchy 
of emirs and took a different attitude towards the post of vicegerent 
in Egypt. Many useful functions were fulfilled by al-Nasir Muhammad 
for the benefit of the people, in order to be sure of his popularity. 
The chapter shows how far al-Nasir Muhammad succeeded in foiling the 
plots arranged by the powerful senior emirs to overthrow his rule, and
in directing administrative matters.
The fourth chapter recounts the conditions of the non-Muslim
subjects, the Christians and the Jews, who lived under Mamluk rule,
the relations between these communities and the Mamluk government,
the attitude of the Muslim Egyptians towards these communities and
the nature of this relationship. The chapter contains a study of
the western merchants, the active commercial relations between the
Mamluk Sultanate and the western world, the social conditions of both
the Jewish community and the Christian community, how far the dhimmis
suffered during the first and the second reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad,
how far that situation changed during his third reign when al-Nasir
Muhammad became his own master, the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad 
• ' • «
towards the dhimmis and how far they succeeded in having his support 
during critical times and fanatical reactions.
The fifth chapter concentrates on the relationship between the 
Mamluk government and the Bedouins throughout Egypt, the Bedouin 
revolts for independence, the Mamluk determination to dominate the 
Bedouins, and the occasional co-operation between them. The study 
sheds light upon the early contact between the Bedouin tribes and the 
Mamluk government during the period under consideration, the political 
and economic relationships between the two parties during this period, 
the continuous Bedouin revolts, al-Nasir Muhammad’s reaction and how* 9 0
far he was strict with them and how far they succeeded in achieving
.their aims.
The taxation system of Egypt during the period under review is 
the theme of the sixth chapter, including the cadastral survey of 
Egyptian land i.e. the Nasiri rawk and the subsequent abolition of taxes.
The chapter is devoted to give a clear picture of the taxation 
structure during the period under consideration, including the system 
of payment, the different kinds of taxes, the methods of the tax 
collectors and of the tax-farmers, the condition of the tax payers and 
eventually al-Nasir Muhammad's attitude towards each group.
Moreover the chapter includes a survey concerning the abolition of 
taxes which was undertaken by al-Nasir Muhammad in 715/1315* The 
abolition of taxes was a bold act carried into effect by a determined 
Sultan who wanted to protect his subjects from the maltreatment which 
they suffered at the hands of tax collectors and to provide social 
freedom for them; and in return he would have popularity among them 
and would enjoy their unfailing support. Al-Nasir Muhammad also paid 
much attention to both agriculture and irrigation. Finally it is 
imperative here to state that at the same time as al-Nasir Muhammad 
began his scheme of tax cancellation in 715/1315? work regarding the 
Nasiri rawk had already been started. In undertaking that essential 
work great changes would occur, both in the amount of State revenue and 
in the assignment of cultivated land.
-The seventh and last chapter at the same time deals with the 
famines and epidemics which occurred in Egypt during this period and 
the co-operation between al-Nasir Muhammad and the population of Egypt 
to overcome these crises. The chapter contains a study of the famines 
and epidemics before al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign, in order to 
achieve through that comparative study a comprehensive picture of the 
situation in Egypt during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad.
This study also allows one to understand the attitudes of the Mamluk 
historians in discussing these aspects of life.
There is also an historical analysis of trouble periods and their 
effect on internal affairs, and the political and economic structure. 
The study shows how deeply the instability of the annual flood of the 
Nile affected economic life (there were times of drought and of extra 
flood), and how the unstable political situation which occurred 
occasionally in Egypt during the period affected the prosperity of 
daily life. On the other hand through the comprehensive study of 
the co-operation between government and people during the trouble 
periods one perceives the extensive administrative discipline in the 
Mamluk regime during the reign.
At the end of each individual chapter conclusions have been 
presented, and at the end of the thesis there is an attempt to bring 
together the main points of these conclusions. From those general and 
final conclusions one can understand the true state of the internal 
affairs of Mamluk Egypt during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad.
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INTRODUCTION
In dealing with the internal affairs of al-Nafir Muhammad's
third reign it is imperative to give an historic survey of the
Mamluk Sultanate during his preceding reigns and to make a general
study of the whole situation in order to have an understanding
of the fundamental nature of the political, economic, social
and religious aspects of the Mamluk Sultanate during the first half
of the fourteenth century. Al-Na§ir Muhammad was elected Sultan
at the age of eight because his brother, al-Ashraf Khalil, was
murdered during a hunting expedition (12 Mutiarram 693/14 December
1293)* Therefore the election of the chief officers of state was
arranged by the leading emirs: Zayn al-ETn Kitbugha al-Man§uri^ as
vicegerent in Egypt (na’ib al-Saltana bi*l-diyar al-Migriyya) and
_ 2
*Alam al-Din San jar al-Shuja*i al-Man§urT as wazir. Consequently,
al-Nagir Muhammad b. Qalawun's Sultanate was nominal and power
3
passed to the oligarchy of emirs.
Within a short time jealousies arose, a clash developed and 
personal ambitions for political purposes clearly appeared between 
Kitbugha and Sanjar. The two desired to hold the reins during 
the nominal rule of al-Na§ir Muhammad. The personal struggle and 
open conflict ended by Sanjar's assassination while Kitbugha, who
"^For his biography, see Tali, fols. 6lb-62a; Durar, iii, 262-
264; Nu.ium, viii, 7, 8 , 42-43, 44-45, 49-50, 55-57, 58, 63-67;
Muluk, viii, 192-193, 203-205.
2
For his biography, see Tali, fols. 43b 44a.
•^ Masalik, fol. 132b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fol. 185b; Nuzhat,
fol. 22b; Mlsr, fols. 33a-b; Durrat, vol. 69b; Tadhkirat, 
fol. 11a; Muluk, viii,l84; Suluk, i, 794, 806; Khitat, iiii part 
177; Durar, iii, 262: iv, 144; Nujum, viii', 4l-^ 2*.
2was the victor, was confirmed in office. Some of the royal Mamluks
(the Burjiyya)'*' who supported Sanjar were punished; therefore
_ 2
Kitbugha became the most effective emir at the royal, court. Here
it could be asked how far Kitbugha aspired to the Sultanate? Was 
the personal clash between Kitbugha and Sanjar a matter of neces­
sity which occurred because the former assumed the formal leader­
ship of the Mamluk state? A few months later, Husam al-Din LachTn 
al-MansurT, the conspirator who plotted the murder of the previous 
Sultan, al-Ashraf Khalil, emerged from hiding and was graciously 
received and pardoned by al-Na§ir Muhammad for Kitbugha1 s sake. 
Therefore how far could the appearance of LachTn confirm the sug­
gestion previously mentioned concerning Kitbugha*s aspiration to 
the Sultanate? Accordingly, the Ashrafiyya rose in revolt, seized 
the royal stables and the armourers' market (suq al-silafr), 
plundered whatever lay at hand, and set fire to many buildings. Yet 
Kitbugha succeeded in defeating the rebels and tortured them to 
death. Thus the Ashrafiyya rebellion showed how far the factions 
were discontented with Lachin1s appearance and even that he enjoyed 
royal forgiveness.^
Ibn TaghrT Bird! analyzes the reasons for the Ashrafiyya1s 
revolt and says that: firstly, LachTn emerged free and attained
1
Concerning the conflict between the Turks' faction and the Bur- 
jiyya faction during the BaljrT period in the Mamluk Sultanate, see 
Hakim Amin *Abd al-Sayyid, Qiyam dawlat al-MamalTk al-thaniya,
Cairo, 1966, pp. 11-35.
2Masalik, fol. 132b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fols. l85b-l87a;
Nuzhat, fols. 23a-2^ fa; Misr, fols. 35b-35a; Zetersteen, 29-31; 
Durrat, fol. 70a; Muluk viii, 172, l8l-l82; *Ibar, v, part V, 
$76-877; Tashrlf, 272-281; Suluk, i, 800-802; Durar, iii, 262; 
iv, l44; Nujum, viii, -^2-46; cf. Malik, fol. ^lb.
^Masalik, fol. 132b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fols. l88a-bj Nuzhat, 
fols. 2^a-b; Misr, fol. 36a; Mukhtasar, iv, 31; Zetersteen, 32-33; 
*Ibar, v, part V, 8751 877; SulukV i, 803, 805-806; Nujum, viii,
. A8-^9. ....................................................................................................................................
3an honourable position at the royal court; secondly, Kitbugha's 
longing for supreme power became apparent.^ In addition it could 
be said that the Ashrafiyya were sympathetic with the weak position 
of al-Na§ir Muhammad, while the oligarchy of emirs enjoyed power.
The question arises here, how far Kitbugha would use the 
outbreak as an excuse for holding sovereignty? Was that rebellion 
the main cause of Kitbugha1s ambition to assume the reins of govern­
ment and the administration? The previous revolt by the Ashrafiyya 
made it clear that the political situation lacked stability to a 
considerable degree and that supreme power should be in the hands of 
a powerful politician and not in the hands of a Sulfan of eight years
of age. This is how Kitbugha explained the quandary to the oligarchy
2
of emirs, and LachTn influenced him strongly in this direction.
t
The questions which should be answered here are why LachTn supported 
and even encouraged Kitbugha to assume the reins of power? Was it 
only the necessity of the critical circumstances? Was it his fears 
of the Ashrafiyya1s anger? And how much did personal interest 
affect the part which LachTn played during that difficult time? Be­
sides, how far was Kitbugha1s intention to hold power affected by 
LachTn1s influence and support? Hence, we may estimate the whole 
position by saying that the oligarchy of emirs regarded these cir­
cumstances and the rule of a child Sultan as a temporary situation 
until a powerful emir should emerge to seize power and inaugurate 
a new reign, supported by the oligarchy of emirs, and encouraged by
^Nujum, viii, *t9; cf. Suluk, i, 792.
^Nuzhat, fols. 2^a-25a; Muluk, viii, 192-193; Suluk, i, 806.
Nujum, viii, ^9-
ka powerful faction.
Ibn Khaldun believes that both Sanjar's movement for supreme 
power and the Ashrafiyya's revolt were the reasons for which Kit­
bugha intended to take power, and his supporters influenced him 
greatly to put his plan into action.’*' Besides, it seems that 
these events showed the powerful position of Kitbugha, both at 
the royal court and in society; therefore he worked to accomplish 
his ambition in the governmental field. On 12 Mu^iarram 69^/3 December 
129^ - Kitbugha was elevated to the Mamluk Sultanate and succeeded 
in obtaining the assent of the Caliph al-Hakim (d. 701/1302), 
the judges, emirs and troops. It was only two days after
the Ashrafiyya's rebellion that Kitbugha attained his own accession 
as al-*£dil Kitbugha with complete official support.^
In accordance with this could we assume that Kitbugha was 
planning to be in power long before this political crisis and found 
in that situation fitting circumstances to accomplish his desire. 
Besides, how far does the previous event confirm the idea that 
the Mamluk had no respect for hereditary rights concerning the 
elevation to the Sultanate, especially during similar crises; how 
much does it show the emirs' desire for competent authority, and 
how often were conspiracies arranged to murder the Sultan or to 
depose him because of the greed of the emir oligarchy for higher 
rank or more powerful position in the government?
When Kitbugha ascended the throne he appointed Lachin vice­
gerent in Egypt, but Kitbugha was unfortunate in being, firstly,
* Ibar, v, Part V, 877.
2Infra, 31-32,
-^ Masalik, .fol* 133a- (Paris Ms.. 2328).; ■ Zubdat,- fol. l88b-; - Nuzhat, ■ •
fol. 23a; Tadhkirat,^ fol. lib; Muluk, viii, 193; Suluk, i, 806- 
807; 3>ararr"Iir, 262; Nu.jum, v m ,  h-9-30-
associated in the people's mind with a great famine and dreadful 
plague; secondly, Kitbugha shared power with Lachln.^
On 28 Mufrarram 696/26 November 1296 when Kitbugha was on 
his way back to Cairo from Damascus, where he had been for a short 
visit, he was attacked by his vicegerent Lachln with other con­
spirators, but Kitbugha managed to flee to Damascus with four or
five retainers, regretting what he had done for his vicegerent and
2
what he had received in return. Thus, for the purpose of seizing 
power, the principles of friendship, loyalty and sincerity weighed 
nothing during the period under study, and the Sultanate was re­
garded as a free heritage for the most powerful emir who could find 
a strong faction for support, and loyal Mamluk emirs for promotion, 
regardless of any political, religious or even moral considerations.
Moreover, the previous events show the danger which might 
come from the office of vicegerent (na*ib al-Saltan.a bi’l-diyar al- 
Migriyya), as well as its extreme importance. Al-Ashraf Khalil 
was murdered by his vicegerent, Badr al-DIn Baydara al-Mangurl; 
al-Nagir Muhammad was deposed, peacefully because of his youth, 
by his vicegerent Kitbugha, and Kitbugha himself was deposed, by 
force, by his vicegerent Lachln.
While Kitbugha was in Damascus persuading the emirs to swear 
allegiance to him, Lachln succeeded in elevating himself to the 
Sultanate.
Kitbugha heard of the recognition of his vicegerent as 
Sultanin Palestine and I^ypt, and the name of Lachln was prayed 
for on Friday. Therefore, Kitbugha announced his submission and
T-Masalik,^ fol. 133b (Paris, Ms. 2328); Nuzhat, fols. 23a-b; Misr, 
fols. 36b-37a. 38a; Malik . fol. 42a; Durrat. fol. 71b; Khabar, v 
’ 3-80; Muluk, viii, 193; Suluk, i, 806-807, 8l0; Khitat, iii, part 
II, -177; Durar, iii, 262, 263- iv, 144; Nujfrm,~viTrr 97-58.
M^ar.-alik, fol. 134a (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fol. 193b; Nuzhat, 
fol. 26a: Malik, fol. 42a; Migrj fol. 3;ki; Mir’at, iv, 228;
wrote to Lachln consulting him with regard to his position.^ It 
is a strange situation to see a Sultan give up his supreme position 
to a usurper without resistance and even agreeing to he a governor 
of a Mamluk province under his rival's command. Was it a question 
of preserving his life and liberty or a clever understanding of 
the actual circumstances with respect to existing political in­
stability? In addition to the fact previously mentioned that 
Kitbugha himself was a usurper, although he was too weak to fill 
the office of sovereignty, in practice, Lachln directed the affairs 
of state. Thus, on 10 Safar 696/8 December 1296, Lachln was elected 
to the Sultanate and appointed the former Sultan Kitbugha governor 
of the fortress of Sarkhad. Accordingly, Kitbugha left Damascus
with his family for Sarkhad after a period of two years and about
2
one month in the governorship of the Mamluk Sultanate.1
Subsequently Kitbugha administered the fortress of Sarkhad 
until al-Na§ir Muhammad, in his second reign, transferred him to 
the governorship of Hamah, where he continued to fulfil the duties 
of his office until his death in 702/1303.^ Therefore, could we 
assume that Kitbugha1s reaction was an approval given by a Mamluk 
Sulfan of the fact that the governorship of the Mamluk Sultanate 
was like a public domain? What were the reasons for the episode
^Masalik, fol. 134a (Paris Ms. 2328); Malik, fol. 26b; Suluk, i, 
824; Durar, iii, 262-263; Nujum, viii, 63-67.
^Masalik, fols. 134a-b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fols. 193b, 195a; 
Nuzhat, fol. 26b; Malik, fols. 42a-b; Misr, fols. 39a-b; Durrat, 
fol. 74b; Mir*at, iv, 228; Suluk, i, 824-826; KMtat, iii, part 
II, 177; Durar, iii, 263: iv, 144; Nujum, viii',' 67-68, 85.
^Nuzhat, fol. 26b; Durrat, fol. 83b; Durar, iii, 264.
7respecting Kitbugha1s deposition? In spite of Kitbugha1s weak 
personality and the typical aspect of the political instability 
of the period there were other reasons for which Kitbugha*s de­
position had to take place. Firstly, the greed and the personal 
ambition of the powerful emirs regarding the accession to the 
throne; therefore a series of conspiracies and assassinations 
occurred in the royal court in that period of political struggle. 
Secondly, the rise in prices, the famine and the plague, so that 
the poor starved to death, and the dead were lying in the streets;
therefore the people disliked Kitbugha.'1' Thirdly, the migration
2
to Syria of about ten thousand Oirat Mongol tribesmen and their 
families who were graciously welcomed by Kitbugha and his governors 
in the Syrian provinces, because Kitbugha was of Mongol origin, 
so that the oligarchy of emirs were jealous enough to hate Kit­
bugha and to resent his reign and to work for its end.*^  Fourthly, 
Kitbugha raised a large number of his Mamluks to be emirs and 
governors at the expense of the oligarchy of emirs who energetically
Nuzhat, fols. 25b, 27a; Malik, fol. ^2a; Misr, fol. 38a;
Mir'at, iv, 227-128; Durrat, fols. ’71a, 73a; Muluk,' viii, 193; 
Suluk, i, 807» 810; Khitat, iii, part II, 177; Durar, iii, 263; 
Nujum, viii, 37* 68.
2
For details about the Oirat immigration, see David Ayalon, "The 
Wafidiya in the Mamluk kingdom", Islamic Culture, xxv, 1931*
91-93.
^Zubdat, fols. 191b-192b; Mukhtasar, iv, 33; Muluk, viii, 203-203; 
*Ibar, v, part V, 878-879; Suluk, i, 8l2-8l3; Khitat, iii, part 
II, 177; Nujum, viii, 63.
8refused to accept this policy and hoped for his overthrow.^ Fifthly,
since Kitbugha himself was a usurper, the plot against him to take
power from his hands became easy for the conspirators who, as soon
as they found the circumstances suitable, planned to dethrone
Kitbugha. Sixthly, there is also Kitbugha's attitude towards the
emirs of high rank; he discharged some emirs from their offices
and did not treat the oligarchy of emirs as graciously as they had
2
been honoured by former Sultans. Hence, Kitbugha genuinely welcomed
Lachln, probably to gain his support when he accomplished his plan
concerning his elevation to the Sultanate, but, on the other hand,
it seems that Lachln himself was planning his own accession to the
throne and his help and support to Kitbugha was temporary until
he was able to take a decisive step with regard to his personal
3ambition to rule the Mamluk Sultanate. Furthermore, the accession 
of Lachln explains his extreme encouragement which Kitbugha enjoyed 
before he was elevated to the Sultanate because Lachln, probably, 
thought that to plot against a usurper could assist him in achieving 
success, while conspiring against a Sultan of a ruling family, contained 
a greater risk, especially if we know the sensitive position of Lachln 
at the royal court shortly before Kitbugha's accession. It appears 
that the above statement is correct and that Lachln longed to succeed 
to the throne; therefore he worked to a considerable degree to fit 
the situation to his political greed. It might be worth noting that, 
depending on the previous events, assoon as a new Sultan was elevated 
to the Mamluk Sultanate he started to appoint his Mamluks to import­
ant offices of state, making a large number of royal Mamluks emirs
^Zubdatj fol. l89a; Mukhtagar, iv, 3^; Zettersteen, 38-^0;
Suluk, i, 818-819.
2Zubdat, fol.‘192b....................
•2 _
For detailed description, see P.M.Holt,"The sultanate of al-Mansur 
Lachln (696-8/1296-9)"1 E.S.O.A.S., XXXVT, part >, 19V3i pp. >21-532.
9and dismissing the Mamluk emirs from their high offices and even in 
some cases confiscating their wealth. It was an important poli­
tical aspect which appeared with each rising of a new Sul£an to 
obtain the help and support which he would need to strengthen his 
position in order to face the oligarchy of emirs.
On 10 Safar 696/8 December 1296 Lachln^ was elected by his
supporters of the Mamluk emirs to the Sultanate and ruled for two
2 _ _
years and two months. Lachln appointed Shams al-DIn Qarasunqur al-
Manguri vicegerent in Egypt (na’ib al-Saltana bi *l-diyar al-Misriyya)
but, on 14 Dhu 'l-Qa'da 696/4 September 1297, Qarasunqur was arrested
_ 3 _ _
and Mankutamur, Lachln*s Mamluk, was nominated vicegerent in Egypt
(na’ib al-Saltana bi ’l-diyar al-Misriyya) and was allowed a free hand
if
to rule the affairs of state. This procedure could be put into 
action and continued without effect but, if we study the attitude 
of the oligarchy of emirs shortly before Lachln1s succession, we find 
that they gave Lachln their agreement to seize power on certain con­
ditions: firstly, Lachln must never try to attain a superior posi­
tion to theirs; secondly, the emirs would share the power and discuss
^For the biography of al-Mansur Husam al-Dln Lachln al-Man§uri, 
see Dhayl, fols. 43b-44a; Khabar, v, 386-387, 389-390; Muluk, 
viii, 222-223; ~‘lbar, v, part V, 879-882, 883-884, 883; Tashrlf, 
6 0, 71-72, 292-293; Suluk, i, 820-828, 829-830, 831, 832,"^833-B37» 
848-849, 832, 836-837* 839-863; Nujum, viii, 12, 1 7, 83, 92-99* 
101-109 , 224.
^Masalik, fols. 134a-b (Paris Ms. 2328); Nuzhat, fols. 27a-b;
Malik, fols. 42a-b; Misr, fols. 39a-b; Suluk, i, 823; Khitat, 
iii, part II, 177; Durar, iv, 144; Nujum, viii, 83; cf. Zubdat, 
fol. 194b.
■^ He was "mentioned by al-MaqrlzI, Suluk, i, 826-827* 829* 833*
834, 838, 843-844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 830, 832, 833, 836,
839, 861, 862, 863* 863* 866, 870, 871.
^Masalik, fol . 134b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fols. 194b, 201b;
Nuzhat, fols. 27a-b, 2.9a-b; Malik, fol. 42b; Misr, fol. 39b; Khabar, 
v, 3 86; Suluk, i, 823, 829, 843, 845* '846, 848, 852-855; KhTpTT"
-iii-, part- II, • 177 •; ■ Nujum, viii, 88, 91* 94, 95* 100-101..........
the affairs of state with him in the royal court, on the other 
hand he had no right to give his own Mamluks power or preference 
or instal them in the chief offices of state; thirdly, he ought 
not to give his Mamluk Mankutamur primacy over the oligarchy of 
emirs.'*' But soon, when Lachin felt the effectiveness of his ac­
cession, he demonstrated Mankutamur's ascendancy and allowed him
to exercise power. Furthermore, Lachin arrested a number of power-
2 _
ful emirs and banished others to the Syrian provinces. Lachin 
schemed to send al-Na§ir Muhammad to al-Karak and promised that 
as soon as al-Na§ir Muhammad was old enough he would put the power 
into his hands. If Lachin gave al-Nasir Muhammad the power im­
mediately this would provoke the oligarchy of emirs to plot against 
him. In return al-Na§ir Muhammad promised that he would put Damas­
cus under the control of Lachin when he returned to power. There-
3
fore al-Na^ir Muhammad left Cairo for al-Karak. The question 
arises here, what was Lachin1s aim in taking such procedure against 
al-Na§ir Muhammad, was he honest in his promise and would he put 
al-Na^ir Muhammad in a position of power when the latter came of 
age?
12ubdat, fols. 19*fb-193a; Nuzhat, fol. 27b; Suluk, i, 822; 
Nujum, viii, 99.
^Nuzhat, fols. 27b, 29b; Khabar, v, 386; *Ibar, v, part V, 88l,
882, 88*f; Suluk, i, 829,' 833-8371 832; Nujum, viii, 88, 89-90, 
96, 100.
^Zubdat, fol. 193s-; Nuzhat, fol. 27b; Durrat, fol. 73b; * Ibar,
v, part V, 88l; Suluk, i, 832-833; Durar, iv, l44-1^3.
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Lachin decided to make his Mamluk Mankutamur his successor 
so that he was second to the Sulfan, the Friday prayer would he 
delivered in the names of Lachin and Mankutamur, and their names 
would be inscribed together on coins.^ It seems that Lachin was 
not honest in his promise to al-Na^ir Muhammad that he would keep 
power for al-Nafir Muhammad, and this procedure concerning the 
sending of al-Nasir Muhammad to al-Karak was a preliminary step 
towards appointing Mankutamur the heir-apparent. It might be also 
that Lachin did this as a precaution, so that if the oligarchy of 
emirs acted against him, he would send for al-Na§ir Muhammad who 
would grant the governorship of Damascus to him, and was his 
attitude towards al-Na§ir Muhammad a preliminary proceeding for 
Lachin1s own sake.
Lachin made a cadastral survey of the quantity and value
—  2 _of the land of the country (al-rawk al-Husami). Therefore Lachin
succeeded in acquiring a large quantity of land, while the oligarchy
of emirs had the smallest share; consequently, the latter felt
great resentment. The emirs decided to be rid of Lachin and his 
_ 3
Mamluk Mankutamur, probably for the following reasons: firstly,
the land survey which he had undertaken; secondly, the arrest 
of many emirs; thirdly, Lachin allowed too great a power to his 
Mamluk Mankutamur, and his intention was that his Mamluk should 
succeed him; fourthly, Lachin became an autocrat. In consequence,
Ibar, v, part V, 882; Suluk, i, 833.
^Nuzhat, fols. 28a.b.; Malik, fol. *f2b; Misr, fol. 4lb; *Ibar, 
v, part V, 881-882; Suluk, i, 8^ 11—8^6; Nu.jum, viii, 91-93j 
98-101.
N^u.jum, viii, 98.
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the oligarchy of emirs, Sayf al-DTn KurjT and Sayf al-DTn Tugh.jT
who, precisely, organized and led the conspiracy, rose against him
1 2 and had him and his Marnlrkmurdered. Eventually the emirs thought
they would restore al-Nasir Muhammad to power,and theyappointed 
Sayf al-DTn Tugh.jT vicegerent in Egypt.^
The contemporary historian Baybars al-MansurT records in his 
work Zubdat al-Eikra that both Sayf al-DTn KurjT and Sayf al-DTn 
Tugh.jT thought they were entitled to assume power in the Mamluk Sul­
tanate, but the senior emirs rejected the idea and decided to sup-
k
port al-Nafir Muhammad and put him in power.
Al-MaqrTzT records the above statement of Baybars al-Man§urT 
but, on the other hand, al-MaqrTzT continues that TughriT and KurjT 
planned that the former would be the Sultan of the state and the 
latter vicegerent in Egypt; therefore the summons to al-Nagir 
Muhammad to come back to Cairo was delayed until l*f EabT*, II, 698/
19 January 1299 when the Cilician expeditionary force under Bak- 
tash al-Fakhri returned to Egypt.^ This might prove that the murder 
of the Sultan of the state and the accession of the killer afterwards was a 
common event in this period of political instability. Having had TughjI
Masalik, fol. 13^b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fol. 202a; Nuzhat, 
fols. 30a-b; Malik, fol. ^2b; Khabar, v, 386, 390; Mir'at, iv,
229; Durrat, fol. 77a; Suluk, i , 836-839; Khitat, iii, part II,
177; Durar, iv, Nujum, viii, 101-102.
^Masalik, fol. 13*fb (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fol. 202a; Nuzhat, 
fols. 30a-b; ' Malik, fol. 13^ -b; Khabar, v, 386, 390; Durrat, fol.
77b; Suluk, i, 837-878; Nujum, viii, 102-103.
^Masalik, fol. 13^b (Paris Ms. 2328); Nuzhat, fol. 30b; Suluk, i, 
803-886; Nujum, viii, 103; cf. Khabar, v, 386-387.
L
Zubdat, fols. 202a-203a.
^Suluk, i, 863-867.
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and KurjT murdered, Baktash al-Fakhri and the senior emirs wanted
2
to put an end to that series of conspiracies and assassinations.
It is worth noting that afterwards the emirs asked Baktash al- 
FakhrT to take power, but he refused the proposal and strongly
influenced the senior emirs in the direction of re-instating al-
3 _
Nagir Muhammad in Cairo. This attitude of Baktash al-Fakhri_ to­
wards a proposal made to him by the senior emirs clarifies the 
political situation of the royal court in the Mamluk Sultanate.
It was a continuous game of plots and murders so that a reasonable 
emir never tried to take part in this unstable situation, even if 
he had the offer from all the senior emirs to succeed to full 
sovereignty, because he knew that the acceptance of the offer would 
cost him his life sooner or later. Besides, it seems that there was 
distrust among the senior emirs at the royal Mamluk court; there­
fore the oligarchy of emirs had no confidence in each other's 
words or support. Subsequently the emirs elected among themselves 
a council of eight emirs to rule until the arrival of al-Na^ir
Muhammad. During this time they shared power. Accordingly those
4
emirs met frequently to discuss the affairs of state. Doubtless 
it was an important coup that several emirs of powerful position in 
the state acted as a collective regency, shared power and waited to 
put a young Sultan of fourteen years old in power. It is strange
■^ For his biography, see Durar, i, 480-481.
^Masalik, fol. 134b (Paris Ms. 2328); Zubdat, fol. 203a; Nuzhat', 
fols. 30b-31a; Malik, fol. 42b; Misr, fols. 44a-b; Suluk, i, 868-869; 
Nujum, viii, 104-105.
■z
Nujum, viii, 224.
Sflalik, fol. 42b; Suluk, i, 869.
1*f
that no one tried to hold power in these temporary circumstances; 
therefore, either they were equal in power so that it was impossible 
for any one of them to try to take control, or they realized that 
it was useless to attempt because, even if one of them succeeded 
in being elevated to the Sultanate, he would soon be dethroned or 
murdered by the others.
On l4 Jumada, I, 698/17 February 1299 al-Na§ir Muhammad arrived 
in Cairo and the affairs of state were put into his hands, with
Sayf al-DTn Salar^ as vicegerent (na’ib al-Saltana bi *l-diyar al-
2 _ 3Misriy.ya) and Baybars al-Jashnaklr as steward (ustadar). The
question arises here, why did the senior emirs decide to bring al- 
Na§ir Muhammad to Cairo and to instal him as Sultan? Did they be­
lieve that al-Nasir Muhammad had a legal claim to seize power, and 
was he entitled to the Sultanate? It seems that the oligarchy of 
emirs recalled al-Na§ir Muhammad to the throne because they 
acknowledged what they owed to his father, Qalawun (678-689/1279- 
1290), and his brother, al-Ashraf Khalil (689-693/1290-1293). Or 
it might be that it was only a temporary solution until a powerful 
emir took over the government, and the oligarchy of emirs assumed 
that al-Na§ir Muhammad's power would be nominal; therefore, they 
would enjoy competent authority. But if the above assumption is 
correct, how far would that political situation continue without 
causing dangerous dissatisfaction?
■^ For his biography, see Dhayl, fols. ^3a-b; Durar, ii, 179-182; 
Nujum, viii, 100, 103, 130, 160, 167, 170, 173, 173, 180, 233,
24o, 2^8, 230, 237, 270.
2
For his biography, see Dhayl, fols. 28a-b; Durar, i, 302-307;
Nujum, viii, ^6 , 100, 132-133, 157-160, 167, 171, 173, 200, 202, 
222-223, 226-227.
^Masalik, fol. 13^b (Paris Ms 2328); Zubdat, fol. 203b; Nuzhat, 
fol. 31b;' Malik, ' fol. ^2b; ' Misr; fols; hZb-kka.] ■ Durrat,- fol. -77-a;- 
Suluk, i, 872-873; Khitat, iii, part II, 177; Durar, i, 503; 
iv, 1^5; Nujum, viii7ll5-ll6.
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Soon after al-Na§ir Muhammad's return to Cairo a war broke 
out between the Mamluk Sultanate and the II-Khan. On 27 Rabi', I, 
699/22 December 1299» in Wadi al-Khazindar in Syria, the Mamluks 
were defeated and the Mongols succeeded in entering Syria. Shortly 
after, the Mongols left Syria and returned to Persia.^ Presumably 
the Mamluks1 defeat was due to the internal disputes among the 
oligarchy of emirs, so that the military force was weakened owing 
to political instability.
Then the Caliph al-Hakim bi Amr Allah A^mad b. *Aii died, 
and his son Abu al-Rabi* Sulayman succeeded him on 29 Jumada, I,
701/26 January 1302, and the Khutba of Friday prayer was delivered
2 _ 
in the latter's name. However, the condition of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate in this period will be studied in detail. Two years 
later, on 2 Ramadan 702/20 April 1303i another war broke out be­
tween the Mamluks and the II-Khan in Marj Rahi£, and the latter
were defeated. The Mamluks succeeded in winning and consolidated
3 _
their power. Some of the Oirat Mongol tribesmen (al-*T7yratiy.ya)
organized a conspiracy to murder both Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars
al-Jashnakir and to return Zayn al-DTn Kitbugha to power, but the
conspirators failed and were arrested.
■^ For details, see Masalik, fols. 133a—b (Paris Ms. 2328); Nuzhat, 
fols. 31b-33b; Malik, fol. 43b; Misr, fols. 45a-46b; Durrat, 
fol. 7 8; Tadhkirat, fol. 12a; Suluk, i, 879* 882-902; Durar, iv, 
143; Nujum/ viii, 117-130.
^Masalik, fol. 136b (Ms. Paris 2328); Malik, fol. 44a; Misr, fol. 
47a; Durrat, fols. 8lb, 82a; Nujum, viii, 147-149.
^Masalik, fols. 136b-137b (Paris Ms. 2328); Dhayl, fols. 4a-8b; 
Nuzhat, fols. 33a, 35a; Malik, fols. 44a-45a; Misr, fol. 48a; 
Durrat, fols. 82b-83a; Tadhkirat, fol. 13a; Suluk, i, 930-939;' 
Durar, iv, 145; Nujum, viii, i^/-l66.
Sflalik, fols. 43a-b; Misr, fol. 43a; Suluk, i, 883-883.
There is another factor which throws light upon the internal 
political situation in this period. It is al-MaqrTzT's statement 
that al-Nasir Muhammad was a figurehead and that the real power 
was in the hands of the oligarchy of emirs; Sayf al-DTn Salar 
and Baybars al-Jashnaklr who held the reins in their hands, pre­
vented al-Na§ir Muhammad from drinking or eating what he liked, 
allowed him only a little sum of money for his personal expenditure 
and put nothing at his disposal,neither power nor money, while 
they administered the affairs of state with full power.^
Ibn Hajar confirms al-MaqrlzT’s record and adds that the 
second Sultanate of al-Na$ir Muhammad was but nominal. Sayf al-DTn
Salar and Baybars al-JashnakTr exercised competent authority over
2 ~
al-Na§ir Muhammad and governed the Mamluk Sultanate.
Moreover, al-MaqrTzT records that al-Nasir Muhammad was in 
straitened circumstances and was continuously short of money; 
therefore he borrowed money from the merchants and the rich in society 
Accordingly, al-Na§ir Muhammad was in a critical situation 
and the oligarchy of emirs put him in power in order to enjoy the 
opportunity of wielding authority. That was the main 
reason for which the oligarchy brought al-Nagir Muhammad to Cairo.
They wanted him to rule the Mamluk Sultanate for the second time, 
but only as a nominal head. It appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad hoped
^Suluk, i, 879; see also Nuzhat, fols. 35a, 36a. 
^Durar, i, 505 '• iii» 263.
3Suluk, i, 879.
Vto take over the government, but to no effect. Consequently,
_ i
al-Nafir Muhammad plotted with Baktamur al-Jukandar to be rid 
of Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars al-Jashnaklr, and the royal 
Mamluks helped and supported the young Sultan. But Sayf al-DTn 
Salar and Baybars al-Jashnaklr were informed and succeeded in 
foiling the plot. Yet great disturbances occurred in Cairo, 
markets were closed and troops surrounded the Citadel of Cairo;
therefore, al-Na§ir Muhammad announced his readiness to resign
2 « from the Sultanate. When the public of Cairo, al-*ammah, knew
about the plot, the fears of al-Na§ir Muhammad and his readiness
to resign, they went to the doors of the Citadel of Cairo in
a storm of applause, showing their support for al-Na§ir Muhammad
against Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars al-JashnakTr, who became
aware of al-Na§ir Muhammad's popularity and of the gravity of the
3 _
situation. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Mamluk
Sultanate, the public of Cairo's support emerged. The public of
Cairo, al-*ammah, wanted to strengthen al-Na^ir Muhammad's position
against the powerful emirs who held the reins. Accordingly, they
showed their disapproval by calling the name of al-Na§ir Muhammad
and refused to draw off when the official troopers (MamalTks)
attacked them. Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars al-JashnakTr realized
^Infra, 108-112.
p
Dhayl, fol. 136b; Nuzhat, fols. 33a-36a; Suluk, ii, 33-36; 
Nujum, viii, 170-173.
^Suluk, ii, 33-36; Nu.jum, viii, 173-17^.
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that it was to no effect to use force; therefore they tried 
diplomacy; they told the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, that 
peace had been restored in the Citadel of Cairo, things were 
straightened out and there was no need to worry about al-Na§ir 
Muhammad who was safe and in good spirits.^ Here it is imperative 
to study the attitude of the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, towards 
the ruling class: firstly, the appearance of the support of the
populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, for the Sultan who, probably, en­
joyed a popular position among his subjects; secondly, the oli­
garchy of emirs knew that there was the populace of Cairo, al- 
*ammah, who desired stable rule and longed to see the end of this 
series of plots and murders; thirdly, the oligarchy of emirs,
especially Sayf al-Din Salar and Baybars al-Jashnaklr, took account 
» 1
of the attitude of the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, when they failed 
to subject them to their authority and to return matters to normal 
by force; fouthly, al-Na§ir Muhammad became certain of his popu­
larity among the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah; therefore how 
far would al-Na§ir Muhammad use this factor for his personal and
political interests? According to al-Na§ir Muhammad's demand
_ 2
Baktamur al-Jukandar was sent out of Egypt. Some of the royal
Mamluks (al-khassakiyya) were accused by Sayf al-DTn Salar and 
Baybars al-JashnakTr of taking a main part in this sedition, therefore
^Suluk, ii, 35-36; Nujum, viii, 173-17^. 
2
Suluk, ii, 36; Nujum, viii, 17^.
they were sent to Jerusalem, but al-Na§ir Muhammad strongly intended
i
to return his Mamluks to Cairo and succeeded in fulfilling this.
desire.^ Because of the previous events an important question
should be asked with regard to the ruling situation in the Mamluk
Sultanate; that is, whether it was ruled by the oligarchy of
emirs, precisely Sayf al-Din Salar and Baybars al-Jashnakir?
Al-Na§ir Muhammad was only a figurehead of the Mamluk state and,
in time, his condition became worse; he was in great need of money
and on bad terms with the oligarchy of emirs, mainly Baybars al-
2
JashnakTr, so that he refused to sign the government bonds.
Consequently Sayf al-DIn Salar, Baybars al-Jashnakir and other
emirs of high offices feared that al-Nagir Muhammad might arrange
another conspiracy to get rid of them.^
At the same time, party spirit ran high between Sayf al-
Din Salar and his supporters, the independent emirs, and his rival
Baybars al-Jashnakir and his faction the Burjiyya. The personal
struggle for power became an open conflict, each of the two emirs
desired to have the governorship of the Mamluk Sultanate at the ex-
b
pense of the other. Thus the personal political competition be­
came part of the factional conflict for supreme power. It seems 
that it became impossible to hide that personal and party rivalry 
during a period in which the position of the Sultan was weakened 
to a considerable degree, and the relationship between the Sultan 
and the oligarchy was no longer friendly even outwardly.
^Suluk, ii, 35-36,37; Nu.ium, viii, 173.
p
Dhayl, fol. 136b; SalafrTn, fols. 70a-72a; Nuzhat, fols. 36a,
37b; Durar, iv, l*+5‘, Nu.ium, viii, 175.
^Suluk, ii, 37.
^Zubdat, fol. 252a; Suluk, ii, 22-23, 23-26, 37-38; Durar, i, 50^.
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Eventually, on 10 Shawwal 708/23 March 130^, on the pre­
text of making the pilgrimage, al-Na§ir Muhammad left Cairo, 
retired to al-Karak and announced his resignation from the throne.
For him it was a necessary step which had to be undertaken as he 
was deprived of all hand in the affairs of state, while Sayf al- 
DTn Salar and Baybars al-Jashnaklr had taken over the government.
Thus the second Sultanate of al-Na$ir Muhammad, which lasted ten 
years, five months and ten days, was ended.^
Here it is imperative to study the writings of the contemporary 
historians with regard to al-Na§ir Muhammad*s abdication. Baybars 
al-MansurT records that, as soon as al-Na§ir Muhammad arrived at 
al-Karak, he sent a letter to Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars al-
JashnakTr 'concerning his resignation from the Sultanate and asked
2 _them to take over the government. Ibn Taghn BirdT repeats the
_ 3
above statement of the contemporary historian Baybars al-Mangun.
But, on the other hand, another contemporary historian gives 
different information with respect to al-Na§ir Muhammad's letter 
to Sayf al-DTn Salar and Baybars al-JashnakTr. Ibn al-DawadarT 
states that al-Nagir Muhammad had to resign, although it was against 
his will. Moreover al-Nasir Muhammad did not write .or send that 
letter renouncing the throne to the oligarchy of emirs. This 
letter was written by Aydamur al-Dawada.r (d. 776/137^)^ *Ala*
^Masalik, fol. 138b (Paris Ms. 2328); Dhayl, fol. l49a; Zubdat, 
fols. 26la-b, 262a; Mukhtagar, iv, 3^33; Nuzhat, fols. 36a-37b; 
Malik, fol. V?b; Misr, fols. 32a-b; Salatln, fols. 72a-7Vb; Durrat, 
fol. 90b; Suluk, ii, ^3-^3; Khitat, iii, partII, 177; Durar, iv, 
143-1^6; Nu.ium, viii, 176-179.
^Zubdat, fol. 262a.
N^u.ium, viii, 179.
4 . iFor his biography, see Durar, i, 429.
al-Din *Ali b. A^ imad b. al-Athir (d# 730/1329)^ in the name
2
of al-Nafir Muhammad without his knowledge. Thus two different 
statements are given by two contemporary historians, Baybars al- 
Manguri and Ibn al-Dawadari. Not much need be said about the 
difficulties which al-Na§ir Muhammad suffered at the hands of 
the oligarchy of emirs, mainly Sayf al-Din Salar and Baybars al- 
Jashnaklr ; therefore al-Nasir Muhammad left Cairo for the purpose 
of giving up his position as governor of the Mamluk Sultanate. 
Furthermore, 'Ala' al-Din*Ali b. Abroad b. al-Athir, who is accused 
by Ibn al-Dawadari of writing that false letter, held high office 
at the royal court of al-Na§ir Muframmad in his third reign and 
was the confidential secretary (katib al-sirr) of al-Na§ir
■z
Muhammad until his death in 730/1329. Accordingly, one might 
say that that resignation from the Sultanate had been undertaken 
by al-Na§ir Muhammad himself, although he was forced to take that 
decisive step because the situation at the royal court and in the 
government was hard to bear. Consequently, the office of the 
Sultanate became vacant,and when Sayf al-Din Salar was asked by
the oligarchy of emirs to seize power he refused and suggested
k 5that Baybars al-Jashnakir be in power.
After this review of political struggle and ruling rivalry
at the royal Mamluk court during the early years of the fourteenth
■*"For his biography, see Durar, iii, 1^—16.
I "
2Purr, ix, 157-153.
^Durar, iii, 14-15.
bFor Baybars al-Jashnakir1s reign, see Suluk, ii, ^5-71; Nujum, 
viii, 252-277.
^Nuzhat, fol. 38a; Nujum, viii, 235............................
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century, we may find this attitude of Sayf al-Din Salar strange 
because we know about his unfriendly relationship with al-Na§ir 
Muhammad and how he deprived al-Nasir Muhammad of power both 
in the government and at the royal court. Sayf al-DIn Salar 
held a high office in the Mamluk Sultanate and his position at 
the royal court was powerful to a considerable extent, yet he re­
fused to hold supreme power. Seemingly Sayf al-DIn Salar, who was 
always eager for power, refused that proposition because he was 
not sure of his powerful position, or he might have thought that his 
status was not powerful enough to guarantee him the dominant 
position. Besides Salar was not prepared to accept what the sup­
reme power and the ruling responsibilities provided. In addition 
the power was in the hands of the oligarchy of emirs, and Sayf 
al-I£n Salar was afraid that his accession might rouse dangerous 
dissatisfaction. Moreover, there was Baybars al-Jashnaklr, 
his powerful position and his supportable faction, the Burjiyya; 
what would be their reaction towards Salar*s acceptance of power? ' 
Furthermore, it appears that Sayf al-ETn Salar knew that even if 
he elevated himself to the Sultanate, it would be only for a short 
time and his reign would end by a plot to depose him. It could 
be also that Sayf al-DIn Salar suspected that the Burjiyya might 
revolt against his rule because they desired to see their master 
Baybars al-Jashnakir in power. Furthermore, what about al-Nasir 
Muhammad and the possibility that one day he might plan to return 
to take power, which meant difficulties would appear, and then Salar 
would have to face a hard situation. This thought might have 
crossed Sayf al-DIn's mind especially as Salar was aware of the 
political difficulties which had occurred during the reigns of
23
Kitbugha and Lachln and had witnessed al-Na§ir Muhammad's re­
turn to the throne to rule for a second time.
Moreover, it might be that Sayf al-DTn Salar was an understand­
ing and reasonable politician and his cognizance of the political 
condition in the Mamluk Sultanate was deep to a considerable ex­
tent, especially as Salar was a man of experience and had lived 
through that continuous struggle for power and had even had a great 
part in it. Therefore, Sayf al-DTn Salar thought and decided to 
refuse the governorship of the Mamluk Sultanate for the sake of 
his life and liberty and even for the sake of his political posi­
tion at the royal court. In other words, he was probably sure 
that he would be safer if he continued to live as a powerful emir 
than as the ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate. Yet even when Baybars 
al-JashnakTr was elected by the Mamluk emirs to the Sultanate,
Sayf al-DTn Salar rejected the idea of holding the office of vice­
gerent in Egypt (na’ib al-Saltana bi *l-diyar al-Misriyya). But, 
when Baybars al-JashnakTr put Sayf al-DTn Salar's acceptance of 
that office as a condition to be fulfilled, then Sayf al-DTn 
Salar accepted the vicegerency in Egypt, especially as the emirs 
urged him to do so.'*'
The contemporary historian, Baybars al-Man^urT, mentions that
Baybars al-JashnakTr was always longing to be in power, and he
had already planned secretly that he, his faction the Burjiyya
and his supporters would co-operate to fulfil that desire concern-
2
ing Baybars's elevation to the Sultanate.
^Nu.jum, viii, 233.
2Zubdat, fol. 263b.
On 23 Shawwal 708/3 April 1309 the accession of Baybars al- 
Jashnakir was accomplished and on 29 Shawwal 708/11 April 1309 
the khutba of Friday prayer in Cairo was delivered in the name 
of Baybars al-Jashnaklr. Subsequently the latter give al-Nasir 
Muhammad authority over al-Karak.^
There were some important aspects concerning Baybars al- 
Jashnakir' s reign. Firstly, the governors, Shams al-DIn Qara­
sunqur of Aleppo, Sayf al-Din Qabjaq of Hamah and Asandamur of 
Tripoli refused to give their oath of allegiance (hilf al-wala*) 
to Baybars al-Jashnakir who failed to exact that oath from them 
until al-Na^ir Muhammad interfered and persuaded them to swear 
to Baybars al-Jashnakir. Accordingly could we understand from 
this that al-Na^ir Muhammad regarded his stay in al-Karak as in-
t
definite? Would al-Karak be the last residence of al-Na$ir Muham­
mad? Could we understand from al-Na§ir Muhammad’s last attitude 
towards his loyal friends, the governors of the Syrian provinces, 
with regard to their attitude towards Baybars al-Jashnakir, that 
al-Nasir Muhammad gave up his position in the governorship of the 
Mamluk Sultanate for ever, and would never go back on his word?
How far would al-Na§ir Muhammad be effected by the situation of 
the Syrian governors? And how far would he use the attitude of 
the Syrian governors for his personal interest? The second aspect
^Masalik, fol. 138b (Paris Ms. 2328); Dhayl, fols. 1^9a-130a; 
Zubdat, fols. 263b-267a; Nuzhat, fols/ 38a-b; Malik, fol. 43a; 
Misr, fols. 32a-33a; Salatinfols. 77a-78a; Durrat, fol. 90a; 
Suluk, ii, ^3-^71 ^8 ; Durar, i, 303: iv, l46; Nu.ium, viii,
180-181, 232-233.
2For details, see Nuzhat, fols. 38b-4la; Nujum, viii, 236-2^2.
respecting Baybars al-Jashnakir1s rule was the attitude of the 
populace of Cairo towards Baybars al-Jashnakir. In reality Bay­
bars al-Jashnakir wasnot popular among the populace of Cairo who 
were tired and weary of Baybars al-Jashnakir and Sayf al-DTn 
Salar.^
This situation reminds us of the attitude of the populace of 
Cairo, previously mentioned, towards al-Na§ir Muhammad when they
2stood with him and supported him against the oligarchy of emirs.
The third aspect of Baybars al-Jashnakir's rule was al-Nasir Muham­
mad's co-operation with the governors of the Syrian provinces.
This coup which had emerged unexpectedly and which was followed
by a series of preparations with regard to al-Na^ir Muhammad’s
3
second restoration to the throne badly affected the relationship
If
between him and Baybars al-Jashnakir.
Fourthly, the appearance of the greed and hatred among Bay­
bars al-Jashnakir's faction the Burjiyya against Sayf al-Din Salar's 
supporters. Besides, some emirs left Cairo for al-Karak to join 
al-Nagir Muhammad and to help him to return to Cairo and hold power.
^Nuzhat, fol. 4la; Suluk, ii, 35; Durar, i, 306; Nu.ium, viii, 244. 
2„Supra, 17^19.
3Infra, 27.
L
Dhayl, fols. 139b-l60a; Zubdat, fols. 269a-270a; Mukhtasar, iv, 36 
Nuzhat, fols. 4la-42b; Salatin, fols. 8la-82b; Suluk, ii, 36-39; 
Nu.ium, viii, 243-247; 236-237.
^Dhayl, fols. 139a-b; Zubdat, fol. 268b; Nuzhat, fols. 42b-43a;
Malik, fol. 46a; Misr, fols. 33h-34a; Salatin, fols. 78a-79b, 80b-
8la; Suluk, ii, 33» 39-61; Durar, i, 303; Kujum, viii, 247-230,
_ _ _  ' 1
Ibn TaghrT Bird! suggests that al-Na§ir Muhammad was always 
thinking and planning to fulfil his determination regarding his 
position in the governorship of the Mamluk Sultanate."*" The situ­
ation both in Cairo and al-Karak developed to a considerable ex­
tent so that al-Nagir Muhammad was militarily ready to march into 
Egypt to face Baybars al-JashnakTr with force, while a great part
of the Mamluk army left Cairo for al-Karak to support al-Na^ir 
2Muhammad. Baybars al-Jashnakir found himself in a difficult 
situation and the circumstances worsened so that he sought for a
new source of support; this was when Baybars al-Jashnaklr ob-
3 4tained a second diploma from the Caliph al-Mustakfl. But it
seems even this was not enough to give Baybars al-JashnakTr the
help and support he needed. Eventually al-Na§ir Muhammad left al-
Karak for Damascus and he entered the city on 12 Sha'ban 709/12
January 1310. When Baybars al-JashnakTr left Cairo he did not
know even where to go, while al-Na§ir Muhammad arrived at Cairo
on 16 Ramadan 709/17 February 1310. Immediately after he received
a letter from Baybars al-JashnakTr informing him of his resignation
from the Sultanate and asking al-Nasir Muhammad to give him the
governorship of the Syrian province Sahyun.^ Again the populace of
1Nujum, viii, l8l. 
p
Dhayl,fols. l6la-l62a; Zubdat, fols. 270b-271a; Nuzhat, fol.
'43a; 'ibar, v, part V, 907, 9 08; Suluk, ii, 63, 67; Nu.ium, 
viii, 239-261.
3
^Infra, 32-33.
L
Salatin, fol. 89b; Suluk, ii, 64-66; Durar, i, 303-308; Nu.ium, 
viii, 262-263; Husn, ii, 112-113.
^Dhayl, fols. l6la-l63a; Malik, fols. 46a-b; Misr, fols, 34a-b; 
Salatin, fols. 82b-84a; Durrat, fols. 91b-92a; Suluk, ii, 68-72; 
Khitat, iii, part II, 177; Durar, i, 306; Nujum, viii, 264-271; 
Cf. TTasalik,' fol. 139b'(Paris Ms. 2328)........................
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Cairo, al-*ammah, showed that they were tired of Baybars al-
Jashnakir and announced frankly their weariness of his rule.'1'
Thus the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad began and, on 19
Ramadan 709/20 February 1310, the khutba of Friday prayer was de-
2
livered in his name. Although al-Na^ir Muhammad promised Bay­
bars al-Jashnakir forgiveness and the governorship of Sahyun,
3
he strangled him soon after his arrest. As to Sayf al-Din
Salar's affair, we will deal with this in detail in a later chap- 
if
ter. But, briefly, it could be said that Sayf al-Din Salar was 
arrested by al-Na^ir Muhammad shortly after the latter1s accession
_ c
and died of hunger in his prison in Jumada, I, 710/September 1310.
Al-Maqrizi cites that when Shams al-Din Qarasunqur and Bahadur 
A§ capture^ Baybars al-Jashnakir, Bahadur As suggested that it 
might be useful to keep Baybars al-Jashnakir alive and to send him 
to Sahyun to hold the governorship there, so that if al-Na§ir 
Muhammad changed his friendly attitude towards them, they would 
be able to use Baybars al-Jashnakir against him and support Baybars 
al-Jashnakir to seize power. But Shams al-Din Qarasunqur rejected 
the idea. Afterwards, when Shams al-Din Qarasunqur knew about al- 
Nasir Muhammad's determination to arrest Shams al-Din Qarasunqur,
^Suluk, ii, 70; 71; Durar, i, 306; Nu.ium, viii, 2^, 270, 271.
2
Masalik, fols. 139a-b (Paris Ms. 2328); Dhayl, fol. 163a; Malik, 
fols. 46b-A-7a; Misr, fols.3^b-36b; SalatinT""fols. 8 f^a-86b;
Durrat, fol. 92a; Suluk, ii, 68-71; Nujum, viii, 272-27^.
^For details, see Masalik, fol. 139b (Paris Ms. 2328); Misr, fol. 
6 -^a; Suluk, ii, 78-8I; Durar, i, 306-307; Nujum, viii, 272- 
273; cf. Durrat, fol. 92.
k
Infra, 102-103.
^Zaman, iv, fols. l89a-191a; Durrat, fol. 93b; Turkiyya, fols.
- 2<6b-27b; ■ T-hamTnv fols. - 128b-130a; • Tall, • fol; ^3a; ■ Mawrid4 37-^ 38.'
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the latter regretted his previous rejection, and marched towards
Damascus instead of Cairo for the sake of his liberty.^" Ibn
_ _ 2
Taghri Birdi repeats this statement by al-Maqrizi. In these
political circumstances al-Na§ir Muhammad began his third reign 
in Ramadan 709/February 1310 and ruled the Mamluk Sultanate for 
thirty-two years until he died on 21 Dhu -,1-Hij'ja 7^1/7 June 
l$kl at the age of sixty.
From an examination of the material summed up above, we reach 
the following conclusions:
(i) Daring the military rule which was established by the Mamluks 
and which continued throughout their long reigns, the throne was 
the prize of personal prowess, courage and daring although the 
reigning Sultan had always to have an open eye and a strong body­
guard. He also had to be conscious and aware of the oligarchy of 
emirs; then he would be able to carry out his work. Only with 
force did the oligarchy of emirs accept the principle of the here­
ditary monarchy. Thus al-Nafir Muhammad, because of his strong 
personality, succeeded in making that principle respected by the 
emirs although the situation was difficult for him because every 
emir had his own body-guard. Also, the Mamluks secured the approval 
and blessing of the 'Abbasid Caliph for their authority.
(ii) The oligarchy of emirs or the ruling class in the Mamluk 
Sultanate never acknowledged the hereditary right to govern.
^Suluk, ii, 80.
p
Nujum, viii, 27^ -.
^Masalik, fols. 139b, lA-9a-b; Suluk, ii, 72, 307; Khitat, iii, 
part II, 177-173.
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(iii) The oligarchy of emirs changed their allegiance from one, 
the present Sul Jan, and elected another because the power was in 
their hands.
(iv) The newly elected Sultan received official authority from 
the Caliph (*ahd).
(v) The deposed Suljan accepted the situation and became only
a provincial governor of the Mamluk territory if the circumstances 
demanded that situation, as happened with Kitbugha.
(vi) There was always a struggle for power among the oligarchy 
of emirs.
(vii) There was the office of vicegerency which was as important 
as it was dangerous.
(viii)The ruling classes were divided into three groups: the
Sul Jan, the Mamluk emirs and the Mamluk soldiers (a.jnad al-Halqa).
(ix) The ruling class was extremely wealthy and they always left 
vast sums of money when they died.
(x) There was always personal ambition to take possession of 
the throne, and the oligarchy of emirs worked to accomplish that 
aim without paying any consideration to the heir of the ruling 
family and did not keep their word with regard to that ruler.
(xi) Sometimes circumstances aided a powerful emir to rule and 
his diplomacy and his political acumen helped him to rule, as 
happened with al-Nagir Muhammad when he govemoed for the third 
time.
(xii) The SulJan would be the head of the state as soon as he had 
sufficient power to impose himself.
(xiii)There was political rivalry among the emirs and al-Na§ir 
Muhammad exploited this rivalry to his own ends.
(xiv) Although the populace of Cairo (al-‘ammah) succeeded in 
showing their joy when a new Suljan came to power and another 
Suljan, whom they hated, was deposed or executed, their position 
and attitude had no deep effect on the political situation in 
the Mamluk Sultanate.
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Chapter I 
THE * ABBASTD CALIPHATE
(i) The relation between al-Nagir Muhammad and al-MustakfT
Under different circumstances al-Ma§ir Muhammad succeeded in
ascending the throne for the third time. His feelings were unfriendly
towards the contemporary Caliph, al-MustakfT bi Allah Abu al-Rabl'
Sulayman,^ because of the latter's support for the last usurper of
power, Baybars al-JashnakTr. That feeling may be clearly illustrated
by al-Nagir Muhammad's words to the Caliph soon after his successful
arrival from al-Karak at Cairo, when al-Na§ir Muhammad snapped rudely
at the Caliph: "How could you come and shake hands with a khari.jT?
Am I a khari.jT and Baybars of 'Abbasid's descent?" The Caliph,
2
shocked by this attitude, kept silent. This situation gives us 
a fundamental idea of the nature of the unfriendly relations between the 
religious head of the Muslims and the ruler of the Mamluk Sultanate. 
There are many aspects of their relations to be taken into account: 
firstly, the acceptance of the new political position of the Mamluk 
regime, without any objection by the Caliph or obligation on the 
part of the Sultan; secondly, the ignoring of the *ahd which had 
been given by the Caliph to Baybars al-JashnakTr; thirdly, the lack 
of interest in having official support from the Caliph for the new 
Sultan.
The question which should therefore be answered here is, who was 
this particular Caliph? Abu al-RabT* Sulayman b. al-^akim bi-Amr
^For his biography, see -Durar, ii,
2Suluk, ii, 73; Nu.jum, ix, 8.
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Allah b. al-*Abbas A^ jnad b. AbT AIT al-gasan was born in Muiiarram 683/
March 128^ - in Baghdad. He moved with his father to Cairo during the
reign of al-Zahir Baybars (638-676/126O-I277) to be Caliph with the
title of al-MustakfT in the place of his father, al-Hakim bi Amr
Allah, in 701/1301 at twenty years of age, after the death of his
father and during the second reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad.^ Moreover,
al-MustakfT was fortunately to enjoy a close friendship with al- 
2
Na§ir Muhammad. On the other hand, al-Na§ir Muhammad was careful 
to have *ahd from al-MustakfT when the latter ascended to the Caliph­
ate in 701/1301, although al-Nasir had already obtained a charter
3of the same kind from the late Caliph.
The two bravely led the Mamluk troops to save the Syrian prov­
inces from the Mongol attack in 702/1302.^ It seems that al-Na§ir 
Muframmad thought of the spiritual help which the soldiers would need 
at that difficult time, and it would not be available without the 
presence of the Caliph on the field of battle. This friendship was 
ended when al-Nagir Muhammad decided to resign, thinking that resignation 
would be more suitable for him than being a monarch without competent 
authority. On the other hand, the Caliph had to accept the change
and nominate Baybars al-Jashnakir to be the new SultSn of the Mamluk
5 6state in 708/1308. It appears that the *ahd which Baybars al-.JashnakTr
^Durr, ix, 79; Zettersteen, 103-7*, Nah.j, iii, 78-80; Mir* at, , iv, 233; 
Bida.ya, xiv, 187; Tadhkira, fol. 121a; Durra_t^f01.242b; Subh, iii,
2£>3: Badr, fol. 39b; ~Khulafa*, 484*
2Khulafa’, kS7.
•^Zettersteen, 106; Husn, ii, 67.
L
Khulafa’,
5
Nu.jum, viii, 232-233; Husn, ii, 112.
S^ub^ i, x, 68-73. ...................................................
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succeeded in obtaining was not sufficient to give his reign the 
legitimacy which he had desired, or perhaps not sufficient to stand 
against the aim of al-Na§ir Muhammad to be the effective ruler of 
the Mamluk Sultanate for the first time, and not its nominal head, 
as he had already been twice. Baybars al-JashnakTr, realizing the 
situation, tried to get aid from the religious head of the Muslims 
for a second time, either not realizing that the Caliph's authority 
no longer had any kind of effectiveness, or unable to find another 
source of support. Consequently, Baybars al-JashnakTr eagerly pro­
cured another diploma (*ahd) from al-MustakfT bi Allah, not only 
nominating Baybars as the only Sultan of the kingdom who should be 
obeyed and respected, but also under estimating al-Na§ir Muhammad's 
preparations for his coming to Cairo by describing the whole affair 
as a riot against the stabilityof the kingdom. Al-MustakfT also 
announced his readiness to fight al-Na§ir Muhammad if the latter 
refused to accept the accomplished fact.'*'
But, on the other hand, in order to understand the importance 
of this edict and to get to the reality of it, one should not forget
the weak condition of al-MustakfT at this time in the reign of Baybars
2
al-Jashnakir. He was respected net by the Mamluk emirs.
Hence it might be worth finding out if al-MustakfT 
gave the *adh to Baybars al-JashnakTr willingly or was forced to do so? 
We find that some of the Mamluk historians, such as Ibn al-DawadarT, 
Baybars al-Ma§urT, al-MaqrTzT, Ibn TaghrT BirdT and others keep silent
X —  —Sal a tin, fol. 93a; Suluk, ii, 63-66; Nu.jum, viii, 26*f.
^Suluk, ii, 6 f^; Nujum, viii, 262, 26k,
3A
on this matter, either because.of their failure to analyse the stand­
ing of al-MustakfT or because the situation itself was not clear 
enough to be described. According to the data of TarTkh al-SalafrTn 
wa*l- *Asakir one could say that al-MustakfT bi Allah gave the *ahd 
under compulsion.'*"
Regarding the attitude of al-Na§ir Muhammad towards al-MustakfT 
it was, as we have previously seen, unfriendly; 
thereafter al-MustakfT endeavoured to explain that he had supplied 
Baybars al-<KashnakTr with the second *ahd reluctantly, and the 
chief judge, Badr al-DTn b.Jama'a (d.733/133^)^ could cement his 
statement cis an eye witness of the previous events. Subsequently, 
all the judges of Egypt and Syria pronounced their verdict respecting 
the legitimacy of al-Na§ir Muhammad' s rule, and al-MustakfT strengthened
5
the edict with his approval. Moreover, the judges, desiring to put 
the decree into action, asked al-Ma§ir Muhammad to renew their 
appointment.^ Giving that order at the early stage of his third 
reign, al-Na§ir Muhammad can be regarded as a ruler of effective 
authority. Thus, al-Na^ir Mu^iammad succeeded in having complete
support from the judges and from al-MustakfT, who handed oyer the
' V*ahd which gave al-Na§ir Muhammad legitimate power in his kingdom.
~*~SalatTn, fols. 95a-b.
^Ibid., fol. 95a.
^For his biography, see Durar, iii, 280-283. 
if _
SalatTn, fol. 95b.
^Ibid.
Salatin, fols. 96a-b.
^Ibid., fols. 97a-b.
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Subsequently, it might be useful to study the text of the tahd
which, after the ordinary beginning, continues:
"In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate, 
now then, praise be to God, the entrusted to manage 
the affairs which had been handled to him ... shows 
the excellent morals of al-Na§ir Muhammad, pious, 
just, enduring and competent. Besides his popularity 
among his people, his high position between his sup­
porters, and his hereditary right to govern."l
Here it is worth stating that this beginning of al-Na§ir
Muhammad’s *ahd is more or less similar to those of the two diplomas
(*uhud) submitted to Baybars al-JashnakTr by al-MustakfT in Shawwal
708/March 1309,^ and in Shalban 709/January 1310.^
Besides, if we study the diploma (*ahd) which had been given
in Sha'ban 709/January 1310^ by al-MustakfT to Baybars al-JashnakTr,
we find that al-MustakfT himself gives no regard to the importance
of hereditary right to rule, and confirms his idea by stating that
5
the governorship must be held by a qualified ruler only. Thus here­
ditary right was specifically denied in the earlier diploma. The 
diploma continues to praise al-Na^ir Muhammad's character and his 
personal conduct by recording:
"His perfect thought, his sincere consideration, and 
faultless meditation help him to keep the customary 
practice of his predecessors."®
^Ibid., fols. 98a-b.
2
Subhi x, 69-70; Suluk, ii, 46; for this diploma (*ahd), see Subh,
• xTtF-75.
^Suluk, ii, 64-66; Nu.jum, viii, 262-263
^For this *ahd see Suluk, ii, 63-6 6; Nujum, viii, 263.
Suluk, ii, 63; Nujum, viii, 263.
^Salatin, fols. 99a-b.
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"God has helped him with assistance, backing, victory, 
glory and consolidation; it was God's will for him 
to achieve this complete success.1 God has kept his 
rights, supported him with men, capable personality, 
and protected him with divine providence. This holy, 
care still assists the most exalted master, the greatest 
SultSh al-Malik al-Na§ir, the corroborated and the 
triumphant.3 The victorious, the Sultan of Islam and 
Muslims, who succeeded in taming al-Khawarij and the 
rebellious, the heir of the kingdom", the Sultan of the 
Arabs, of the Persians, and of the Turks."
This title which is mentioned here for the first time in a Mamluk
text became an Ottoman title.
"The sword of Islam, the successor of al-^Imam, he is the 
Alexander of the time, the owner of the Qur’an, Pahluvan-i 
jahan,^ Chosroes of ’Iran, the king of the universe, 
the Sultan of the world Abu al-Ma'all Muhammad the son 
of'the happy Sultan the martyr al-Malik al-Man^ur Sayf 
al-DIn Qalawun, God may keep his power immortal and make 
his demonstration visible."
These titles are very interesting in several respects. Firstly, 
the assertioii of hereditary right; secondly, the aspect of universal­
ity with which al-Na§ir Muhammad's rule is attributed; thirdly, 
the confirmation of the religious position of al-Na§ir Muhammad and 
how far this supports his right to rule and, fourthly, the comparison 
of al-Nasir Muhammad's personality with those of previous distinguished 
rulers of the world.
"If God leads him to be straight and honest, aids him 
against his enemies, saves him from any danger that 
may face him,^ supplies him with sons and money, 
strengthens him with wisdom and right guidance, protects 
him from wickedness, guids him safely, then God knows 
that he would be the man of his period like the sun of 
the earth,6 especially because of the encouragement he
^Salafln, fol. 99b,
2i Ibid., fol.100a.
3 —I Ibid; cf. Suluk, ii, 66; Nu.jum, viii, 263.
i
|
| Pahluvan-i jahan is Persian: "The hero of the world".
| ^SalatTn, fol.100b.
; /r
| Ibid., fol.101a.
[
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has from his assistants, and from the fitting circum­
stances, and the only thing which he has to do is to 
take his place on the throne, and draw the despised 
men away from his kingdom,and if he would like to be 
the ruler of Egypt he should be the most strong man, 
and he would be, for God would support and promote his 
condition.nl
"Coming back to authority successfully, having military 
aid from the soldiers, spiritual promotion from his 
subjects who come from different parts to confirm his 
situation.^ Furthermore with the backing of God and 
the diploma nothing would stand in his way, or obstruct 
a happy conclusion when he claims the throne as a power­
ful monarch, he would have the Sultanate and the obedience 
of his subjects."3
"The year which had already passed had been futile and 
worthless, and the weak Caliph had to approve the pre­
ceding events, although Us heart was full of friendly 
emotions and deep belief with al-Na§ir Muhammad; besides 
al-Nasir Muhammad and the Caliph have announced by their 
common edictjtheir interests of unity and co-operation, 
and the judges (quflat) had witnessed the meeting and 
heard the evidence ofal-MustakfT that he had given Baybars 
al-JashnakTr the *ahd under pressure. Moreover the 
Caliph gave his complete support to al-Najir Muhammad by 
a legitimate verdict."3
"Hence with this decree the foundation of the kingdom would 
be strong, and the clouds of the previous year would dis­
appear. Furthermore the judges of the Muslims regarded 
this charter as a decisive order which should be officially 
certified at diwan al-*Insha*, including its order that 
the Caliph concede to al-Nasir Muhammad full power and . 
mandayory authority to rule the country with justice, 
kindness,and a well equipped army. The names of the 
Sultan and of the Caliph would be engraved together on 
dirham and dinar.6 Al-Na§ir Muhammad had the right to 
appoint governors for the provinces of the state, to 
terminate corruption, to mobilize an army against his 
enemies, to nominate rulers, leaders and representatives, 
to collect money and levy taxes from his various resources,
^Ibid., fol. 101b.
| 2Ibid., fol. 102a.
| 3Ibid., fol. 102b.
ij. _
Salatin, fols. 103a-b; cf. Suluk, ii, 66; Nu.jum, viii, 263. 
^Salatin, fol. 103b.
^Ibid.,. fols., 10^-a-b......................................
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and to spend the money for the good of the state.
Also, to observe the Muslim posts, to protect the 
frontiers, to give back to the people the money which 
had been acquired unlawfully and arbitrarily, whether 
it was a small or a large sum.^ Emirs and commoners 
should be treated equally, paying attention to the un­
justly treated people was proof of good determination.^
Following the orders of God in the Qur'an, and the advice 
of the prophet Muhammad in the Sunna would keep him on 
the right track. The Sultan must also be a military 
leader, and hence the accomplishment of his duties should 
encourage his subjects to fight for the sake of God, 
and sacrifice their properties and souls to achieve victory 
' over their enemies. They would then be taken to Paradise.
All these items have been listed only as reminders for he was 
utterly known as a man of qualification and of skill.
Thus he could respectfully have the *ahd from Amir al- 
Mu'minTn who believes that al-Nasir Muhammad will be the 
most capable ruler of the kingdom, who knows exactly the 
truth of every matter, and understands precisely the 
state of different affairs.3
There are great expectations that he would successfully 
accomplish what is expected from him, and above all that 
he would have divine support, and the holy aid of a will 
of God. !,6
Seemingly, this diploma is the only available document concern­
ing mu * ahadat al-Na§ir Muhammad for a second time by al-MustakfT bi 
Allah. What should be asked about this diploma (*ahd) is why al- 
Na§ir Muhammad was intent on having an *ahd, especially if we 
compare the powerful position of al-Nafir Muhammad with the critical 
situation of al-MustakfT as a consequence of the part which he had 
played during the reign of Baybars al-JashnakTr. Was it a question 
of legitimacy? And even if it was, why was al-Na§ir Muhammad so 
keen to obtain that *ahd at an official meeting in the presence of 
the judges?
1Ibid., fol. lOVb. 
^Ibid., fol. 103a. 
3Ibid.
Salatin, fols. 103a-b. 
^Ibid., fol. 105b.
Ibid., fol. 106a.
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Apparently al-Na§ir Muhammad, at the beginning of his third 
reign, wanted to make use of every possibility which could cement 
his position, with complete disregard for the connected difficulties, 
at least in those early days of his rule. Besides, al-Najir 
Muhammad and the judges were careful to make use of the question 
of *ahd; hence, to accomplish the common aim, the judges asked al- 
Na§ir Muhammad to renew their appointment in their offices, having 
acceded to the request that al-Na§ir Muhammad be esteemed as a 
legitimate ruler who could practice his authority freely. There is 
nothing mention by contemporary historians about the relationship 
between al-Na^ir Muhammad and al-MustakfT during the following years 
but one may assume that this relation was less friendly than it had 
been during the preceding years. As a result, it might be worth 
saying that* the Caliph was the head of the Muslims but not the head 
of the Muslim states. Furthermore, although the name of al-MustakfT 
was mentioned in the Friday khufba before the name of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad we should not assume that this carried political weight: 
it was only a kind of formality. Besides, in spite of recording in 
tahd that the name of al-MustakfT would be engraved on coins, there 
is no mention in the Mamluk writings in regard to the fulfilling 
of this condition.
The essential work which the Caliph was obliged to carry out was 
to submit *ahd to the Sulfan for the purposes of legitimacy, although 
he never held the right to promote himself with that kind of trans­
action, and to claim the office of the Caliphate; he should be per­
mitted that office by the Sultan and the judges. In conclusion, it 
is worth noting that the Caliph, at the time of al-Na§ir Muhammad, 
was not allowed the right to refuse to confirm the coming of a new 
Sulfan into power; also, he had to accept the settled situation
4o
without any proposal of change. Therefore it appears that the
relation with . al-M^ir Muhammad continued, at least formally,
to be friendly, but this does not mean that al-Na§ir Muhammad forgot
that historic episode when al-MustakfT stood in his way to the 
2
Sultanate. This last statement can be easily borne out by al- 
Nagir Muhammad’s behaviour towards al-MustakfT in Mutiarram 737/
August 1336, when the former arrested al-MustakfT and imprisoned 
him and his family in a tower in the Citadel of Cairo where his 
father, al-^akim bi Amr Allah (d. 70l/l30l)^ used to live, forbade
  i
him intercourse with the people and put a Jandar at his door as guard. 
What reasons lie behind this occurrence? And what sort of mis­
understanding forced al-Nagir Muhammad to take such an action against 
al-MustakfT, especially as we know that there was considerable good­
will at first between the two heads? No doubt the foregoing action 
which had been perpetrated by al-MustakfT against al-Na§ir Muhammad 
had adversely influenced their friendship and had a bad effect upon 
al-Na§ir Muhammad's standing towards al-MustakfT. Thereafter, it 
appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad kept his feelings and waited for the 
soonest fitting moment to take a firm hand with al-MustakfT, to 
make it clear to him that being Caliph did not give him the right 
to interfere in the affairs of the state and that he should be satis­
fied with being a Caliph with no political or social influence but 
only a head of religious authority. Imprisoned like that, the Caliph 
was deprived even of his personal rights concerning his dwelling place
~*~Nahj ,iii, 80.
2 —Suluk, ii, 63-6 6; Nu.jum, viii, 263.
3
•For his biography, see Durar, i, 119-120.
^ *Uyun, fol. lla; 'Bidaya, xiv, 178; Suluk, ii, 403; Badr, fol.
34b; Khulafa*, 486 *
^Suluk, ii, 4l6.
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and the people he could meet. In other words, it shows complete 
interference by al-Na§ir Muhammad in al-MustakfT's freedom of 
thought, speech, and way of life.
Some historians mention direct reasons which caused the un­
friendly atmosphere surrounding the intercourse between al-Nagir 
Muhammad and al-MustakfT. Ibn KathTr^ states that al-Na§ir Muhammad 
became angry with al-MustakfT, without giving details. Al-SuyufcT 
says the reason for the misunderstanding between al-Nagir Muhammad 
and al-MustakfT was that a plaint was taken to al-Na§ir Muhammad 
in the handwriting of the Caliph to the effect that al-ha^ir Muhammad 
should attend the sessions of the holy law (Majlis al-Shar* al-SharTf)
at which the Sultan was angry and the affair came to this pass, that
_ 2
al-MustakfT was banished to Qu?. As a result, it could be that al-
Na§ir Muhammad got from those words an impression that al-MustakfT
was trying to hold on to some religious rights or to be supreme
in the religious field. Ibn Shakir al-KutubT says that Muhammad,
the son of al-MustakfT (d.738/1337) i was the cause of the broken
relations between al-Na§ir Muhammad and al-MustakfT but unfortunately
Ibn Shakir does not explain the matter in any detail. On the other
hand, al-Suyu^T also records that Ibrahim, the nephew of al-MustakfT,
was the cause of the misunderstanding between the Caliph al-MustakfT
and the Sultan after they had been like brothers, by his having
if
carried to him a slanderous tale regarding him.
^Bidaya, xiv, 187.
^Khulafa*, ^87; cf. Suluk, ii, 4l6-^ fl7.
^*Uyun, fol. 3 a^-,
L
Khulafa’, ^88.
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Therefore we could assume that Ibrahim, probably, desiring 
to hold the office of the Caliphate, and knowing the possibility 
of fulfilling his wish because of his relation to al-Mustakfi , 
tried to rouse al-Nagir Muhammad against al-Mustakfl for his personal 
desire, especially as he knew about the unfriendly relationships be- 
tween al-Nagir Muhammad and al-Mustakfl. Hence, if this assess­
ment is right, that could be regarded as a clever operation carried 
out by Ibrahim to make use of the situation at the expense of al- 
MustakfT's position in the royal court.
Having been imprisoned, al-Mustakfi spent about five months
and seven days in the Citadel of Cairo until he was set free in Rabi*
1 ^
Ii737/October 1336, mostly for the sake of Qu?un (d.7^2/13^1), the close
friend of a^-Nagir Muhammad.
Immediately after, in Dhu 'l-gijja 737/July 1337, a royal decree of 
al-Nagir Muhammad ordered the exile of al-MustakfT to Qug in Upper 
Egypt. Concerning the subject matter, al-ShujaTrecords that the 
association between al-Mustakfi and a young Mamluk called Abu Shama
caused tension in his relations with al Nagir Muhammad, who imprisoned
_ 3
the Mamluk and exiled al-Mustakfi. Accordingly, al-Mustakfi, with
his family of about one hundred persons, left Cairo for Qiug in
4
Mukarram 738/July 1337. Al-Nagir Muhammad allowed al-Mustakfi
5
and his family what was sufficient for their maintenance, although
~^Suluk, ii, 4l6; Badr,fol. 33b.
For his biography,see. Durar, iii, 257-238.
^Nagir, fol. 10a; cf. Suluk, ii, 4l6.
^Nagir, fol. 9a; Migr, fol. 112a; Zettersteen, 194; Subh, iii,
 ^2 6 3; Sulnk, ii, W 7  Badr, fol. 36b; Khulafa*, 486.
5 0^Talafa,,. 2 ,86. ......................' / ..............................................................................................................
43
al-MaqrTzT states that the annual allowance of the Caliph was de­
creased from five thousand dirhams to three thousand, and ulti­
mately to one thousand dirhams and that his women had to sell their 
clothes for a living.^" Although the position which the Caliph held
in the court and in society was religious only, the people received
2
the news of the banishment of al-Mustakfl with regret and grief.
Hence to be expelled although a Caliph could be regarded as a vital 
step,accomplished for the first time by a Sultan regarding a Caliph, 
in the history of the Mamluk Sultanate. It helps to make the 
position of the Caliphate at the time of al-Na^ir Muhammad clear to 
scholars. The taking of this measure by al-Na§ir Muhammad -against 
al-Mustakfi might give the idea that the Caliph in this period was 
no more than a subject who had to accept the orders of the rule 
without protest. But, on the other hand, one must wonder,if the 
situation had this element of loyalty by the 'Abbasid Caliph towards 
the Mamluk; Sultan, why al-Nagir Muhammad took this step at all?
As there is no contemporary document dealing with the matter, the 
only alternative is conjecture. Firstly, because of the weak status 
of al-Mustakfi, it seems there was no reason foral-Nagir Muhammad 
to fear him, which could have been the cause of his banishment.
Therefore, one reascnwhich can be suggested here is that al-Na§ir 
Muhammad, with a long period of settled rule, wanted to be the only 
distinguished head inthe Mamluk Sultanate, even if the other head 
was merely nominal. Secondly, if we reject the idea that al-Ha^ir
^Suluk, ii, 417.
^Badr, fol. 36b.
Muhammad had no fears concerning his supreme power in the state, it 
could be worth saying that al-Nagir Muhammad might have been afraid 
of a well organized conspiracy against him by al-MustakfT and the 
Mamluk emirs. But without proof of this suggestion a third reason 
comes to light, which concerns the character of al-MustakfT as a 
person of religious authority. Seemingly al-Nasir Muhammad became 
angry and so decided to send al-MustakfT to Qu?i far from the 
capital of the Sultanate.^-
In conclusion, it might be worth saying that these three purposes 
together could be the cause of the action taken by al-Nagir Muhammad, 
even though one of them alone might explain al-Nagir Muhammad's 
motives. The most remarkable feature of this series of important 
events was that the name of al-MustakfT continued to be mentioned
_ 2
in the khulba in Cairo in spite of his being in Qu§. This may con­
firm the idea that al-Nagir Muhammad wanted a Caliph to stand beside 
him at ihe summit of the monarchy provided the Caliph had no effect­
ive position from the practical point of view.
Finally, in Sha'ban 7^0/February 13&0, in Qug, al-MustakfT
died, and was buried there, being upwards of fifty-six years of age,
3
and having spent thirty-nine years in the office of the Caliphate.
It is strange thatal-Nagir Muhammad did not try to deprive al- 
MustakfT of his nominal functions. Either he meant to reassure the 
people that there was still a Caliph in'.the Sultanate who, having 
been exiled, had no effect on the Sultan's position in the society,
lSuluk, ii, kl6', cf. Khulafa*, -^87.
^Husn, ii, 67; Khulafa*, ^ 87.
* Nagir, fol. 53h; Migr, fol. 127a; Zettersteen, 207; Tadhkira, fol.
121a; Suluk, ii, 502; Nu.jum, ix, 151; Khulafa* , *f86 • ==3
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or else Hafir did not feel that he had the right, in spite of his 
powerful standing, to deprive al-Mustakfl of his status, especially
if we remember that al-MustakfT had a good standing in society,^- as
2 _ ^ _
he was popular among the people. According to al-Suyuti, Ibn Fa$l Allah
t - - 3al- UmarlfoMasalik al-Absar,states that al-MustakfT was of good character.
Respecting the personality of al-MustakfT it is probably worth
pointing out that he had a sense of modesty and a grasp of management.
4
He had intelligence and knowledge* Al-Mustakfi was also accomplished 
and generous, wrote an extremely fine hand and was brave and skilled in 
the game of polo (La*b al-Kura) and in shooting with the crossbow (al- 
ramy bi*1-bun dug). He conversed with learned and literary men and was
g
munificent to them and a benefactor of their society. Al-MaqrTxT writes 
that al-MustakfT was an honourable man of good character, was rich and 
had accomplished many meritorious deeds. Among other things, he built
g
a school in the city of IkhmTm in Upper Egypt.
(ii) The Caliphate in the later time of al-Nasir Muhammad
When al-MustakfT felt that his fate had overtaken him he held
a meeting of forty honest persons to witness that his son Afcmad would
•hthulafa’, 487.
^Badr, fol. 36b.
3Khulafa’, 487.
^Al-Shuja'T in his Nagir, fol. 71a says:
I ,bSdf\ S'!. i.L^ cc ^  Nl—
<■ ' * * ’ j> . . s
. J J  tJI J
5 _
Ibid. See D. Ayalon, Notes on the Furusiyya exercises and games in the
Mamluk Sultanate. Studies in Islamic history and civilization (Scripta 
Hierosolysitana, ix), Jerusalem, 1961, 46.
c
Khulafa*, 487.
^Suluk, ii, 304.
- o.......................................
Mi.gr, fol. 127a; Jawahir, fol. 231b; Zettersteen, 207; Nu.jum, ix, 151.
46
take over the Caliphate as his successor to the Y'eWg vous power,
as the new Caliph of the Muslims.^ The judge of Qu§i having seen
2
and heard the will, confirmed the appointment. Consequently, it
could appear from the will that the Caliph had the right to appoint
the next Caliph, assuming -that he was the person who knew best who
3
was the most suitable candidate for the office.
Hence it is the more noteworthy that, when al-Na^ir Muhammad 
heard that al-Mustakfi had nominated his son A^ imad as his successor 
to the Caliphate, he refused to accept the appointment on account
- 4  —tof his personal feeling against al-Mustakfi, on which al-Shuja'i
ssiys j " ♦ 4 i
(_$.i  . . .  ( j l i a h . l l iJmjU 14 i .•> q  U a Lw J l 3
J k » » l  4 .1—  L  dyilclj ij i„0> l & J I  ^  l$ J 11 - **j  e 4 J ^ I
* toe (y 0 \S .. i ...itO (^IkiuJ I (j ■«»*
*
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In addition, al-Na§ir Muhammad wanted to nominate Ibrahim, who was 
the son of the heir to the Caliphate, al-Mustamsik bi Allah AbXI*Abd 
Allah . Muhammad, son of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah Abu al-Abbas A^ unad. 
His grandfather, al-Hakim, had covenanted for the succession for 
his son Muhammad and gave him the title of al-Mustamsik bi-Allah, 
but Muhammad died during al-Hakim’s lifetime, whereupon he took 
the covenant for al-Mustamsik's son* this Ibrahim, thinking that 
he would be worthy of the Caliphate. But after a while he discovered
^Nasir, fol. 53b; Nujum, ix, 151.
^Nujum, ix, 151.
3
For such an appointment from a Caliph to bis successor, see Subh, 
ix, 379-385.
4
Nasir, fol. 53b; Suluk, ii, 502; Nujum, ix, 151; Khulafa, 488;
• cf. -Badr, -fol.- 39b.............................. —  : ~ ........
^Durar9 i, 56.
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that he was wrong in his belief.*^ Consequently, al-Hakim turned
_ 2
to nominate his son, al-Mustakf1 , the uncle of Ibrahim.
It seems that circumstances came to the aid of Ibrahim with
3a second opportunity to be Caliph with the title al-Wathiq bi Allah.
Thereafter, al-Nagir Muhammad ordered that A^ imad, the son of al-
Mustakfl, would be given the allowance which used to be submitted
to Ibrahim which was: monthly, five hundred and sixteen and two-
thirds dirhams, eight aradib of wheat, tnree aradib of barley;
bread four times a day, twenty pounds of meat daily and the usual 
if
clothes. Immediately after, al-Nagir Muhammad called Ibrahim
for a personal talk, and again for a meeting until he held an
official meeting at the house of justice (Par al-*Adl),and, in
the presence of the judges, al-Naijir MufcLammad made clear hisdesire
to appoint Ibrahim as the new Caliph of the Muslims and asked them
to approve his nomination. But the judges refused his request,
for they thought that Ibrahim was unfit for the office of the
5
Caliphate because of his bad morals, especially as he had been 
married for a while to a girl singer who had been divorced according 
to the Sultan's order.
1Khulafa>, 489.
^Nasir, fol. 33h; Khulafa*, 488.
^Nasir, fol. 33i>; Khulafa*, 488.
4 *Misr fol. 127b; Zettersteen, 207.
5 'Zettersteen, 207; Suluk, ii, 302-3; Nu.jum, ix, 131.
^Suluk, ii, 268; Badr, fol. 17a.
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Finally al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in achieving his aim 
and Ibrahim was installed els the new Caliph of the Muslims with 
the title al-Wathiq bi Allah and was permitted to be given the 
allowance of the late al-Mustakfi, which was about three thousand 
and five hundred dirhams, nineteen indabb of wheat and a few aradib
of barley.'1' But it seems that the judges ..never agreed with al-
_ 2
Na§ir Muhammad regarding the appointment of Ibrahim as Caliph.
As a result the khufrba was cut off from the mosques for three 
months and three days; it was precisely from Sha*ban 740/February
134-0, the death of al-Mustakfi until Dhu '1-Qa'da 740/May lj40, the date
_ 3
of the succession of Ibrahim as a Caliph. This fact is quite
different from Arnold's statement that Mal-Na§ir Muhammad, deprived
the Caliph, Wathiq bi-Allah Ibrahim, for some months even of the
4empty dignity of having his name mentioned in the khutba"; for 
Ibrahim was not at that time a Caliph from an official point of view.
The part which was played by al-Na^ir Muhammad suggests that 
the actions taken by him against al-Mustakfi were partly created 
by his personal feelings against al.*- Mustakfi.
Seemingly, it was because of this personal feeling that al- 
Nasir Muhammad refused to approve the appointment of A^ unad, the son 
of al-Mustakfi, given to him by his father. Besides, although al- 
Nagir Muhammad knew that Ibrahim was not the person to be a Caliph
^Nasir, fols. 53"b-54a; Misr, fols. 128a-b; Jawahir, fol. 231b;
Zettersteen, 207-208; Suluk, ii, 503.
^Nasir, fol. 54a.
3Mjsr, fol. 128b; Zettersteen, 208.
^Arnold, The Caliphate, 100.
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because of bis disreputable personal behaviour, he appointed him
Caliph. Al-Na§ir Muhammad was only interested in the fact so
far as it served his purpose.
Concerning the personality of al-Wathiq bi-Allah Ibrahim, the
second Caliph of the Muslims during the third reign of al-Na§ir
Muhammad, it appears that he succeeded so little in gaining the
confidence of the people that they petitioned the Sultan against
him, describing his evil life. But al-Na§ir MutLammad paid no
attention to this and persisted in his intentions until the people 
2
acknowledged him. Moreover, it seems that the allowance granted 
to Ibrahim was so scanty that the populace in derision nicknamed 
him al-Musta'-fcl bi-Allah (the beggar)."^ Al-Suyufl quotes Ibn 
Fa$l Allah al-*Umari in Masalik al-Absar, that Ibrahim had been a 
man of disreputable behaviour during the early years of his life, 
that he grev; up in dishonour, and inclined to naught but the neg­
lect of piety. He was led astray by sensualities, and did un­
necessarily sinful things. He associated with the mean and the
base. His extravagance brought his reputation low; he was so
U
blind as to think praiseworthy that which was wicked.
Thereafter, when al-Na§ir Muhammad was at the point of death, 
he commended to the emirs the restoration of authority to the heir 
of al-Mustakfi, his son Alfcimad. Thus, when al-Mansur Abu Bakr, the 
son of al-Na§ir Muhammad, assumed supreme power, he convened an 
assembly on the 2lst Dhu '*1-Hijja 74l/7th June 1341, and summoned the
^Suluk, ii, 303; Badr, fol. 17a.
^Jawahir, fol.232b; Suluk, ii, 303; Khulafa*, 488-9.
* ^ Jawahir, fol. 232b; Suluk, ii, 303; Khulafa? 488-9, Nu.jum, ix, 151.
4
• Khulafa’, 489....................................................
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Caliph al-Wathiq Ibrahim and the heir Ahmad and the judges 
and asked them, "Who by law is entitled to the Caliphate?"^ The
t 2judge, Izz al-Dln b. Jama'a answered "Verily the Caliph al-
Mustakfl, who died in the city of Qu§, bequeathed the Caliphate
after him to his son Ahmad and had it attested by forty witnesses
in the city of Qu§; and this was proved before me after its con-
firmation before my deputy in the city of Qus." Consequently, the
Sultan Abu Bakr deposed Ibrahim and gave his mubaya*a to Ahmad
if
who was surnamed al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, and became the Caliph 
of the Muslims until his death in Sha'ban 7^8/November 13^7.^
What reasons made al-Na§ir Muhammad make this change respecting 
the office of the Caliphate in the last years of, his mile? Re­
garding this, it is worth noting that al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah Ahmad
6had been appointed with a new form of covenant of allegiance. 
Reverting to our question, one might say that there is no mention 
of any direct reasons which would have had a deep influence upon 
al-Nafir Muhammad's position towards the Caliphate or- against the 
personality of the Caliph, and thus the sole comment which can be 
made is that either al-Na^ir Muhammad was displeased with the 
character of Ibrahim and decided that he was unfit to be a Caliph,
1Ibid., ^90. 
o
For his biography see, Durar, ii, 378-382; Shadharat, vi, 208-209.
^Khulafa*, ^90.
^Ibid.
•^Subh, iii, 263-266.
6 — «For this covenant of allegiance (mubaya* a), see Subh, ix, 320-331;
Khulafa*, ^91-^99.
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or else he realized that his actions against the Caliphate had * 
had a bad influence upon the court as well as upon society, and 
that he should be more careful in his policy towards the Caliphate, 
Therefore al-Na§ir Muhammad had second thoughts in the matter and 
the change respecting the holder of the office taking place before 
his death.
(iii)The function of the Caliphate
Although it is true that there were in the Mamluk Sultanate 
two heads, the Sultan and the Caliph, it is also quite true that 
the SultSn was the only effective ruler who dealt with political 
affairs as well as with religious matters. Therefore, the only 
reason for the Sultan to welcome the Caliph as aieligious authority 
besides his power was the legitimacy it gave to his rule. Subse­
quently, the rights which the Caliph enjoyed were firstly,
presenting a delegation to the Sultan to give a legitimate aspect 
to his power; secondly, the mention of his name in the khutba before 
the name of the Sultan and thirdly, the inscribing of his name on 
coins beside the name of the Sultan, but it seems that this last 
function was not carried out during the reign of al-Na§ir Mufciammad. 
Fourthly, the Caliph was accustomed to exercise the right of choosing 
his successor, although, as we have seen, al-Na§ir Muhammad success­
fully managed to cancel the will of al-MustakfT regarding the suc­
cession of his son A^ unad to the Caliphate. On the other hand, the 
Caliph had to be an obedient subject who had to yield to the royal 
command either respecting his position as Caliph or concerning his 
personal conduct. Moreover, the whole history of the Caliphate 
during the era of al-!Na§ir Muhammad indicates that the Caliph had 
no right to interfere in political life, although al-Na§ir Muftammad
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was careful to pave the way for him to enjoy a comfortable life.
From a military standpoint the Caliph could be a useful person
and this can be observed from the part which was played by al-
MustakfT when the governor of Yemen, al-Mu’ayyad Hizabr al-DTn Dawud'1'
stopped sending the usual annual present to al-Na§ir Muhammad in
707/1307. Al-Na§ir Muhammad asked al-MustakfT to use his position
as Caliph of the Muslims, and to write to the YamanI king advising
him to respect his loyalty to the 'Abbasid Caliphate and to remember
his friendship with the Mamluk Sultanate by continuing to send
3
his annual gift as a symbol of obedience.
This gives one the impression that the Caliph could be a help
to the kingdom in practising his religious authority, although that
must be by the order of the Sultan and under his supervision too.
There was also Muhammad Tughluq, the ruler of Dihli during the
first half of the fourteenth century, who sent to the Caliph al-
MustakfT a humble petition, seeking his recognition, and at once
k
substituted his name for his own on the coins of the empire. This 
could give us an idea about the importance to a Muslim ruler of 
having recognition from the Caliph of the Muslims for the purposes 
of legitimacy.
(iv) Conclusion
Through this long discussion concerning the Caliphs who lived 
during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad and the function of the 
Caliphate, it can be understood that, although the Caliphs contemporary
^For his biography, see, Durar, ii, 99-100.
2Subh, vi, *f21-*f22.
* ^ For this letter* see Subfr, vi, ^21-*+26.
'Sir 'Wolseley Haig,' ’’Five Questions in the .History of the Tughluq Dynasty 
of Dihli", J.R.A.S. (1922), 351; see also Cambridge History of Islam, 
ii, l8.
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with al-Na§ir Muhammad used to he brought out with great pomp 
and ceremony^ as the Caliphs of the Muslims, to give the colour 
of legitimacy to the rule of the contemporary Mamluk governor, who 
had the right to assume the title of Sultan, the situation of the 
Caliphs at the time of al-Na§ir Muhammad was humiliating, and the 
Caliphs never had the right to speak or to live freely. Hence, 
it is untrue to say that the Caliphs enjoyed an independent position. 
During the period of al-Nasir Muhammad’s rule the Caliphs lived 
as prisoners and acted under the supervision of the Sultan, and 
they had no right to interfere in political life, which was con­
sidered to be the business of the Sultan only and to have nothing 
to do with the Caliph of the Muslims.
Finally, it might be worth stating that the condition of the
I
'Abbasid Caliphate during al-Na§ir Muhammad’s third reign was of 
no effect in regard to political life; and the internal 
circumstances, especially respecting the Mamluk governorship, made 
this situation clear enough to be noticed by both the ruling class 
and the people. It was a period of powerful foundation concerning 
the political status and the governorship. Furthermore, one might 
say that the aspect of legitimacy, which had been much desired by 
the Mamluk rulers, even those of competent authorities and great 
power like al-Na§ir Muhammad, was the only thing which helped the 
Caliphate to exist throughout the period under study.
Besides, although al-Nasir Muhammad worked to weaken the 
position of the Caliphate because of his political ambitions and 
personal feeling, and to disgrace the standing of the Caliphs in the 
royal court as well as in society, he was careful to keep the 
Caliphate and to protect its existence. This statement gives us a
'^Su'bh', ii'i,' 280.
&clear idea of the importance of having a Caliph beside the Mamluk 
Sultan in the royal court, in the Egyptian society, in the Mamluk 
Sultanate and in the Islamic world. The Mamluk rulers, probably, 
wanted to show themselves supported by the Caliphate,
even if they were powerful and could easily have continued to rule 
the Mamluk Sultanate alone, as could al-Na§ir Mufciummad. It was, 
in fact, the religious right and the legitimate aspect which were 
eagerly desired by the Mamluk Sultans. But that importance was 
not enough to provide the 'Abbasid Caliphate with power or efficiency; 
therefore, one could record that, if the Caliphs during the period 
under review tried to practise political work or to interfere in 
state affairs, al-Nasir Muhammad would not have hesitated to put 
an end to the 'Abbas'ld Caliphate and to its nominal existence.
Moreover we should not forget that al-Na§ir Muhammad was very 
careful and extremely serious in using every source of power and 
every element of support to cement his political position as the 
most powerful headdn the Mamluk Sultanate; therefore he used both 
force and diplomacy, even with the weak factors, to accomplish his 
great expectations in the political, diplomatic, economic, religious 
and social fields.
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Chapter II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
(i) The basic divisions
Coming to study the administrative division of Egypt during 
this period one might ask what were the main parts of IJgypt? How 
far is it possible for us to reconstruct "this from existing sources 
and documents? Information comes rather sporadically about the ad- 
' ministrative division of Egypt. Besides the work of Ibn Fa$l Allah
al-'UmarT, Masalik al-absar, ^ there is the anonymous work, Taqwim
« 2al-buldan al-Misriyya fi al-acmaL al-Sultaniyya, which was carried
out by the order of al-Ashraf Sha'ban. Therefore, we may deduce 
certain general principles with regard to the main administrative 
provinces and centresdn Egypt. It might be important in the history 
of this period to discuss the regularity of the division, the finan­
cial resources and expenditure of every province (niyaba) and of every 
wilaya, and the local administration of this division. We will study 
the administrative division of Egypt befox-e and after the NasirT rawk,
i.e. redistribution of lands between the Sul Jan and the muqta^. When 
that speedy cadastral survey (kashf al-bilad) was. made, the estates 
were divided into Koyal (al-khass al-Sultani) and iqta^s.
Subsequently, a new division concerning the administrative 
picture of the Egyptian lands appeared. Accordingly, the districts' 
■chiefs of police (wulat) were of the muqta^.-^
^Paris Ms. 2325.
p
Cambridge, U.L. Ms. Qq. 65.
Poliak, Feudal!sm in Egypt, .Syria,. Paies.tj.ne- and- the- Lebanon- 1250-1900? 
25. '
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According to al-Qalqashandl, al-Qu^a'i records in his Khitafr 
that Egypt was divided into three main sections (afryaz), consisting 
of fifty-five regions (kurat) . 1 The first section (frayz) is Upper
•Egypt (al-Wajh al-Qibll), which extends from the south part of
_ 2
Fusfcat to the southern limits of Egypt and comprises twenty regions.
'The second section is Lower Egypt (al-Wajh al-Ba^ri), which consists
of thirty-three regions distributed in four districts (nawahT). The
■3
first part, the Eastern Hawf, comprises eight regions. The second 
_
part, Batn al-Rif, consists of seven regions. The third part, 
Minfcaqat al-JazTra, between the eastern and the western banks of the 
Nile, comprises five regions. The fourth part, the Western Hawf, 
consists of eleven regions. The third section covers the Qibla kuwar
which
5
were five regions,
»
but only 
Table I
four are recorded.^
The regions of:
The first section The third section
1. al-Fayyurn 1. al-Tur wa-Faran
2. Manf 2 . Raya wa’l-Qulzum
3. WasTm 3. ; Ayla wa-^iayyi ziha 
wa-Madyan wa-^iayyi ziha 
wa’l-'AwnTd wa-£ayyiziha 
wa ’ 1-Hawra * wa-^iayyi ziha
4. al-Sharqiyya 4. Bada Ya'qub wa-Shu'ayb
^Subhj iii, 379; cf. Khitat, i, part I, 129.
2Subfr, iii, 379-384. Kuwrat no. 13 is missing from Subfr, see Table I.
"2
Subfr, iii, 385-386. See Table IT.
4It means the lower land in Egypt, see Subh, iii, 386.
^Ibid., iii, '386-388, 389-391'. See'Table I.
^See MaptNos.I Sc II.
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Table I (cont.)
5-
65.
8 .
310.
HI.
312.
314. 
115". 
U 6*
m .
i» S' 
u^.
Xo.
The first section
Dala§ wa-Busayr 
Ahnas 
al-Qays 
al-Bahnasa
Ta^ ia wa-Hayr Shanuda 
Buwayf
al-Ashmunayn wa-Angina wa-Shutb
Suyufc
Qahquwa
Ikhmlm wa*1-Dayr wa-Abshaya 
Hu wa-Dandara wa-Qina 
Qift wa’l-’Uqgur
Asna wa-Armant 
*Uswan
Table II
The regions of the second section
Part one Part two Part three Part four
IL. Ayn Shams 1 . Bana
wa-Busayr
1. DamsTs 
wa-Manuf
1. Sa
2 . AtrTb 2. Samannud 2. TuwwatManuf 2. Shabas
3- Bana
wa-Tumayy
3. Nawasa 3. Sakha wa- 3. al-Badhaqun 
Tayda wa’l- 
Farrajun
4+. Basta 4. al-Awsiyya 4. Buqayra 4. al-Khays waJl-Shirak
wa-Day§a
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Table II (cont.)
Part one Part two Part three Part four
5. 'Tarabiya 5. al-Bujum
a-
5. BasHrud 5. Khirbita
6. <Qurbay£ 6. Daqahla 6- Qar^asa wa-MagXl
7. San wa-Iblil 7. TannTs wa- 7. al-Milyadas
Dimyat
8. ;al-Farma 8. Ikhna wa-RashTd
wa’l-^ArXsh wa’1-Buhayra
9. (missing)
10. Maryu^
11. Lubiya wa-
Maraqiya
This administrative division of Egypt was completely changed after
this speedy cadastral survey of Egypt and the redistribution of lands
(the Nagiri rawk) which was accomplished by al-Nagir Muhammad's order
in 715/1315."^ Moreover, al-Nagir Muhammad spent two months in Upper
2
%ypt to supervise the carrying out of the operation. Concerning 
this period,the first political geographer worthy of consideration 
is Ibn Eadl Allah al-'Umari, the Sultan al-Na§ir Muhammad's confidential 
secretary (katib al-sirr), who wrote Masalik al-absar. and records that 
Egypt during this period was divided into two fundamental parts,^
kUpper Egypt and Lower Egypt. There were 2 ,163 districts (nawafrX) in 
Egypt excluding the JTziyya parts which belonged to the Royal privy
_ _ _ c
purse or were the Sultan’s estates (bilad al-DXwan bi’l-JTziyya). Lower
1Infra, 263-271. _
^Suluk, ii, 1^7.
^Masalik, fol. 20lt(Paris Ms. 232^).
if
See Maps Nos. Ill, IV.
^TaqwTm, fol. 2b; cf. Saniyya, 3.
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AI — Ma ray ha
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Egypt extended from the north coast of Egypt to Cairo and covered
Alexandria and Barqa. To the east it stretched as far as Khalij
Amir al-Mu'minin.'*' Lower Egypt was divided into six a*mal, as 
2
follows: Barqa, al-Gharbiyya, al-Sharqiyya, al-Qalyubiyya,^ al-
Manufiyya and ’Ushmum. Besides the capital of Egypt, there were 
two cities in Lower Egypt, Alexandria and Damietta, which did not 
belong to any *amal or had no *amal of their own? There were 
1,651 districts (nawahT) in Lower Egypt, distributed in eleven 
a*mal.^ Almost every *amal had its own centre, as is shown in 
Table III.
Table III 
Lower Egypt during this period
The * amal its districts 
(nawahT)
its centre
1. Al-DawafrT (Dav/ajpi al-Qahira) 20 Cairo
2. Al-Qaljubiyya 59 Qalyub
3. Al-Sharqiyya 380 Bilbays ^
b. Al-Daqahliyya 217 , 6Ushmum'
5. PawafcT Thaghr Dimyat 12 -
6. Al-Gharbiyya 471 al-Mahala
7. Al-Manufiyya 232 Manuf
^Masalik, fols. 201b-202a (Paris Ms. 2525).
2Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari does not make a distinction between a* trial 
and wilaya, see Masalik, fols. 201b-202a (Paris Ms. 2525).
^Ibid.
^Saniyya, 3-b,. cf. Table III.
5
For Bilbays, see Bui, 113-119.
£
For *Ushmum, see Ibid.
6o
Table III (cont.)
The * amal its districts 
(nawafrT)
its centre
8. Abyar wa-Jazirat Bani Na^r
9. Al-Bu^ayra
10. Fuwwa wa’ l-MuzaJiamatayn
11. Nasturawa
bG
16
Abyar
Damanhur^
Fuwwa
According to Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'UmarT there were nine a*mal 
in Upper Egypt, as follows: Qus, which was on the east bank of the 
Nile; it was the greatest and covered the Bedouins, 'Arab Qamula, 
and Uswan which was at the further end of the southern frontiers of 
the Mamluk Sultanate, Tkhmim, Asyut, Manfalut, al-Ashmunayn, al- 
Bahnasa, al-Fayyum, Itfit and al-JTza. Al-Qalqashandi confirms
this record and adds briefly some notes regarding the centres
—  c _ b(mar aid, z) of the a'mal which will be illustrated in Table IV.
Table IV 
Upper Egypt during this period
The *amal its districts its centre
1. Qu§ - Qus
2. IkhmTm 26 Ikhmim
3. Asyut 32 Asyut
b. Manfalut - Manfalut
3. Al-Ashmunayn 103 Al-Ashmunayn
^Subh, ii, *+02-^ 10.
TaqwTm, fols. 3a-b; cf. Saniyya, 3-b; Khitat, i, part I, 129.
3Masalik, fol. 201b (Paris Ms. 2323). 
^Subh, iii, J>3G-b0b.
Table IV (cont.)
The a mal its districts its centre
6. Al-Bahnasa 236 Al-Bahnasa
7. Al-Fayyum 97 Al-Fayyum1
8. 'ifcfTtt 30 2
** 4^*
9. Al-JXza"' - Al-JTza
However, it is both interesting and important to note that there 
W e 'rG a<trial in both Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt, and almost every 
'amal had its administrative centre.
Ibn Fagll Allah al-'Umari states that Qus was the only city in
_ , 5  _
Upper Egypt. Yet we know that Qug, the city, was the administrative
centre (r.'.arkaz) of Qu$ the 'amal.^ Abu al-Fida* (d. 732/1331) con­
firms the previous statement that Qu$ was the most important city 
in Upper Egypt and came next to al-Fus^af in its greatness; Qu§
was an important market for the merchants from *Adan. Abu al-Fida*
—  8continues that Quj was on the eastern bank of the Nile. Qu£ had
its own port on the coastal section, at a distance of three days1
9 -journey, tne port of al-Qu^ayr on the Red Sea. Moreover, Abu al- 
^For detail, see Bui, 110-113.
*9Subh 1 iii, 396-AoA.
"T'asalik, fols. 201b; Tacwlm, fols. 3h-Aa; cf. Saniyya, A3.
A
Tacwlm, fols. yh-Aa; cf. Saniyya, A-3; Khitafr, i, part I, 129. 
^Kasalik, fol. 193h (Paris Ms. 2323).
^Sunra, A2.
7Bul, 111.
° I b i d .
y Ib i_ d .
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Fida*, in his book Tagvim al-baldan records that Uswan was on the 
eastern bank of the Nile and was at the same time an important part 
of Qu^ the wilaya. Besides, Uswan was the last part of the south­
ern frontier of Upper Egypt.^
2
Furthermore Abu al-Fida* cites that 'Aydhab, on the Red Sea 
in Upper Egypt, was the commercial port for the merchants from 
Yemen and the main port from which the pilgrims left Egypt for al- 
Kijaz.^
Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari describes Alexandria as a fortified
city,protected by a military-force, and it was. the only city in
Efcypt whose governor (hakim) was appointed by Royal Decree (marsurn
sultani). The people of Alexandria were aware of the maritime affairs.
Alexandria was a glorious city of beautiful buildings. There were
eight districts (nawahl) in the port of Alexandria.
Abu al-Fida’, the contemporary historian of al-Nagir Muhammad,
records that Alexandria was on the Mediterranean Sea (Bah^al-Rum);
it was one of the greatest cities, and it had a little fertile is-
/•
land on which one could find different kinds of land production.
Alexandria was surrounded by a strong wall or stone with four gates
(abwab), Rashid gate (bab), Sidra gate, Sea gate and a fourth gate
7which was opened only on Friday. It is clear from this short survey
1Ibid., 113.
^Infra, 227-228.
3Bul, 131.
Masalik, fol. 193h (Paris Ms. 2323); cf. also Khitat, i, Part I, 130. 
5 -Taqwim, fol. 3h; cf. Saniyya, 4.
r
Bul, 113.
^Ibid.
that Alexandria was not far from constituting a provincial unit. 
Alexandria covered the northern coastal parts of the west part of 
Lower Egypt and stretched to Barqa.'*'
Besides the three wilayat of Egypt, already mentioned, Upper
Egypt, Lower Egypt and Alexandria, Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umarl mentions
2 3 • -Barqa which was inhabited by the Bedouins. It was a large wilaya,
divided into three sections: the coastal section, the mountainous
section and the country. Barqa was an important part of the Mamluk
5
Sultanate, and it was governed by a Mamluk governor.
Besides the capital (qa^ida) of Barqa, An£abulus, there were
other cities in Barqa such as Tulymatha and Tabjirqa. According to
al-Qalqashandi, Ibn Fa^l Allah al-'Umari records in his work Masalik
al-absar that Barqa was a large province (iqlim), of beautiful
parts, fertile land, inhabited cities and full of livestock and strong 
7horses.
According to Ibn Fa^l Allah al-'Umari there was another part 
of Egypt, i.e. the oases, which was an important division,' although 
it could not be listed among the wilayat, or the a*mal with regard to
{ g
the administrative division of Egypt. Some of the Wahat were situated
^Masalik, fols. 2olb-202a (Paris Ms. 2323). 
^Masalik, fol. 202b (Paris Ms. 2323).
3Infra, 223, 230-232.
L
Masalik, fol. 202b (Paris Ms. 2323).
^Ibid. 
Ibid., fols. 203 a-b; cf. Subh, iii, 393. 
^Subhi iii1 393.
0
Masalik, fols. 202a-b (Paris Ms. 2323).
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in Upper Egypt. Others were between Mi§r (Fusta£) and Alexandria. 
Subsequently Egyptian oases (wahat) were distributed among the
2
limits of Misr (Fusta£), Alexandria, Upper Egypt, Nubia-and Abyssinia.
_ 3
The wahat were rich in their springs and fertile land. There were
three regions (kuwar) in the oases territory (Min^aqat al-Wa^at),
which extended from the western side of Upper Egypt to the northern
frontiers of Nubia: firstly, al-Wah al-Khags or Wah al-Bahlnc\sa.which
was- an important centre for the production of dates (tamr) and raisins
Czabib). ‘ Secondly, al-Wah al-Dakhila which came next to the first
Wah in the building (*imara) and covered many cities such as al-
Qugayr and al-Qalamun. Thirdly, al-Wah al-Khari.ja which was between
'5
al-Wah al-Dakhila and the countryside of Upper Egypt.
In 733/1333 Gaza became a province (niyaba) of Syria and its
governor (na’ib) had to correspond with the viceroy of Syria (na*ib
al-Sham) concerning the local affairs of Gaza. Before that Gaza was
£
a wilaya, and its governor corresponded with the Sul£an.‘ Abu al-
— 7Fida* regards Gaza as a Syrian province. Therefore it could be' 
said that this change respecting the political and the administrative 
position of Gaza affected the picture of the administrative division 
of Egypt during the period under study. Consequently we will not 
deal with Gaza in this work with regard to the administrative division 
of Egypt.
^Ibid.
2
Ibid; cf. Intisar, ii, 11.
•^Masalik, fols 202a-b (Paris Ms. 2325); cf. Intisar, ii, 11.
Zj.
Subh, iii, 393-394; cf. Intisar, ii, 11.
3
Subh, iii, 393-394; cf. Intisar, ii, 11-12.
r
Subh, iv, 198; Suluk, ii, 338.
7Bul, 238-239.
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(ii) The local administration
After the re-distribution of Egyptian land* the Na§iri rawk,
there were in Egypt twenty-four emirs, each was the commander of
1,000 horsemen of the Halqa (muqaddam * alf).~^  There were also
other emirs, each of whom had under his command more than seventy
horsemen. This statement is made by Ibn Fa£l Allah al-'Umari.
2
and recorded by al-Qalqashandi in Subh al-a*sha. There was one 
_ -z.
inspector (kashifY  for Upper Egypt and another for Lower Egypt; 
a few years later they became provinces (niyabat), nevertheless 
they maintained the two inspectors, each of whom had under his
_  if
command seventy horsemen (the emirs of al-tablakhanah).
Ibn Fa$l Allah al-*Umari records that there was a chief of 
police (wall) in Qus in Upper Egypt.^ The chiefs of police (wulat) 
of the a kept the Sultan informed of every detail concerning 
the internal affairs of their a*mal^ Accordingly, the Sultan made 
all the decisions with respect to local administration through the 
chancery (diwan al-* insha*). If the matter was vital the Sultan 
dealt with the essentials and left the polite formulas for the con-
_ n
fidential secretary (katib al-si rr).
^Subh, iv, l*f.
2
Ibid., iv, 15.
3
It seems that the function of the inspector (kashif) was to inspect 
the administrative affairs and the social situation of either Upper 
Egypt or Lower Egypt because each part had its own inspector (kashif); 
see Subh, iv, 25. ““
k
Ibid., iv, 25» 65.
^Masalik, fol. 195a (Paris Ms. 2325). 
c
Subh, iv, 59.
^Ibid.
i
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There were seven chiefs of police (wulat) in the wilayat of 
Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt, each of whom had under his command
seventy horsemen (the emirs of al-frablakhahah).  ^In Upper Egypt
_ _ . 2
there were four wilayat, each wilaya governed by one of these emirs.
  _ _ _  _ 3
These wilayat are al-Bahnasa, al-Ashmunayn, Qus and Uswan. There
was no chief of police in Asyut because the head of the administration
_ ^
or the governor-general (wall al-wulat.) resided there. Lower Egypt
was divided into four wilayat •. al-Sharqiyya, XL-Monufiyya, al-
5 __
Gharbiyya and al-Bu^ayra. These are the wilayat in Upper Egypt
£
and Lower Egypt which were administered by emirs of al-tablakhanah.
Although al-Qalqashandi mentions that there were only seven 
wilayat in Mamluk Egypt during this period he records eight. A chief
of police (wall) was appointed to each wilaya and lived in the
— — 7 —wilaya town (maqarraI,.walT), for example, in the wilaya cif al-Sharqiyya
g
the chief of police (wall) lived in Bilbays. In the wilaya of al- 
Manufiyya the chief of police (wall) lived in Manuf and in the wilaya 
of al-Gharbiyya the chief of police (wall) lived in al-Ma£alla al- 
Kubra. This wilaya, al-Gharbiyya, in lower Egypt, was as important
^Ibid., iv, 66; see also p.26.
2
Ibid., iv, 66.
•^Ibid., iv, 26, 66.
^Ibid., iv, 26, 66.
^Ibid., iv, 26-27, 66.
^Infra, 6^ , 7o.
^Subh, iv, 26-27, 66.
^Ibid., iv, 27,66.
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as the wilaya of Qus in Upper Egypt.
There was also the wilaya of al-Bu^ayra and the chief of 
police (wall) lived in the wilaya town (maqarr al-walT) of DamJlhur.^
2
There were al®other wulat, the emirs of twenty (al-*ashrawat),
3
each of whom had under his command approximately twenty horsemen.
There were seven wilayat in Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt ad- 
ministered in this way. There were three wilayat in Upper Egypt, 
a_L-JTza, ^ I^fl^ and Manflu£. Eour wilayat of this kind were in Lower
_ 5
I^ gypt, Manuf, Ushmum, Damiette and Qa£ya.
There was also the&ffice of controller (nagir) of al-JTza
'if
who was responsible for the Royal privy funds (al-khass al-SultanT)
t 6in all parts of al-JTziyya (tamal al-JTziyya).
There was a controller (nagir) in Upper Egypt (nagir al-Wa.jh al-
QjhlT) who was responsible for money left by any citizen who died 
7
without an heir. There was also a controller fulfilling the same
g
function in Lower Egypt (nazir al-Wa.jh al-BabrT). In all probability 
al-Na^ir Muhammad was responsible for appointing the chief admini­
strators of both provinces and a*mal.
During the period under study there were in the Mamluk Sultan­
ate two market inspectors (muhtasib-nagar al-hisba), one in Cairo and
^Ibid., iv, 27i66,
2
Ibid., iv, 66.
^Infra, 69.
S^nbfr, iv, 27, 66.
^Ibid., iv, 27» 28, 66, 67.
r
Ibid., iv, 33.
^Ibid., iv, 33. 
o
Ibid., iv, 3^ -.
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one in al-Eus£at.^ The latter was responsible for appointing the
_ 2chief of police (wall) of the a*mal in Upper Egypt. The Cairo in­
spector was responsible for appointing the chief of police of the
3
a*mal of Lower Egypt except for the city of Alexandria. These con­
tradictory statements appear in Subji al-a'sha. However, the Sultan 
was solely responsible for appointing the chiefs of police (wulat) 
of the a*mal and provinces in both Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt. 
Perhaps these contradictory statements are due to the frequent con­
sultations, all of which were written down but not dated.
There were two inspectors (kashif): one in Upper Egypt, the 
k
other in Lower Egypt. 1
A Royal Decree is recorded by al-Qalqashandi concerning the
_ 5
appointment of the controller of Alexandria (nagir). His responsi-
I
bilities were, firstly, to direct the internal affairs of Alexandria
with integrity; secondly, to maintain order; thirdly, to collect
the various taxes levied or the inhabitants and foreign merchants;
fourthly, to be lenient towards the foreign merchants and to behave
6
with justice towards them,- because they contributed to the national 
7
wealth; fifthly, to act towards the foreign merchants m  accordance 
with the Royal Decrees (al-marasim al-sharifa), and to adopt a bene­
volent attitude; sixthly, to send all the money so collected direct
^Ibid., iv, 37.
2Ibid.
^Ibid.
Zf
Subh., vii, 137; cf. Kashf, 129-130.
S^ubfr, vii, 226.
zr
Ibid., xi, ^20, *f21.
^Ibid., xi, ^21.
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to the Treasury; seventhly, to supervise every transaction which
increased the capital of the port; eighthly, to control the civil
servants and, on the other hand, not to be over strict with them;
ninthly, if the controller (nazir) observed any new events he
could send to the government in Cairo for consultation.'*' Subsequently
2
he would receive a reasonable answer.
Other Royal Decrees concerning the office of control (nagir)
in Alexandria are mentioned by al-Qalqashandi.^ He quotes a Royal
Decree concerning the nomination of the chief of police (wall) of
the wilaya of al-Sharqiyya. This decree deals firstly with the im-
portance of the wilaya; secondly with the maintenance of order;
thirdly, the protection of the citizens; fourthly, this position
was offered to this chief of police (wall) in consequence of his
strong personality, his good reputation, his honesty and his in- -
corruptability; fifthly, the decree deals with his duties to control
the conduct of the wilaya, trade, agriculture, construction and 
5
taxation.
This Royal Decree was issued by al-Nasir Muhammad.^ A similar 
Royal Decree had been issued concerning al-Gharbiyya by al-Nasir
7
Muhammad.
■*Tbid.
Subh, xi, 42; also cf.
5Ibid., xi, 40-42, 421-423
^Ibid., xi,
5Ibid., xi, 43-44.
^Ibid., xi, 44.
^Ibid., xi, 45-^7.
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Al-Qalqasnandi records a Royal Decree concerning the office 
of the governor-general (wall al-wulat) in Upper Egypt.'*' The 
decree mentions:
2
1. A prayer of thanks.
2. The importance of Upper Egypt was due to: firstly, that it 
was the route to Yemen and al-Hijaz and must have complete protection 
from outside attack; secondly, that there were important centres
in Upper Egypt and they were included in the decree: al-Bahnasa,
al-Ashmunayn, Qu§, Ikhmim, Asyu£, Manfalut and 'Iffi^. Within these 
territories were the assignments (iqta*s) of the Mamluk emirs of
_ __ ■Z
different ranks: tne emirs of thousands (muqaddamu al-’Uluf) , tne
emirs of seventy (’umara* al-tablakhanah), the soldiers (al-mamalik)
N 4and the troopers (a.jnad al-fralaqa;.
3. Owing to the extent and the importance of Upper Egypt it was 
necessary to appoint a governor-general (wall al-wulat) to maintain
5
order, to protect the people and the region from attack.
4. To protect Upper Egypt from rohbery and violence, a governor- 
general was appointed, a man of experience and integrity. The de­
cree states that the governor-general would introduce reforms and
• 4. ^suppress riots.
1rbid., xi, 426-427.
2Ibid., xi, 427-428.
^Ibid., xi, 428.
^Ipid.
^Ibid.
^Subh, xi, 429.
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5. The governor-general had to fulfil his duties according to 
the laws of Islam (shari'a) : 1 punish dishonesty, reward honour­
able conduct and show benevolence towards the people, and himself
2
be incorruptible.
On the other hand, it was part of his office to inspect other 
cities and provinces to see that law and order were maintained and
3
that there was no prostitution.
6. The government decreed that all the chiefs of police (wulat)
of the a*mal should obey the governor-general and sustain him in 
the fulfilment of his duties.
No protection was to be given to robbers and law breakers. If 
this law were infringed the penalty would be execution and confiscation 
of property.
7. MoreoVer, it was the governor-general1 s responsibility to
guard the city gates and outside the city walls.
8. Another edict forbade the Bedouins and the cultivators to
own horses and carry arms, under pain of punishment.
9. It was part of the governor-general1s office to encourage the
development of industry and trade, and to collect taxes from the 
traders; on the other hand, to show leniency in the fulfilment of 
his functions. If a merchant was brought to court he must be treated
A
with forebearance.
^Ibid., xi, 429.
^Ibid.
•^Subfr, xi, 430.
^Ibid.
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10. To help people in difficulty and to investigate thoroughly each 
case; to apply the laws of Islam and of the Sultan. At the same 
time the guilty must be punished.^
211. And may God bless you in the fulfilment of this office.
According to the Mamluk sources, al-Na§ir Muhammad chose very 
strict chiefs of police (wulat) for the a*mal and wilayat and gave 
them absolute power to maintain order and to keep the people in sub­
jection.^ The Mamluk sources reveal that the chiefs of police
(wulat) were unduly severe; when al-Nasir Muhammad became aware of
k
this he dismissed these wulat, confiscated their money and property 
and sent them into exile , as happened in the years 733/1333) 737/1336 
and 739/1338.^ If the chief of police (wall) or the inspector 
(kashif) fulfilled his duties satisfictorily he was promoted, as in
n
the case of Sayf al-DIn Zulugaya (d. 738/1337) who was, firstly, 
the chief of police (wall) of al-Sharqiyya, and al-Najir Muhammad
g
appointed him inspector of Lower Egypt. According to the Mamluk 
chronicles, there were many appointments and dismissals, as in the 
id lay at of Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt, namely al-Sharqiyya al-
^  . _  Q .........    . . .
Gharbiyya, Qus and al-Ashmunayn.
^Ibid., xi, 430-431.
2Ibid, xi, 431.
"'Nagir, fol. 23b; Suluk, ii, 301-302, 36I; Durar, ii, 209.
Nagir, fol. 23b; Durr, ix, 378; Suluk, ii, 338, -419, 463.
^Nagir, fol. 23b; Durr, ix, 378; Suluk, ii, 338, 419, 463.
^Suluk, ii, 358, 4191 463.
7 _
Ibn Hajar named him Dalday, see Durar, ii, 209.
^Nasir, fol. 23b.
^Misr, fols. 117a, 119b, 120a, 126a; Suluk, ii, 463.
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In Sha'ban 739/March 1339 al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed the emir
1 2 'izz al-DTn Azdamur Qu.1T, inspector of Lower Egypt, who was blood-
3
thirsty and imprisoned many lawbreakers and criminals.
Although the information with regard to this matter is brief, 
one might say that being strict and firm helped to hold the office 
of chief of police (wall) in an *amalor of a governor (na’ib) in a 
province in order to maintain order and to provide protection. Be­
sides, it could be said that al-Na$ir Muhammad practised that firm 
policy for public welfare and commonweal on the one hand, and to the 
advantage of his personal interests on the other.
Ibn Hajar records that*AlI b. Hasan al-MarwanT (d.740/1339) 
was first chief of police (wall) in Upper Egypt and later became 
chief of police (wall) of Cairo. In the fulfilment of his duties he 
was extremely severe.^ Therefore it can be assumed that his conduct 
was approved by the government. The Mamluk chronicles state no reasons
for these dismissals and appointments, merely the names of the chiefs 
5
of police (wulat), and few details regarding these dismissals and
appointments; we deduce from this that al-Nasir Muhammad chose men
_ 6 _
of powerful personalities as wulat.' The Mamluk historians give no 
reasons for these dismissals and appointments.
For his biography, see Durar, i, 333-336.
2Misr, fol. 121a.
^Pirar, i, 333.
4 
Ibid., iii, 40-4l.
^Misr,fols.118b, I20b-121a; Zetersteen, 198, 200, 201, 202; Suluk, 
ii, 270, 310, 4l0, 418-419.
r
Misr, fol. 121a; Durar, ii, 209.
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Al-Nasir Muhammad was very strict with his chiefs of police 
(wulat) and if he learnt of any impropriety of conduct, he dismissed 
them, punished them severely and confiscated their property.^
Al-Turkumani was the chief of police (wall) of al-Bufciayra,
_ 2
subsequently he became inspector (kashif) of Lower Egypt. Some
of the wulat who were dismissed were later reinstated, presumably
because of their experience or through the intercession of powerful
friends.^ The inspector (kashif) of Lower Egypt was responsible
for the prosperity of the region. When the office of chief of police
was offered and refused, the recipient was arrested and his property 
Zf
confiscated.
Qadidar (d. 730/1329)P  the chief of police (wall) of Cairo 
for a period of six years, was conscientious and succeeded in arrest­
ing many of the law-breakers (mufsidun); therefore al-Easir Muhammad 
gave him absolute authority which he. wielded. This proved that al- 
Na§ir Muhammad wanted his chiefs of police (wulat) to be firm but 
just.
Al-MaqrTzi states that in Jumada, I, 737/December 133& al- 
Fayyum was raided, one thousand, two hundred horsemen (fursan) were 
captured. The chief of police (wall) of al-Fayyum came with the 
Bedouin emirs and brought arms and horses. According to the Royal
7
Decree, the Bedouins were not allowed to carry arms or to own horses.
1Suluk, ii, 313, 413.
^Nasir, fol. 23a.
^Ibid.
b
Zetersteen, 132.
^For his biography, see Durar, iii, 244.
r
Suluk, ii, 300-301; Durar,iii, 244.
^Sulhk, ii, 424.
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Apparently al-Na^ir Muhammad was informed that the Bedouins in
al-Fayyum carried arms and owned horses; then, in order to be
sure, al-Nasir Muhammad ordered that al-Fayyum must be taken by
surprise. Subsequently al-Nagir Muhammad knew with certainty that
the situation in al-Fayyum was contrary to his ordersj therefore
the armed Bedouins were captured.
The coming of the chief of police (wall) of al-Fayyum,
accompanied by the Bedouin emirs, to al-Na§ir Muhammad with arms
and horses'*" proved that the situation in al-Fayyum was against al-
Nasir Muhammad's desire. Ov.ing to this event one might say that,
firstly, there were chiefs of police (wulat) who did not carry out
the Royal Decree including local affairs. Secondly, al-Nasir Muhammad
feared that the Bedouins might revolt against his rule if they were
allowed to carry arms and to own horses, or at least they might cause
disorder in their regions; therefore he opposed them.
According to al-Maqrlzi, one might say that the chief of police
(wall) of Alexandria, in order to maintain order and to provide public
_ 2
safety, could use both force and fines (gharamat), and be firm with 
the law-breakers (mufsidun).
In Rajab 727/May 1327 the inhabitants of Alexandria revolted 
against the chief of police (wall). Baybars al-Karkarl, and wanted 
to get rid of him.^ Then the emirs *Ala* al-DEn al-JamalT (d. 730/1330)^
~*~Suluk, ii, 424.
^Ibid., ii, 250.
^Durr, ix, 342.
Ll
Infra, 141, <
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Sayf al-DTn Tughan al-Shamsi (d. 7^1/13^0)^" and others went to
Alexandria to quell the revolt and to help Baybars al-Karkari
the chief of police (wall) of Alexandria. Subsequently many people
were arrested and thirty-one persons were executed because of
the part which they had taken in the riot. The magnates of
Alexandria (kibar al-balad) were arrested and fined 1,070,000 
2
dirhams. Thus, with force and firmness, the riot was subdued and 
conditions returned to normal.
Unfortunately Ibn al-DawadarT does not give any reason for the 
riot, and does not discuss in detail the factors which made the 
inhabitants of Alexandria take this aggressive attitude towards 
the chief of police (wall) of Alexandria. It might be both a 
question of lack of principle with regard to the personality of 
the chief of police (wall), and because the chief of police (wall) 
was extremely firm and strict that the inhabitants rose against his 
policy.
■3
In RabT*, II, 7^0/0ctober 1339» Jamal al-Kufah, the controller 
of privy funds (nagir al-khass) went to Alexandria and confiscated
all the property^ of Baybars al-KarkarT al-Rukni,^ the chief of
— 7police (wall) of Alexandria, who had died a short time before.
Jamal al-Kufah found many houses and shops and twenty gardens belonging
^For his biography, see Durar, ii, 227-228.
p
Durr, ix, 3^2 ; Duran, jy, 33 .^
No biography is found.
^Suluk, ii, 493.
^Nasir, fol. 69a; Zefcersteen, 203; Suluk, ii, ^93. 
c
His name and the exact date of his death are in dispute; for detailed 
information, see Nasir, fol. 69a; Zetersteen, 203; Suluk, ii, ^93.
^Suluk, ii, ^93.
77
to Baybars al-Karkari and sold them for 560,000 dirhams. When
Jamal al-Kufah completed the work he returned to Cairo.'*' Thus
al-Nasir Muhammad confiscated all the property of Baybars al- 
2
Karkari al-RuknT. Probably the confiscation of the property 
was accomplished for the benefit of the privy purse of the Sultan 
(al-khass al-Sultan”).
■ ■  ■  t r ~ .
Accordingly, it might be concluded that, firstly, Baybars al-
KarkarT was the chief of police (wall) of Alexandria for a long
period.^ Secondly, al-MaqrxzT here calls the chief of police (wall)
of Alexandria by the title governor (na*ib). But we knew that
Alexandria was changed from a wilaya into a province (niyaba) in
767/1360, and here al-Maqrizi speaks about Alexandria in 7^-0/1339
£
as a province ( niyaba) administered by a governor (na’ib). Thirdly, 
Baybars al-KarkarT was rich and therefore it could be said that the 
chief of police (wall) sometimes worked for his personal interests. 
Fourthly, the continuous confiscation respecting the emirs' property 
and wealth for the benefit of the Royal privy purse of al-Rasir 
Muhammad; therefore the economic factor played an important part 
in the confiscation of the property of the emirs and the chiefs of 
police (wulat) for the personal interests of al-Nagir Muhammad.
~*~Suluk, ii, 493.
p
Nagir, fol. 69a; Zetersteen, 205; Suluk, ii, +^93.
3
Supra, 62-63.
L
Suluk, ii, ^98.
S^ubfr, iii, A-08; iv, 2*f, 63-6 .^
^Suluk, ii, 498.
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Concerning Barqa, Ibn Fa^l Allah al-'Umarl states that 
Barqa was distributed among the Mamluk emirs (iqfra*s) for a 
time, and subsequently was distributed as iqta’s among the Bedouin 
emirs of Banu Sulaym.
(iii) The economic importance
The cibra of the Egyptian provinces (aqallm) was 9,584,064 
dinar .jayshl.^  The *ibra of Lower Egypt (Wilayat al-Wajh al-Ba^iri)
2 twas 6,228, 455 dinar .jayshl. This *ibra of Lower Egypt was
■2
distributed among its a^mal as appears in Table V.
Table V 
Lower Egypt
The * amal its *ibra
1. Al-Dawa^il 153i075 D.J.^
2. Al-Qalyubiyya 419,850 D.J.
3. Al-Sharqiyya 1,411,875 D.J.
4. Al-Daqahliyya 596,071 D.J.
5., Dawahi Thaghr Dimyat 11,100 D.J.
6. Al-Gharbiyya 1,844,471 D.J.
7. Al-Mctnufiyya 374,6291/3 D.J.
8-. Abyar wa Jazlrat BanI Nasr 200,232 D.J.
9. Al-Bufrayra - 741,294 D.J.
10. Fuwwa wa*l Muzahamatayn 50,846 D.J.
11. Nasturawa 43,500 D.J.
12 •
5
Al-JIziyya
c
62,000 D.J.
^Taqwlm, fol. 2b; cf. Sardy.ya, 3.
^TaqwTm, fol.-. 3a; Saniyya, 4; cf*. Table V.
~L
Taqvam, fols. 3a-b; cf. Saniyya, 3-4.
if ’ ..................... ..........................
D.J. = dinar jayshi.
^The land of dlwan al-khass or al-khass al-Sultanl is excepted, 
,see S a n iy .y a ftp----------------------------------------------------  :----
— Tn m  ~m, fnln.* ~^ a-b :_____ Saniyya, 3-4.« c.f. gupra, 61, Table IV.
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The *ibra of Upper Egypt (Wilayat al-Wajh al-QiblT) was 
3 »3351808^/2 and ^ /3 dinar jayshi^and was distributed among its 
a'mal as in Table VI. ^
Table VI
Upper Egypt
The 'amal its *ibra
1. Al-'IJfUiiyya lIt3,9971/2 D.J. 3
2. Al-Bahnasawiyya 1,301,6^2 D.J.
3. Al-Fayyumiyya 16^,050 D.J.
*f. Al-Ashmunayn 762,0^0 D.J.
5. Al-Asyufciyya 323,920 D.J.
6. Al-Ikhmimiyya 2^3,925^/3 D.J.
7. Al-Qusiyya k lk, 663V 2 D. J.^
The *ibra of DawaJpT Thaghr Alexandria was 11,000 dinar jayshi.^  
If we compare this with the *ibra of DawalpT Thaghr Dimyat we find
.......... g . . .  . . .
the two almost the same.
Ibn Fa£l Allah al-'UmarT records that Alexandria was the sea­
port (furda) of the West (al-gharb), Spain (al-Andalus) and the 
European Islands (.jaza’ir al-ifranj); from all these parts ships 
came to Alexandria loaded with goods, and from there the ships
~*~Taqwim, fol. 3”b; Saniyya, *f.
2
TaqwTm, fols. J>b-ka] cf. Saniyya, *f-5.
3 -D.J. = dinar jayshi.
If.
TaqwTm, fols. Jb-^ a; cf. Saniyya, f^-5.
5
TaqwTm, fol. 31; cf. Saniyya, k.
r...............................................
See Table V.
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returned with the local products of Alexandria. Unfortunately,
Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari does not mention any of these products
of Alexandria. Accordingly, it could be said that Alexandria was
almost an international market and free port for different kinds of
goods and a commercial centre for merchants, especially of the
2
Mediterranean countries.
Ibn Fa£l Allah al-'UmarT describes Alexandria as a city of
3
beautiful paved roads and cheap fruit. This shows that Alexandria 
had its own local production from its fertile land, and the fruit 
was of great amounts and accordingly low priced.
e
Moreover, Ibn Fa$l Allah al- Umari states that Damietta was
an important seaport, although it was not of the greatest import-
Zf
ance, like Alexandria in the Mamluk Sultanate.
Furthermore, Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari compares Alexandria with 
5al-Fustat, which means that al-Fustaf was a city of economic sig­
nificance. Therefore one could say that Alexandria was the first 
from the economic point of view.
Concerning the economic activity of Upper Egypt, Ibn Fagll 
Allah al-'UmarT states that Uswan was the way to 'Aydhab on the 
coast of the Fed Sea; from ‘Aydhab one could go to India, Abyssinia 
and Yemen.^ Thus 'Aydhab was a port of commercial activity, and 
the commercial relations between Mamluk Egypt and the Yemenite
merchants were strong, and the merchants enjoyed safe conduct in
Egypt. 3h consequence, there was commercial exchange between Egypt
^Masalik, fol. 196b (Paris Ms. 232,5).
2
For details about Alexandria as a seaport, see Subhi Labib, "Egyptian 
Commercial policy in the Middle Ages", Studies in the Economic history 
of the Middle East, ed. Cook, 5^» 66-67i 71* 73.
^Masalik, fol. 197a (Paris Ms. 2325).
4
Ibid., fol. 196b.
■^Ibid.-................................................... ..........r
Masalik, fol. 195b (Paris Ms. 2325).
Subhi Labib, on.cit., 68-69.
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and the other parts of the world, both in the East and the West; 
besides the economic activity in both Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt 
was continuously vivid and vital.
About Barqa, Ibn Fa^l Allah al-'Umari records that Barqa was 
of great significance with regard to there being grassland for 
riding animals (horse, mule, donkey) and for beasts.^ Barqa's 
horses were famous and strong, but one could not compare the famous 
Arab horses from al-Hijaz, al-Ba^irayn and Syria with the horses of 
Barqa, although the latter were good and expensive. The Egyptian 
soldiers (.jund, al-Mamalik) were always eager to buy horses from 
Barqa.^
The Bedouins of Barqa lived on pasture and cultivation, and 
they were primitive in their way of living. Al-Nasir Muhammad per­
mitted the Bedouin emirs of Banu Sulaym large iqta’s, for example
■z
the emir Fa*id b. Muqaddam, who was a muqfa* of an extensive part 
of Barqa.
Respecting the iq^a* s of the Mamluk emirs we find that al-
Na^ir Mufctammad had the absolute authority to assign the places in 
_ 5
which those iqta*s must be; therefore al-Na§ir Muhammad was care- 
* ful that the iqta* s of the Mamluk emirs and the troopers (a.jnad al- 
fralqa) were scattered to weaken their position; for example, an 
iqta* of an emir of high rank would not be near to another iqta* 
belonging to another emir of similar rank, so that al-Nafir Muhammad
ifoasalik, fol. 203a (Paris Ms. 2323).
^Ibid.
^Infra, 222.
^Masallk, fols. 202b-203a (Paris Ms. 2323).
. ^ Khitat, i,.Part I,.lVf..........................................
82
could centralize the power in his hands and be absolutely certain
of the security of his political position as the head of the
Mamluk Sultanate."^ "
Al-Maqrlzl accuses the Copts of being responsible for the
determined policy undertaken by al-N5§ir Muhammad against the 
2
Mamluk emirs. Al-MaqrizI records that the Copts succeeded in 
arousing al-Nasir Muhammad's feelings against the Mamluk emirs; 
on the other hand, al-Nasir Muhammad was favourably deposed to 
the Copts, who adopted Islam. 1
Large parts of the Egyptian land were kept for the benefit 
of the Royal privy purse (al-dlwan al-Sultanl, al-khass al-Sharif);
therefore the biggest share of the whole *ibra of the Egyptian
_ 5
land went to the Sultan, especially in al-JTza and Alexandria.
As we know the importance of al-JTza for its fertile land and the 
significance of Alexandria as one of the most important sea ports 
in the Mediterranean, we are not in need of further explanation 
of why al-Nasir Muhammad had personal interest in those areas.
(iv) The NasirT reforms
In 711/1311 al-Na§ir Muhammad decided to dredge the Canal 
of Alexandria,^" in order to preserve water throughout the year;
^Khitat, i, part I,
^Ibid., i, pant I, 1^3.
^Infra, 249.
Schitat, i, part I, 1^3.
^Saniyya, 137-138, 1^2, 1^3 . 1^3, 1^6, 1V7, 131, 132.
^Nujum, ix, 217; cf. Khitat, i, part II, 301.
83
accordingly, al-Nagir Muhammad commanded the Mamluk emirs to supply 
a share of the workmen, and all the chiefs of police of provinces 
(wulat al-aqalim) went to Alexandria to supervise the operation.^
The work began in Rajab 71l/November 13111 with a work force of 
^0,000 labourers; the object was to widen and deepen the Canal.
When the work was completed and the Canal became wider and deeper they
builtarched bridges (qanatir).They discovered a large amount of
_ _ 2
lead (ragas). Afterwards the people built water-wheels (sawaql),
3
a new village was founded and called al-Nasiriyya. The extent of 
the land which was used was 100,000 faddan; they constructed 600 
water-wheels (sawaqi) and *f0 villages. Consequently this facilitated 
the approach of large vessels. There were about 1,000 fields under 
cultivation, and a sufficient number of villages to house the people. 
Thus the waste land became useful in every way and the people came 
to live there.
They constructed an embankment (jisr) and used lead (rasas) for 
the foundation. The work took three months to construct. Subse­
quently, they constructed 30 arched bridges of stone and brick. The
_ _ 5cost of the embankment was 60,000 dinars, and there was an old 
palace outside Alexandria which was demolished in order to use the 
stone from which it was built. In the foundations of the palace
N^un'urn, ix, 217-218.
2
Khitat, i , part II, 301; Nujum, ix, 217-218.
3
Nujum, ix, 218.
Zt
Khitat, l, part II, 301; Nujum, ix, 218.
^Khitat, i, part II, 301; Nujum, ix, 218-219.
Khitat, i, part II, 302; Nujum, ix, 219.
was a strip of lead (ragag) which led from the palace to the
1 2 sea; there was an immense quantity of this metal, lead.
In 71^/131 +^1 al-Nagir Muhammad was very anxious to construct
_ -Z
a large number of embankments (.jusur) and irrigation canals.
In order to realize this scheme he sent the emir *Iz al-D^ r. .
Aydamur al-Khatirl^ to al-Sharqiyya, the emir 'Ala’ al-DTn Ay- 
5 _
daghdi ShaqTr to al-Bahnasawiyya, the emir Sharf al-Din Husayn
b. Jciy^ aw'- 1° Asyu£ and Manfalu£, the emir Sayf al-Din Aqul al-
. 8 9Hajib to al-Gharbiyya, the emir Sayf al-Din Quill to al-
Tal^awiyya and Bilad al - A shmunayn, the emir Badr al-Din Jankall
al-Baba^ to al-Qalyubiyya,^ the emir 'Ala* al-Din al-Tallli^ to
13 1 - 1k - 15al-Bu^ayra, the emir Badr al-Din Bakfcut al-Shamsi to al-Fayyum,
the emir Sayf al-Din Bahadur al-Mu'izzi to Ikhmim and the emir
Baha* al-Din Aglam^ to Qus."^
^Khitaf, i, part II, 302; Nujum, ix, 219.
2
For the whole work, see Nujum, ix, 217-219.
•^Suluk, ii, 137; . Nujum, ix, 38.
M E * ’ 2 ^ 5  •
^Infra, 1 2 5 •
£
For his biography, see Durar, ii, 50-52,
7 •>
No biography is found.
0
Suluk, ii, 137-138; Nu-jum, ix, 38-39.
9
No biography is found.
^Infra, 156, 265.
~*~^Suluk, ii, 138; Nujum, ix, k0.
12No biography is found.
^ Suluk, ii, 138.
^For his biography, see Durar, i, ^89.
^Suluk, ii, 138.
16----No biography is fuund.
'Infra, | 5 o •
■^ ■^ uluk, ii, 138; Nujum, ix, AO.
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Accordingly it could be said that the Mamluk government paid 
great attention and beneficial supervision under al-Nasir Mufcammad's 
rule with regard to cultivation and irrigation.
The troopers (a.jnad al-halqa) complained that the emirs annexed 
their land, but al-Na^ir Muhammad refused to listen to their com­
plaints. The reason for this annexation was as follows: when al-
Na^ir Muhammad constructed the embankments (jusur) and built arched 
bridges (qanatir) the river water was kept in and formed a reservoir
which increased until it became a lake or small canal which was vital
1 2 to irrigation.. Then one of the emirs, Rukn al-Din al-Qalnajql -
the inspector (kashif) of al-Bufrayra - asked al-Na§ir Muhammad to
give his son an assignment (khubz ) in this rich area, al-Bu^ay^a.
Subsequently, al-Nasir Muhammad sent the emir Aytamush al-
Muhammadl with the accountant of finances in the vizierate (mustamfi
Lj.
al-dauila), al-Muwafaq, to measure these lands; they found it was 
25»000 faddan.^ They returned with the measurements (masharifo), 
the documents in which the measurements were recorded.^ However, 
the. emirs had mis-stated the measurements and recorded only 15»000 
faddan, because the land was divided among the emirs (muqta/s). 
Therefore al-Na^ir Muhammad assigned to them between 300 and 400
^Suluk, ii, 231.
^ o  biography is found.
•^Suluk, ii, 231.
4No biography is found. 
5Suluk, ii, 231.
6Suluk, ii, 231, fn.6.
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dinars permits (mithalat); subsequently the troopers (a.jnad al- 
halqa) were indignant'*' because that money was taken from their 
assignments.2
In 725/1325 al-Na§ir Muhammad decided to dig a new canal which 
extended from outside Cairo to Siryaqus, in order to widen the Great 
Canal. ^ Besides, he wanted to build water-wheels (sawaql) and to
4
plough the surrounding land. Al-Nagir Muhammad wanted that new 
Canal (the Na§irl Khali.j) to be wide enough to allow ships to trans- 
port crops when the Nile was at its height during floods. In order
to execute his plan al-Nasir 'Muhammad placed the work completely in
7 _ __
the hands of his vicegerent, the emir Arghun al-Dawadar. The
latter went with the engineers (muhandisun) to the Nile to choose 
the most suitable site in that part of Upper Egypt. Finally they 
decided on.Siryaqus. They brought labourers from different a^al
O  \
to start digging in Jumada, I, 725/April 1325. They destroyed 
the houses and the gardens in that area in order to use the land 
for their construction. Subsequently al-Na^ir Muhammad compensated 
the owners of the property. The work lasted two months. They
^Suluk, ii, 231.
2Ibid.
■Z _
Khitat, iii, part I, 34; Nu.jum, ix, 80.
Zj. __
Nu.jum, ix, 80.
^Khitat, iii, part I, 34, 35; Nujum, ix, 80, fn. 1.
£
Nujum, ix, 80.
n
Khitat, iii.i part I, 34; Nujum, ix, 8l.
^Khitat, iii, part I, 34; Nujum, ix, 8l. 
^Khitat, iii, part I, 34; Nujum, ix, 8l-82.
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constructed many arched bridges (qantara, qanatir).~*~ When the
work was finished, the Canal was used for shipping, the water-
_ 2
wheels (sawaqi) supplied water for irrigation. Therefore a settle­
ment developed including houses, gardens and farms. On 6th Jumada, 
II, 723/20th May 1323 al-Nasir Muhammad inspected in person the
entire work; he was pleased and satisfied with the success and
3
there were celebrations.
In 738/1337 al-Nagir Muhammad decreed that a new embankment 
(jisr) must be constructed on the eastern bank of the Nile to pre­
vent flooding. Therefore, to construct this embankment engineers 
were brought from Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt. They decided to re­
move the sand and to widen the Nile so that the water flowed into 
If
a Canal; then they raised the embankment to protect Cairo from 
5
floods. Then al-Na^ir Muhammad returned to the Citadel of Cairo 
and gave his permission for the plan to be carried out. Subse­
quently al-Na§ir Muhammad sent postboys (barTdi, burud) with his 
Royal command to bring men from different a*mal, and superintendents 
(mushiddun) were to accompany their labourers. They also summoned 
stonemasons (hajjarun) to prepare material for malting the embankment. 
Then the stones (hi.jara) were transported to the river-bank where 
the embankment was to be built. Within ten days men came from
^Khitat, iii, part I, 3^-33; Nu.jum, ix, 82-83.
2 _
Khitat, iii, part I, 33; Nujum, ix, 83.
-z. _
Khitat, iii, part I, 33; Nujum, ix, 83-8 .^
^Suluk, ii, 449-^30.
•^Ibid., ii, ^30.
6Ibid.
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1 _ t 2
different parts (nawahl) and the emirs Kbagha *Abd al-Wa]pid and
■^Sahbngha al-Hajib^ received the men, organizing and distributing 
the work among them.
The chief of police of Cairo (wall al-Qahira) and the chief 
of police of Fus^ aj; (wall Misr) conscripted all the men required 
and forced them to work on the embankment. Men were seized from 
the mosques and the markets; therefore the people remained in 
their houses and dared not go out. The work began and continued 
until some^ of the men fell unconscious and were covered in sand, 
in consequence they died immediately. This was the fate of many
5
workmen. Al-Na§ir Muhammad came to inspect the work and insisted 
that the work be accomplished in the shortest time. The work was 
terminated in two months. While the work was in progress twelve 
ships sank.^
23,000 ships transporting the rocks were discharged to form 
the embankment. The machines employed were made of wood and very 
strong ropes were used for this purpose. In a certain place, al-
Jazira, they excavated deeply to form a Canal (khali.j) to conserve
......................  ' ■ ■ 7..................
extra water when the Nile was at flood. They realized the importance
^Suluk, ii, ^30.
^No biography is found.
■^ For his biography, see Durar, i,
L
Suluk, ii, ^30.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Suluk, ii, -^30-^ 31.
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of this work during the floods, and al-Na§ir Muhammad was exultant 
at the result.'*'
2In Shabin, a part of al-Manufiyya in Upper Egypt, the pressure 
of the water against the embankment, which had been already con­
structed by al-Nasir Muhammad, was so great that it overflowed and 
flooded the lower land. Therefore al-Na§ir Muhammad decided that 
another embankment was essential to withstand the pressure of the 
water.^ It was in Rabi*, II, 7^-O/October 1339 when al-Na§ir Muhammad
appointed one of the emirs, Baybugha^ the falconer (fraris al-tair),
5
to supervise the work.
Al-Na^ir Muhammad raised a levy to cover this extra cost. He 
levied on the villages ^ /8 dirham per dinar. They conscripted the 
workmen'and constructed the embankment (jisr) of bricks and plaster 
(.jibs). Finally the work was completed. It was of great use be- 
cause it enabled the irrigation of a large extent of land. Conse­
quently al-Nasir Muhammad was concerned to build embankments (jusur) 
in certain reaches of the Nile. The work was carried out under 
government supervision. There was public contribution towards the 
cost. The Mamluk government was anxious to protect the agricultural 
land for the benefit of the country. Al-Na§>ir Muhammad was concerned 
with agricultural reform and irrigation, and also to enhance his 
own popularity. These improvements increased.the prosperity of the 
country as a whole.
^Suluk, ii, ^31.
2
Khitat, iii, part I, 73-
^Suluk, ii, A-93. 
kFor his biography, see Durar, i, 511 •
^Suluk, ii, ^51.
^Ibid., ii, -^93.
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In 7^1/13^0 al-Na§ir Muhammad went to Birkat al-Habash, out­
side Cairo, accompanied by engineers, and decided to dredge a small 
Canal from the Nile to the foot of the mountain. Then he planned 
to dig for wells, ten in number, of the depth of forty dhira*, and 
to construct water-wheels^" in order that the water could be drawn 
from the Nile to the aqueducts (qanatir) to provide water for the 
Citadel of Cairo. Al-Nasir Muhammad appointed the emir Abgha 
*Abd al-Wa^id to supervise the work. Many houses were destroyed
2
in making the Canal* They mobilized the stonemasons (^ajjarun).
3
The work proved a great success.
Al-Na§ir Muhammad was greatly concerned with al-JTza, so that
_  ij._____ __
he constructed many embankments (.jusur) and aqueducts (qanatir)
_ c
throughout al-JTza; for example, in * Umm Dinar where the work 
was completed in two months.^ It was al-Nasir Muhammad who initiated 
the work and succeeded in protecting the land from flooding. This 
work was beneficial to the inhabitants of al-JTza. Much of the land
n _
came under cultivation. There were five aqueducts (qanatir) on
g
the Na^irT Canal (al-KhalT.j al-NasirT). Then many aqueducts 
(qanatir) were constructed during al-Na§ir Muhammad’s reign and by
"^ Khitat, iii, part II, 1 63; Nu.jum, ix, l60-l6l.
2 _Khitat, iii, part II, 163; Nujum, ix, l6l.
^Nujum, ix, l6l; cf. Khitat, iii, part II, 163. 
k
Nu.jum, ix, 190.
^Ibid.
^Infra, 259.
7 _Nu.jum, ix, 190.
o
Khitat, iii, part I, 33-
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his own command, for example, Qanatir al-siba in 733/133^1
1 2 Qanfarat *Aq Snnqur, Qanatir al-awnz in 723/1323, Al-Qan£ara
al-jadida in 723/1323, Qanatir ban! Wa’il in 723/1323i Qanfcara al- 
amiriyya in 723/1323, Qanatir bab al-bafyr in 723/1323 aJid Qanatir 
al-Hgjib in 725/1325.3
Lastly, it could be said that great care was taken by al-Nasir 
Muhammad in the economic administration and the social improvement 
in. the Egyptian wilayat and districts (nawafr!). Besides, al-Na§ir 
Muhammad was concerned about his popularity among his subjects.
Thus the Na§iri reforms served the political and the economic aims 
of the Mamluk government during the period under study. On the 
other hand, there were chiefs of police (wulat) who were unfaithful 
with regard to either their internal administration in those parts 
where they held the administrative offices, or in their attitude 
as officials responsible for carrying out their duties with sin­
cerity, especially in their relations with al-Nasir Muhammad, the 
head of the Sultanate, who was presumably anxious to see them ful­
filling their obligations efficiently.
(v) Conclusion
The administrative system in the Mamluk Sultanate was efficient 
because there was a central administration in Cairo where the most
important offices (dawawln) were situated and the head administrators
lived. Besides, there was a local administration in each province 
(iqllm) under the control of the chiefs of police (wulat al-aqalim).
There was a chief of police (wall) who was responsible for the 
protection of the *amal from outside interference and internal
1Ibid., iii, part I, 37.
^Ibid., iii,.part I, 39.
^Khitat, iii, part I, 38-^0, kk.
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disruption; tnerefore the Sultans were careful to appoint those 
in whom they had complete confidence and who were already known for 
their bravery and administrative skill.
The chief of police of Cairo (wall) was responsible for the
protection of Cairo, and for maintaining order within the city,
namely, to arrest the thieves and the agitators, and the governor
of Cairo and his civilian force for the control of fire, riot and
general protection of civilians. Besides one of his duties was to
prevent the making and distribution of alcohol and to prevent the
cultivation and the consumption of hashish. Consequently the chief
of police (wall) of Cairo was fully occupied. He had to protect
and maintain the gates of Cairo and to survey the closing of these
gates at night to protect the city from attack. There were also 
»
other administrators whose concern it was to help the chief of police 
(wall) of Cairo, for example, the governor of Mi§r (Fus£a$).
Special consideration was given to Alexandria because there 
were many foreign communities; it was a very prosperous port and 
it had a flourishing international trade. Also Uswan, which had be­
come self-sufficient owing to its importance as a purt during the 
reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad. There was an inspector (kashif) for 
Lower Egypt where authority included all the provinces (aqalim) 
of the Delta, and another inspector (kashif) for Upper Egypt, whose 
authority included all the provinces (aqalim) of Upper Egypt. None 
of the administrators who held the highest offices nor those who 
held the lower offices enjoyed permanent positions. Each of these 
officials could be dismissed, imprisoned or even killed merely on 
suspicion or because he was not competent; sometimes the dismissed 
official might be exiled to another city, such as Jerusalem, or
Mecca . It was possible that an important official might be exiled 
to a distant province on suspicion of plotting.
The administrative division of Egypt during this period was 
divided into limited provinces because the power of the Mamluks 
was sustained by military force. Although Egypt was divided into 
a*mal, that does not imply tnat every camal had its own chief of 
police (wall); besides some wilayat were divided into small ad­
ministrative parts. Each chief of police (wall), irrespective of 
the extent of his wilaya, owed the same subjection to the Sultan, 
who had the power to appoint or dismiss him.
All the Mamluk governors, especially the emirs, were responsible 
for preserving order within the cities and provinces.
There was one market inspector (mufrtasib) in Cairo who was 
responsible for the conduct of the markets and the control of the ' 
merchants; besides there was the chief of police (wall) of Cairo who 
was in completely control of the functioning of the entire process.
The money which the emirs earned by the sale of their produce 
(*ibra) fluctuated because of shortage or the poverty of the crops, 
or because of a re-distribution of the land, the NasirT rawk, which 
affected the administrative division of Egypt, or even because of 
neglect of the land, which deteriorated. Sometimes the Mamluk 
emirs (muqta*s) restored the fertility of the land, subsequently 
producing crops, and the money which resulted was used for the 
enrichment of the land and the land-owners, the Mamluk emirs. For 
example, Kawm al-Wadan in al-Gharbiyya in Lower Egypt, the *ibra 
was 500 dinars before the Na§iri rawk and after the 20-distribution 
of land became 823 dinars.^  The shortage of labour affected,the
■*Tor details see Saniyya, 63-68.
9^+
size of the crops, as happened in Tabrlna in al-Buhayra in Lower 
Egypt when profits rose from ^00 dinars to 750 dinars because 
there was an increase in the labour force.^ Sometimes the profits 
did not fluctuate because of the stability of conditions.
If we examine the functioning of the Nasirl rawk as a re­
distribution of the land would this reveal the importance of the 
economic and social factors? Probably it would reveal that, for 
example, the Mamluk emirs complained sometimes of the extent of the 
duties claimed by the government. The soldiers objected to the ill- 
treatment which they suffered at the hands of their masters, the 
Mamluk emirs (muqta*s).
The cultivators complained of the treatment received at the 
hands of the Mamluk emirs (muqta*s), and the excessive taxes which 
they had to pay, and the attacks to which they were subjected at 
the hands of the robbers on the roads.
The people endured miserable conditions owing to heavy taxation 
and the demands of the tax collectors and the tax farmers for sums 
of money for their own pockets, and the manner in which the taxes 
were enforced; therefore the re-distribution of iqta*s benefited 
the population.
The administrative division o£ Egypt into separate units in­
creased the productivity of the land.
There were great extremes in the economic conditions throughout 
Egypt which caused social unrest; subsequently there were politi­
cal movements which affected the nature of the adrrinistrative division 
there.
^For details, see Saniyya, 116-123; Taqwim, fols. 38b-6lb.
Al-Nasir Muhammad was the sole source of power who appointed 
the chiefs of police (wulat) of the wilayat and a*mal, hut he was 
careful to consult the judges (quflat) and high ranking emirs.
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Chapter III 
THE POLITICAL PLOTS
(i) The political situation
It seems that al-Nasir Muhammad, in order to come to power, 
directed his attention to achieve many factors for a strong founda­
tion of a new era. Probably al-Na§ir Muhammad realized, through 
his personal experience, that having a strong and united league 
supporting high aims which aspired to take over the government was 
of great importance for what help and support tnis union could give.^ 
Besides, it appears that the strong position of Baybars al-Jashnaklr 
and Sayf al-Kun Salar in the state was one of the important factors 
which, according to al-Na^ir's view, helped them to act against his 
power; therefore, the question arises here, how far would al-Na§ir 
Muhammad work to limit the legislative power and to minimize the 
executive authority of the Mamluk emirs? And to what degree would
the failure of al-Na§ir Muhammad's co-operation with Baktamur al-
_ 2Jukandar against Baybars al-Jashnaklr and Salar oe a lesson to 
al-Na§ir Muhammad during the third period of his rule, when he be­
came his own master? Moreover, it appears that al-Na§>ir Muhammad
became certain of his popularity among the populace1of Cairo, al- 
5
tammah; the question which should be asked here is to what extent would 
al-Na§ir Muhammad take advantage of that condition? And how far 
would the internal policy of al-Na§ir Muhammad be affected by that
1
Nu.jum, viii, 233-239.
%ujum, viii, 170-173.
%br detailed information, see Suluk, ii, 67; Nu.jum, viii, 173,
2¥f, 26*+, 268, 270, 271.
standing? Seemingly, the failure of the conspiracy planned by 
al-Nagir Muhammad and Baktamur al-Jukandar in 707/1307 against 
Baybars al-Jashnakir and Sayf al-Din Salar, the close friendsnip 
between Baybars and Salar during the second reign of al-Na^ir 
Muhammad and the unfriendly relation between the two after al- 
Nagir Muhammad gave up his position in the Mamluk Sultanate.^
These events, however, affected the nature of al-Nasir Muhammad's 
behaviour with the Mamluk emirs. It is likely that al-Nagir Muhammad 
became certain that every emir worked to fulfil personal aims; 
subsequently, how far would al-Na§ir Muhammad change his character 
with different diplomatic and political aspects for the cause of 
his own power?
In ftama^ lan 703/March 1308 al-Na§ir Muhammad left Cairo with 
his family, ostensibly for a pilgrimage, but in reality to accomplish 
his plan of resignation from office and establish his residence at 
al-Karak, and the emirs commended him to God’s protection while 
they were still on horseback. Afterwards al-Nagir Muhammad wrote to 
them from al-Karak about his resignation.
When the emirs knew about the abdication, they wrote furiously 
to al-Najir Muhammad asking him to come back to Cairo. When he re­
ceived their demand, he answered that he would stay, isolated, at
al-Karak until the crisis was over with God's will, either by death
2
or by another solution. This statement by al-Nasir Muhammad could 
be estimated as a turning point in the historic nature of the Mamluk 
regime under the rule of al-Na§ir Muhammad. Besides, it could be 
inferred-that al-Nagir Muhammad's residence at al-Karak was not a
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genuine intention of a lasting resignation and definite abdication.
It was probably a step which had to be taken by him, either for 
better conditions concerning his position as ruler of a great 
kingdom, or for the sake of his honourable dignity and his high­
mindedness.
In other words, al-Na§ir refused to be a governor of a country 
without wielding any kind of power, while the different kinds of 
authority were in the hands of Baybars and Salar. Therefore, it 
was not the end of his reign, but was almost a period of preparation 
for a new rule, an era in which he could practise his legitimate 
rights in government. On the other hand, being so eager to have al- 
Nagir Muhammad back on the throne means that Baybars and Salar 
were afraid that they might not succeed in having absolute approval 
from the Mamluk emirs and the complete support of the people. Further­
more, they themselves were no longer friends and each tried hard to 
seek personal aims at the expense of the other. Immediately after,
al-Na^ir Muhammad knew that Shams al-IEn Qarasunqur,^  Qabjaq al-
2 3 _
MangurT, and Asandamur Kurj'T, the governors of Aleppo, Hamah and
Tripoli respectively, refused to acknowledge Baybars al-Jashnakir as
sovereign or to pay homage to him and they even sent to al-Nasir
Muhammad informing him of their support and readiness for military
help to return him to power. Here again al-Na^ir Muhammad gives a
clear picture, according to the Mamluk historians, of his situation
and how it was only temporary, yet they should be subject to the
^Infra, 114.
^For his biography,see, Durar, iii, 24-1-24-3.
^For his biography,see Durar, i, 387-388.
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existing power and must assume the burdens of government. Therefore
the three governors swore an oath of loyalty to Baybars al-JashnakI
Subsequently, one might say that it was a period of waiting, of
thinking and of preparation until the suitable opportunity arrived.
The Mamluk writings agree that al-Nasir Muhammad, in his letter 
2
to Baybars, used to address him with his royal title al-Malaki al-
MuzaffarT for the purpose of peace, while Baybars kept asking for
3
al-Nagir Muhammad's loyalty and subjection. Yet, at the same time, 
when al-Na§ir Muhammad was confirming his subjection to Baybars al- 
Jashnaklr, he wrote to the governors of Aleppo, Hamah, Safad and
/f
Tripoli for help and support, and they granted his request willingly.
Thus, al-Na§ir Muhammad started working for his return to Cairo with
a new policy; it was a practical policy of diplomatic and political
aspect. Moreover, al-Na§ir Muhammad tried to use the factor of
affection and sympathy with the governors of the Syrian provinces by
reminding them of his ancestral line, his forced abdication, his
helpless condition, his patience with Baybars, who displayed arrogance
towards al-Nasir Muhammad's Mamluks, horses and arms, and lastly,
5 ...............
asking them for help.
Probably al-Na^ir’ Muhammad succeeded in making these governors 
favourably disposed towards him and deeply attached to his status. 
However, this is the first time that we see al-Nasir Muhammad using 
this kind of diplomacy in seeking the Syrian governors' compassionj
^Nujum, viii, 238-2^2.
2 _
For the text of this letter, see Suluk, ii, 52-33.
■^ Suluk, ii, 52-53; Nujum, viii, 2^5.
Sfaluk, ii, 57-58, 6l; Nujum, viii, 2^7.
Ibar, v, part V, 907-908; Suluk, ii, 58.
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apparently he expected the sympathy and support that he had earned
by his deeds. It seems that, under the influence of sympathy,
decency and nobility on the one hand, and the feeling of responsibility
on the other hand, the Syrian governors were totally prepared to.give
al-Na§ir Muhammad the aid, promotion and encouragement which he needed.
It might be also that the Syrian governors helped al-Nasir Muhammad
in their own political interests, that Baybars al-JashnakTr might one
day act against them, or they thought that through the help which
they would give al-Nasir Muhammad they could achieve higher positions
*
in the ruling field of the state. Mostly they became his right hand 
in helping him in his hopeless situation which al-Nasir Muhammad could 
not longer bear, and eagerly worked to regain his royal position and 
restore the status quo.
In Sha'ban 709/January 1310 al-Nasir Muhammad left al-Karak for 
Damascus, accompanied by his helpful and sincere emirs, and the 
public were extremely happy and warmly welcomed his return.^ Soon 
in Damascus the Muslim Friday sermon, khufcba, was changed and de­
livered in al-Na^ir Muhammad’s name instead of Baybars al-Jashnakir’5 ;
2
it was in reality a memorable day. Concerning the situation in
£}gypt, we find that Baybars’ supporters severely blamed him for
being friendly with Salar whom they saw as the cause of the unstable
3
position because of his jealousy and misguidance. This data gives 
us the opportunity to see the importance of the office of vicegerent 
of Egypt (na’ib al-Saltana bi*l-diyar al-Misriyya) and allows us to 
ask what action al-Na§ir Muhammad would take respecting this office, 
especially after he realized the significance of the post and,
^Durr, ix, 171-172; cUyun, xii, fols. 136b-137a; Suluk, ii, 66-67; 
Nujum, viii, 267.
p
JUyun, xii, fol. 137b; Suluk, ii, 6 8; Nujum, vii, 268.
^Suluk, ii, 39* 61, 70; Nujum, viii, 270.
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at the same time, how far that dignity could be dangerous to great
power. Besides, if al-Na§ir Muhammad abolished the office of vice-
gerency of the Sultanate what would be the reaction by the Mamluk
oligarchy regarding that cancellation?
In Ramadan 709/February 1310 the khutba of Friday prayer in all
the mosques of Cairo was delivered in the name of al-Nasir Muhammad,
while he was on his way to Cairo.^ Eventually Baybars ai-Jashnakir
was strangled in the presence of al-Na§ir Muhammad in Dhu'l-Qa'da
709/April 1310, and the third reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad began.
Hence, al-Na§ir Muhammad began his third reign by putting an end to
3
the life of Baybars al-Jashnakir. This point throws some light on 
al-Nagir Muhammad's political methods with the powerful emirs for the 
sake of his absolute power, as we will see throughout this chapter.
In addition^ it appears that what al-Na$ir Muhammad did to Baybars 
was only the beginning of a long series of actions against the strong 
Mamluk oligarchy, and it would not finish untilthe end of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad's life. Seemingly, Baybars' hopes were frustrated sooner 
than he had imagined. In order to explain in detail; firstly, al- 
Na§ir Muhammad always enjoyed great popularity, and he was still 
popular during the rule of Baybars al-Jashnakir. Probably it was
not easy for the populace of Cairo to forget al-Na§ir Muhammad. 
Secondly, al-Na§ir Muhammad desired to rule, to take over the govern­
ment, and to come to power, worked and planned efficiently to achieve 
his claim, and to accomplish his desire to be the head of the Mamluk 
Sultanate and his own master at the same time. Thus al-Nasir Muhammad 
in 709/1310, being a man whose character and personality had changed
^Suluk, ii, 71.
2Suluk, ii, 72-73; Nujum, viii, 273-276.
•^ For details, see Durr, ix, 197-204; *Uyuri, xii, fols. 133a-l38b#
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deeply, started his third period of rule with a varied policy of 
political astuteness, diplomatic cunning and administrative subtlety; 
these aspects would be obviously noticed through a study concerning 
his relations with the Mamluk oligarchy, and his behaviour towards 
the sincere supporters who helped him in making arrangements and 
preparations for a successful return to power. Subsequently, al-Na§ir 
Muhammad turned his attention towards Sayf al-DIn Salar, who claimed 
power during the second reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad at his expense.'*' 
Carefully al-Nagir Muhammad started to plan Salar1s fate; he was
friendly to him after his return, accepted his precious gifts and made
_ 2
him the governor of al-Shawbak in Shawwal 709/April 1310. A few months
later, al-Na§ir Muhammad sent for Salar to come back to Cairo, but the 
latter gave the excuse that he was ill and unable to travel. Conse­
quently al-Nasir Muhammad dispatched an immediate order to the governors
of the Syrian provinces to take care to prevent Salar*s flight, and
 3 4
simultaneously sent Baybars al-Dawadar and San jar al-JawilT to
_ 5
Salar to persuade him to return with them to Cairo. Although they
assured Salar that al-Na§ir Muhammad wanted him to return to Cairo
only because he was eager to have him near,him for his advice, Salar
refused to accompany them and promised to follow. Al-Na§ir Muhammad
£
became worried when they returned to Cairo without Salar.
On the other hand, Salar was bewildered at the loss of his posi-
7
tion, and uncertain about al-Nasir Muhammad's attitude towards him.
~*~Durar, ii, l8l; Nujum, viii, 170, l8l.
^Salatln, fols. 92b-9^a; Tali, fol. Suluk, ii, 73j
Dnrar, ii, 180; Nujum, ix, 11; Mawrid, 37.
3
For his biography, see Durar, i, 309-310.
Zf
For his biography, see Durar, ii, 170-172.
^tU.yun, xii, fol. 139b; Suluk, ii, 88; Nujum, ix, 16.
r .............................
Suluk, ii, 88; Nujum, ix, 17.
7Suluk, ii, 88; N^ jum.? ix, 17.
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Eventually Salar decided to leave for Cairo where he was imprisoned 
by al-Nagir Muhammad in the Citadel of Cairo in RabT*, II, 710/
August 1310.^ Although Salar left a great fortune of money, gold,
silver, jewels of different kinds, horses, clothes and quantities
2  _
of valuable things, he died of hunger in his prison in Jumada, I,
710/0ctober 1310.^
Hence, the impression is that there were many factors which were 
necessary for al-Nasir Muhammad to build a strong foundation concern­
ing his rule and his state. Firstly, a brave and co-operative clique 
consisting of the royal Mamluks, for support and assistance, especially 
at times of difficulty. Secondly, great wealth and large personal for­
tune either by personal investment in the business field, or by confis­
cating tbe property of the wealthy emirs. Thirdly, considering the 
fact that the Mamluk emirs should enjoy a respectable position at the 
court, al-Nasir Mutamrad kept paying them great attention either by being 
careful to ask for their advice in every respect or by allowing them 
competent authority, in view of the fact that they would be under strict 
supervision by al-Na§ir Muhammad himself. Fourthly, al-Na§ir Muhammad 
was keen, in his career, to take care of his subjects1 condition so that 
they should enjoy satisfaction and gratification concerning their 
economic and social status. It seems that al-Na^ir Muhammad knew that 
he was popular among the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, and was deter­
mined to promote that popularity to attain its highest degree. 
Through the previous study respecting . the first steps of 
al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign one could clearly notice that he was
^Suluk, ii, 88; Nujum, ix, 18.
2 tlhmn, xii, fols. l67b-l69a; Dhyl, iv, fol. 189b; Turkiyya, fols. 
26b-27b; Thamih, fols. 128b-l30a; Suluk, ii, 97-99; Nu.jum, ix,
17-20; Mav/ri cl, 37-98.
^*Uyuny xii, fol. l68a; Dhyli iv » fols. 189a, 190a-191a; Tali, fol. A3a; 
T3rrat, fols. 26Vb-233a;"TurUiyy5L, fols. _2i6b-27a; Thamln , fol. 128b; 
ii, 97; Nujum., ix,' 18; Mav/rid, 37.
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working all the time to confirm the reality of his being the 
only ruler in the Mamluk Sultanate. Therefore, he kept watching 
the position of the emirs with suspicion, fears and astuteness and 
was clearly aware of every action he had to take either against 
the MamHik emirs, or for the sake of his personal rights. Fifthly, 
al-Na^ir Muhammad understood through his personal experience that 
the Mamluk emirs did not respect his inherited claim to rule; 
subsequently, in order to be in power, to hold supreme authority 
and to enjoy continuous possession of the throne, he worked to 
have the confidence of his supporters and to favour his follow­
ers in employing them in the important offices of the state.
On the other hand, it appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad tried hard to hold 
the power of making ordinances and executive power in his own hands 
in order to* reach the central position in the Mamluk regime. The 
question arises here, how far would al-Na§ir Muhammad go in order 
to accomplish what he most desired of power and centralisation.
And to what degree would al-Nasir Muhammad's achievements be crowned 
by success. Furthermore, it might be worth noting that al-Na^ir 
Muhammad probably was working to achieve a strong basis. Accordingly, 
in 709/l309i al-Na§ir Muhammad released some emirs who had been 
imprisoned during the preceding period, and bestowed on them high
posts in Syria,^ but as soon as al-Nasir Muhammad became sure of
2
his situation he put them back in prison.
Besides, it seems that al-Na§ir Muhammad was trying to extend 
his power over the judges (quflat) ^  to consult them concerning the
n
Suluk, ii, 77-78; Nujum, ix, 15.
2 _
Nujum, ix, 15.
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most important judicial matters.^ The previous analysis and the 
additional facts, already mentioned, lead us to ask, was al-Na§ir 
Muhammad attempting to transform the Mamluk regime into a personal 
autocracy? In order to reach a reasonable result a comprehensive 
study of the relations of al-Na§ir Muhammad and the Mamluk oligarchy 
should be undertaken.
(ii) The Mamluk oligarchy.
Concerning the Mamluk oligarchy it seems that al-Nagir Muhammad
was acting according to previously studied plans when he appointed
Shams al-DTn Qarasunqur viceroy of Damascus (na*ib Dimashq), Qabjaq
al-MansurT, governor of Aleppo, Asandamur Kurji, governor of Hamah,
_ _ 2
al-Hajj Bahadur al-Halabi, governor of Tripoli and Qu£lubak al-
 3 4
Mangun, governor of Safad. Thus, al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed his
supporters to the ruling offices soon after his arrival in Cairo.
On the other hand, in Shawwal 709/March 1310, al-Nasir Muhammad
planned to arrest twenty-two Mamluk emirs of high rank, and succeeded
with the help of his royal Mamluks in taking possession of them by a
3
well organised scheme. Other emirs fell into al-Nasir Muhammad's
hands later in 712/1312. Hence, al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in
executing all the Mamluk emirs who either had acted against him,
or had been loyal to his former enerm.es, the predominant usurper 
7
predecessors. Simultaneously al Nasir Muhammad accomplished the
^Husn, ii, ll*f.
2
For his biography, see Durar, i, 500.
3
For his biography, see Durar, iii, 252-253.
^Durrat, fols. 278a-b, 282b, 285a-b; Suluk, ii, 75-76; Nu.jum,. ix, 11. 
^Durrat, fol. 278b; Suluk, ii, 7 6; Nujum, ix, 13.
r
Tadhklrat', fol.' 6Vb'; ' Suluk, ii, 117»'ll8; 'NujUm, ix,' 30,' 3^.
^Suluk, ii, 77-78.
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third step of his plan concerning his internal policy with the 
Mamluk oligarchy; he started raising his Mamluks and friends to 
the amirate and installed them as governors and viceroys; they
were thirty-two of his Mamluks, such as Tankiz al-Husami,^ Aydamur
2   5
al-Shaykhi, Arghun al-Dawadar,. Baybars Amir Akhur, Aytamush
_  ‘f  K
al-Mu^ammadi, and others.
Moreover, in RahT*, II, 712/August 1312, al-Na§ir Muhammad 
brought into power another group of forty-six Mamluks of his party 
and made them emirs with big celebration. Probably al-Nasir 
Muhammad's main aim through these acts was to create a powerful 
circle of supporters around him. Therefore one could infer that al- 
Na§ir Muhammad, with greater subtlety and resolution, determined to 
have his .situation stabilized, his reign firmly established and his 
position utterly secure. Thereafter, having been confirmed as a 
powerful ruler, al-Na^ir Muhammad began his coup concerning his 
powerful supporters, that is to say, al-Nasir Muhammad made up his 
mind to get rid of those senior emirs who had helped him to achieve 
his second restoration; with his previous fundamental steps and the 
changed circumstances al-Na§ir Muhammad thought that his coup would 
be achieved successfully. Seemingly, supporters such as Shams al- 
Din Qarasunqur realized the basis of al-Nasir Muhammad's behaviour 
against them, and became worried about their position and afraid
Infra, 149.
2
For his biography, see Durar, i, 428.
For his biography, see Durar, i, 308.
Vor his biography, see Durar, i, 424.
~*Suluk, ii, 77; Nu.jum, ix, 13-14.
■ ^Tadhkirat,' fbl. 64b;' Suluk, 'ii, Il8.
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that al-Na§ir Muhammad would annihilate them and, lastly, they 
decided to keep at a distance from him.1 Al-MaqrTzT confirms
the above fact by recording that. al'-Na§ir Muhammad was planning
—  2to seize Shams al-DIn Qarasunqur and Asandamur KurjT. Thus,
al-Na§ir Muhammad prepared to seize the strong emirs whose help 
and support were the main reason for al-Na§ir Muhammad's success­
ful return to rule. Apparently circumstances helped al-Na§ir
Muhammad in approaching his object through the sudden death of
_ 3
both Qabjaq al-Man§urT, governor of Aleppo, and al-Hajj Bahadur,
4
governor of Tripoli. Al-Na§ir Muhammad was extremely happy 
when he received the news of their deaths in 710/1310 because of
5
his fears of their strong position.
Subsequently, al-Najir Muhammad turned his attention towards
—  6Asandamur KurjT, governor of hamah, who soon after he learnt of 
the death of Qabjaq al-Man$urT moved to Aleppo to hold the office
7
of governorship there. That personal movement accomplished by 
Asandamur KurjT without asking al-Na$ir Muhammad had a profound 
effect upon the latter, and made him more serious and quick to 
put his thought into action regarding the capture of the governor 
of Aleppo.^
1Suluk, ii, 82.
2Ibid.
"Wrrat, fols. 283a-b.
Suluk, ii, 90.
3 _
Ibid.; Nujum, ix, 24.
D^urjrat;, fol. 278a.
^Ibid., fol. 282b; Suluk, ii, 89.
^Suluk, ii, 89.
According to al-Na§ir Muhammad's command Karay al-Man^uri^"
(d. 719/l319)» governor of G aza, left Cairo for Aleppo, with a
reinforced army on the pretext of making a sudden attack on Sis,the
Armenian capital, and successfully captured Asandamur KurjT,
2
who gave himself up without resistance. Thus al-Na§ir Muhammad
succeeded in having Kurji imprisoned in Cairo after only six months
3 ^of his being governor of Aleppo, and all his wealth was confiscated.
Eventually, Asandamur KurjT was executed in his prison in Dhu '’l-Qa'da
721/November 1321. After this event it was obvious that the ruling
policy of al-Naigir Muhammad concerning his relation with the Mamluk
oligarchy had been accomplished for his personal aims and to protect
his position from any danger that might occur from the powerful
emirs, without paying any regard or consideration to what they had
given him of political allegiance, sincere support and military aid
to enable him to maintain supreme power.
(iii) The plot of Baktamur al-Jukandar
As a result of the previous action by al-Na§ir Muhammad against 
one of his main supporters whose assistance was almost the cause 
of his taking over the government, all the senior emirs became 
afraid of further action against them and opposition to their power­
ful position. And, on account of their fears, they tried to seek 
protection for their lives. Furthermore, because of these different
"^For his biography see, Durar, iii, 266-267.
2
Dur^ q.t, fol. 282b; Suluk, ii, 93; Durar, iii, 267; Nu.jum, ix, 26-27. 
D^ury-ctt,,fol. 282b; Suluk, ii, 9^; Nujum, ix, 27.
Suluk, ii, 93; Nujum, ix, 27.
^Durar, i, 388,
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circumstances, there was a conspiracy plotted against al-Nasir
Muhammad to dismiss him from governorship.^ Subsequently, in 710/
_ 21310, when Baktamur al-Jukandar, the vicegerent of the Sultanate
— — 3(na*ib al-Saltana bi'l-diyar al-Misriyya), in dread of al-Na§ir
if
Muhammad’s policy as an astute politician, and fearing for his life,
_ 5
co-operated with Batkhass al-Manguri (d. 711/1311) and organized a
g
plan to end al-Nasir Muhammad’s rule and to replace him by Musa, 
the son of All b. Qalawun, or al-Malik al-Salih *All, who had been
joint Sultan with Qalawun and his intended successor, but predeceased
7  _
him, the cousin of al-Nasir Muhammad, as ruler of the Mamluk
g
Sultanate. The coup was well organised by Baktamur al-Jukandar,
Batkhass al-MansurT and the emir Musa b. *A1T b. Qalawun. Besides,
g
with the help of the Mugaffariyya Mamluks who were prepared to seize 
the emirs who were close to al-Na§ir Muhammad on the arranged day 
of the plot, it seemed that the plot would be accomplished."^ 
According to Ibn al-Dawadari, one might understand that Baktamur 
al-Jukandar had been planning that day for such a long time that 
he tried hard to persuade al-Na§ir Muhammad to make thirty Mamluks 
of his party emirs until he succeeded in fulfilling his desire, 
for he wanted them to stand beside him on that day against al-Nasir
1Ibid.
*Tor his biography, see Durr, ix, 212-213; Durar, i, 8^*1—487;
Nu.jum, viii, 105, 146, 139» 170-171* 174, 2^5, 259; ix, 13*
24, 25-26, 28, 29-30.
■^ Durrat, fol. 277b; Suluk, ii, 77; Nujum, ix, 13.
^Suluk, ii, 91; Nujum, ix, 24.
c
For his biography, see Durar, i^  ^72-473.
For his biography, see Durar, iv, 377-378.
^Suluk, i, 682, 744-745.
^Suluk, ii,91-92; Durar, i, 485; iv, 377; Nujum, ix, 24.
9  * ..........................................................................
'The Muha'ffar'iyya Mamluks' belonged to Baybars al-Jashnakir who was
^strangled immediately after al-Na5ir Muhammad’s return to power.
Sulci’ ii’ 92; Durar, i, 485; iv, 577; Nu.jum, ix, 24-25.
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Muhammad."*' Unexpectedly Baybars al-Jumdar, one of the conspirators,
for the purpose of reaching a high position at the royal court,
2
went and informed al-Na§ir Muhammad about the plot. On the other
— — _ 3
hand, Baktamur al-Jukandar sent to Karay al-MangurT (d.719/1319)»
governor of Damascus, Qufclubak al-Man§uri (d. 7l6/l3l6), governor
5 6of §afad, and to Qu^luqtamur, governor of G aza for their support.
Subsequently Karay al-Man§urT was the only one who warned Baktamur
to be careful and to reject the idea, but the latter continued with
7
his plan against the rule of al-Nagir Muhammad. Eventually, al 
Najir Muhammad, discovering the conspiracy, sent immediately for 
Baktamur, arrested Batkhags in his presence and dispatched his
g
soldiers to seize Musa who escaped because of his fears. Two
days later the emir Musa and all his followers and supporters were 
9
seized.
»
Surprisingly al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in foiling the con­
spiracy without mention of Baktamur's participation in the plot;^
^Durr, ix, 212.
^Suluk, iii 92; Nujum, ix,
3.
Supra, 108.
L„
Supra, 105.
5
For his biography see, Durar, iii, 230.
^Nujum, ix, 25.
7Ibid.
^Suluk, ii, 92; Durar, iv, 37?; Nujum,
^Suluk, ii, 92; Durar, iv, 378; Nujum,
^Suluk, ii, 92; Nujum, ix, 26.
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all the conspirators were taken, by al-Nafir Muhammad's order, 
to be executed by being nailed in the presence of the populace 
of Cairo, al-^ammah, against the walls of the Citadel of Cairo but, 
as soon as this was begun the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, wept 
for them and al-Na^ir Muhammad issued his order of forgiveness 
through pity and mercy.^ In conclusion, al-Nasir Muhammad was 
commended and praised by the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah. Thus 
we see how al-Na§ir Muhammad acted in accordance with the will of 
the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, so that one might almost infer that 
he knew of his popularity and on this account worked as far as he 
could to keep and to promote it. Thereafter the question which 
should be answered here is, why was al-Na§ir Muhammad careful to 
continue his friendly relationship with Baktamur al-Jukandar in 
spite of his knowledge of his collaboration in the conspiracy? Yet 
why was al-Na$ir Muhammad concerned not to mention the essential part 
which had been played by Baktamur al-Jukandar and even to be extremely 
mindful to show his utter ignorance respecting this. Presumably he was
biding his time. But: not before long al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded
—  —  —  3in seizing Baktamur al-Jukandar in Jumada, I,'711/ September 1311.
With Baktamur al-Jukandar many emirs of high rank, who were
if
among his main supporters, had been arrested. Baktamur al-Jukandar 
remained in his prison in Alexandria and later in al-Karak until he 
was killed in 716/1316. Through a study concerning the way in which
^Nu.jum, ix, 26.
2Ibid.
~Z
Jawahir, fol. 226a; Suluk, ii, 102; Durar, i, ^83; Nu.jum, 
ix, 28; cf. Durr, ix, 213.
^Suluk, ii, 102-103; Nu.jum, ix, 28-29.
^Durar, i, -^83.
112
Baktamur al-Jukandar was captured, one could easily understand that 
al-Na§ir Muhammad had been preparing for that day for a long time, 
until he succeeded in devising a satisfactory plan to seize Baktamur 
al-Jukandar without his being aware of al-Na^ir Muhammad's plot against 
him.^ Apparently al-Na§ir Muhammad was afraid that Baktamur al-Jukandar 
might flee to Damascus, where he would probably be protected and sup­
ported by his,friends, the governors of the Syrian provinces. Besides 
that., Baktamur al-Jukandar was the vicegerent of the state (na’ib al- 
Salt an a bi*l-diyar al-Misriyya), and his being in that strong position 
could easily help him either to escape or to act against al-Nasir 
Muhammad. Consequently al-Nasir Muhammad planned secretly, with 
great caution and reflection, a scheme to arrest Baktamur al-Jukandar,
2and managed to seize him and immediately imprisoned him in Alexandria.
At the same time, al-Na§ir Muhammad arrested Karay al-Mansuri, Qu^lubak
al-Mansurl and Qu£luqtamur, who had collaborated with Baktamur al-
Jukandar against al-Na§ir Muhammad, and they were imprisoned together
3
with Baktamur at al-Karak.
Soon, in Jumada, I, 71l/September 1311> al-Nasir Muhammad nominated 
Baybars al-MansurT (d. Ramadan 725/August 1325) to be vicegerent of " 
the Sultanate.^" It seems that al-Nasir Muhammad, in order to weaken 
the powerful status of the Mamluk emirs, and to found a direct 
personal relation with his subjects at the same time, announced shortly, 
in Jumada, I, 711/September 1311? that he himself would attend the
^"Concerning the seizure of Baktamur al-Jukandar, see Suluk, ii,
102-103; Durar, i, ^85; Nu.jum, ix, 28-30.
^Durar, i, ^85; Nujum, ix, 29-30.
^Durr, ix, 212-213; Jawahir, fol. 226a; Suluk, ii, 101, 10^ f;
Nujum, ix, 3-0.
If
Suluk, ii, 103, 10 -^, 105; Durar, i, 510.
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house of justice (Par al-*Adl) regularly every Monday to listen 
to the complaints of the people and to give personal judgment.^"
Consequently, the Mamluk emirs became frightened.^ There is a lack 
of information concerning the reasons which made Baktamur al-Jukandar 
conspire against al-Na§dr Muhammad by seeking a broad collaboration 
with other emirs in order to put an end to his rule and to replace 
him with his cousin Musa. Therefore, it could be inferred that 
this plot could be regarded as the end of one period as well as the 
beginning of another. Seemingly the Mamluk emirs held a powerful 
position in the Mamluk regime and respected the ruling power as 
far as that subjection did not affect their effective bureaucratic 
condition. Subsequently they realized that, as soon as al-Na§ir 
Muhammad took possession of power, he began to rule with 
determination, losing diplomacy and politics to strengthen
his authority; in other words, he acted according to the situation 
that necessity makes its own laws. Probably al-Na§ir Muhammad 
governed for the sake of his authority as if it was a necessity 
and even had no respect for promises. Consequently, the Mamluk 
emirs, who apparently were displeased and disagreed with this differ­
ent royal policy, co-operated for the collapse of al-Nafir Muhammad's 
government, but it seems that they took futile steps which resulted 
in absolute failure.
Besides it seems that al-Nasir Muhammad determined to follow his political 
policy concerning his standing with the powerful emirs for the pur­
pose of keeping the Mamluk regime under his absolute command on the
^Tufcfa, 2^ f; Suluk, ii, 103.
^Suluk, ii, 103.
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one hand, and in order to exercise authority over the military, the 
legislative power and the executive power on the other hand. To 
accomplish each item of his policy al-Na§ir Muhammad worked to take 
power from the hands of the senior emirs, to prove that he was 
no longer a titular Sultan, and to take up with great subtlety 
and reciprocal integrity the policies to transform' the Mamluk
ruling system of the Sultan and the oligarchy of emirs into a 
personal autocracy and authoritarian regime. It appears that al- 
Nagir Muhammad wanted to put a definite end to the continuous tension 
in the Mamluk state between the oligarchy of the great emirs and the 
personal autocracy of the Sultan.
(iv) The issue of Shams al-Din Qarasunqur
Thereafter al-Na§ir Muhammad turned his attention to Shams al-
K n  Qarasunqur (d. 728/1327),"^  seeking for a successful plan to get
rid of him. This determination was the next step which al-Na§ir
Muhammad was eager to take concerning his policy and his aim, at
the same time to hold the reins of power in his hand, in spite of
the fact that Qarasunqur was the first one who helped him to assume
power,2 and encouraged him with great support and unlimited help
3
to restore his position among the ruling class. Besides, the 
Ashrafiyya kept remembering that Qarasunqur was one of the killers 
of al-Ashraf Khalil, and urged al-Nagir Muhammad to take his revenge.
^For his biography see, Muluk, viii, 96, 129, 130, 145, 150, 166- 
167, 168, 170, 173. 174, 18?, 204, 212, 224, 232; Durar, iii, 246- 
247; Nu.jum, viii, 4, 13, 22, 88, 9 9, 106, 130, 237-238, 239-241,
245, 258-259, 266, 273; ix, 27-28, 30-33.
^Suluk, ii, 6l; Nujum, viii, 240-241.
^Suluk, ii, 67-88; Nujum, viii, 245, 258-259, 264, 266; cf.H.Masse, Melanges 
D'orientalisme, Un refugie Mamlouk a la cour mongole de Perse, 
by G. Wiet, pp. 396-397 (Teheran 1963).
^Tuhfa,iy43; Suluk, ii, 79; Nujum, viii, 273.
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Immediately after, when Qarasunqur was informed about the attitude
of the Ashrafiyya towards him, Qarasunqur left Egypt for Damascus
for his own safety.^" Besides, it seems that Qarasunqur became
2afraid of al-Na§ir Muhammad's new situation.
In Shawwal 709/March 711 al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed Qarasunqur 
viceroy of Damascus (na’ib Dimashq), but Qarasunqur was still worried
for his life, especially after the capture of Asandamur KurjT
3 _
in 710/1310. Consequently Qarasunqur asked al-Nagir Muhammadto be appoint­
ed governor of Aleppo and his request was granted in Dhu ''l-Hijja 710/ 
April 1311 by a royal decree issued by al-Na§ir Muhammad and sent
_    il
with Arghun al-Dawadar al-MangurT (d.73i/1330), who had been
secretly commanded to capture Qarasunqur if he was fortunate enough
5
to find helpful circumstances.
In Mufrarram 7H/May 1311 Arghun al-Dawadar arrived in Damascus 
to accomplish the transmission of Qarasunqur to Aleppo, and in spite 
of his kind and noble behaviour towards Qarasunqur the latter was 
careful to be protected all the time during Arghun's visit and 
extremely careful to make . Arghun miss every opportunity that could 
be used against his safety.^ A few days later, Qarasunqur left 
Damascus with his Mamluks, six hundred horsemen, for Aleppo with
Suluk, ii, 79, 80; Nujum, viii, 27^.
^Suluk, ii, 80; Nujum, viii, 27^.
D^urV'q.t, fol. 278a; Suluk, ii, 75, 93; Nujum, ix, 27.
For his biography see, Durar, i, 351-352.
^Tatimmat,i, 6 6; Parr«l,fol. 278a; Suluk, ii, 93,.9^, 99-100; Nujum, ix, 27. 
r
Tatimmat,ii, 66; Bidaya, xiv, 6l; Durr^t,fol. 278a; Suluk, 
ii, 99; Nujum, ix, 28.
extreme caution and complete protection from any danger that 
might occur on the way, and Qarasunqur settled in Aleppo; in 
Mu£arram 711/May 1311 Arghun left Aleppo for Cairo, unsuccessful 
in fulfilling al-Na§ir Muhammad's order. Yet al-Nasir Muhammad 
thanked Arghun for being careful.^ Subsequently when Qarasunqur 
was informed that al-Na§ir Muhammad had seized Karay al-Man§urT, 
Asandamur KurjT and Baktamur al-Jukandar, he took precautions, 
provided care, made friendly relations with the Bedouins on the 
eastern borders of Syria and strengthened his good friendship
_ 2
with the nomads of Al Muhanna.' Moreover, in order to obtain the
_ 3
sympathy and affection of Sulayman b. Muhanna, the Bedouin emir
(d. 7^5/13^4), Qarasunqur let Sulayman b. Muhanna know about
al-Nasir Muhammad's intention to arrest Sulayman by showing him
the Royal Edict. Thus we see that, at the time when al-Na§ir
Muhammad was trying to seize Qarasunqur, he was using him to
fulfil a similar function respecting his political policy with
the powerful heads in the state. Furthermore, when Qarasunqur
received al-Na§ir Muhammad's permission for a pilgrimage, according
to his request, he left Aleppo in Shawwal 711/February 1312 for
al-Hijaz, accompanied by four hundred Mamluks, and ordered the
5
rest to stay in Aleppo to protect his property. In the meantime,
^Tatimmat, ii, 66; Suluk, ii, 100; Nujum, ix, 28.
2
Suluk, ii, 107; Nujum, ix, 30.
3
For his biography, see Durar, ii, l63-6*f.
L
Suluk, ii, 107-108; Nujum, ix, 31; cf. Masalik, iv, fol. 78b.
Mukhtasar, v, 6 f^; Durr, ix, 219; Nahj, iii, 203; Tatimmat, ii, 
66; SuiUk, ii, 108; Nujum, ix, 31.
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while Qarasunqur was on his way al-Na$ir Muhammad accomplished
three steps of great importance. Firstly he ordered Qara^ay Al-
Ashrafi-k d. 73^/1333)i who had been appointed by Qarasunqur to be
his vicegerent in Aleppo during his absence on pilgrimage, to
prevent Qarasunqur when he came back from entering Aleppo unless
2
he brought a Royal Edict. Secondly al-Na^ir Muhammad dispatched a
force of five hundred Mamluks to al-Hijaz to seize Qarasunqur as soon 
3
as he arrived. Thirdly, al-Na^ir Muhammad ordered all the governors
of the Syrian provinces to stop Qarasunqur with force if he tried to
if
pass through their districts or cross their provinces. When Qarasunqur 
was told about al-Na§ir Muhammad's preparations against him he returned 
by a different road to Aleppo with the help of Sulayman b. Muhanna, but 
Qara^ay Al-Ashrafi stopped him from entering his province, Aleppo, be­
cause of al-Na§ir Muhammad's order, and even refused "to allow him.to
5
take his wealth or property or his family. Therefore Qarasunqur 
succeeded in seeking refuge in the eastern frontiers of Syria with 
Al Muhanna who welcomed him and granted him protection, and Sulayman 
b. Muhanna wrote to al-Nagir Muhammad asking forgiveness for
^For his biography, see Durar, iii, 2^8.
p
Suluk, ii, 108; Nu.jum, ix, 31.
^Mukhtasar, v, 6b; Durr, ix, 219; Nahj, iii, 203-206; Tatimmat,
h _
Durr, ix, 221; Suluk, ii, 108; Nujum, ix, 31; cf. Wiet, op.cit., 398.
c
Mukhtasar, v, 6b; Durr, ix, 221; Nahj, iii, 206; Tatimmat, ii,
’66';'" Bidaya, xiv, 63; Suluk, ii, 10S, 110; Nujum, ix, 31-32.
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Qarasunqur and a new province for him.^ Then al-Na§ir Muhammad
agreed to Sulayman b. Muhanna1s demand and gave Qarasunqur the
2
choice between the Syrian provinces. Yet it seems that al-Nasir 
Muhammad was not honest about his offer because, immediately after 
the departure of Sulayman b. Muhanna's messenger from Cairo, he 
dispatched a strong army towards the districts of II Muhanna; 
meanwhile Qarasunqur, probably practising the same policy, wrote 
to al-Nasir Muhammad accepting his offer and asking for the fortress
Z
of Sarkhad, although he had written to Iqush al-Afram (d. 720/
1320), viceroy of Damascus, to help him at that time of difficulty, 
and both al-Nasir Muhammad and al-Afram agreed to Qarasunqur's re­
quests. ^
At .last Qarasunqur succeeded in taking his wealth from Aleppo
and painfully departed from the province, where he had administered
local affairs for twenty-four years, while the people of Aleppo 
5
watched him sadly.
Ibn al-Dawadari records that Qarasunqur was mistaken concerning
the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad towards him and made a mistake
£
in taking extensive precautions. Besides, Qarasunqur imagined
^Masalik, iv, fol. ry.8b ; Durr, ix, 220-221; Malik, fol. 67b;
Tuhfa, 43; Suluk, ii, 109; Durar, iii, 2^6; Nu.jum, ix, 31-32.
2 _
Mukhtasar, v, 6k; Tatimmat, ii, 67; Suluk, ii, 109; Nu.jum, ix, 32;
cf. Masalik, iv, fol. 78b.
z
For his biography, see Durar, i, 396-398; he is named in other 
Mamluk chronicles Aqush.
L
Mukhtasar, v, 66; Durr, ix,. 222; Tuhfa, i, ¥f; Suluk, ii, 109-110; 
Nujum, ix, 32; cf. Masalik, iv, fol. 78b.
^Durr, ix, 221-22; Nahj, iii, 206; Suluk, ii, 110.
^Durr, ix, 223; cf. Mukhtasar, v, 6^f, 66.
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al-Na§ir Muhammad's evil intentions towards him, and he was 
completely wrong concerning al-Na§ir Muhammad's decision respecting 
his capture.^- The question arises here, how far is the above state­
ment of Ibn al-Dawadari correct? Considering the position 
of Ibn al-Dawadari as a contemporary historian in
the period of al-Na§ir Muhammad, and through a full study regarding
the political policy of al-Na^ir Muhammad towards the oligarchy
of powerful emirs, and according to the writings of the Mamluk
historians, it could be said that the seizure of Qarasunqur was
the most important part of al-Na§ir Muhammad's policy respecting
2
the execution of the senior emirs. Subsequently al-Nagir Muhammad 
sent the emir, Taq^ay al-Jumdar, and Arghun al-Dawadar to persuade
i
Qarasunqur to return to Aleppo and to assure him of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad's sincerity and respect. But Qarasunqur, because of his 
fears, refused to accept the offer, and, even when he received the 
Royal Edict concerning his appointment as viceroy of the Sultanate, 
Qarasunqur insisted on refusing the offer.^ Immediately after Aqush 
al-Afram arrived to assist Qarasunqur j informed him about the. 
armed forces which had been already dispatched by al-Nasir Muhammad
against them, and suggested that they should fight al-Nagir Muhammad
_ A
for the feake of their prestige, but Qarasunqur rejected the idea.
^Durr, ix, 223; see also *Ibar, v, part iv, 914; cf. Mukhtasar, 
v, 64, 66; Nahj, iii, 20'7-208; Tuhfa, 43. " '
2
Mukhtasar, v, 6 6; Nahj, iii, 207-208; Tatimmat,ii, 68; Tuhfa,
43; "Ibar, v, part iv, 914.
Mukhtasar, v, 66; Durr, ix, 223-22.3; Tatimmat, ii, 69.
L
Mukhtasar, v, 66; Durr, ix, 22.3-226; Nahj, iii, 208-209; Tatimmat, 
ii, 6 8; Biaaya, xiv, 63; Tuhfa, 44; "Ibar, v, part iv, 914;
Suluk, ii, 110-111; Nujum, ix, 32.
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Lastly, when Qarasunqur and al-Afram received a letter of welcome 
and an offer of protection from the Mongol ruler, Oljeitu b.
Arghun b. Abgha b. HulakiT, and became sure at the same time that 
al.~Na§ir Muhammad had reinforced that army to fight them, they de­
cided to flee to the Mongol court where they would be honorably 
welcomed and graciously treated.^
When the Mamluk army reached Him§ they knew about the flight 
of Qarasunqur and al-Afram, therefore they left Him? and returned
to Cairo, while al-Nagir Muhammad had been acquainted with the
2news of the escape in Mufrarram 712/May 1312. Then the Mongol ruler
appointed Qarasunqur governor of Maragha, and al-Afram governor 
_ 3
of Hamadhan. Thus, as we have seen, al-Nagir Muhammad worked hard 
to get rid of Shams al-DIn Qarasunqur, the man without whose moral 
encouragement, political help and military aid, al-Na^ir Muhammad 
was unable to restore his ruling position. The point which is 
worth noting here must be about the reasons which made al-Na$ir 
Muhammad insist so firmly on seizing Qarasunqur. It might be the 
powerful position of Qarasunqur and his political influence on the 
other emirs made al-Najir Muhammad worried and afraid with regard 
to his status so that he was extremely anxious to arrest Qarasunqur
for the sake of his rule and his personal ambition to govern.
i
It could be also that because of the personal experience of 
al-Najir Muhammad with the oligarchy of the emirs during his two 
previous reigns he became excessively careful, deeply suspicious 
and cautious in his attitude towards the strong emirs of the state,
Masalik, iv, fol. 78b; Mukhtasar, v, 66-67; Durr, ix, 227-230;
Nahj, iii, 210-211; Malik, fol. 67b; Tatimmat, ii, 69; Bidaya,
xiv, 1^ -0; Tufrfa,i,[-4A; ‘ibar, v, part iv, 91^; _Suluk, ii, 113;
Durar, iii, 246-2^ +7; Nu.jum, ix, 32-33.
^Tatimmat,ii, 69; *Ibar, v, part iv, 91^5 Suluk, ii, 110-111;
Nujum, ix, 32......................................................
^Suluk, ii, 113; Nu.jum, ix, 33 L Jor details,see Durr, ix, 230-233;
TiiTua", ¥f; cf. , 39o.
even those who helped him to take possession of the throne, the 
emirs of high rank and of effective authority; he followed them 
one after another to arrest them, imprison them and put them to 
torture until they were executed. This policy was applied by al- 
Nasir Muhammad soon after he became sure of his effective power.
Besides, we know through the biography of Qarasunqur that he 
was party to the murder of al-Ashraf Khalil, brother of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad; it would be easy for us to understand the Deality of al- 
Nasir Muhammad's attitude towards Qarasunqur almost because of 
his fears of a similar action taken against him.
But, on the other hand, we see that al-Na§ir Muhammad followed 
that political policy with almost every powerful emir and especially 
those who. brought power back into his hands. He assumed that they 
had the ability to take the power out of his hands and to prevent 
him from ruling effectively. Therefore, in the interest of pro­
tecting his position, al-Nasir Muhammad accomplished the policy of 
putting an end to the lives of the effective emirs. Seemingly, 
Baktamur al-Jukandar realized the reality of that situation; he 
plotted against al-Na§ir Muhammad1s government in order to replace 
him by his cousin Musa so that the emirs could have the opportunity 
of practising their previous customary domination, but he failed 
to achieve success.
Furthermore, it might be also that economic interests had 
played a part in that policy as an aim to the advantage of the royal 
privy funds.
On the other hand, we see how Qarasunqur acted- his part as 
an astute politician who knew exactly the character of his enemy,
122
so that he never trusted the promises of forgiveness, of pro­
tection and of high office which al-Na^ir Muhammad had frequently 
given him. It seems that the two men were politicians of equal 
skill. Therefore, it was difficult for either of them to succeed.
But it is surprising how Qarasunqur rejected the idea of fighting 
al-Na§ir Muhammad and theonly answer to that is that either 
Qarasunqur found it impossible to wage wax against al-Nasir Muhammad 
owing to being uncertain of winning a victory, or that he was loyal 
to the Mamluk Sultanate and did not want to provoke a civil war and, 
for the welfare of the people and for the peace of the country, he 
preferred to seek refuge with the Mongols. It could be also that 
Qarasunqur had no personal interest either in ruling the kingdom, 
or in holding supreme power, for, if he had desired to be in power,
I
he would have arranged that for himself instead of helping al-Nasir 
Muhammad to seize power.
Lastly, through a study concerning the function of Qarasunqur, 
his biography and his later status in the Mamluk state, it can be 
seen that he was to a considerable extent a wealthy man, widely 
popular and extremely powerful and consequently he was of great 
danger to al-Nagir Muhammad's position. Therefore, al-Nasir Muhammad 
used diplomatic negotiations, political lures and military threats 
to seize him, but he failed to fulfil his desire. This was a clear 
picture of one aspect in the Mamluk political field concerning 
the nature of the relations between al-Nafir Muhammad and the oli­
garchy of emirs at the beginning of his third reign.
In Rabi*, II, 712/August 1312 the army which had been sent by 
al-Nasj.r Muhammad after Qarasunqur returned to Cairo, and al-Nasir
Muhammad arrested most of the leaders because they had failed 
to accomplish his design concerning the capture of Qarasunqur.'*' 
Besides, al-Nasir Muhammad seized several emirs whom he had thought
were sympathetic to Qarasunqur, such as Baybars al-Mansurl, the
— 2 3vicegerent of the Sultanate, Sunqur al-Kamall, and others. Im­
mediately after al-Nasir Muhammad appointed Arghun al-Dawadar to
Zf
hold the office of vicegerent of the Sultanate, and Tahkiz al-
5
Husami, viceroy of Damascus. Moreover al-Na§ir Muhammad confis­
cated Qarasunqur's wealth, which was about thirty two thousand 
golden dinars with some other valuable objects made of gold and 
silver.^ This might support the economic factor concerning the 
reasons which made al-Na§ir MufcLammad anxious to seize Qarasunqur.
Ibn al-Dawadari states that the ruler of the Mongols started, 
because of Qarasunqur1s encouragement, to prepare a campaign to 
attack Syria; the Mongol campaign besieged al-Ra^ba in Ramadan 712/ 
January 13131 hut when they knew about the arrival of the Muslim
army at Gaza on their way to fight the Mongols, the latter left 
7
for their country. It seems that Qarasunqur had to take part m  
any campaign that might be organized by the Mongols against the 
Mamluk Sultanate even if Qarasunqur was against the idea because, 
above all, he was under Mongol protection.
'LDurr, ix, 229; *Ibar, v, part V, 91^-913; Suluk, ii, 117.
2
For his biography, see Durar, ii, 177.
^Suluk, ii, 117.
Zf
Ibid.
^See *Ibar, v, part V, 91^.
%ah.j, iii, 223.
’ 7For details, see Durr, ix, 231-239.
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In 713/1313 when Qarasunqur was informed that al-Nasir Muhammad
had arrested his sons and confiscated their wealthy he was sad,^
therefore he thought of attacking Syria but circumstances did not
help him to fulfil his wish. Again, in 713/13131 Qarasunqur thought
of putting his plan concerning an attack against Syria into action
3
but it was only a thought. Hence the impression is that Qarasunqur 
planned to wage war against the Mamluk Sultanate for the destruction 
of al-Nasir Muhammad's rule as revenge had to be taken against al- 
Nasir Muhammad because of his opposition to Qarasunqur's sons. On 
the other hand, al-Na§ir Muhammad never gave up the idea of putting 
an end to Qarasunqur's life. Consequently al-Na§ir Muhammad kept 
sending his men to the Ilkhanid territories to fulfil his desire;
kfor instance, in 720/1320, al-Na§ir Muhammad sent thirty men (fidawiyya)' 
one after another, but none succeeded in accomplishing his command; 
many of these men were killed while they were attempting to carry 
out that order.5 The question arises here, why was al-Nagir Muhammad 
eager to execute Qarasunqur even after the latter's flight to the 
Mongols? Was it only personal feelings of hatred, or political fears
1
Durr, ix , 267-263.
2
For details, see Durr, ix, 268-279.
^Mukhtasar, v, 77; Bjdaya, xiv, 7^.
^Al-fidawiyya were a section of al-Isma'lliyya who were descended 
from Isms/il b. Ja'far al-Sadiq b. Muhammad al-Baqir b. *A1I Zayn 
al-*Abidin b. al-Husayn al-Sabit b. *A1T b. Abl Talib. However, 
the Isma'lliyya were a group of al-Shiites. 1.■ _ j
I ■ i | In
time they became powerful and occupied large parts of Persia and 
Syria. A1-Qalqashandl quotes Ibn Fadl Allah al-'Umari who says 
that al-fidawiyya believed that the ruler of Egypt was their supreme 
head; therefore they obeyed him and followed every single instruction 
for his personal interests. Accordingly, the ruler of Egypt sent 
al-fidawiyya to kill his enemies; on the other hand, they did not 
care to lose their lives in order to fulfil the demand. Subsequently, 
if al-fidawiyya messenger failed to carry out the order bis family
would execute him. For details, see Subh, i, 119-112.
NahJ, iii,m2kl-2k2; , Bjdaya, xiv, 7^ ; Tuhfa, i, Suluki ii» 20? 
"s&S also V/ie c, , -j99-^01
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of Qarasunqur1s influence and position in the Mongol court? It 
appears that the two factors were behind that attitude of al- 
Na§ir Muhammad towards Qarasunqur.
In return, Qarasunqur succeeded in 720/13.20 in sending four 
fidawiyya to Cairo for the purpose of assassinating al-Na§ir Muham­
mad, and when they were discovered by al-Na§ir Muhammad’s officials 
two were killed and two fled. As a result al-Nasir Muhammad became 
careful to protect himself and, for his safety, he ordered the 
people not to stand on the sides of the streets while he was going 
to the Maydan.^
In 727/1327 al-Na§ir Muhammad arrested Faraj b. Shams al-Din
2 5^
Qarasunqur (d. 73^/1333) and imprisoned him.
In Shawwal 728/August 1328 Qarasunqur died in the Mongol 
Z*
kingdom. In conclusion al-Nafir Muhammad was pleased and sent
c _
his sons *Ali b. Qarasunqur (d. 7^8/13^7) and Faraj b. Qarasunqur, 
to Damascus to hold high posts there. Thus with the death of 
Qarasunqur the reasons for the unfriendly relationship between al- 
Na§ir Muhammad and Qarasunqur’s sons came to an end and a new and 
friendly relationship came into being.
(v) The political reaction of the emirs
In Babi*, II, 715/July 1315 al-Nasir Muhammad arrested Baktamur 
al-Hajib (d. 728/1328)^ and Aydaghdi Shaqir (d. 715/1315)^ because
^Suluk, ii, 208-209.
2
For his biography, see Durar, iii, 230.
^Badr, fol. 19b.
^Bjdaya, xiv, l^ fO; Tuhfa, i, ¥f; Suluk, ii, 305; Nujum, ix, 273.
^For his biography, see Durar, iii, 95-96.
^Bidaya, xiv, 1^3; Suluk, ii, 305.
^For his biography, see Durar, i, ^83-^84.
8por his biography, see Durar, i, 425-^26.
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they co-operated in formulating a plot against al-Na§ir Muhammad
and he was informed about it immediately before they succeeded in
1
putting their intention into action.''* Soon after their capture,
AydaghdT admitted that he had formed a scheme against al-Na§ir
2
Muhammad's power, therefore he was killed at once. All the wealth
3
and the property of the conspirators were confiscated immediately.
At the same time, al-Na^ir Muhammad captured other emirs such as
h c
Bahadur As (d. 730/1329) and Tamur al-Saqi (d. 7^3/13^2)^ who
g
were powerful emirs of high rank. The question which should be 
asked here is, who are these conspirators?
Baktamur al-Hajib was appointed chamberlain (ha.jib) in Damascus. 
He was a man of experience and probity, subsequently he became vice-
n
roy of Gaza. Later, in 710/1310, he became wazir of al-Na§ir
Muhammad's government. In 713/1313 Baktamur was arrested. Later
he was set free and became viceroy of Safad. Afterwards he joined
the group of al-Na§ir Muhammad's advisers (umara* al-mashura) in
Cairo. He was a man of great moral courage and prepared to face
o
al-Na?ir Muhammad when he disagreed with him. 0 Baktamur was wealthy 
^Bjdaya, xiv, 73; Suluk, ii, 144.
p
Durar, i, If26; Suluk, ii, l44.
^Bjdaya, i, 73; Durar, i, 426.
h,
lor his biography, see Durar, i, 497.
5
For his biography, see Durar, i, 319.
Suluk., ii, 144; Durar, i, 319.
^ Durar, i, 483.
 ^Ibid.
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and when al-Na§ir Muhammad arrested him in 715/1315 he confiscated 
his wealth which amounted to 120,000 dinars and 5OO1OOO dirhams.^ - 
He was liberated four years later in 719/1319 and died in 728/1328. 
Presumably Baktamur was arrested under suspicion and later released, 
his experience made him valuable as an adviser. It is possible
that there was a lack of evidence.
_ _ _ 3
AydaghdT Shaqir was a Mamluk of the former Sultan Lachln
4and he proved worthy of his office and was raised to the emirate;
5
subsequently he became a close friend of al-Na§ir Muhammad. When
al-Na§ir Muhammad left for al-Karak he followed him and became his
favourite. He incited al-Na§ir Muhammad against the other emirs;
therefore the emirs united against him and informed al-Nasir Muhammad
7
that Aydaghdi was planning to overthrow him. Consequently al-Nagir
g
Muhammad arrested him and had him executed in the year 715/1315.
Bahadur A$ was a handsome man, apparently al-Na§ir Muhammad 
was attracted to him. Bahadur served al-Na^ir Muhammad-devotedly 
in al-Karak. In return al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed him viceroy 
of Safad in 711/1311.^
^Durar, i, 484.
2Ibid.
■^ Durar, i, 425.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
£
Durar, i, 426. 
^Ibid.
8Ibid.
^Durar, i, 497.
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Tankiz al-Husaml, the viceroy (nl^ib) of Syria, resented 
Bahadur and persuaded al-Nasir Muhammad to arrest him for reasons 
which are unstated and he was imprisoned for an unspecified period"^ 
before being released and returned to Damascus, where he remained 
until his death in 730/1329 .2
Tamur al-Saqi v/as a Mamluk of Qalawun who became viceroy 
(na*ib) of Him§ and later of Tripoli; he was arrested in 713/1313 
and imprisoned in Alexandria for approximately twenty years. He 
was liberated in 733/133^ and appointed emir in Damascus.^
On the advice of Tamur the viceroy of Syria, Tankiz, who had 
been determined to fight al-Na§ir Muhammad, surrendered. Tamur 
died in 7^3/13^2.^
This shows how the oligarchy of the emirs was trying to put 
an end to al-Na§ir Muhammad's reign by a conspiracy. "On the other 
hand, with the discovery of the plot, al-Na§ir Muhammad became 
strict and violent with regard to conspirators and more careful in 
observing the other emirs and even imprisoned some of them. In 
other words, al-Na$ir Muhammad wanted a reign of new aspect, differ­
ent from his two previous reigns, while the oligarchy of the Mamluk
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Durar, i, 319.
^Ibid.
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emirs fought him by plotting against his rule to the advantage of
their powerful position in the Mamluk state. Subsequently al-Nasir
Muhammad continued to fulfil his policy concerning the capture of
the emirs who held important posts, or of powerful influence; for
example, in 7l8/l3l8, al-Nagir Muhammad seized several emirs such
as Sayf al-DIn Tughay al-Nasir! (d. 7l8/l3l8).^ because al-Nasir
Muhammad had no confidence in Tughay al-Nasiri and completely mis-
2
trusted his intent. Thus we see how al-Nasir Muhammad was extremely 
strict concerning both the intentions and the actions of the Mamluk 
emirs, and eagerly desired to be absolutely sure of their sincerity 
and their loyalty to him and to his rule, and to accept with complete 
obedience his reign in all its aspects. Besides, at the same time, 
he wanted to stop them from grumbling and complaining. Probably al- 
Nagir Muhammad believed profoundly that, in order to restore his 
right to rule, he should exact an effective promise from the emirs 
of his Sultanate.
Apparently the populace of Cairo, al-*ammah, realized the reality 
of al-Nasir Muhammad’s position towards the oligarchy of the emirs, 
and of his character with regard to his suspicion, care and awareness; 
therefore, the populace behaved so as to derive advantage from this 
situation by writing to him accusing his emirs and the powerful offi­
cials of the state of working against al-Nasir Muhammad's rule. In
3
addition, these letters were without signatures. The question that 
arises here is, how far al-Nasir Muhammad was affected by these
For his biography, see Durar, ii, 221-222.
2Purrat, fols. 301b-302a; Suluk, ii, 183-18^; Durar, iii, 222. 
^Suluk, ii, 208.
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anonymous letters. The answer is to state that, in RabI*, II, 726/ 
March 1326^ al- Na§ir Muhammad seized Sayf al-DIn Qatlubgha al- 
Fakhrl (d. 7^/l3^3) 1 and Tashtamur al-saql (d. 7^3/13^3) because 
he found an anonymous letter recording that Qaflubgha and Tashtamur
2f
had planned to kill al-Nagir Muhammad. But the Mamluk emirs stood 
beside the accused emirs, denied the accusation and persuaded al-
Na§ir Muhammad to release them. Eventually al-Na§ir Muhammad granted
s 6the emirs1 demand. Qafrlubgha was sent to Damascus, and Tashtamur
_ n
became one of the courtiers (al-,umara, al-khassakiyya). Seemingly 
as much as personal hatred played an important part in stirring al- 
Na§ir Muhammad against other emirs, also the strong friendly relations 
of the emirs (khushdashayya) had been usefully employed for the 
safety of other innocent emirs.
Afterwards, in Jumada, I, 726/April 1326, al-Na§ir Muhammad
g
seised the emir Baha’ al-DIn Aslam (d. 7^7/13^6) and his brother Sayf
al-DIn QarmajI because of an anonymous letter stating that they were
conspiring with the support of their Mamluks to attack al-Nasir
9
Muhammad and to change the government of his state. Al-Na§ir
^Cf. Durar, iii, 230.
2
For his biography, see Durar, iii, 230-232.
^For his biography, see Durar, ii, 219-220.
4
Suluk, ii, 28l; . Durar, iii, 230.
^Suluk, ii, 28l; Durar, iii, 230.
£
Durar, iii, 230.
^Ibid., ii, 219.
g
For his biography, see Durar, i, 389.
^Suluk, ii, 281-282.
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Muhammad, who believed every evil accusation, imprisoned the brothers 
with other emirs without a proof of guilt.^
(vi) The office of nvicegerencyin Egypt1' (Niyabat al-Sal tana).
Through the preceding study concerning the first stages of al- 
Na^ir Muhammad1s third reign it was remarkable that a new political 
policy had been started especially respecting the power as well as 
the position of the oligarchy of the emirs, notably those who held 
high posts such as the office of the vicegerencyof the Sultanate 
(niyabat al-Saltana bi *l-diyar al-Misriyya). Concerning this im­
portant post we know that al-Na§ir Muhammad had been either deposed 
during his first reign, or forced to resign during his second reign, 
and the situations had occurred because of the holders of that post.
The question which should be raised here is, what was the attitude 
of al-Na§ir Muhammad towards that post during his third reign when 
he became his own master? Returning to the beginning of the third 
reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad we see Sayf al-DIn Salar in 710/1310 
asking al-Na$ir Muhammad for his resignation from the office of vice- 
Sul]; an (niyabat al—Saltana bi * 1—diyar al—Mjsriyya).^ Accordingly 
Baktamur al-Jukandar became vicegerent (na’ib al-Saltana bi *l-diyar 
al-Misriyya) in Shawwal 710/February. 1311*^ but, for his action 
against al-Na^ir Muhammad, Baktamur was imprisoned in 711/1311.^ 
Therefore, Baybars al-Mansurl held the vicegerent office in 711/1311,^ 
but, shortly, in 712/1312, Baybars was seized by al-Na§ir Muhammad
^Suluk, ii, 282.
2
For this office, see Subh, iv, 16-17.
3 -
Suluk, ii, 73; Purar, ii, l8l; Nujum, ix, 11.
4
Suluk, ii, 77; Purar, i, 483; Nu.jum, ix, 13.
^Suluk, ii, 91-92, 102; Purar, i, 483; Nujum, ix, 24-26, 28-30.
^Suluk, ii, 103; Purar,’ i', ’310;’ Nujum,' ix,' 30.........
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and was put in prison until 717/1317 because of his sympathetic 
attitude towards Shams al-DIn Qarasunqur.'*' Subsequently, in
Jumada, I, 712/September 1312, al-Nasir Muhammad appointed Arghun
_  _  2
al-Dawadar (d. 731/1330) vicegerent of the Sultanate. Thereafter,
in Muftarram 727/November 1326, al-Nasir Muhammad captured Arghun
because he had failed to seize Muhanna the Bedouin chief and al-
Nafir Muhammad accused him of being unfaithful in accomplishing
this command.^ Afterwards, for the sake of Baktamur al-Saqi, al-
Nasir Muhammad forgave Arghun and nominated him governor of Aleppo,
whereupon he held that post until his death in Rabi*, I, 731/
December 1330 in Aleppo. Then al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the
office of vicegerent of the Sultanate and until his death in 7^0/
13^1 for thirteen years there was no vicegerent in the Mamluk Sultan- 
5
ate. Ibn Taghri Bird! says that al-Nasir Muhammad was afraid that
any one might claim that vital office; therefore he abolished that
post. In another place Ibn Taghri Bird! states that al-Nasir
Muhammad abolished the office of vicegerency in order to be the only
one who had the right to rule the Mamluk Sultanate with full authority
7
and unlimited power.
      - —  — —------ —■—-»
~*~Suluk, ii, 117; Durar, i, 510; Nu.jum, ix, 33-3^.
^Wafi, viii, 338; Suluk, ii, 118; Durar, i, 331; Nu.jum, ix, 3^.
^Wafl, viii, 339-360; Bidaya, xiv, 127; Suluk, ii, 279; Durar, 
i, 331-332; Nujum, ix, 88.
z*
Wafi, viii, 36O; Bidaya, xiv, 127; Suluk, ii, 279? 339; Durar, 
i, 332; Nujum, ix, 88.
c. _
Nujum, ix, 103.
^Ibid.
n
Nujum, ix, 17^.
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(vii) The conspiracy of Baktamur al-Saqi
It seems that al-Na§ir Muhammad was preoccupied by the power­
ful position of the vicegerent (na*ib al-Saltana bi *1-diyar al- 
Misriyya) , either because of his personal expeilence, or because of 
the attempts of some vicegerents towards him, especially during the 
first half of his third reign when he became an astute politician 
who wanted to rule the state with full power and competent authority. 
Apparently in order to have complete co-operation and to enforce 
respect for his status, al-Na§ir Muhammad worked to have his own 
Mamluks around him for help and support, and at the same time abol­
ished the office of vicegerency in order to have no official of 
significant authority. Besides, al-Nasir Muhammad attached import­
ance to being the sole ruler, and to having complete supremacy over 
the oligarchy of the emirs and to be in control of power. The 
question which ought to be asked here is, how far would the fact 
of having his own Mamluks around him help al-Na§ir Muhammad to seize 
the reins of power? Moreover to what degree the Nasiri Mamluks would 
be loyal to their master; they were privileged to assume consider­
able power depending on their being his Mamluks (al-Mamallk al- 
Nasiriyya), and therefore they would be faithful to him. This brings 
us to a conspiracy secretly organized by some of the Nasiri Mam­
luks who were greatly favoured by al-Nasir Muhammad. Baktamur al-
_ 1 2 
Saqi (d. 733/1332) was the closest friend to al-Na§ir Muhammad;
thereupon he became extremely rich and highly respected by other
3 _ _ _
emirs. Baktamur al-Saqi was a Mamluk of the Sultan Baybars al-
■^ For his biography, see Tuhfa, i, 169; Jawahir, fols. 230a-231a; 
Durar, i, 486-487; Badr, fol. 32a; Nu.jum, ix, 6 9? 73t 100* 101- 
102, lCk, 103-106  ^300.
^Jawahir, fol. 230b; Suluk, ii, 364; Durar, i, 486; Badr, fol. 32a; 
Nujum, ix, ,100, 103 , 300 , 3.01.
^Bidaya, xiv, l6l; Jawahir, fol. 230b; Suluk, ii, 384; Durar, i, 
4l8, 486; JBadr, fol.""32a; Nu.jum, ix, 102, 103.
JashnakTr.^ When al-Nasir Muhammad came to power Baktamur became
2one of his Mamluks. In time, Baktamur became intimate with al- 
Nasir Muhammad and they spent most of their days together.^ Bak­
tamur reached a high position in the state and in consequence became 
wealthy.^
There is a certain amount of evidence .to show that Baktamur
5
was actually planning to kill al-Nagir Muhammad. In fact, al-Na§ir
g
Muhammad forestalled him, killed him and confiscated his wealth.
Subsequently al-Nasir Muhammad regretted this hasty action and said
openly that there would never again be such a man in the Royal Court
8Moreover Ahuk, the son of al-Na§ir Mu^ianmad (d. 740/l339)» 
married the daughter of Baktamur in a ceremonious wedding in 732/ 
1332. 9
In the same year al-Na§ir Muhammad intended to leave Cairo for' 
a pilgrimage with some emirs of powerful office, chiefly Baktamur 
al-Saqi, his wife and his son A^ imad (d. 733/1332).^ Subsequently 
they left Cairo and al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed the chamberlain (al-
^Durar, i, 486.
^Tbid, i, 487.
^Ibid.
4Durar, i, 486.
^Ibid., i, 487.
^Ibid.
7Ibid.
g
For his biography, see Durar, i, 4l8.
^Bidaya, xiv, 137; Durar, i, 4l8; Nu.jum, ix, 100, 101-102.
10For his biography, see Durar, i, 114-113.
1*5
Ifcajib) , Sayf al-DEn Almas (d. 735/1332) in the office of vice­
royalty (na’ib al-Saltana ) during the ab­
sence of al-Nasir Muhammad on pilgrimage, it was a temporary appoint­
ment because as we have already seen the office of vicegerency had 
2 _
been abolished. Almas was an intimate friend of al-Nasir Muhammad.
3
He gradually wielded more power. Without possessing the title he 
in fact exercised the power of interim viceroy of the Mamluk Sultan-
Zj. _
ate (na’ib al-ghayba). When al-Nasir Muhammad left for al-Hijaz
for pilgrimage he left Almas with two other emirs in the Citadel of
Cairo to direct affairs of state in the year 732/1332.5 On his re-
6turn, al-Nagir Muhammad arrested Almas. Na’ib al-ghayba was an
- 7office of regent, who was appointed during the absence of the Sultan.
Shortly, while al-Nasir Muhammad was on his way to al-Hijaz, 
he knew that Baktamur had made an agreement with some of the royal
g
Mamluks to slay al-Na§ir Muhammad. Consequently al-Na§ir Muhammad, 
for his own safety, on the pretext of illness, decided to return to 
Cairo and the emirs agreed to the intention, except Baktamur who
g
advised al-Na^ir Muhammad to continue the journey for pilgrimage. 
Thereupon al-Na^ir Muhammad accepted Baktamur's advice, but he sent
■^ For his biography, see Badr, fol. 32a; Durar, i, 410-^11; Nujum, 
ix, 108.
^Badr, fol. 32a; Durar, i, 4l0; Nujum, ix, 102.
^Durar, i, ^10.  ^ |
^Ibid.
5Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Subh, iv, 17.
o
Tufcfa, i, 169; Jawahir, fol. 231a; Suluk, ii-, 3^; Badr, fol. 32a; 
Nujum, ix, 10^ f.
9NuJum, ix, 1CA.
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his son Anuk and his wife Khawand Tughay (d. 7^ +9/l3^ 9)"*" to al-Karak 
2
for their safety. Thus al-Na§ir Muhammad started taking steps
to thwart Baktamur's plot. Thereafter al-Nasir Muhammad continued
his journey with great caution and he was careful secretly to change
3
the place where he slept many times during the night. Besides, al-
Zf
Nagir Muhammad was careful to tell no one of this matter. Before 
al-Na§ir Muhammad' ’s arrival in Mecca thirty of his Mamluks fled 
towards Iraq, probably because of their fears of his anger that he 
knew about the organized plot, but al-Nagir Muhammad continued to 
fulfil the duties of the pilgrimage, trying to assume indifference
5
concerning the flight of the .R>yal Mamluks. These aspects of care 
and precaution regarding the character of al-Nasir Muhammad throw 
light on his personality as a politician who had great interest in 
protecting his position as a ruler of a great state. Moreover, al- 
Na^ir Muhammad succeeded in capturing the fleeing Mamluks and sent 
them to al-Karak. Respecting the position of Baktamur we find that, 
on their way back to Cairo, al-Na§ir Muhammad planned to poison 
Baktamur and his son Ahmad, and he succeeded in having them poisoned 
in Mufrarram 733/September 1332.^
Apparently it was a secret personal struggle between al-Na§ir 
Muhammad and Baktamur, each one wanted to succeed in killing the other.
■^ For her biography, see Durar, ii, 221.
2 _
Nu.jum, ix, 10k,
3 _
Suluk, ii, 333; Durar, i, ^87; Nujum, ix, lO^ f.
L
Suluk, ii, 36^; Nujum, ix, 1C&.
^Nujum, ix, lO^f-103.
^Suluk, ii, 339.
^Tuhfa, i, 169; Bidaya, xiv, l60-l6l; Jawahir, fol. 231a; Suluk, 
ii, 36^-363; Durar, i, -^87; Badr, fol. 32a; Nu.jum, ix, 103.
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According to the Mamluk historians we see that the personal desire 
of the two against each other was created soon after their departure 
from Cairo for the pilgrimage."*" Therefore every one tried to pro­
tect himself and to take advantage of any opportunity that could
2
make the other fall into an ambush or into the other's hands.
Furthermore, al-Na§ir Muhammad was extremely careful to keep Baktamur
under his eye in order not to give him an opportunity to act against
him and, with more wariness, al-Nasir Muhammad began to plan Bak- 
3
tamur's death. The question arises here, why did al-Nasir Muhammad
poison the son A]^ mad as well as his father and,as a matter of fact,
4
three days before his father, Baktamur al-Saqi?
Ibn Taghri Bird! analyses the situation , stating that al- 
Na§ir Muhammad arranged the death of A^ imad to be three days before 
that of his father so that Baktamur would be sad about his son's 
sudden death; therefore he would be less cautious concerning his 
own protection from any danger that might occur to him from al-Na§ir 
Muhammad and that would be the opportunity that al-Na§ir Muhammad was
5
waiting for. Besides that, Ibn Taghri Birdi thinks that if al-Na§ir 
Muframmad left A^mad b. Baktamur alive, the Mamluks of Baktamur might 
stand by him and support him in talcing aggressive action against 
al-Na^ir Muhammad. Consequently, al-Nasir Muhammad, in order to
~*"Tuhfa,i,l69; Nu.jum, ix, 10^-103.
2
Nujum, ix, 106.
■2
Suluk, ii, 36^ -; Nujum, ix, 106.
4
Durar, i, 113, 4-87; Nujum, ix, 103, 106.
3 _
Nujum, ix, 106.
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achieve complete success, had to put both of them to death. 
Immediately after the arrival of al-Na§ir Muhammad in Cairo he 
seized Almas., who had taken an important part in that conspiracy 
in spite of his being al-Na§ir Muhammad’s Mamluk, as Baktamur al- 
Saql was.^
As soon as al-Na§ir Muhammad arrived in Cairo, he confiscated
all the property and the possessions of Baktamur and, among these
things, he found a letter written by Sayf al-DIn Almas . to Baktamur,
when the latter was with al-Na§ir Muhammad in al-Hijaz, telling him
that he had prepared to take possession of Cairo and the Citadel of
3
Cairo, and was waiting for news and orders from Baktamur. When
al-Nasir Muhammad found the letter he was sure that Baktamur al-
Saql and Sayf al-DIn Almas had co-operated in plotting to kill al-
Na^ir Muhammad and to assume the power of the Mamluk Sultanate;
thereupon al-Nasir Muhammad arrested Almas in Muharram 733/
September 1332, and immediately killed him, and confiscated his
if
wealth and all has possessions.
Ibn Battuta states that Baktamur al-Saqi arranged this plot
in order that his son Ahmad could come to power and take over the 
5
government.
N^u.jum, ix, 106.
^Durar, i, iflO; Badr, fol. 32a; Nu.jlfrn, ix, 107.
^Durar, i, 4l0; Badr, fol. 32a; Nu.jum, ix, 107-108.
^Durr, ix, 373; Badr, fol. 32a; Durar, i, 4l0; Nujum, ix, 108. 
^Tuhfa, i, 169.
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But it is recorded in the manuscript of Tarlkh Jawahir al- 
Suluk that Baktamur al-Saqi planned this plot for his own ambition 
to hold supreme: power in the Mamluk Sultanate.^
Both al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghri Bird! in their statements 
regarding the position of al-Na§ir Muhammad towards Baktamur al- 
Saqi agree to attribute al-Nagir Muhammad with knowledge, understand­
ing, cunning and astuteness.^
However al-Nasir Muhammad succeeded in foiling this conspiracy 
which had been carefully planned by his own Ibyal Mamluks who, with­
out al-Nagir Muhammad’s care ahd friendly attitude, would not be 
able to maintain a high position in the Mamluk Sultanate. They en­
joyed high positions and a great amount of wealth. But it seems 
that the desire for personal independence and competent authority 
was extremely strong and uppermost in the minds of the Mamluk emirs 
so that as soon as one of them found himself in such a powerful posi­
tion he began to plan the destruction of the existing government in 
order to seize power. Besides these emirs were not used to being 
ruled by one governor, or to be under a supreme power; hence, when 
al-Nagir Muhammad started his third reign with the fact that he would 
be thecnly one who had competent authority to carry out both the 
legislative power and the executive power, the oligarchy of the emirs 
was disappointed.
Consequently the Mamluk emirs began to revolt against that 
authoritarian power by plots and conspiracies,which were mainly 
arranged to put an end to al-Nasir Muhammad's life and, consequently, 
his power. Apparently they believed that there was no distinction 
between themselves and al-Na^ir Muhammad, neither in economic con­
dition, nor in social status; therefore why was al-Na^ir Muhammad 
the only one who enjoyed that absolute power?
The statement of Jawahir, fol. 231a, * JUaS yu£j, ^  i
’Suluk, ii, 36 ;^ Nujum, ix, 106. ^ u ^
1,
iko
On the other hand, it appears that al-Nasir Muhammad under­
stood the situation and perfectly realized how serious the political 
situation was, especially concerning his relations with those emirs. 
Consequently, al-Nasir Muhammad worked to increase his wealth and 
to strengthen his politicalpower in order to be able to face any 
revolt that might occur at the expense of his government.
(viii) The case of Sharf al-Din al-NaslpI
When al-Na§ir Muhammad seized supreme power in 709/1309 for 
the third time there were two important offices, vicegerent of the 
Sultanate, which has already been mentioned, and the wazirate (al- 
wizara). The wizara was both an honourable and responsible office, 
later the wazlr became more or less a figurehead, he had not the 
power to appoint or dismiss government officials. The Sul£an in- 
sisted on being informed of all matters, therefore the wa^Tt» was 
not necessarily a man of any outstanding qualifications or character.
p
Later al-Nagir Muhammad abolished this office. Concerning the latter 
office, al-Na^ir Muhammad appointed Fakhr al-ETn 'Umar b. al-KhaliII 
(d. 711/1311)^ to be his first wazir in his third reign,^ but he was 
deposed in Ramadan 710/January 1311.^ Immediately after al-Na§ir
/T
Muhammad nominated Baktamur al-Hajib (d. 728/1327) to be his wazir,
but soon Baktamur al-Hajib was discharged from his office in Rabi*,
II, 7H/August 1311. Subsequently, Amin al-Din *Ahd Allah b. al-
^For the function of wizara, see Subh, iv, 28.
^Subfr, iv, 28.
^For his biography, see Purar, iii, 170-171.
4
Suluk, ii, 7 6; Durar, iii, 171; Husn, ii, 223.
Suluk, ii, 89; Durar, iii, 171; Husn, ii,223.
^Supra , 125,
^Suluk, ii, 100-101; Husn, ii, 223.
1*U
Ghannara (d. 7^1/13^0)’*" became the wazir by al-Na§ir Muhammad's
2 —  order in Rabi', II, 711/August 1311. After two years, in Jumada,
1» 713/August 13131 al-Na§ir Muhammad dismissed Ibn al-Ghannam 
3
from his office. Then al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the office
L
wizara in 713/1313.
After that for ten years there was no wazir in al-Nasir
Muhammad's government until Rabi', I, 723/March 1323» when al-Na$ir
_ 5
Muhammad returned Amin al-Din b. al-Ghannam to his office. In
Ramadan 72*+/August 132*+ al-Na§ir Muhammad dismissed Ibn al-Ghannam
from his office and replaced him immediately by *Ala* al-Din Mugh-
6 7latay al-Jamali (d. 730/1330), who was the last wazir in al-
Na§ir Muhammad's government. Al-Nasir Muhammad abolished that
—  8office completely from his government in Shawwal 729/August 1329.
Thus al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the two offices, probably
to be the sole master of state affairs, but it should be admitted
that the office of wizara was not as important as the office of
vicegerency and the wazir had not absolute power, neither profound
9
effect on the internal matters of the state. Therefore the aboli­
tion of the wizara did not affect the administrative structure of 
the Mamluk Sultanate.
^For his biography, see Durar, ii, 2.51-232.
^Suluk, ii, 100-101; Durar, ii, 252; Husn, ii, 223.
•^Suluk, ii, 12*+; Durar, ii, 252.
A
Suluk, ii, 12*+.
^Suluk, ii, 2*+8; Durar, ii, 252; Husn, ii, 22*+.
r
Suluk, ii, 256; Durar, ii, 252: iv, 336; Husn, ii, 22*+.
n
For his biography, see Durar, iv, 33^-355.
o
Suluk, ii, 311; Durar, iv, 33^, Husn, ii, 22*+.
9Subir, iv* 28; • Suluk, ii, 311. .............
On the other hand, in 711/1311 al-Nagir Muhammad established
the office of control of privy funds (nagar al-khass)which had
been held first by Karim al-Din *Abd al-Karim^ (d. 724/132^+)^ and
Zj.
he continued to occupy that office until 723/1323. The controller
of privy funds (nazir al-khass) was responsible for the Royal.privy
5
purse or to control the privy funds, but gradually he became close
6to the Sultan and controlled the different affairs of the state. 
Moreover, nazir al-khass had his own diwan, diwan al-khass, with its
directors (mubashirun), controllers (nugzar), accountants (mustawfun),
—  —  7superintendents (shaddun) and other officials. After the arrest of
Karim al-Din al-Nasir Muhammad appointed Taj al-Din Is^aq (d. 731/
O Q
1331) to fill the office of nagir al-khass in 723/1323. After
the death of Taj al-Din Is^ iaq in 731/1311» we find Muhammad b.
Nagr Allah (d. 736/1335)"^ was the one who held the office of nazar
al-khasg. 11 Shortly, in Rajab 732/April 1332, Sharf al-DIn 'Abd
*12
al-Wahliab al-Nashu (d. 7^+0/1339) filled the office of nagar al-
- 13khasg and became controller of privy funds for eight years.
^Suluk, ii, 103; Nujum, ix, 76; Subfr, iii, V?2.
2 _
Suluk, ii, 103; Nujum, ix, 76.
For his biography, see Durar, ii, k01-k-0k9
L
Durar, ii, *t02, kOk.
^Subh, iv, 30.
^Ibid.
7§ ^ h , in, Z+53.
g
For his biography, see Durar, ii, bj>2.
^Suluk, ii, 2^7; cf. Durar, ii, -^32.
1(^ For his biography, see Durar, iv, 27 .^
^Durar, iv, 27^; Suluk, ii, 3^0.
"^ Fo'r 'hi's biography,' see' Durar', iii ^29-^30; ' Suluk, 'ii, '3^ 7i 3^8, '358,' 
361, 370, 38 f^, 393, 392-^pO, ^08, 409-^10, 4l3» ^22, ¥+6 , ¥f8 , ¥?5-
1^3
What happened to al-Nashu could be significant for giving 
clear picture concerning the political situation of the Mamluk 
Sultanate during the third reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad. In order 
to understand the whole situation it is better to start with the 
relationship between al-Na§ir Muhammad and al-Nashu. Al-Nashu suc­
ceeded in exploiting the two weak points respecting al-Nasir Muham­
mad's character, suspicion and greed so that al-Nashu began to 
rouse al-Nasir Muhammad against the emirs and to confiscate their
wealth, as happened in Safar 733/October 1332.^ Al-MaqrizT states
-  2 that al-Nashu was crue.l to the people without distinction. But
unfortunately al-Maqrizi does not mention the reasons which made
al-Nasir Muhammad, who was formerly known as an astute politician,
believe every statement made by al-Nashu without making a complete
investigation, or even taking any kind of lawful procedure for the
ft
safety of the accused persons, either the emirs or the people, as 
occurred in 733/1332, in 733/1335 an! in 736/1336."^ Besides a 
new aspect concerning the administrative affairs might be clearly 
noticed when some of those who succeeded in attaining high office 
tried to depose the others who might have a bad effect on their
position, such as al-Nashu had carried out with Taj al-DTn Isfcaq
if _
and his family and with other emirs. Thus al-Nashu employed a
5
mistaken policy against the emirs and the population as well. This 
policy had been frequently put into action by al-Nashu against the 
Mamluk emirs, as occurredin the years 736/1335? 738/1337 and
^For details, see Suluk, ii, 358.
^Ibid., ii, 36l.
3Suluk, ii, 361, 393.
^Ibid., ii, 3^8, 358, 38 ,^ ^00, *f09; Nujum, ix, 135? 289.
^Nasir, fols; 38b-ifOb, l+Sb-^B;- -Suluk,• ii,- 351? 361,- 0^0, kOS-bO^ )- 
Nujum, ix, 115.
739/1338 when al-Nashu held the office of nagar al-khags.^  Al-
Shuja*!, the contemporary historian of al-N agir Muhammad's third 
reign5 records that al-Nashu worked to confiscate the property of
arises here, what is the connection between the above events and 
the political situation? Apparently the political situation had 
been affected by these happenings concerning the safety of the 
people and the peace of society as well, but in order to under­
stand the actual reaction, we should study the act of al-Nagir, of 
the people and of the emirs. Firstly, concerning al-Nasir Muhammad,
we find that his attitude was in agreement with al-Nashu that al-
- - 3Nasir Muhammad was always ready to defend his nagir al-khasg.
Furthermore, al-Nashu succeeded in spoiling the relation which had
existed between al-Nasir Muhammad and the emirs so that al-Nagir
4Muhammad became mostly antagonistic to them. Secondly, respect­
ing the populace of Cairo, it could be said that they suffered badly 
_ 5
because of al-Nashu; therefore they took an aggressive position 
against al-Nashu and tried to kill him in Barnaul an 737/April 1337, 
but the attempt did not succeed. Consequently, it seems that the 
populace of Cairo realized that it was God alone who could help 
them in their difficulties, accordingly they kept going to the mosques
_ 2 
the a.jnad al-balqa, the emirs and even the poor. The question
'Suluk, ii, 3511 469.
• jjp——jc * - J\ !».«■> J.. 1 I
’Nasir, fol. 43a; Suluk, ii, 413.
z.
For detailed information, see Suluk, ii, 400, 409-410, 4ll, 4l2-4l4, 
419-420, 473-477.
^Ibid., ii, ^00, 469, 4?6; Nu.jum, ix, 113, 113, 131.
.^ Suluk., ii, 422.
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to make a complaint against al-Nashu's bad treatment and to ask 
God for help."*" Furthermore, al-Shuja*! states that when the popu­
lace of Cairo went on pilgrimage they asked God to help them
against al-Nashu, and when al-Nasir knew about this, he attached
2
no importance in coming to their aid. This explains the social 
condition of the populace of Cairo, how severely they suffered and 
how difficult it was for them to enjoy justice even for a short 
time. Besides, it shows that the populace of Cairo were extremely 
religious and simple. Moreover, it probably proves that the social 
situation of the populace of Cairo was weak anu that it was difficult 
for them to improve their condition either by personal meeting with 
the ruling class,or by direct letters to the Sultan; therefore 
they kept praying to God for care and support.
Thirdly, regarding the status of the emirs, especially when 
they became certain that al-Nashu was arousing al-Nagir Muhammad 
against them, so that their possessions were often confiscated in 
the years 732/1331. 733/1332. 73V1333. 735/1334, 736/1335 and 737/
3
1337. Consequently, the emirs tried to sow seeds of discord be­
tween al-Nagir Muhammad and al-Nashu by sending anonymous letters 
to al-Nagir Mubammad, as happened in 736/1335* explaining to al-Nasir 
Mubammad al-Nashu1s act of sabotage, and how this would cause the 
fall of the Nagiri state unless al-Nagir Mubammad set out to protect
_ 4his power and to save his kingdom by executing al-Nashu. This gives
^Ibid., ii, 446.
2 _
Al-Shuja*i in his Nagir, fols. 44b-45a, states:
^  Ul L>0 £-1 I ^  I I— * Q  UaJLJ L 1 fujj
*........ V  * H  ^ 1 O J O4 ^  i
 ejj ^ .|— CJ-JI SSLo Jo Lll»
• J-SJI ^------It
%iluk, ii, 348,'358, 361,'370, 384-385, '393,' 400, '408-409...............
^Suluk, ii, 399; Nujum, ix, 113.
ike
a clear picture concerning the powerful position of al-Nagir 
Muhammad so that the emirs did not dare to speak with him frankly 
about the matter of al-Nashu, or even to send signed letters, 
apparently, for the safety of their lives; notably, they under­
stood from the preceding years of al-Nasir Muhammad1s rule the 
actual attitude of al-Nagir Muhammad towards the Mamluk emirs, and 
they probably realized the nature of his relationship with the offi­
cials of high rank. Besides, one gets the impression that al-Nashu 
enjoyed high position in the Boyal Court, and al-Nasir Muhammad 
favoured him.
But it is evident that the emirs did not succeed by these means 
in achieving their purpose concerning the seizure of al-Nashu; there­
fore they decided to speak personally with al-Nagir Muhammad and 
agreed to choose Yalbugha al-Yakyaya (d. 7^8/13^7)^" because he was a 
close friend of al-Nasir Muhammad, to act as representative of the 
umara* al-khassakiyya and to tell al-Nagir Muhammad that al-Nashu 
was not as al-Nagir Muhammad thought and had expected. Subsequently 
Yalbugha al-Ya^iyawi had a meeting with al-Nasir Muhammad and informed 
him about the opinion of the courtiers (al-umara* al-khassakiyya) of
al-Nashu and how far al-Nashuf s behaviour could cause the ruin of 
2
his kingdom; therefore al-Nagir Muhammad followed Yalbugha al-
_ 3
Yaftyawi's advice.
Furthermore, Tankiz al-Husajni confirmed Yalbugha1s words con­
cerning the opinion of the emirs, of the merchants and of the populace
^For his biography, see Durar, iv, k^ >G-k^ >7»
2
Al-Shujat'~i in his Nagir, fol. *f6a, cites:
J 1 . i • ! j  — «^ I ( j j l— . iQ i U I  ^ 1 * j . L ‘(j U-^L^U 1 - * i L J Isi
• —kJLli U* jiS\ j— jy>-L
^Suluk, ii, +^76.
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of Cairo against al-Nashu.^ Tankiz*s opinion was important be-
2cause of the high position he enjoyed in the Mamluk Sultanate.
Thus the emirs succeeded in turning al-Nagir Muhammad’s attention 
towards al-Nashu1s mistakes, and they managed to persuade al-Nagir 
Muhammad to seize al-Nashu. In addition, al-Nagir Muhammad took 
his decision concerning al-Nashu * s arrest because Yalbugha al- 
Yahyawi told him that the khasgakiyya were waiting for an oppor-SByti M ■ ' — ' " 1
tunity to overthrow al-Nagir Muhammad's government, and, in order
_ 3
to protect his kingdom, al-Nagir Muhammad should arrest al-Nashu.
Probably this was the main reason which made al-Nasir Muhammad 
work to arrest al-Nashu without hesitation. Consequently, for the 
protection of the kingdom, and the safety of al-Nagir Muhammad's 
rule, we find al-Nashu and his family were arrested in Safar 740/
4August 1339 and they were tortured to death.
Moreover, at a meeting between al-Nasir Muhammad and the emirs, 
the former asked the emirs about the situation of the khasgakiyya 
against al-Nasir Muhammad, and the emirs assured al-Nagir Muhammad 
that the whole situation was caused by al-Nashu and for that he must 
be executed. Hence al-Nagir Muhammad approved the suggestion for
5
the sake of his rule. However, al-Nagir Muhammad was convinced of 
the emirs' opinion against al-Nashu when he found that al-Nashu left 
great wealth, though while he was nazir al-khass, he professed that 
he was in need of money, and proclaimed poverty in the presence of
~*~Suluk, ii, *+76.
2Infra, 149-150.
^Suluk, ii, 477; Nu.jum, ix, 133.
Siagir, fols. 46b-48b; Suluk, ii, 478-4-79, 480-481, 483-486;
Nujum, ix, 131, 133-134.
•■^ Suluk-, ii-, 483;- Nujum, -ix, -l4l-l42.-.............................
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al-Nasir Muhammad; subsequently all al-Nashu's wealth was confis­
cated.^
This leads us to consider again the reasons that made al- 
Nagir Muhammad plan to arrest al-Nashu; it was the financial factor, 
because we know that whenever a person of high position in the Royal 
Court was arrested, his wealth was later confiscated for the benefit 
of the Royal privy funds (al-khass al-Sultanl).
Therefore, the Mamluk historiansagree with the idea that al- 
Nashu accomplished his aggressive acts against the different social
classes because he was a Christian and, even when he adopted Islam,
2 _ 
he was a hypocrite, especially when the Mamluk historians mention
the property of al-Nashu we find they are careful to state that a
valuable cross was found among his belongings."^ Besides, after his
_ k
death, it was found that al-Nashu was without circumcision. However
the populace of Cairo, al-'ammah, were delighted at the death^of
al-Nashu.
Apparently al-Nashu's behaviour against the ruling class, the 
administrative officials and even against the poor might cause a 
revolt among the emirs against al-Nagir Muhammad's rule, or a riot 
among the people, which might cause great damage to the government, 
but to agree with this idea does not mean we agree with the Mamluk 
historians who say that al-Nashu had behaved thus simply because he 
was a Christian. Seemingly it was an individual case which had oc­
curred because of the personal ambition of al-Nashu for higher 
position at the court at the expense of the emirs, and more money 
at the e:xpense of the rich.
^Nasir, fol. 47b; *Uyun, fols. 40b-a; Suluk, ii, 48l, 483;
Nu.jum, ix, 138-139.
^Suluk, ii, 48l.
• ^ Ibidfc ,lir 48l; .Nujum, ix, 138..................................
4Suluk, ii, 486; Nujum, ix, 142.
^'Uyun, fol. 40a; Nujum, ix, 133-137.
1^9
(ix) The affair of Tankiz al-Husarnl
Coming to the late years of al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign, 
it could be assumed that peace and stability would result in politi­
cal life because of the changes concerning the administrative structure 
and the determined rule; these had been carriedout by al-Na§ir 
Muhammad. But what happened respecting the position of al-Na^ir 
Muhammad towards his Mamluk, the emir Tankiz al-Husami (d. 7^1/13^0)^ 
makes it obvious that al-Nasir Muhammad faced political trouble shortly 
before the end of his rule.
Tankiz al-Husami, the viceroy of Syria, came to Egypt at a very 
2 _
early age. Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil bought him as a Mamluk, later 
he became the property of LachTn and, on his death, Tankiz became 
the property of al-Na§ir Muhammad.^ He accompanied al-Nasir Muhammad
|L
to al-Karak» and served al-Na§ir Muhammad as messenger. When al-
Na§ir Muhammad came to power he appointed Tankiz viceroy of Damascus
5
as a reward for his loyalty. Respecting Tankiz al-Husami, it is 
imperative to say that he was appointed by al-Na^ir Muhammad to be 
viceroy of Damascus in RabI1, II, 712/August 1312.^ Afterwards 
Tankiz al-Husami was highly respected by al-Nasir Muhammad, enjoyed 
an honourable position at the Royal Court, and became the closest
■^ For his biography, see Nagir, fols. 31a.-33b, 5^b-68b; Durr, ix, 380- 
38l, 392; Albab, fols. 201a-20Vb; Durrat, fols. 297a-b; Suluk, ii, 
118, 237, 317, 3391 ^1 7, ^32-^331 ^60-^62, ^97-501, 506-308, 309-312; 
Durar, i, 320-528; Badr, fols. 39b-^ +0b; Nu.jum, ix, 3^ +i 38, 931 101- 
102, 115, 119, 12.9-130, l*f5i 1^6, 147-^9, 131-132, 153-138, 139-160.
2
Durar, i, 520.
3Ibid.
^Ibid.
~* I b i d .
S\“~lr, fol. 5^b; Albab, fol. 201a; -Durrat, fols. 297a-b;__>
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friend of al-Na^ir Muhammad.'*' Al-Na^ir Muhammad welcomed Tankiz 
al-Husami, whenever the latter went to Cairoi with a friendly re­
ception and gracious celebration, as happened in the years 730/1329, 
732/1331. 733/1332, 73V1333, 735/1331*, 737/1336 , 737/1336, 738/1337 
and 739/1338, and accordingly it appeared obvious that Tankiz al- 
HusamT was in al-Na§ir Muhammad's favour. Al-Shuja*T states that 
Tankiz al-Husami- attained an exalted position during al-Nasir 
Muhammad’s rule because the latter entitled Tankiz al-Husami to be 
the general governor of Syria with competent authority; therefore, 
if the other governors of the Syrian provinces wanted to contact al- 
Nasir Muhammad concerning local affairs, it should be done through 
Tankiz al-Husami. On the other hand, Tankiz al-Husami was acquainted 
with everything respecting the local situation of the Syrian provinces.' 
Subsequently, Tankiz a'l-Husami continued to accomplish his duties as 
viceroy of Syria during his lifetime, for twenty-eight years, until 
he was seized by al-Nagir Muhammad's men in Dhu 1-Hij ja 740/June 
1340 and brought to Cairo in Muharram 74l/June 1340 to be imprisoned
If
and executed only twelve days after his arrival in Cairo. Moreover,
*Ibar, v, part IV, 948; Suluk, ii, 118; Durar, i, 520; Badr, 
fol. 40a; Nujum, ix, 34.
^Nasir, fols. 31a-33D, 53a; Durr, ix, 380, 392; Albab, fol. 202a;
Uyun, fol. l6a; *Ibar, v, part IV, 948; Durar, i, 521-522; Suluk, 
ii, 237, 317, 368, 417, 436, 460-462; Badr, fol. 40a; Nujum, ix,
38, 93, 101:-102, 119, 129, 130.
2
Nasir, fols. 31a-33B, 5^a-b;Albab, fols. 202a-203a; Durr, ix, 380,
392; *Uyun, fol. l6a; SulUk, ii, 237, 317, 359, 417,436, 460-462;
Durar, i, 523, 524; Nujum, ix, 93, 101, 151, 129.
*2
In his Nasir, fols. 53a-b, al-Shuja'l says:
I — ■  ^LtJ L I <4^/ 4 I JlJ I ^  llaluJ 1 JLto ( jSjS cf 0  ^
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Sasir, fols. -57b} 'M£g£, -fols. -132b, jU'fas • WSlk. -fol.; f***; ; •
""'"Uyun, fol. 45b; Durrat, fol. 297h; Suluk, iij 506; D}i£2£.’ 1 ’ ^ 5 
Fodrt fol. 40a; huHTml, ix, 151-132; 66.
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al-Na§ir Muhammad arrested Tankiz al-Husami1s family and his
Mamluks as well, and confiscated all the great wealth which Tankiz
al-Husami had left, and even that which had been obtained by the
Husami Mamluks.^ The questions arise here, what were the reasons
which made al-Nasir Muhammad act so suddenly against his closest
friend Tankiz al-Husami; and what caused the change that resulted
in Tankiz al-Husami's execution by al-Nafir Muhammad’s order soon
after his arrest?
Al-Shuja'i states that Tankiz became suspicious of al-Nagir
Muhammad’s attitude towards him a few months before he was seized;
therefore Tankiz discussed the situation with his Mamluks who ad-
2
vised him to take arms and money secretly to Qal'at Ja'bar, and
3
prepare the place as a refuge for him if the necessity should arise.
In fact, Tankiz was right in his suspicions concerning al-Nagir
4
Muhammad’s srcret plan to capture Tankiz. Ibn Taghri Bird! repeats
al-Shu.ja*!’ s statement and adds that, when al-Na§ir Muhammad knew
about Tankiz's intentions, he decided to send an arri^ r to seize
3
Tankiz before the latter accomplished what he intended. But we
l
find Ibn Taghri Bird!, in another place, when he explains the reas­
ons which made al-Na§ir Muhammad arrest Tankiz, records that the 
latter asked al-Na§ir Muhammad to travel to Qal'at Ja'bar and, when 
al-Na§ir Muhammad refused the request, Tankiz commented that in a
^Nasir, fols. 67b-68b; Misr, fol. 136a; Albab, fols. 20^ -a-b; * Uyun,
fols. Vtb, 46b-A7a; SulHk, ii? 507-508; Burar, i, 526; Badr, fols. 
^Oa-b; Nujum, ix, 152; Mawrid, 66.
^For Qal'at Ja'bar, see Buidan, II, 150.
^Al-Shu.ja*!, in his Nasir, fol. 59Bi states:
^ o '  <j\— 1 ^ 0 1 ** aJc I^LiU
*---------- j \  ^  o b  K  J------I j|^  ^  ^  j  J JL-Cj
^Nasir, fols. 60a-b. J
^Nn jiTm. ix, lA6-l*t6.
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meeting with his friends, his Mamluks and other emirs, al-Nasir 
Muhammad's mind was easily influenced by the young Na§irT Mamluks, 
and it would be better for al-Na^ir Muhammad to resign, to give 
the supreme power to one of his sons, and to allow Tankiz to direct 
the affairs of state. Consequently, al-Nasir Muhammad was informed, 
became extremely angry and decided to capture Tankiz.^ This proves 
that Ibn Taghrl Birdl agrees with al-Shu.ja'T concerning Tankiz’s 
secret move to Qal'at Ja'bar, although it seems that Ibn Taghrl 
Birdl regards this point and the following events as the reason which 
changed al-Nasir Muhammad’s attitude towards Tankiz.
Al-MaqrTzI endorsed the previous fact given by al-Shuja'l and 
Ibn Taghrl Birdl that al-Nasir Muhammad's position towards Tankiz
O
changed; therefore Tankiz planned to flee to Qal'at Ja'bar. Accord­
ing to al-Maqrlzi, in Dhu -M-Hijja 7^0/June 13^0, al-Nafdr Muhammad 
appointed his son Abu Bakr (d. 7 ^ 2 / 1 3 ^ 1 to be his heir-apparent.^
This fact confirms the previous statement concerning Tankiz's desire 
to direct the affairs of state, especially if we know that, immediately 
after, al-Nasir Muhammad agreed with Musa b. Muhanna (d. 7^1/13^1)
g . . .  ......................................................
to seize Tankiz, and Musa promised al-Na§ir Muhammad that the Bedouins
7 - _would prevent Tankiz from fleeing. According to al-Maqnzi, there
were thirty thousand dinars in Qal'at Ja'bar with arms and provisions,
^Nu.jum, ix, 159; see also, Suluk, ii, 3^9.
^Suluk, ii, ^98.
~Z
For his biography, see Durar, i, ^62-^64.
^Suluk, ii, ^99.
^For his biography, see Durar, iv, 382. 
c
Suluk, ii, V99.
^Ibid; Nujum, ix, 1^ -6.
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all belonging to Tankiz al-Husami. Therefore, could we assume 
that Tankiz was certain about al-Nasir Muhammad's unfriendly attitude 
towards him during the preceding months, and that Tankiz knew that 
if al-Nasir Muhammad had the least suspicion of any person of high 
rank that meant the endof that person's life and, accordingly, 
that Tankiz prepared Qal'at Ja'bar to be his refuge but that al- 
Nasir Muhammad was quicker than Tankiz in word and deed?
In addition, the Mamluk chronicles record that Artana (d. 753/
2 _
1352), the governor of the Rum state in Little Armenia, sent to
al-Nagir Muhanimad a letter through Tankiz al-Husami without a letter 
to Tankiz to keep him informed; therefore Tankiz sent the messenger 
back to his master without fulfilling his request and al-Nasir 
Muhammad was enraged by Tankiz.^ How far does the above report 
confirm Tankiz's ambition for equal position with al-Na§ir Muhammad? 
Moreover, al-Na§ir Muhammad wrote to Tankiz to release one of the 
Mamluks who had been imprisoned by Tankiz, but the latter refused 
al-Na^ir Muhammad's request; consequently, al-Na§ir Muhammad per­
sonally ordered the governor of al-Shawbak to set his Mamluk free,
If ’ '
and was on bad terms with Tankiz. Undoubtedly these events could 
be regarded as minor occurrences which would be forgotten in time, 
but if we know that al-Nasir Muhammad was involved in these events 
it would suffice to reveal how far that situation might be taken 
into account against Tankiz al-Husami. Al-MaqrizI mentions that 
Tankiz al-Husami executed some Christians who caused a great fire
^Suluk, ii, 5081 512.
For his biography, see Durar, i, 3^8-3^9.
^Suluk, ii, 509; Nujum, ix, 159.
^Suluk, ii, 509; Nujum, ix, 159-160.
13^
in Damascus 7^0/13^0; therefore Tankiz became the object of al-
Nasir Muhammad's anger, especially because of al-Na§ir Muhammad's
fears that the Muslim merchants would be badly treated in Byzantium.'*'
Besides Tankiz refused to send the money which he had taken from the
2
Christians and said that he had to use that money for rebuilding.
_ "2 
Al-Shuja'i, who deals with this event in detail, records three
excuses which Tankiz used for not sending the money. Firstly, the
high level of prices in Syria. Secondly, the condition of drought
k
in Damascus in that year. Thirdly, the use of money for rebuilding.
Furthermore, Tankiz al-Husami'had to send two of his sons to Cairo
to marry two daughters of al-Na^ir Muhammad, but Tankiz delayed in
5sending his sons and al-Nafir Muhammad was annoyed. Moreover, when
£
al-Na§ir Muhammad sent Bashtak al-NagirT (d. 7^2/13^1) to bring
Tankiz's sohs to Cairo, the latter thought that Bashtak had come to
7
seize him, and he refused to send his sons with Bashtak.
According to al-Shuja'T Tankiz was in a state of military 
readiness and was entirely engaged in preparing war material; there­
fore al-Na§ir Muhammad was worried and seized Tankiz. But Tankiz's 
defence of the accusation was that he was always in military pre­
paredness, and al-Na^ir Muhammad had never seemed aroused by that 
situation until a later time when the emirs succeeded in arousing
1Infra, 186-187.
^Suluk, ii, ^97.
^Nasir, fols. 36b-38a.
^Ibid., fol. 38a.
5Suluk, ii, 497-^98; cf. Albab, fols. 203b-20*fa.
For his biography, see Durar, i, ^77-^79.
rp
rAl-Shuja'l in his work Nas.ir, 38a-b, says:
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al-Nagir Muhammad against Tankiz.^
Al-'Ayni mentions another situation which exasperated al-Nagir
Muhammad with Tankiz. In reality al-Hasan b. Tamar dash, the governor
2
of Sis (d. 7^/l3^5) i was extremely afraid of Tankiz; therefore
he sent a messenger to al-Nagir Muhammad that Tankiz asked al-Hasan
b. Tamardash to go and join him in order to form an alliance against
al-Nagir Muhammad. Consequently, al-Nasir Muh.ammad was infuriated,
3
and had doubts about Tankiz's attitude towards him.
Ibn Hajar analyses the attitude which al-Hasan b. Tamardash 
had adopted towards Tankiz that al-Hasan was extremely eager to have 
Syria in his power, and because he was certain that Tankiz would de­
feat him and would obstruct his advance into Syria, al-Hasan attempted
this successful step with al-Nagir Muhammad against Tankiz to pave
kthe way for his military expedition against Syria. While al-Safadi
states that there was a widespread rumour that Tankiz would flee
to al-Hasan, and al-Nagir Muhammad was considerably influenced by
that rumour; therefore, al-Nagir Muhammad’s position towards Tankiz
5
was changed for the worse. Furthermore, it is easy to understand 
from the Mamluk writings concerning this period that the Mamluk emirs 
played an important part in arousing al-Nagir Muhammad’s anger against 
Tankiz because of their jealousy, especially when they saw that al- 
Nagir Muhammad kept asking for Tankiz’s advice in every matter
^Nagir, fols. 66b-67b.
2
For his biography, see Durar, ii, 15.
^Badr, fol. ^Oa; see also, Durar, ii, 15.
Zf
Durar, ii, 15.
^Albab, fols. 203b-20^a.
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respecting the affairs of state, and they successfully worked to
make al-Nagir Muhammad believe that Tankiz was preparing for his
flight from Damascus for self-protection.'*' In conclusion, al-
2
Nasir Muhammad prepared his army to fight Tankiz, and sent
letters of friendliness and politeness for the purpose of attachment-
and unify (mulattifat) to the governors of the Syrian provinces,
3
and to the Mamluk emirs in Syria. Thus, because of the opposition
i
of the emirs to Tankiz, al-Nagir Muhammad became more determined
if
to seize Tankiz al-Husami.
Seemingly, the idea that Tankiz might flee to the Mongols or 
to the Rum to form an alliance against the Mamluk Sultanate is 
difficult to believe because Tankiz was always sincere in fulfilling 
his duties and was loyal to al-Nagir Muhammad; besides, he was al­
ways on good terms with al-Nagir Muframmad until a few months be-' 
fore his capture. Consequently, there was no reason for Tankiz 
to think of taking refuge in any place. But the fact that Tankiz 
prepared Qal'at Ja'bar as a refuge for him when necessary was a 
natural reaction of self-protection against al-Nasir Muhammad's plan 
to capture him either by diplomacy or by military function. Hence 
al-Nagir Muhammad decided to send an army, including fifty-seven 
emirs and led by JankalT al-Baba (d. 7^6/13^6),^ Bashtak al-Nagiri, 
ArqafSy al-Qafjaql (d. 750/13^9)^  Qamarl Emir Shukar (d. 7^6/13^3),^
^Nasir, fols. 62a, 66b; Albab, fols. 203b-2(yta; Suluk, ii, ^62, ^98; 
Durar, i, 32^, 323; Badr, fol. A-Oa; Nujum, ix, 130, 1^ -6.
^Suluk, ii, Af.98—lf99j Nujum, ix, l*+6, 1^7.
■^ Nasir, fols. 62b-63a; Suluk, ii, ^98, ^99» 300; Nu.jum, ix, 1^7.
if _
Suluk, ii, 309.
For his biography, see Durar, i, 339-5^0.
%br his biography, see Durar, i, 33^.
7For his biography, see Durar, iii, 236.
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— 1 — 2the emir Barsanbagha (d. 7^2/13^1) and Tashtamur al-SaqT, to
- 3 - -fight Tankiz al-Husami in Damascus. Moreover, Musa b. Muhanna
left Cairo to be ready with the Bedouins near Him§ for immediate
help.^ The army left Cairo in Dhu -'1-Hijja 7^0/June 13^0.^ Besides,
by al-Nasir Muhammad’s order, Tashtamur al-SaqT, the governor of
£
Safad, left his province with troops for Damascus. These data 
give us, indirectly, an idea of the strong position of Tankiz al- 
HusamT in Syria, and the extent of al-Na§ir Muhammad’s fears that 
his army might fail to achieve his desire concerning the capture 
of Tankiz.
Ibn TaghrT Bird! records that when the troops of Safad, led 
by Tashtamur, arrived at Damascus, Tankiz thought of fighting them
but, when he realized the weakness of his position, he gave up and
7 -surrendered to Tashtamur. Thus Tankiz al-Husami was captured by
8 9al-Nasir Muhammad’s emirs, and the army returned to Cairo. Sub­
sequently al-Na§ir Muhammad became extremely happy when he received 
the news regarding the arrest of Tankiz al-Husami.'*'^
1 ' 
Supra, 88.
2 v Supra, 130.
^Nasir, fols. 62a-b; Misp, fols. 131b-132a.; Suluk, ii, ^98-^99? 500; 
Durar, i, 525; Badr, fol. 40b; Nu.jum, ix, 1^7.
^Suluk, ii, ^99; Badr, fol. ^0b; Nujum, ix, 1^6.
^Nasir, fol. 62b; Misr, fol. 132b; Suluk, ii, ^99; Nujum, ix, l*+7.
r
Nasir, fols. 62b-63b; Misr, fol. 32a; Albab, fol. 20^a; Suluk, ii,
500; Durar, i, 525; Nujum, ix, 1^7.
^Nu.jum, ix, 1^ -8; cf. Nasir, fol. 59b.
^Nasir, fols. 63a-6^ +b; Misr, fols. 132a-b; Albab, fol. 20^ -a; Suluk, 
ii, 500; Durar, i, 525; Nujum, ix, 148.
^Suluk, ii, 500-301; Nujum, ix, 158-1^-9.
10Nasir, fol. 65a;’ 'Misr, 'fol.' 132b;' Suluk,' ii,' 500': ' Nujum, ix', 1^8. •
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Apparently al-Nasir Muhammad was afraid of perfidy, afraid 
of ruse and extremely suspicious and careful for fear that he 
might be betrayed by other emirs; therefore while al-Na§ir Muhammad 
was preparing to capture Tankiz al-Husami he issued a royal request 
that all the emirs, the troopers (a.jnad), and the Mamluks should 
take an oath of allegiance to al-Nasir Muhammad during his life­
time and to his heirs afterwards, and the army must always be pre-
Ibn TaghrT Bird! cites that al-Na§ir Muhammad was determined to
seize Tankiz al-Husami eight years before Tankiz's capture was
achieved,and al-Na§ir Muhammad had been waiting all these years
2
for suitable circumstances.
Probably there is an exaggeration in the above statement be­
cause it is obvious in the Mamluk writings respecting this period 
that al-Nasir Muhammad decided to seize Tankiz al-Husami only a 
few months before Tankiz's capture had been accomplished by the 
Nagiri emirs, and only when circumstances made that capture a 
necessary step should it be carried out for the sake of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad's rule. Besides, it is. clear, in al-Shuja*!' s writings 
that when Tankiz suspected al-Nasir Muhammad's attitude towards
him, he worked to protect himself; therefore al-Nasir Muhammad
_ _ 3
started to make plans to capture Tankiz_al-Husami.
Considering the different sides and the many aspects of the 
situation, one gets the impression that Tankiz al-Husami succeeded 
in holding almost complete power to direct the local affairs of 
Syria without fulfilling any kind of obligation concerning al- 
Nasir Muhammad's personal advice, even if it was from the theoretical
pared for war, completely armed and perfectly trained.'*' Moreover
Al-Shuja'l, in-his work Nasir, fol. 65a, cites: s
4! Jc t Qjh 1? (Js J-&->»• U)l dtUI fllkLJ I
0  ^0
*■ L>-3wX—•
■Nu.jum, ix, 211; cf. Nu.jum, ix, Durar, i, 525.
Nasir, fols. 59a-b, 62a-b.
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point of view. Seemingly, in time Tankiz, al-Husami was in a power­
ful position, and al-Nagir Muhammad was as always suspicious, careful, 
and had no confidence either in the emirs of high rank, or in any 
circumstances which might arise. Subsequently, at that time, Tankiz 
was the most powerful emir in the Mamluk Sultanate, and he was al­
most the ruler of Syria under al-Nagir Muhammad's supervision. There­
fore al-Nagir Muhammad began to suspect Tankiz's affairs, even the 
ordinary ones, and he became more and more afraid of Tankiz's power 
and of his competent authority. Apparently al-Nagir Muhammad was 
afraid that Tankiz might try to seize supreme power, either during 
his life or later during the reign of his heir-apparent, and his fears 
and suspicions made him plan to seize Tankiz before the latter worked 
to overthrow his government, at least, as al-Nagir Muhammad seemed to 
think. Accordingly, al-Nasir Muhammad fulfilled his decision and 
Tankiz al-Husami was arrested.
(x) Conclusion
There has been a thorough study concerning the relations be­
tween al-Nagir Muhammad and the oligarchy of the emirs who were either 
those who helped him to seize power for the third time, or the loyal 
Mamluks who had been brought up, educated and held high rank in the 
court or in the society because of his care and support. Concerning 
his position, al-Nagir Muhammad found that in order to keep the reins 
of power in his hand, he should work to strengthen his situation; 
therefore he paid, much attention to his adherents, that they should 
be a large number, well educated either in military or in cultural 
affairs.
Apparently al-Nagir Muhammad pursued a policy of strange aspect 
towards his Mamluks who had been made emirs to carry out his orders 
for the'sake of'his-supreme-power.but, as,soon as he was aware of
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S their strength, he tried by different methods to execute them because
they might be a threat to his power. Thus, al-Na§ir Muhammad pract­
ised that political policy with his Mamluks, extremely friendly and 
generous at the beginning and aggressive to the point of murder at 
the end, when they became strong and had many followers under their 
command. This policy was followed with a great number of the Nagiri 
emirs who were in power. It was probably personal feelings and ex­
treme ambition regarding supreme power in the Mamluk Sultanate.
Seemingly, on the assumption that he should be in control of power, 
al-Na§ir Muhammad fought hard for this purpose without respect for 
personal friendship, and without regard for the sincere service and 
loyalty which he had had from those emirs who had to be murdered for 
the sake of maintaining his rule.
Secondly, al-Na^ir Muhammad probably realized that being wealthy 
added great consideration to his position as the head of the Mamluk 
Sultanate and, from this viewpoint, the execution of the rich and 
powerful emirs was of great use and importance because this confis­
cated wealth and property was taken for the royal privy purse. Be­
sides, al-Nasir Muhammad had established the office of najar al-khass 
to serve the royal privy funds; consequently al-Nasir Muhammad 
was extensively wealthy. Thirdly, al-Nasir Muhammad discussed 
internal affairs with the emirs and listened to their ideas and 
views to make them feel by this behaviour how important their 
position was in the koyal Court, and that their presence for advice 
and discussion was essential to a considerable degree, although the 
words of al-Nafir Muhammad were alone effective enough to be put 
into action. Consequently, the political position of the emirs 
was greatly weakened in different political, economic and social 
fields. Thus, al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in satisfying the desire
l6l
of the emirs to have some influence on current matters, and to 
have some part in managing the internal administration. Besides, 
probably al-Nasir Muhammad allowed them to enjoy that situation 
because he was certain that this condition would notlave the least 
effect either on the political status, or on his power as an astute 
politician and a powerful ruler.
Coming to al-Nasir Muhammad1s position, it must be mentioned 
that al-Na^ir Muhammad was cautious with respect to the attitude 
of the people towards him; therefore he was careful to be popular 
and to have their affection and attachment. Besides, many useful 
functions had been fulfilled by al-Nasir Muhammad for the benefit 
of the people, and also to court and woo the people. Apparently, 
when al-Nasir Muhammad became sure of his popularity, he was intent 
on maintaining that condition and to cement that popularity, either 
*>y benevolent actions , or by treating them with absolute justice. 
Moreover, he was careful to let them enjoy justice and honesty, 
even if it was at the expense of the emirs. Al-Na§ir Muhammad 
trusted his people, depended largely on their support and relished 
to a considerable degree being popular among them. Seemingly, on 
the contrary, al-Nasir Muhammad was full of suspicion, caution and 
fears towards the oligarchy of the emirs. Apparently he was anxious 
to be diplomatic in his relations with them so that they might think 
that they had enough power to succeed in overthrowing al-Nasir 
Muhammad's government, while in reality he was the one who succeeded 
in foiling their plots against his power. During his previous 
reigns, al-Nasir Muhammad became sure that the oligarchy of the 
emirs did not respect his right to rule, and the government was in 
the hands of the powerful senior emirs; therefore al-Nasir Muhammad
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endeavoured to be the centre of power, to hold power in his hand 
and to be always aware of the ruling factors.
It appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad understood that being power­
ful would provide him with a different situation concerning the respect 
of the senior emirs, with a firm foundation for his rule, his situation 
would be stabilized and he would be installed in a ruling position 
permanently. So that al-Na§ir Muhammad ended as an effective ruler 
in a secure position. Besides, it seems that al-Na§ir Muhammad's 
resolution came into effect; he was his own master and he attained 
a definitive position at the expense of the emirs. Similarly, al- 
Nasir Muhammad succeeded in seizing the reins of power and in holding 
the legislative power as well as the executive power. Moreover, 
although al-Nasir Muhammad respected the four chief judges, it was 
obvious that,he assumed judicial power.
On the other hand, coming into power at the expense of the 
emirs helped al-Na§ir Muhammad to put his hand on great amounts of 
money; in other words, having arrested the oligarchy of emirs and 
confiscated their property and wealth provided al-Nasir Muhammad with 
movables and landed property. Consequently al-Nasir Muhammad became 
wealthy and the political circumstances helped him to become a ruler 
of strong personality. These two factors, wealth and a strong 
personality, had an extensive effect on the third reign of al-Nasir 
Muhammad so that it could be said that it was of great importance.
In addition, al-Nasir Muhammad, as the chief executive of the 
Mamluk Sultanate, showed great success in management respecting poli­
tical affairs and successfully managed, as administrative officer, 
in directing administrative matters, as well as in dealing with 
those of high-ranking emirs.
Probably al-Na§ir Muhammad wanted to put the powerful emirs
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under his command, therefore he succeeded in accomplishing his desire 
so that he became awe-inspiring, and his reign was the object of 
reverence and respect. Additionally, for thirty-two years, al-Nagir 
Muhammad enjoyed a rule of dignity because of his determination to 
reign with resolution, firmness and subtlety.
Lastly, al-Nagir Muhammad strengthened his rule in every possible 
way, such as by executing the powerful emirs, confiscating their 
wealth, buying new Mamluks for support, putting an end to the senior 
emirs' desire for personal independence and establishing a new reign 
of firm foundation, strong structure, political stability, flourishing 
economy, social security and administrative progress. Thus, the 
political aspect of the Mamluk period during the third reign of al- 
Nagir Muhammad had been affected by bureaucracy and by administrative 
roles. By contrast, the political life concerning the rule of al- 
Nagir Muhammad as an astute politician was much more highly deter-i 
mined. Thus, in the first half of the lAth century, Egypt and Syria 
were ruled by al-Nasir Muhammad, a ruler of Mamluk origin and a Sultan 
of experience, and who could be regarded with firm justification as 
the founder of a new period with different aspects.
During the early years of the lAth century:, al-Nasir Muhammad 
considered his position in the political field of the Mamluk Sultan­
ate, the Nasiri emirs were a great help in revealing new aspects in 
the administrative structure and the economy. By the 1^ -th century, 
the Mamluk power was dominant in Egypt and Syria. The stability of 
the rule was an important factor there for lasting political domina­
tion, while the*Abbasid Caliphs were, at that time, over-shadowed by 
the wealth and the governmental advance of the ruling class of the 
Mamluks. It was a long period of political stability.
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Chapter IV 
THE NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS
(i) The western merchants
The non-Muslim community in Egypt could be divided into two 
parts, the foreign merchants and the natives. Concerning the first 
group, there were three thousand Christian merchants according to 
the estimates of some foreign writers.^" "Most of the Indian pro­
ducts poured into the empire of the Mamluks, and the Venetians,
Genoese, Florentines, Pisans, Catalans and, at a later date, the
French, had no alternative but to come to the subject lands of the
2
Sultan for the purchase and exchange of goods’.1 This gives us an 
idea of the active commercial relations between the MamlHk Sultan­
ate and the western world. Foreigners had to take up residence 
in the fun dug assigned to their country in which they transacted 
their business, stored their goods and had their living quarters.
The Muslim government in Egypt also permitted foreign trading 
cities, in the first instance Venice, Genoa, Pfsa, Barcelona and
Marseilles, to maintain consular missions under their own juris- 
3
diction. How far does the evidence of this condition confirm 
the view of the good treatment given to those merchants under the 
Mamluk regime? The impression is • that the European commercial
groups succeeded in getting suitable and beneficial markets under 
their trade agreement. On the other hand, it seems that the Mamluk
Kammerer, Le Regime et le status des Etrangers en Egypte, 17.
2
Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, 115.
■7
■^ Subhi Labib, "Egyptian ^ commercial policy in the Middle Ages',’ (Studies
in the Economic History of the Middle East, (ed. M.A.Cook), p.71.
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Sultans regarded these European merchants as hostages to the
state and, whenever the Muslims were attacked by any of the Christian
countries, revenge would be taken on the foreign merchants in Cairo
and Alexandria. Consequently, the foreign minority might never
have had a feeling of safety in Egypt. But, on the., other hand,
there were good relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the
Christian countries for most of the Mamluk period and firm precautions
were taken against the foreign merchants only when danger of a
2
Christian invasion seemed imminent. These precautions can be 
regarded as a reasonable action taken by a state towards the nation­
als of a country threatening it since these people might be a danger, 
through loyalty to their own country. Besides, if these foreigners 
were badly treated during the Mamluk period of the history of Islam, 
it was mostly by the natives, the Egyptians and the Mamluks, as in 
the great conflict which occurred in Alexandria in 727/1326-7, 
when many people were killed. There were many consuls
in Alexandria belonging to the different countries of the western 
merchants, such as the Venetian consul who was seen by the friar 
Mario Esposito in Jumada, I, 72^/April 1324.'^
(ii) The Jewish community
According to a written statement by Bernard De Breydenbach 
who visited Egypt at the beginning of the second half of the Mamluk 
period in Egypt there were about fifteen thousand Jews in Egypt, 
of different occupations, but particularly in trade. n0n m'a dit
 ^Nu.jum, xi, 29-30.
^Tibr, 6l-62.
•^Suluk, ii, 2?A.
^Mario Esposito, Itinerarlum Symonis Semeonis -Ab Hybemia Ad Terram 
Sanetarn, 75.
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/ /
qu'il y a plus de 15»000 Juifs exer^ant des metiers ou a donnes
au commerce."^ The Jews were free to retain their places of wor­
ship, to perform the liturgical rites and to have their religious
ceremonies in an Islamic land, under the rule of the protectors
2
of Islam, the Mamluks.
According to al-Qalqashandi the Jews of Egypt in the early
Mamluk period were divided into three communities: Rabbanites,
3 4
Karaites, and Samaritans. They were all under the supervision
of Ra’is al-Yahud, who had to take care of their social affairs and
5
to deal with their judicial functions according to Jewish law. There
g
were many Jewish synagogues in Cairo. In other words, the Jews
lived in their small state within the Mamluk Sultanate, where they
7
had their own life and customs. Another traveller who discusses 
the condition of the non-Muslims in the Mamluk period, Friar Jehan 
Thenaud, says in his book that there were more than ten thousand Jews 
in Cairo who had their streets, their synagogues and their markets, just 
as there were more than ten thousand Christians, Syrians and Copts 
who owned a great number of churches. MEn ceste ville du Cayre sont
^Larrivaz, Les Saints Preregrination du Bernard de Eredenbach, 56.
2jgiit, ii, bGk, k65, k73-b?b.
3
For more details about Karaite Schism, see Baron, A Social and 
religious history of the Jews, 209-285.
Zj.
For more details, see Subb, xi, 385-390.
^Tajrif, ^+2-1^3; Subh, xi, 390.
^Khit, ii, k6b.
7
See Bosworth. "Christian and Jewish religious Dignitaries in Mamluk 
Egypt and Syria Qalqqsliandi1 s information on tneir Hierarchy^ 
Titulature and appointments”1 I.J.M.E.S., iii, 1972, pp. 70-72.
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plus de X mille Juifs qui ont leur rues, sinagogues et marches
et plus de X mille Chrestiens,taut Suriens, Copthes que Jacobites
qui ont maintes eglises."^ It seems that the economic rise of
Egypt and its great commercial activity at that time attracted
many Jews to come and settle in Egypt; they came from Constantinople,
Baghdad, Damascus, Acre, Tyre, Aleppo and Muslim Spain (Andalus);
they also arrived from European countries like Italy and France and 
2
from other parts. It also appears that those Jews who dwelt m  
Egypt succeeded in obtaining a strong hold over banking operations 
and financial affairs.^
(iii) The Christian community
The friar Jehan Thenaud also speaks about his journey to
k
Mount Sinai and to St. Catherine’s Monastery. We will deal later
. 5
with the monastery of St. Catherine from different points of view.
The Christian natives of Egypt were divided into three groups: 
the Jacobite Christians (al-Ya/aqiba) or Copts, the majority-Syrians, 
and the Melkite Christians. The people least mentioned in con­
temporary sources of the West and most neglected in the modern 
histories of the Crusade were the Jacobite Christians within the Mamluk 
Sultanate itself. The head of the Christian community
was the patriarch, who had to rule the internal and local affairs?
g
of the Christian community. In order to live safely in that Muslim
1
Jean Thenaud, Le voyage D ’outremer, 51 •
2
Mu.j tama1, *+1.
3
Larnvaz, loc.cat.
^Jean Thenaud, op. cit. , 72-82.^
^Infra, 176-183.
^Atiya, op.cit., 272.
?l?or more details about the Christian hierarchy, see Subfr., v, h72-k'yk. 
*See Bosworth, on.cit., I.J.M.E.S., iii, 1972, pp. 66-70.
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society the Christians had to comply with the conditions of 'Umar 
h. al-Khattabl’
Apparently there were many monasteries in Egypt where the
monks lived, worshipped and devoted their lives to the service of
2
God and Christianity. Some of the Copts were clerks in government
offices, others were merchants and tradesmen, others were bishops
and priests and such like. They were also tillers of land and
3
there were others who worked as servants and domestics. Although
we occasionally read about the life or -the nature of the life of
the Copts it is possible that they put their hands to different
kinds of work and served in the royal offices as well.
The Copts kept their personal traditions, as they sustained
their churches in Cairo and in the other Egyptian provinces and al-
MaqrlzT counts fifty eight monasteries in Upper Egypt; the Christians
performed votive offerings, immolations, and oblations to the monks 
if
there. The Coptic Church kept its religious customs. The Copts, 
especially in Upper Egypt, were very concerned to protect their 
traditional behaviour and to continue using their own language,
..................... 5 ...............
"Coptic", among themselves.
Baybars al-Man§urI, Ibn al-Dawadara, Ibn AbT al-Fa^a’il and 
other historians of the period under consideration did not concern them­
selves to explain the Coptic system of rules, their religious methods 
or even the structure of their Church. It seems that the Copts had
^For the condition of 'Umar b. al-Khattab, see Subh, xiii, 357-360.
2
For more details about the Christian monasteries, convents and 
churches, see Khifr, ii, 501-519.
3Copts, 72-73.
L
Ibid., 36-5^.
5Ibid.', 'A3. .....................................................
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their ovm patriarch who was always appointed by the Sultan,1 and
who was treated respectfully in the official writings issued from
_ 2the royal office, ndTwan al-Sultanfl.
(iv) The situation of dhimmTs    ITT
During the Crusade the Christians in Egypt maintained a
neutral attitude, and never tried to help the common religious and
military union of the Mongols and Catholic Europe for a decisive
3
battle against Egypt. This was never accomplished. Therefore the 
Christians in Egypt enjoyed good treatment throughout the Holy war. 
Afterwards, during the Mamluk period, the Coptic community suffered 
painfully from Mamluk enmity, although the Mamluks never took an 
aggressive action against Coptic religious rites. This does 
not mean that the Mamluk Sultans had a common policy to the Copts, 
whereas the latter played an active part in the social life and 
official offices of the government. The question which should 
be answered here is what are the reasons which caused the Copts 
so much trouble in the Mamluk period?
Apparently there are three reasons which we re the basis of the 
critical situation. Firstly, the Mamluk Sultanate obtained powerI
illegally, and the Sultans, remembering that sensitive situation
tried to have a legitimate basis for their regime. Cleverly, they used 
Islam both as a faith and a state; they worked to make Egypt the_ 
centre of the Islamic Caliphate and to show themselves as the sincere
1Suluk, ii, 1 7^.
2Subb, xi, 392-393
3
Atiya, loc.cit.
^Ugur, 538.
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supporters of the Caliphs. By that great deed they almost succeeded 
in accomplishing their aims. Secondly, the Crusade had a great 
effect on the bad treatment which the dhimmls suffered during the 
early period of the Mamluk Sultanate. Undoubtedly that war in­
creased the hostile religious feelings of the Muslims for the 
non-Muslims, especially the Christians. Thirdly, there was in 
Europe the crusading propaganda against the Mamluk Sultanate in 
the early fourteenth century,^ but it seems that, if the Roman 
Church approved the plan to cut off commercial relations with Egypt, 
the trading cities of Europe, now an important political influence,
would not sacrifice their profits, and this ambitious scheme never 
2
became operative. When the crusading countries failed in the 
military and political fields they turned their attention and ex­
ertions tov/ards another realm: the economic factor could be a vital
force for crusading targets.
3
Marino Sanudo, the Venetian who wa.s born at the beginning 
of 1270, is one of the most important leaders of that propaganda.
He worked most of his life for a functional and well organized 
Crusade, but the new circumstances were stronger than his wishes.
It was a new period of economic activity and commerce. The Mamluk 
Sultans, knowing and hearing about that active propaganda, continued 
their aggressive feelings against the Christians. In the end, 
one should not believe that the whole period of the Mamluk Sultanate 
was a series of different sorts of persecutions against the non-
^Campbell, The Crusade, 4^2.
2Ibid., 458.
“Z
For his biography,see Atiya, op.cit., 116-120.
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Muslim subjects. Apparently the non-Muslims were justly treated 
during the first reign and the early years of the second reign of 
al-Nagir Muhammad (699-708/1299-1308). The non-Muslims enjoyed 
freedom to worship and to hold their ceremonies. In Rajab 700/
April 1300 this status changed; a MaghribT vizier (wazir) arrived in 
Cairo on a pilgrimage, and was surprised to see the Christians and 
the Jews so free; they lived well, they dressed well and possessed 
livestock.^ Besides, the vizier was depressed one day when he 
came upon a man on horse back with a white turban and a gorgeous 
cloak, followed by a multitude of people,, who prayed 
to and implored him, .embracing his feet, while he eschewed 
them, pushing them off, and ordering his slaves to drive them away 
from him. They were asking him to look upon their state, but this 
only made him more arrogant and : rash and, later, when the .
t
2
vizier knew that that man was a Christian, he became furious.
In a meeting with al-Nagir Muhammad, his vicegerent in Egypt,
Sayf al-DTn Salar, his ustadar Baybars al-JashnakTr, and other emirs
of high ranks, the Maghribl vizier spoke about the advanced condition
of the non-Muslims in Egypt,, their mighty and high social position,
and the.  ^ magnificient way of living which they enjoyed at that time.
He also expounded the bad condition of the non-Muslims in his country
compared with their condition in Egypt, and eventually he warned
al-Nagir Muhammad of the overbearing and overpowering status of his
3
non-Muslim subjects. Therefore, in Rajab 700/March 1301, there
1K M t « ii, 498.
2Copts, 102-3; Khij:, ii, 498.
•^Subb, xiii, 377; Copts, 103; Kbit, ii* 498.
was a general conviction that a new royal policy should he followed 
by the non-Muslims; the two emirs, Sayf al-KTn Salar and Baybars al- 
Jashnakir, sent for the elders of the Christians, for the two 
Christian patriarchs, for the judge of the Jews, and for the congre- 
gation of the Christians of the Church of the Mu'allaqa.,. and for 
those of the Convent of the Mules, al-Qusayr and others. Then came 
the four chief judges of the four madhahib of Islam who contended 
with the Christians and the Jews, and bound them down to the terms 
of 'Umar's agreement with them.'*' Thereafter, the Royal Ordinance 
was announced that no emir was allowed to employ a non-Muslim in 
his office, that the Christians must wear blue turbans and the Jews 
yellow. 2
"The women of the non-Muslims should have a different 
appearance to distinguish them from Muslim women, the 
two parties are not allowed to ride horses or to carry 
arms, and if they do ride donkeys they should double 
their feet inwards; furthermore, they are not permitted 
to ride along the middle of the road, to raise their 
voice louder than that of the Muslim, or to have their  ^
buildings higher than i^ hat of their Muslim neighbours.
Besides this decree, the non-Muslims
"are not authorized to worship openly, or ring the . .
bells of their holy places, or to propose their faith 
of Christianity or Jewish religion to a Muslim to con­
vert him. Also they are prevented from buying a Muslim 
slave; moreover, they have to hang a bell around their 
necks if they want to go to the public bath. They are 
not allowed to imitate the Arab rings or to teach their 
children the Onr*an cr even employ a Muslim for their 
hard work. And they are not sanctioned to have a large 
fire. In'the event of a person of the two communities 
committing adultery with a Muslim women he would be 
executed."b
~*~Copts, 103; Kbit, ii, ^98.
2
Zetterstcen, 8?; gubfci xiii, 377-8; Khij;, ii, b98. 
^'ibar, vi, 89 .^
^Ibid., vi, 893.
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Hence the patriarch of the Christians obliged his people to wear
blue turbans and a girdle about their loins, and forbade them to
ride on horses or mules. Moreover, he indicated to them that they
were subject to the Royal Decree, and threatened anathema on any
one of them who should act otherwise, and that he would be cast
out of the Christian community if he rebelled. The same happened
within the Jewish community.^" This decision was then sent in a
2number of copies to the several provinces. Seemingly that in­
struction had a great effect on the society of Egypt at that 
time for the circumstances were normal, and relations between the 
people of different religions were friendly. Furthermore, the 
Maghribi vizier asked for the destruction of the churches, but 
the chief judge refused his request and wrote a decree that no 
church should be demolished except those which had lately been re­
stored. Many of the churchesin Egypt were closed for some days
3
although their elders tried to have them re-opened. After a short
time some of the Christians re-opened a church and the public
gathered and complained to Sayf al-Din Salar that this had been
done without permission, and said that they regretted that the
Christians had stopped wearing blue turbans and that some emirs were 
if
protecting them. Consequently an order was declared in Cairo and 
all over Egypt that the Christian and Jewish communities should wear 
their coloured turbans and, if anyone refused to follow any text . 
of the ordinance he would be beheaded and his property confis­
cated. Also, it was absolutely forbidden to employ a non-Muslim
^Cp-pts, 103-4.
^fIbar, vi, 893.
^Copts, 104.
^Suluk, i, 914.
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in any office belonging to the Sultan, or to a Mamluk emir.^
Accordingly, the mob obtained domination over the Christians and
Jews, pursued them and beat them on the neck with their shoes and
with their fists. They treated in this way all whom they saw
without the prescribed dress. So many non-Muslims hid,
2
and did not dare to walk in the market. Subsequently, the non- 
Muslim subjects were careful to wear their coloured turbans, blue 
for the Christians and yellow for the Jews, and to avoid riding 
horses and mules. The groups who worked at the offices of
J
the state, or in the honourable dlwan of the Sultan, had to give
up their work, except those who embraced Islam, and there were
many. Afterwards, al-Uagir Mu&ammad wrote to all the Mamluk
3
provinces in Syria and Egypt confirming the Royal Edict.
When the people of Alexandria heard about this edict they 
hurried to demolish two churches which had been built during the 
Islamic period, and they ruined that part of every house belonging 
to a non-Muslim that was higher than the house of his Muslim neigh­
bour. ^
Accordingly, the people of the two communities, Jews and 
Christians, made every effort to regain their previous privileges - 
freedom to worship, to work in honourable offices and to wear 
white turbans - but without success. By money and promises they 
attempted this with the Mamluk emirs, men of high posts, and with
~*~Tbid. , i , 915.
^Ibid., i, 915; Copts, 105.
3 r
Zettersteen, 87•
^Ibid., Nu.jum, viii, 134.
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many of the important officials of the state. Nevertheless, they 
could not achieve their aims.. Undoubtedly, Baybars al-jashnakir 
(al-Man§uri) encouraged and supervised these critical events.1 Further­
more, when al-Na§ir Muhammad in 709/1309 took his seat one day 
between the Mamluk emirs, the judges of Egypt and Syria and the
| ‘ulama*, the vizier Ibn al-Khalil informed the SultSh that the non-
\
I Muslims offered to pay 700,000 dinars every year to be allowed to
i
| wear white turbans. Al-Nagir, aware of the sensitivity of the situ-
|
f ation, asked for the views of the ^lama*, but they kept silent.
! 2 
' Hence the great scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327)* delivered a
long sermon about the importance of the Islamic shara’i * and the
necessity of putting those shara’i' into action. Ibn Taymiyya
ended his speech with some words against the vizier. Eventually,
Ibn Taymiyya said to al-Na§ir Muhammad ’’You are not the
man who would support the non-Muslims”. Al-Nagir Muhammad confirmed
3
the speech of Ibn Taymiyya, and refused the proposition. There­
fore, the Jews and theChristians continued .wearing their coloured 
Zf
turbans. This situation gives us a clear idea how important it 
was to the non-Muslim subjects to be able to wear the same colour, 
white, as the Muslims so as to look equal, to have the same position 
in society, and to enjoy the same rights. They used both peaceful and 
violent methods; they offered huge sums of money to the state, just 
to be free of these limitations and to have a normal life like the
1Zettersteen, 87•
2For his biography, see Shadharat, vi, 80-86.
3
' Nazinn, fol. 107a; Bidava, xiv, 53-5^; Husn, ii, 300.
Zf
Husn, ii, 300.
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Muslims.'*' Seemingly, we could understand from this stand that 
the tulama* were powerful and effective. Obviously the 
Christians and the Jews suffered much from this condition and its 
restriction, otherwise they would not have continually endeavoured 
by every means to have it changed.
(v) The monks of Mount Sinai
So what was the attitude of al-Nagir Muhammad towards these
events concerning his non-Muslim subjects? In fact there is no
mention in the contemporary writings of any kind of act by al-Ma§ir
Muhammad against them. On the other hand, there is a document which
could give us an idea of the status of al-Nagir Muhammad with his
non-Muslim subjects, although this document concerns only the monks
2
of St. Catherine of Mount Sinai.
The Original Arabic Text:
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The English translation:
1 In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful
2 This /±sj our rescript to all who tahe cognizance of it
tc
3
_ _ 2
3-4- Muhammad b. Qalavmn approved from the Royal court o the emirs.
Let the exalted command - May God exalt it - be done- 
3 viz. their excellencies the greater amirs the fighters in
the holy war
8 the divinity assisted, the commanders, the chosen, the
observers, the deputies 
7 the military supervisors, and all the administrators
'^Sic ♦
^Stern, op.cit., 236, fn.97.
3Ibid., 248.
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8 in the provinces of al-Sharqiyya, Ayla, at Qulzum, the coast 
of
9 Sinai, and the muq^a's of the coast and Faran
10 the glories of Islam, the noble emirs, the pillars of the 
kings
11 and the Sultans. God prolong their success
12 and fortuneI We inform them that the Monks
13 dwelling in Sinai have used a submission to the Royal Court
.\k that they are devoted in the said mountain
.13 to prayer for this prosperous state, and to the service
of the devoted pilgrims
16 at their return from the holy ££Ljaz, and the Muslim 
visitors to Mount Sinai 
17-18 Now a people known as the §adriyyun have risen against
them making allegation , and submissions against them.:
19 to the Royal Court which are untrue, and their purpose
20 therein is to break the good relations, therefore there 
was sent from the sacred Court
21 a person who investigated their affairs, being informed 
of the prohibition concerning them
22 on several occasions, and produced a report of the untruth 
of their submission,
23 and of their possession of decrees of previous rulers
2k recommending them and showing regard to them in all their
affairs
23 and circumstances, and attention to their welfare and we 
have decreed
26 our entire recommendation, regard and protection
27 forbidding any who would offer them harm in their palm- 
tree and ...
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28 and their vineyard, their fields, their means, their crops,
29 their possessions, their circumstances, their orchards, 
their fruits,
30 their lands and all that is attributed to them;
31 and let no enemy raid them
32 ^Depending on this/ on the terms of the Royal Decrees which
are in their possession from
33 the preceding kings on whom be God's mercy,
3^ the terms holding valid until the end of time, and they 
shall suffer no change 
33 from these terms. Their peasants and pickers shall not be
hindered
38 from passing to their palm-trees when they will. Whatever
37 is stolen from or is lacking, let it be paid to them and 
restored.^*
38 The responsibility of all who are due aware of this our 
decree
39 viz. the governors and the deputies in al-Sharqiyya, Ayla, 
al-Qulzum,
f^O the coast of Sinai, and the muq fa * s of the coast
b'] and Faran is to submit to it, to act according to it, and
to hasten to obey
b2 obey it. Let no one offer them harm
b3 from the Sadriyyun and the Eammakuh and other nomads
bb let them not read a repetition of this
2
b$ . nrd.not if God most high will
•^gubfr, xi, ll^ f, cf. 106-7.
2Cf. Sufrfr, vi, 233.
l8l
46 written on 13 Rabl* II
47 in the year 710
1
? The slave has obeyed
48 let the slave obey the sacred decree (May God most high 
exalt it) Mughlatay in al-Sharqiyya
49 Baybars-in al-Sharqiyya the sacred decrees (May God Most High
2
sanctify and honour them with complete obedience)
50 and has received it with complete obedience
3 451 By the exalted instruction of the Emir Sayf ^al-DIn Baktamur
al-Jukandar/
52 vicegerent of the sacred Sultanate (May God grant power)
53 Praise be to God alone and this blessing 
and peace be upon Our Lord Muhammad. His
5
prophet, and his people and his companion.
This document contains a Royal Edict, which was issued by al- 
Na^ir Muhammad in 710/1310 for the advantage and requirements of 
the Monks in the Monastery of St. Catherine. In that decree al- 
Na^ir Mutanmad tells all the men of high rank who worked for the
''"Stern, op.cit., 248, 256-7 .
2
For Mustanad, see Subh, vi, 264-5.
^Stern, op.cit., 244. 271.
^For the post of Atabik see Subh, vi, 208. 
^For Hamdala, see Sub£, vi, 265-266.
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state - the noble Mamluk emirs, the leaders of the armies, the 
rulers of the provinces, the administrative officials and other 
directors of different affairs in Ayla, al-Qulzum, Sa£iil al- 
!fur, Muqja'i al-Sajjil and Faran - that the monks on Mount Sinai 
who served the state, the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and the Muslim 
visitors to Mount Sinai, were reported by some people called al- 
§adriyyun, who worked in the offices of the state, as acting 
against the welfare of the state. In reality, al-§adriyyun aimed at 
disrupting the good relations existing between the Monks of the 
Monastery and the government. Al-Na^ir Muhammad, realizing the 
nature of the whole matter, ordered that the monks should be 
treated well and that all their affairs should be regarded care­
fully. They were to have support and care, freedom in their lands 
to protect their trees and to live their own life in safety and 
peace. At the end of the ordinance al-Magir Muhammad threatened 
punishment to anyone who tried to carry out an act of aggression 
against the monks, especially the Bedouins and the natives of 
those provinces.: Probably this document is of great
historical importance for it explains a great deal about the posi­
tion of al-Na§ir Muhammad towards his non-Muslim subjects.
Firstly, it makes clear that the written order of the Royal Court 
should be carried out according to certain formalities and under 
the supervision of Sahib Edwan al-Ins^a*, who should put the Sultan’s 
command in a form suitable to the circumstances. Also, it could be 
understood that it was possible to submit a petition to the 
Sultin,during the period under consideration, concerning difficult
"''For more details about ETwan al-Insha*, see SufrtU ii 101-139; 
vi, 197-200.
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circumstances or in a situation of need; thus the petition could
be handed to the Sultan in a reasonable form which could be dealt
with efficiently.-^- Moreover, through studying this petition
one gets the impression that al-Na^ir Muhammad sent his own men
and faithful observers to search out the reality of the matter,
to examine the circumstances behind the situation and to try to
2
determine the best treatment for the condition. Consequently, 
one could say that the administrative structure during the third 
reign of al-Nagir Muhammad was well organized and strictly ob­
served and supervised by the rulers of the state.
Furthermore, al-Nagir Muhammad, desiring a complete solution 
for the complaint raised, added to the ordinance concerning the 
welfare of the Monks of St. Catherin’s Monastery a threat of severe 
punishment for anyone who dared to act against the terms of the 
decree - those terms which showed great royal care and effective 
support for the loyal Monks.
It seems that this Royal Ordinance could be seen as a turning 
point in the history of Mamluk-Christian relations during the 
period under review, for it shows clearly the just status of al- 
Nagir Muhammad towards a section of his non-Muslim subjects.3
(vi) The European and Abyssinian reaction
No doubt the situation previously noted respecting the non- 
Muslims and the Mamluk rule had a great effect in other parts of 
the world, notably the Christian countries.In 726/1326 al-Na^ir 
Muhammad was asked by Pope John XXII to treat his Christian subjects
1Subfc, vi, 202-20 .^
^Ibid., vi, 203-206.
%f; Eosworth,-"Christian and Jewish .religious Dignitaries in. Mamluk 
Egypt arid Syria: Qalqashandl1 s information on their Hierarchy, 
titulature and appointment", I.J.M.E.S., iii, 1972, p.63.
l8*f
kindly, with the promise that the same would be done for the
1
Muslims in the West. It seems that the Pope and the rulers of 
the Christian countries knew about the condition of the non-Muslims 
in the Mamluk Sultanate, either from the European travellers who 
usually went through Egypt, Mount Sinai and Syria to Jerusalem ..on a
4 t
pilgrimage, or from the western traders who played an active part 
in the commerce with Ifeypt. These people, who certainly had either 
seen or heard about the strict regulations to which the Christians 
and the Jews must submit by order of the Mamluk court, must have 
talked of it in their countries; consequently, the ruling class 
there tried to help their brothers in religion, in Egypt and Syria, 
by being in touch with al-Na§ir Muhammad to reach a reasonable 
solution for both sides. Thence the Pope diplomatically wrote 
to al-Nagir Muhammad to help the Christians, and, at the same time, 
promised him good treatment for the Muslims in the Catholic world.
But it seems that the Pope’s letter had no effect on the position 
in Egypt at that time. Aragon was one of the Christian kingdoms 
which attempted to help the Christians in Egypt by writing diplomati­
cally to al-Nagir Muhammad. The correspondence between these two 
countries started in 700/1300 when Jaime II (1291-1327)i king of 
Aragon, who treasured the interest of his country and realized the
possibilities of reaping more benefit through diplomacy than by wyging
2
futile wars against Egypt, sent a long letter to al~3Ma§ir Muhammad
asking firstly for safety for the merchants who travelled between the
two countries and,secondly,for assurance and protection for the
3
Aragonese pilgrims to Jerusalem. In conclusion, al-Nagir Muhammad
"Sluir, op.cit., 73. ...........
2
Atiya, Egypt and Aragon, 10.
"^Alarcon y Canton, Los documentos Arabes diplomatico, Atiya,
op.cit.,, 17-19.
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answered Jaime II in a letter dated 13 Shawwal 699/2 July 1300, 
promising him what security he wanted for his Aragonese sub­
jects.''" Respecting the matter of the non-Muslims in Egypt at 
that time, we find the second Aragonese embassy which was de­
spatched in 703/1303 required the opening of Christian churches in
Egypt which had been closed after the edict of 700/1300 concerning
2
the non-Muslim subjects.
Subsequently, al-Na§ir Muhammad, wishing to be on good terms 
with the kingdom of Aragon, and desiring to come to an understand­
ing with Jaime II, worked to accomplish the wishes of the king by 
opening two churches in Cairo. He also wrote a letter to the 
Aragonese court which was sent with the Egyptian envoys. In this
letter he explained his action as being for the sake of friendship
3
between the Aragonese kingdom and the Mamluk Sultanate, although 
the subject of churches could only be settled in accordance with 
the religious law, which proclaimed that none of these churches
might be left open except those which were in existence at the time
of ‘Umar.^ Apparently this exchange of letters between King Jaime 
II and al-Na^ir Muhammad had a great effect.on the religious policy 
of al-Nasir Muhammad for although, as we have seen, it was difficult 
for the Sul£an to change the strict attitude of the pious, the 
tnlama>, and the powerful Mamluk oligarchy, he succeeded, somehow, 
in opening two churches to maintain diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. Eventually, it seems also, the exchange of embassies
^Alarcon y Santon, loc.cit.; Atiya, loc.cit.
Alarcon y Santon, op.cit., 351; Atiya, op.cit., 21.
^Alarcon y Santon, loc.cit.; Atiya, op.cit., 22.
^Alarcon y Santon, loc.cit.; Atiya, op.cit., 24.
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and letters between the kingdoms of Egypt and Aragon prevailed in 
achieving many aims: first, friendship and good understanding
between the two sides, second, protection for the Aragonese pil­
grims to the Holy land and, third, security for the Christians in 
the Mamluk Sultanate.
Furthermore, the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus 
(1282-1320) was concerned about the status of the dhimmXs in the 
Mamluk Sultanate, and so in 70.5/1303 he sent an embassy to al- 
Nagir Muhammad requesting that al-Mugallaba be given back to the 
Christians. ^ But apparently al-Hagir Muhammad did not grant 
the demands of the Byzantine Emperor for in 710/1310 we see 
another Byzantine embassy from Andronicus II to al-Nasir Muhammad 
repeating the request and stating the Emperor's wish to see the
Christians i‘n the Mamluk Sultanate enjoying justice, peace, freedom
2
of worship, and their churches opened.
Consequently, al-Nagir Muhammad succeeded in obtaining the 
agreement of the *ulama* that two churches of the Copts and the
Melkites be given back to their people, and opened two synagogues,
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■   x
but he refused to open the Church of al-Mugallaba. It appears
that al-Nagir Muhammad accomplished this either because
of his feelings of sympathy with his non-Muslim subjects, or to
maintain diplomatic and friendly relations with Byzantium and to
strengthen them, or for both these reasons.
1
Al-Mugallaba was a church in Jerusalem which was turned into a 
mosque at the time of al-Zahir Baybars (658-678/1260-1277)* see 
Niyahat, xxix, fol. 283b.
^Nihayat, xxx, fol. 28a; Suluk, ii, 90.
^Suluk, ii, 90 ; Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects, 
5 8; cf. Suluk, ii, 17.
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It seems that the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II was 
grateful to al-Nagir Mujpammad for what he had done for the non- 
Muslims in the Mamluk Sultanate. Andronicus II expressed his 
gratitude by sending valuable presents to al-Na^ir Muhammad with 
his third embassy, who arrived in Egypt in Sha*ban 712/December 1312, 
with k2 porters (hammalun) carrying different kirids of precious gifts.’*' 
All these embassies from the pontifical court, Aragon and Byzantium, 
give us a clear picture of the Mamluk court in the reign of
al-Na^ir Mujpammad at the beginning of the fourteenth century; 
clearly the court became a centre of many embassies sent by Euro­
pean rulers to promote their friendship with the Mamluk.Sultanate, 
and to confirm their co-operative attitude to the dhimmis in the 
Islamic world. Apparently those European Ambassadors who were wel­
comed by al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in obtaining his care and pro­
tection for the Christians in Egypt and Syria.
In order t© i: vprove the position of the Christians in Egypt
2
the Abyssinian kings also wrote to al-Ea§ir Muhammad to this end.
The Abyssinian kings constantly interfered in religious affairs
to indicate their sympathy with the Christians. The Christians 
were to receive different and better treatment, or the Muslims in 
Abyssinia would suffer retaliation. Probably relations between 
the Mamluk Sultanate and Abyssinia continued to be friendly,^
bespecially in the reign of al~Na§ir Muhammad. When Amda § yon,
~*~Nah.j > iii, 229; Malik, fol. 70a; Suluk, ii, 120.
^Tashrif, 170.
Suluk, ii, 333.
^'Eshur, "Ba'd a^wa’ jadlda 'ala al-'alaqat bayna Misra wa’l-Habasha 
fl al-'usur kL-wusta", M.T.M., xiv (Cairo,1966-7), pp. 20-21.
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the king cf.Abyssinia (712-7^3/1312-13^2 )j1 heard of the bad 
situation of the non-Muslims in Egypt, he sent his envoys to al- 
Na§ir Muhammad in 726/1326 with a vehement letter asking for an 
immediate change, and threatened to persecute in like manner the 
Muslims who were domiciled in Abyssinia, and to deprive Egypt
2
of water by deflecting the course of the Nile into the desert.
Moreover, in the year 737/1336, the king of Abyssinia
dispatched another embassy to al-Nagir Muhammad presumably concerning the
3
oppression of the Christians by the Muslim rulers. Although al-
Nagir Muhammad sent the Royal Mission back to Abyssinia with a
2f 5
sarcastic reply good relations between the two sides continued, and
the Abyssinian embassies continued appealing to Egypt, especially when 
they needed a new Metropolitan, for the Coptic Patriarch in Egypt
used always to appoint the Metropolitan of Abyssinia from the
7
Christian Copts in Egypt.
On the other hand, the indifference ■ of the Mamluk Sultans 
towards the several missions from Abyssinia forced the Abyssinian 
kings to put their threats into action; King 'Amda Syon suppressed
....................   Q ........................  ............
the Muslims violently and he killed many.
"'‘Budge, A History of Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia, i, 288-290.
2 _
Suluk, ii, 270; Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 70-71.
^Suluk, ii, *flO.
Trimingham, op.cit., 71.
^At the time of al-Zahir Barquq (783-790/1382-1388) an embassy 
came from Abyssinia to Egypt in 7.8^ -/1382 with precious presents. 
For more details, see Nun urn, xi, 2*f6.
£
For more details about the Patriarch of Alexandria,see. Subh , v, 
308-321.
•^ gubfri v, '322-323.-...........................................
g
Trimingham, op.cit., 63-71.
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Presumably the events concerning the non-Muslims
in Egypt at the beginning of the third reign of al-Na^ir Muhammad
encouraged some of the Muslim rulers in Abyssinia who lived in
their seven small kingdoms i . . 1  :
(ifat, Dawaro, 'Arababani, Hadya, Sharkha, Bali and Dara)^ to change
their policy from one of casual raids and gradual penetration to a
2
definite war of aggression. They invaded Christian territory, 
burnt churches, and forced Christians to apostatize. An Abyssinian 
ambassador returning from Cairo was captured by the Muslims and,
3
after failing to make him abjure his faith, they killed him. This 
aroused the Abyssinians. In 1328 'Amda §yon overwhelmed the Muslim
outposts and then sent columns in all directions, paralysing Muslim
b 5positions. Between the years 1332 and 1333 the Muslims of Ifat
sent an embassy to Cairo to ask, with the help of *Abd Allah al-
6 7Zayla'i, al-Na§ir Muhammad to intervene with the Abyssinians
on their behalf. Al-Nagir Muhammad asked the Coptic patriarch to
write to the king of Abyssinia asking him to change his policy and
to refrain from persecuting the Muslims in his country. Immediately
the Coptic patriarcn sent a long letter to the Abyssinian ruler
■^ For more details about these Muslim kingdoms,see Subh, v, 32^-337. 
2
Trimingham, op.cit«, 71.
3
Trimingham, loc.cit.
Zf
Trimingham, loc.cit.
5
For more details,see Trimingham, op.cit., 72-73.
^(d. 782/1360). For his biography,see Durar, ii, 310.
n
For more details about the struggle between 'Amda Syon and the 
Muslims in the east and south-east of Abyssinia, see. T. Tamrat, 
Church and state in Ethiopia 1270-1327, 132-1^3.
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expressing the desire of the Sultan respecting the persecution 
of the Muslims by the Abyssinians.^ It seems that the Christian 
patriarch played an important part in the field of religious re­
lations between the Mamluk Sultanate and Abyssinia concerning
2
the Christian and Muslim communities in the two states. But no 
one can say that that position was not likely to change; it only 
lasted for a short time and soon the good relations were resumed 
and both parties were always trying to eliminate any cause which 
could affect their relations for the worse. Apparently the cir­
cumstances between the Christian and Muslim powers continued friendly
3
during the following years. Besides, there were always strong
links and continued correspondence between the ruling class in
Abyssinia and the patriarchs in Cairo, Alexandria and Jerusalem.
Thatwas the situation between Abyssinia as a Christian stronghold
in East Africa with the seven small Muslim kingdoms on its borders,
and Egypt as the capital of the Mamluk Sultanate and the centre
of the Caliphate. It might be worth mentioning that the Abyssinian
Christian governors were concerned and serious in their objections
to the unkind treatment of the Christian community by the Mamluk 
5
rulers. Nevertheless, at the same time, the Muslim communities 
in Abyssinia were being ill-treated. On the other hand the Mamluk
^Subh.i v, 333; Trimingham, op. cit., 72.
2
A similar part was played by the Patriarch of Alexandria, Marcos, 
in 733/1332 for the help of the communities of different religions 
in the two countries, Egypt and Abyssinia. See Trimingham, op. 
cit., 73-7^. Another similar event occurred in 783/1381 and 
needed the intervention of the patriarch for peace, see Subfr, v,
333; *Inba*, ii, k6.
3
Trimingham, op.cit., 73.
k
Tashrlf, 172-173.
5
The exchange of embassies between Egypt and Abyssinia concerning
the. dhimrrqs. continued, throughout the Mamluk .regime in .Egypt.........
For more details on this matter, see Tibr, 67-72.
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Sultans ignored the Abyssinian embassies' demands, and refused 
the request of the ambassadors, while, on the other hand, 
the Mamluk rulers themselves continually asked the Coptic 
patriarch or the patriarch of Alexandria to write to the Abyssin- 
ian kings in order that the Muslimsin Abyssinia should be well 
treated. Consequently, and because of this critical situation, 
if the condition of a minor religious community in one of the 
countries was changed, this was because the circumstances of 
that country demanded it. Apparently there were causes which 
helped to create this special aspect of the relationship between 
the Mamluk Sultanate and Abyssinia. Firstly, perhaps the Mamluk 
Sultans thought that the Muslim rulers in the seven small Muslim 
kingdoms in Abyssinia could defend themselves, especially if they 
succeeded in uniting. Secondly, the Abyssinian kings demonstrated 
their ability to oppress the Muslims in the Abyssinian lands, 
although at the same time they never forgot to declare their 
desire to be on good terms with the Mamluk regime. In other words, 
in their diplomatic letters to the Mamluk Sul "tans, they used a 
method of promises (tar^hib) and threats (tahdTd)^  which apparently 
the Muslim Sultans ignored. In spite of these difficulties the 
two countries might easily have reached an agreement if there had 
been no other circumstances which, seemingly, affected their co­
operation. But the exchange of embassies between the Catholic 
West and the Abyssinian kings and the Mamluks1 knowledge of the 
political contact between the two Christian powers against their 
kingdom militated against an agreement.
1Tibr, 67-71.
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Therefore the Mamluks were not surprised to find this 
association between the Catholic West and Abyssinia because, if 
there were to be any sort of crusading effort in the European 
West against the Muslim country, no doubt the Europeans would 
hope to have assistance from Abyssinia since it was a Christian 
stronghold in the Islamic East with a strategic position in East 
Africa on the Red Sea. It might be also that the Abyssinian rulers 
realized the importance of the religious bond which connected them 
with the European Christian powers. Therefore, they appeared more 
demanding in their relations with the Mamluk Sultans.
Consequently, the Mamluks could do nothing more than stop the 
patriarch of Alexandria from appointing a new Metropolitan for 
Abyssinia when one was needed. Moreover, if the Mamluks intended 
to ill-treat the Christians, the Abyssinians would do the same by 
suppressing*the Muslims in their country. Subsequently, in spite 
of these changed circumstances and the unfriendly relationship 
between the Mamluk Sultanate and Abyssinia, the Mamluks always 
welcomed the Abyssinian ambassadors who continued to go to Egypt 
throughout the Mamluk period.
(vii) The position of dhimmis between the years 71^-721/131^-1521
In order to carry out a complete study of the social con­
dition of the dhimmis, the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad towards 
the dhimmis as a minor party of a different religion in a Muslim 
environment, and the relation between the two sides, al-Nasir 
Muhammad as a Muslim ruler of a Muslim realm and the dhimmis as 
non-Muslim subjects, it is imperative to study the minor dally acts 
of the Muslim Egyptians towards the Christians and the Jews. In 
7lVl31^ a man from al-Husayniyya, a quarter in Cairo, rode his
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horse, carried his sword, and rushed through the streets trying
to kill every Jew and Christian on his path. Unfortunately he
managed to injure some and to cut the hands of others, and
eventually he was arrested and beheaded.^
Moreover, an unfortunate incident occured to stir up the
hidden resentment of the people (Muslim Egyptians). The carpets
and lamps of a Muslim fair having been lent for use at a Christian
festival, a fanatic and his followers attacked the worshippers
and destroyed their church. Al-Nasir Muhammad, ii anger, threatened
to cut out the fanatic’s tongue, but in the end relented and
2
sent him away with a solemn warning. It is quite obvious that
all these occurrences are individual, and it is unfair to judge
the stand of the Muslims in Egypt at that time through these
particular incidents. Presumably there were unfriendly feelings
of the Muslims towards the dhimmis.
Thereafter, in Shawwal 713/January 1316, all the churches
and synagogues in Cairo were closed but after two months, on the
20th Dim -'1-Hijja 713/17th March 1316, al-Mu*allaqa, a church,
was opened and al-Nasir Muhammad bestowed a robe of honour upon
3
the Christian patriarch. Accordingly a Byzantine embassy from 
Andronicus II Palaeologus arrived in 7l6/l3l6 1° assure the
Zf
support of the Emperor for the Christians in the Mamluk Sultanate.
^Suluk, ii, 139-1^0.
2Suluk, ii, 133-136.
^Ibid., ii, 137.
^Ibid., ii, l6*f; Badr, fol. 7b.
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In 7l8/l3l8 the Christians succeeded in obtaining permission from 
al-Nasir Muhammad to restore the walls of the Church al-’Barbara in 
al-Rum quarter* Therefore many of the Christians gathered, and 
the Copts brought tools * materials, etc. to accomplish the reparation of 
the Church. On the instructions of al-Na§ir Muhammad they had 
Muslim engineers and superintendents. When the work was finished, 
the church became one of the splendid buildings of Cairo. Some 
Muslims disliked the reparation of the church; they went to Arghun, the 
vicegerent (nai’b al-Sultan) (d. 731/1330)^" and asked him to pull 
down the new parts of the church. They also accused Karim al-Din 
al-Kabir (d.724/1323), riagir al-khasg, of using his strong and in­
fluential position in the Royal Court to gain more privileges for 
the Christians.
Eventually the Muslims succeeded in having a Royal ;Decree 
from al-Na§ir Muhammad allowing them to pull down the new parts of 
the church. Moreover, the Muslims built a mihrab in the ruined 
place, and used the church as a mosque in which to perform ritual 
prayer# Al- Na^ir Muhammad, in anger, commanded that the mihrab should 
be torn down and the whole building restored as a church for the 
Christians. But it seems that al-Nasir Muhammad's order was not 
carried out and the building was used neither as a church nor 
as a mosque, until it became ruins. It is likely that the dhimmis 
succeeded in gaining the support of al-Nasir Muhammad and that later 
the Muslims gained his support. As we have seen, this happened for
^ Supra, 115.
2
Suluk, ii, 182-183.
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only a short time and, as soon as circumstances changed, al-Nagir 
Muhammad turned in favour of the non-Muslims. Al-Nasir Muhammad 
also found, in the correspondence with the European countries who 
cared for the situation of the Christians in the Mamluk Sultanate, 
a great opportunity to take immediate action for the sake of non- 
Muslim subjects. Therefore, one could assume that he was sympathetic 
to the dhimmis for two reasons. Firstly, because they were his sub­
jects, even if they were of a different religion, and for the 
stability of his state he wan careful to observe two factors: 
justice and equality for all his subjects. Secondly, considering 
the importance of diplomatic and friendly relations with the Christ­
ian countries, al-Na§ir Muhammad was concerned that the dhimmis should 
be treated with justice.
Besides, if al-Na§ir Muhiammad supported for a while the wishes 
of the public and the firm stand of the scholars, the ^ulama*, against 
the non-Muslims, he never allowed the Muslims to take a strong hand 
with the dhimmis, and they were treated on an equal footing with 
Muslims.
(viii) The demolition of the churches, and fires in the mosques
On the 9th of Rabi', II, 721/8 May 1321, at the time of the 
Friday prayer, when the Mamluk emirs were praying, some of the work­
men who were digging the fountain of al-Na^ir's pool decided to 
raze the church of al-Zuhri. Later they devastated the church after 
they had plundered all the valuable objects, without the knowledge • 
of the government.^ Thence they went to the church called al-Hamra*,
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 35 Suluk, ii, 216-217; Tritton, op.cit., 6l.
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which was one of the greatest churches in Egypt, where they 
robbed all the money and the wine of the church.'*' After that 
they moved to the "Church of the Bu Muna" by the seven water­
mills, and did the like to it, dragging out the nuns, pillaging
2
and burning everything.
Al-Nasir Muhammad was indignant when the smoke of the
3
burning churches told its tale; there were no commoners with­
out some spoils from the sacking, such as a jug of wine, and
kthey expelled the nuns. Consequently al-Nasir Muhammad was
5
enraged because of the sacrilege to the churches by the public,
g
he immediately sent Aydaqmush with his troops to restrain the
mob. The Mamluk force arrived in time to protect the Mu'allaqa
7
Church from attack. Aydaqmush succeeded in scattering the 
crowd at the doors of the church and in arresting some people.
g
Fifty soldiers were appointed to guard the church. According 
to the order of al-Na§ir Muhammad and the verdict of the judges, 
some of the arrested were beaten, others had their noses cut
9off.
At the same time, in Alexandria, the mob and the public de­
molished four churches."The same thing was going on all over Egypt;
^Suluk, ii, 217; Tritton, op.cit., 62.
^Suluk, ii, 217.
3
Lane-Poole, The story of Cairo, 217.
A
Suluk, ii, 217.
5 _
Njhayat, xxxi, fol. 3.
^For his biography, see Durar, i, A26-^28.
7 _
Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 3.
^Suluk, ii, 217-218; cf. Tritton, op.cit., 62*63.
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 3-
IQSuluk, ii, 219.
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at Alexandria, at Damascus, at Kus, churches were burning’.' The
number of churches which were subverted in Egypt at that time was
2
sixty. Although the previous occurrences might express the
feelings of the common people and the mob towards the non-Muslims,
it seems that they acted this way towards the non-Muslims because
of their desire to plunder, to pillage and to damage, more than
because of their religious fanaticism against Christianity or the
Jewish religion.
About the position of al-Nasir Muhammad, it appears that the
whole situation outraged him and, according to al-MaqrlzT’s writings,
3
al-Na§ir Muhammad was greatly disturbed when he heard the news.
Al-MaqrTzT continues that al-Nagir was furious so that he thought
to go himself to punish the mob but, later, he ordered two of his
Mamluks to leave immediately to chasten the common people with the 
Zf
sword. Moreover, for a third time, al-Maqnzi explains the anger
felt by al-Na^ir Muhammad concerning the treatment of his non-
Muslim subjects and to their churches at the hands of the common
people and that the Mamluk emirs tried hard to allay his annoyance 
5
and his fury. . ........
A month after the burning of the churches fires began to break 
out in Cairo. Fires started on Saturday, 13th Jumada, I, 712/l8th 
September 1312, and lasted until the end of the month. The fire
■''Lane-Poole, op. cit., 2l8.
^Suluk, ii, 219.
^Ibid., ii, 217.
Zj.
Ibid.; Tritton, op.cit., 63.
•^Suluk, ii, 217.
Ibid. , ii, 220; Nu.jum, ix, 63.
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spread to many quarters and the wind carried the flames far and
wide so that many schools, public baths, and about one hundred
houses were burnt.'1' Many houses belonging to the Mamluk emirs
were burnt, one after another, and the fire continued although
every effort was made to extinguish it. Different kinds of pots
Twere filled with water and put near the shops, in the markets,
2
besides the stables and m  houses,without any success. Every
one believed that the whole of Cairo would be burnt. People
climbed the minarets; poor and rich alike hastened to utter
prayers and praise and lamentation. Men cried and wept everywhere.
Men were even stationed at the Cates of Cairo, to turn back the
3 _
water carriers if they tried to leave the city. The Mamluk emirs 
and the public worked together to carry water from the schools 
and the public baths. All the water carriers were impressed, and
twenty four emirs of the highest rank worked at the head of the
k
lines of men carrying water. An area of seventeen houses was
5
demolished to clear a space round the burning buildings. It was
g
noticed that these fires were apparently aimed at the mosques-; maay
.      7
mosques, inside and outside Cairo, were destroyed by the fire, and
the people stayed on the roofs of their houses for protection so
"^ Al-Muv/ayrl in his Nihayat, .xxxi, fol. 4 states:
«'*4iU laLjt \j lj Jjjj It o  L a J 1 jJI (j* I L-a &1a.~>.
2
Again al-Nuwayri in hi s.. Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 4 cites: . -
i I. .1 t ifif y  (j !j x d I I * IJ— *  ^  I O 4 jJ *■* Is J  I <~9 J \ji
i Coi < ^ 3t IsjLtiI y  * ell jl— Lj
JjL. J CJI UUgL. 'i y*,i-j-------------l,eCUu.^ • •
 ^ .... ^
^Tritton, op.cit , O*
4
Nu.jum, ix, 69.
5- Tri-tton-, op-, cit-. , • 67-68-.....................................................
6. La:oe-Poole, loc. cit.
■7Suluk, ii, 222; Ku.jum, ix, 6?.'
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that they could not sleep or go to Friday prayer. 1
On the 20th of the month three Christian monks were captured
while they were throwing torches at some houses. Consequently
the people were sure that the work of incendiaries was evidently
2
organized by the Christians. Although the monks confessed that
they were responsible for the fires in the mosques, shortly they
retracted their confessions, and al-Nasir Muhammad refused to
acknowledge that the Christians were the incendiaries because of
3
his liking for them. Two monks were arrested while they were set­
ting fire to the school of al-Kahariyya, and before the chief of police 
of Cairo, (the Wall),'Alara al-DTn Sanjar (d. 733/133^) they ad­
mitted that they had started the fires to avenge the destruction 
5
of the churches. Furthermore, a Christian was caught at the Mosque 
of al-Zahir with pieces of cloth soaked in oil and pitch and naptha; 
he acknowledged that the Christian community had arranged the work of 
burning the moscues, using wicks of naptha and pitch.6 Al-Nasir Muhammad 
ordered his private secretary/ nazir al-khass^. Karim al-DTn al-Kablr,
.^ Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 4.
2 _
Al-NuwayrT in his Nihayat, xxxi, fol. k says:
1 7j Lw Lail I iiHs J— yy  ^ 11 o* O  ^
0 &  l^lscw Iy  i  (_5^  I I g) ! c J  o  jl* • £ ( _ ) * U  I «.!— J I j <x ^ j  \ j  U
^ I, ojUI J  l3 okJ I
3 _
Al-NuwayrT in his Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 4 records the following statement:
«* ...I.) j l^ lj*^  pJ p . t o* ( (Jjis p—jw pit
i_5j 1 11 JjO o* (j^1 O  ^ J**’ U  !■*» J 1^ I nl.. t IjiLL !i t L«^ rtl I pJ I p»J l*J I 1 "|ft *Jj
^ ^ *> *f
 ^1 1 (^ 6 b I Ju t lLj^p I I •I Jijsjj i l>> * Luc 1 il {jA |. I**
^   ^ ^ j 1.* I I • ^ cU j aj^ J i I ^  I I jus jjjlt
gjlialwJ I C. J 1 ^  JI f < *1j* VI 15*1 f jJ I ^  lcfj Id* IsdLft I J LJ I
* LmjJL ( J ^1*1— ft «
Durar, ii, 172,
^Suluk, ii, 223-22^f; Nu.jum, ix, 67-68; cf. Tritton, op.cit., 70-71. 
^Suluk, ii, 223; Nu.jum, ix, 68; Tritton, op.cit., 69.
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to call the Coptic patriarch, who came immediately and was welcomed by
al-Nasir Muhammad. They brought before him from the governor's house
the three Christians who repeated to Karim al-DIn al-Kablr, in
the presence of the patriarch and the cVwe^ o? >^oVice ,*Alam al-
DIn Sanjar al-Khazn,1 what they had previously confessed.2 When
the patriarch was told about the happening, he wept and said that
the incendiaries were as foolish as the Muslims who previously
destroyed the churches without the permission or even the knowledge
of the Sultan, and he left the whole matter in the hands of al-
Na^ir Muhammad . The Patriarch was sent back to his house in 
3
honour. Therefore two Christians, found guilty, were burnt m
k
a pit in the presence of the public by order of al-Na§ir Muhammad.
Hence al-Nasir Muhammad on 22 Jumada,I, 721/19th June 1321 
warned the people that he had chastised the incendiaries and, if a 
fire started at a house, the owner of the burning house should 
arrest his neighbour. The public became extremely exasperated
5
and accused Karim al-DIn al-Kablr of protecting the Christians.
Al-Na§ir Muhammad asked for the advice of the Mamluk emirs 
concerning the most suitable solution, in their opinion, with
1£ujora, 1991 
2
Tritton, op.cit., 70.
^Suluk, ii, 22*f; Nujum, ix, 68. 
k
Lane-Poole, op.cit., 219.
5 Al-Nuv/ayrl in hi s.. Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 3 says: 1^__________^  ^ LUJL-JI Ii
: —*U {3 C C, \u*JL o 1---- ULJlj  ^ (..*|| Hj ^  ^
i t  lij I ij Lv. C i titJk,119 Sj I J I CL& Jlaj Cl»9 I 4 luilj •*- J'^J ^  gn jJ I • 'tl^ A
(j LhifciJ I Jij. j t ul 1 111 I t I 1^ t UJ 1 J J J JU* Is
J5*i I 15^' l^J 1 4 J—J!j ^jLL^L***-! 1 £ ^ • ♦ * « O U  1^ (jjUail L c L
1 a jjS 4j L«.«fWM» tSj™— ^  "'i 1 lw ^  11—ix*. V L> I t j 1 j^] x ^
lioLJ 1 & I d-aJLrsJ 1 • (3 LLiImJJ J l5i _  <L*» U>*J L jjjy l I ?
Jl li.'i us pur 1J]^  L’LIx, I [^ ujIj 4_j^ 1u-iylL l5ll^
* <■_-«i.J L 4.J \j 4k £ gj ihlluj 1 I Lul^ 4 LiJj£
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regard to the Christians for their responsibility for burning 
mosques, and the public who disliked the Christians and Karim
al-Din al-Kablr who wasacting for them at the Royal Court. The
- ' 1 - - 2emirs Sayf al-DTn Baktamur and Jamal al-DTn Aqush al-Ashrafi
who had discussed the subject with al-Na§ir Muhammad separately, 
advised him to dismiss his private secretary and the other Christ­
ians who were working in the offices of the government to ensure
3
the peace of the country.
Al-Nagir Muhammad disagreed with his advisers, sent troops 
throughout Cairo with orders to charge the crowds and spare none. 
The mob, learning the news, disappeared so that the Mamluks or 
the soldiers found the markets closed and the streets deserted.
Two hundred people were arrested near the Nile, and brought before 
al-Na§ir Muhammad who, with the agreement of the judges, ordered 
them to be executed or to have their hands cut off. Many Muslims 
were hung by their hands along the way from the Gate of Zuwayla 
to the Citadel of Cairo. It was a sad day for the people, and 
every place in Cairo v/as closed on that day. Many others had their 
hands cut off, and some died because of this. Others were com­
mandeered for digging the ground at al-Jiza. Thus the decree of
al-Nasir Muhammad was firmly carried out and Karim al-DTn al-
5
Kabir was extremely afraid of the anger of the public.
^For his biography, see Durar, i, A82; Nujum, ix, 27^.
2 _
For his biography, see Durar, i, 393f; Nujum, ix, 310.
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 3; Suluk, ii, 22A-223; Nujum, ix, 69; 
Tritton, op.cit., 72.
Zf , _ _ _ _ -
Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 6 ; Suluk, ii, 223; Nujum, ix, 69.
^Suluk, ii, 223-6; Nujum, ix, 69-70.
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Apparently there are three deductions to be made. Firstly, 
the Christians who certainly were responsible for the burning of 
the mosques and other buildings; it would seem that their action 
could be attributed, in principle, to a natural reaction to what 
had happened to their churches. Also their action could be esti­
mated as a courageous operation carried out by brave people who 
were members of a minority in an Islamic country governed by 
Muslim rulers.
On the other hand, the burning of the mosques by Christians 
made the gulf between the Muslims and the Christians more difficult 
to bridge. In other words, this action of the Christians probably 
gave rise to mutually hostile feelings. Secondly, the Muslims 
who were shocked to see their holy places ruined by fire and, in 
their great religious enthusiasm, acted foolishly in a way that 
cost many of them their lives. Thirdly, al-Na§ir Muhammad, who 
protected the Christians, refused to accuse them of burning the 
mosques.^ Shortly the whole situation became clear and the cul­
prits among the Christians were chastised. Al-Nasir Muhammad, 
who was seriously angry with the mob for their opposition to the 
Christians and their interference in the affairs of the government, 
insisted on hanging some of them; in vain they pleaded innocence,
even the emirs interceded for them, but al-Na§ir Muhammad was re-
2
solved to make an example of somebody.
Seemingly, al-Nasir Muhammad acted unkindly towards his Muslim 
subjects, most of whom were ignorant, or unwisely moved by strong
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. A. 
2
Lane-Poole, log.cit.
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religious zeal. Besides, even if al-Na§ir Muhammad succeeded in 
gaining peace and quiet in the streets, certainly his action in 
hanging the Muslims precluded a trustful friendship between the 
Muslims and the Christians for a long time.
On the 24th of Jumada, I, 72l/2lst June 1321, al-Nagir Muham­
mad called together all the judges and discussed with them the 
question of his non-Muslim subjects being allowed to wear white tur­
bans as they used to do during the early years of his reign. The 
judges refused to give al-Nasir Muhammad their agreement on this; 
al-Nasir Muhammad was displeased and kept silent.^" Other fires started 
to break out here and there, near the Mosque of Ahmad b. Tulun, in
2
the Citadel of Cairo, in the House of Baybars al-Ahmadi, the Mamluk emir,
and in Turntal Funduq; all these mysterious fires surprised al-Nasir 
»
Muhammad. He was sad when he knew that all the fourteen marble 
columns in the Funduq had been lost in the fires, and goods valued
3
at ninety thousand dirhams belonging to a merchant were destroyed. 
Aftewards some Christians who were arrested admitted that they 
had caused the conflagrations. It seems that, this admission 
made al-Na^ir Muhammad more ready to accept that the Christians 
were the incendiaries of the fires in the mosques and in the 
houses of the honourable Mamluk emirs inside and outside Cairo.
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 6.
2
For his biography, see Durar, i, 302. 
^Suluk, ii, 226; Nujum, ix, 70.
Zj.
Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 6.
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(ix) The edict of 721/1321
In conclusion, on Thursday 27th Jumada,1,721/ 24th
June 1321, al-Nasir Muhammad issued a decree against the non-Muslim
subjects concerning their social condition; it was more or less
similar to the edict of 7OO/13OO, with an addition that the annual
tribute which the non-Muslims paid should be doubled.^* The verdict
was announced in all the provinces and cities of the Mamluk Sultan- 
2
ate. The churches and the synagogues closed, the Christians
continued wearing the blue turbans and the Jews the yellow ones.
The Copts were compelled to wear blue belts, to carry a bell round
their necks at the baths, and to ride only asses. Moreover, the
emirs were not allowed to employ Christian servants, nor were the
Copts any longer to hold posts in the government offices. The
public or the mob found in these circumstances a suitable opportunity
to take revenge on the non-Muslims, who hardly dared to show them­
's
selves m  public, and a great many became.Muslims.
But these regulations lasted only a few days and the Christian 
employees returned to their employment in the offices of the Mamluk emirs.^ 
It seems that the need of the Mamluk emirs for the administrative 
qualifications of the Christian employees was the cause, of this 
immediate change. Apparently the edict, like similar edicts before 
it, fell into abeyance. Probably Lane-Poole is right when he says 
"it must be admitted that there was grave provocation on both sides,
^Ibid., xxxi, fols. 7-8; Suluk, ii, 226-227. For more details about 
the non-Muslims' dress, see Tritton, o~p.cit., 120-123.
2
Nihayat, xxxi, fol.6.
^Suluk, ii, 227; Nujum, ix, 71.
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 8.
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and that the outrages sprang from popular fury, not from the 
fanatacism of the rulers."^
It appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad was so firm with the public 
that it often happened that when he was riding to the Maydan he 
never saw anyone on his way. The public, fearing his anger, 
hardly appeared in the streets when they knew that he would ride 
that day. Therefore al-Na§ir Muhammad, displeased to see empty streets 
while he was riding, announced that the public would not be molested where- 
ever they might be^ This does not mean that al-Nasir Muhammad per­
mitted his Muslim subjects to have a superior position in the society 
at the expense of the non-Muslims. One day in the year 723/
I323 a fanatical SufT at Damascus, seeing a Muslim kiss the hand of 
a Christian secretary, advanced and killed the Christian. As a re­
sult, al-Nasir Muhammad, unmoved by the excited cries in favour of 
the fanatic, had him hanged at the city gate. The leaders of a
•4.
dangerous outbreak at Alexandria were treated with similar firmness.
In these events which happened in Egypt in the first half of 
the fourteenth century respecting the non-Muslims there was a man 
who played an active part; he was the reason for some of these 
occurrences. He was *Abd al-Karlm b. Hibat Allah b. al-Sadld al-Misri 
al-QadT al-Kablr,^ the nephew of al-Taj b. Sa'ld al-Dawla (d. 708/ 
1308).^ Karim al-DTn al-Kablr was a Christian Copt, and he embraced 
Islam at the time of Baybars al-Jashnaklr, who employed Karim al-DIn
Lane-Poole, op.cit., 220.
2
Nujum, ix, 72.
^Ibid.
k
Muir, Mamluk or Slave Dynasty of Egypt, 60.
^Supra, 142.
r ...........................................................
Suluk, ii, 6l; for the biography of al-Taj b. Sa*Id al-Dawla, 
see Durar, i, 515-516.
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al-rKabir to take charge of all the written accounts of court
matters after the death of his uncle al-Taj h. Sa'id al-Dawla,
who had held that high post..'*' When al-Na§ir Muhammad b. Qalawun
took revenge on Baybars al-Jashnakir, and took possession of the
throne, al-Nasir Muhammad dismissed Karim al-Din al-Kabir from
_ 2
his post and confiscated his wealth of 100,000 dinars. In 710/
1310 al-Na§ir Muhammad appointed Karim al-DIn as controller of the 
— — 3privy purse (nagir al-khass), which was a new office established
by al-Nasir Muhammad in 710/1310, and Karim al-DTn al-Kablr was
the first to hold this post. By the time Karim al-Din al-Kabir
succeeded in gaining the friendship and confidence of al-Nasir
Muhammad he had become a person of high position in the court and
5
had seventy Mamluks working in his service wherever he went. The
—  6Mamluk emirs were anxious to serve him, and al-Nasir Muhammad was
careful to bestow a robe of honour upon him on many occasions, for 
example in 710/1310^ and 7l6/l3l6.^
Soon Karim al-DTn became such an important character at the 
court, as well as achieving a high position in the palace, that al-
Nasir Muhammad honoured him by allowing him to bestow robes of
- 9honour upon the Mamluk emirs.
~*~Suluk, ii, 6l.
^Durar, ii, 401: iii, 13.
^Ibid., ii, -^02. 
k
Ibid.; Suluk, ii, 93. For more details about the part of 
Nagir al-Khass, see Subh, iv, 30*
5
Durar, ii, 402.
^ I b i d .
^Suluk, ii, 103.
I^biri., ii, 163.
9Durar, ii, J+02.
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Karim al-DIn al-Kablr built many mosques in Cairo and Damascus,
repaired numerous roads and dug sundry wells.^ It seems that the
friendship between al-Na§ir Muhammad and his nagir al-khass was
strongly cemented, in'7l6/l3l6, when Karim al-Din al-Kabir was ill
in Alexandria. Al-Nasir Muhammad was worried about him and, when
he recovered, all Cairo was beautifully decorated for his return.
1,600 candles were lit and lots of golden and silver coins were 
2
thrown around him. Al-Nasir Muhammad, pleased at the recovery 
and arrival of Karim al-Din, bestowed upon him a robe of honour and 
presented him with 10,000 dirhams.^
On the other hand, it appears that Karim al-Din was kind, 
generous and pious. He was fond of scholars, supported them, and 
tried to have some of the scholars of his time around him. Be­
sides he never stopped attempting to prevent al-Nagir Muhammad 
from plotting against anyone. He was also generous, reasonable,
dignified, wise, intellectual, humble in his behaviour, and simple 
3
in his appearance. There were many examples of the wealth, the
g
generosity and the kindness of KarTm al-Din, and of his close re-
7
lationship to al-Na§ir Muhammad, through which he held the treasure
^ Ibi d.
2Ibid.
^Suluk, ii, 163.
bDurar, ii, ^02.
^Ibid., ii, ^03.
r
Suluk, ii, 2^3-2^, 2^3; Durar, ii, f^-03. 
^Suluk, ii, 211, 2bl.
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house (bavt al-mal) and the Royal Privy Purse of al-Nasir
i
Muhammad.^
These circumstances changed when the conflict started between
the Christians and the mob who accused Karim al-Din of acting for
2
the Christians at the court of al-Nagir Muhammad. It seems that
the public did not forget the attitude of Karim al-Din towards
the Christians when they appealed to him to pull down the mihrab
° i r
which the Muslims had built in the Church of'Barbara. Karim al-
Din was angry and importuned al-Nasir Muhammad until he had the
_ 3
mihrab demolished.
Although al-Nasir Muhammad was annoyed by the action of the
public, and firmly punished them for the sake of the security and
safety of the country, it seems that he was affected by their re-
A
action to Karim al-Din; and that is why, when Karim al-Din pro­
voked al-Nagir Muhammad againstthe commoners, al-Na^ir sent him 
to Alexandria to get money and to examine the church which had been
5
destroyed. The attitude of the public towards Karim al-Din al- 
Kabir might be one of the reasons which weakened the friendship 
and attachment between al-Nasir Muhammad and the nagir al-khass. 
There were also the Mamluk emirs, who desired to Dave Karim al-Din 
dismissed by al-Na§ir Muhammad, and to have him rewarded for his 
previous efforts and activities concerning the affairs of the state
■''Durar, ii, 4-02.
p
Suluk, ii, 224; Nujum, ix, 69.
^Suluk, ii, 182-183.
L
Ibid. , ii, 226; Nu.jum, ix, 70 -71.
5
Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim subjects, 66.
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and of the Sultan.^ The only possible reason for the unfriendly 
attitude of the mob and the Mamluk emirs towards Karim al-DTn 
al-Kabir was his previous religion, Christianity, and from this 
might have emerged their suspicion of his honesty and his sincerity.
It could also be that al-Na§ir Muhammad was suspicious of the wealth
_ 2
and . prosperity of Karim al-Din al-Kabir.
Besides, we should not ignore the personal policy of al-
Nasir- Muhammad towards his men and the powerful Mamluk oligarchy.
As soon as one of them reached a peak of success, al-Na§ir Muhammad
hurried to put an end to his life, without paying any attention to
his previous efforts and accomplishments on behalf of the state.
It seems that al-Nagir Muhammad decided to arrest Karim al-DTn
al-Kabir, ‘and formed a plan to fulfil his aim in due course. On the
l4th of Rabl\ II, 723/22nd April 1323» al-Na§ir Muhammad ordered the
Mamlnk emir Arghun al-Dawodar (d.731/1330) to seize Karim al-DTn and to
3
confiscate all his property. They found in his houses in Cairo, 
Birkat al-FTl, material and dresses valued at 60,000 dinars, .and 
different kinds of valuables. After two months, on the 24th of
Jumada,II,723/29th June 1323> KarTm al-DTn was released and sent to
5
Shawbak and from there to Jerusalem where he stayed about a year; 
^Nihayat, xxxi, fol. 3; Suluk, ii, 224; Nu.jum, ix, 70.
^Suluk, ii, 243.
I
^Suluk, ii, 243; Durar, ii, 403-4o4.
 ^Suluk, ii, 243.
^Fortress in Transjordan.
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then by the order of al-Na§ir Mu^ammad^KarTm al-DTn al-Kabir
was brought back to Cairo on the 17th of RabT', II, 724/l3th April
1324.^ In Egypt his lands and houses were confiscated, and all his
2
wealth was taken for the state.
Later, on the l8th of RabT*, II, 724/l4th April 1324, Karim
al-DTn al-Kabir was sent to Uswan where he was kept prisoner.''’
On Thursday, the 20th of Shawwal 724/lOth October 1324 he 
4was hanged. According to Ibn Hajar, the precious things and 
valuable objects belonging to Karim al-DTn al-Kabir were carried 
by a caravan of mules to the Citadel of Cairo; the beginning of 
the caravan was at the house of Karim al-DTn and the end of it at 
the Citadel of Cairo. This statement gives us a clear impression 
of the wealth of Karim al-DTn.
Furthermore, some historians accuse KarTm al-DTn of working 
for the Christians, and attempting to break; the good relations be­
tween al-Nasir Muhammad and his Muslim subjects. Apparently, KarTm 
al-DTn was acting with the Sultan on behalf of both sides to settle 
the matters of state, and to establish peace in the country. Hence, 
if KarTm al-DTn took steps in a matter concerning the non-Muslims, 
he was striving for the best regarding the peace of Cairo.
c
Although KarTm al-DTn knew that the populace disliked him? he 
attempted to persuade al-Na§ir Muhammad to change his order against
^Suluk, ii? 248, 255; Durar, ii, 4o4.
^Suluk, ii, 248, 255; Durar, ii, 404.
^Suluk, ii? 235; Durar, ii, 404.
^Suluk, ii, 259; Durar, ii, 404.
5
Durar, ii? 404.
^Suluk, ii? 224; Nujum, ix, 68-69.
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the mob and to be kinder to the public; it seems that he suc­
ceeded in achieving his desire.^ Another example was when the Mam- 
luks were going to cut off the hands of some people at the command 
of al-Nasir Muhammad, Karim al-Din pleaded with al-Na§ir Muhammad 
to forgive them, and again al-Na§ir Muhammad did what Karim al-Din 
wished.^
Moreover, when Karim al-Din came back from Alexandria in 722/ 
1322 he worked immediately to set free all those who had been im­
prisoned during the previous events in the struggle between the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims. All these examples support the view 
that, although Karim al-Din was a Christian in the early years of his 
life, he adhered to the rites of his new religion when he adopted 
Islam and spent all his life at the court of al-Na§ir Muhammad working
1
for the best concerning the affairs of the state.
(x) Dhimmis in the late years of al-Nasir's reign
The late years of al-Na§ir Muhammad's reign could be considered 
as a period of safety and peace when the Egyptians could live to­
gether without a Royal Edict severing the friendly ties which 
existed. Contemporary sources do not mention any event concerning 
the ^M'mmis during the years 722-7^0/1322-133^ until we come to the 
end of the year 7*+0/l3^0 when we see that contemporary writers and 
later historians mention an event of similar character. The most 
important aspect of this is the attitude of al-Na§ir Muhammad towards 
dhimnns and towards the Christian countries. In Shawwal 7^0/April 
13^0, fires broke out in the east side of the Umayyad Mosque in 
Damascus, soon the fire reached the MOsque and lasted two days until
1Suluk, ii, 223; Ni^um, 70.
^Suluk, ii, 226; Nujum, ix, 70.
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it was extinguished by the efforts of the governor of Damascus,
_ 1 2Tankiz al-Husami (d. 13^0), and his people. At the beginning
of the next month,Dhu 'l-Qa'da/May, of the same year, great conflagrations 
broke out in different parts of Damascus which burned for another 
two days; seemingly many places and buildings were demolished, 
goods and posessions were lost to the value of 1 ,600,000 dinars.^
A slave boy told the governor of Damascus that his master, Yusuf b. 
Mujalll al-Makin, the clerk in the army office (liatib diwan al-
Ll
Jaysh), and other Christian scribes were the incendiaries.‘
Apparently, when Tankiz al-Husami asked these Christians about the 
truth of the matter, they confessed that the conflagration had been 
organized by them, and by two monks recently arrived fron Con­
stantinople to teach the others how to make packets of naphtha;
with those packets they had succeeded in starting the fires in
5
Damascus, and the two monks had already left for Cyprus. Tankiz
al-Husami sent a letter to al-Nafir Muhammad explaining the whole 
6
matter. After that the incendiaries, who were eleven Christians,
7
were put to torture and finally killed. Moreover, their money, 
which was more than one thousand dirhams, was used for the repair
1Supra, 153-154.
^(Uyun, fols. ^2a-b; Suluk, ii, **93.
^Suluk, ii, ^93.
L
Ibid., ii, 496.
 ^* Uyun, fols. *f2b-^ 3a.; Suluk, ii, ^96. 
c
Suluk, ii, ^96.
^Ibid., ii, ^97.
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of the Umayyad Mosque.^ Al-Na§ir Muhammad disapproved of the
action of the governor of Syria against the Christians, and warned
him that this would arouse the anger of the Byzantine people against
2
the Muslim merchants who used to go to Constantinople for trade.
3
Although the governor of Syria tried to expound the matter to al-
Na§ir Muhammad and told him that the money which had been confiscated
from the Christians was used for the repair of the Umayyad Mpsque,
if
al-Nasir was still furious about the event, although it was true 
that the money was used to repair the mosque.
Although this is not the place to discuss relations between 
al-Nafir Muhammad and the governor of Syria, it might be worth men­
tioning that the previous occurrence was probably one of the con­
tributory factors which affected the close friendship between al- 
Kasir Muhammad and Tankiz al-Husami.
That this was the only occurrence during that long period of 
quiet and peace might confirm that kindness and friendliness towards 
his non-Muslim subjects, the Christians and the Jews, was an import­
ant aspect of the internal policy of al-Na§ir Muhammad, who was 
always careful to implement that intention.
(xi) The feasts of dhimmis
Seemingly the unfriendly circumstances above described respecting 
the non-Muslims during the period under consideration did not deeply 
effect the good relations between the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
Egyptians; the friendship and attachment between the two parties 
continued throughout the period. The most significant example is
^*Uyun, fols. 44a-b; Suluk, ii, 497.
S^uluk, ii, 497.
'^ For m'or'e detail's about this'matter, see ' * Uyun, fols. -42a-44b;........
Tndhkirat, fols. 119a-120b.
^Sulu?, , ii, 497.
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the sharing of the Muslims in the festivals of other social 
assemblies. On these occasions both parties had common cele­
brations and enjoyed certain special aspects of amusement, al- 
although the Muslims were aware that these festivals concerned 
only the non-Muslims. Whenever an opportunity for these feasts 
pertaining to the non-Muslim subjects arose we see the Muslims
taking part, beautifully dressed, and exchanging extravagant pres- 
2
ents. One gets the impression that the Muslims celebrated non-
Muslim events with gaiety and mirth. It is to be expected that
our information about this subject is necessarily less complete
and sufficient than we would wish because contemporary historians
rarely mention this kind of social aspect and activity. On the
other hand, the non-Muslims used to give presents to their Muslim
friends an(d rulers on every suitable Muslim occasion; this had a
great influence on the friendly relations between the Muslim rulers
and their non-Muslim subjects."^ The Coptic feasts were many, and
if
took place at different times in the Coptic year.
_ 5
Nayruz, New Year's day, a Christian Copt festival, was one
of the most important solemnizations which the Christians celebrated;
they were accustomed to cook a certain kind of sweet called zalabya,
7
and to make bonfires. The Muslim public, learned men, scholars
^Madkhal, ii, ^6.
^Ibid., ii, V7.
^Ibid., ii, ^8.
L
For more details, see Subh, ii, -^15-^ 19; Khit, i, 26k-267.
g _
For the word Nayruz, see Subji, ii, f^l9.
^Madkhal, ii, -^8.
^Subh, ii, *KL9; Khit, i, 267.
2l5
officials and rulers, were careful to share in the Christian
feast, to cook zalabyaand to solemnize the occasion with their
friends and relatives.^ Nayruz day was also regarded as an official
holiday in Egypt and all the schools and the shops were closed on 
2
that day.
There were some other important days when the Christians 
enjoyed certain traditional customs and the Muslims were eager to
-Z
follow the Christians in their traditions. Khamls al-'Adas was the
second festive occasion; for this, the Christians solemnized three 
if
days before Easter. The Christian women were accustomed to go to
_ c
market to buy incense (bakhur) and rings. The Muslim women were
minded to do the same, and the markets became so crowded that it
« 6was difficult for anyone to go there on Khamls al-Adas. Both 
Christian and Muslim women were mindful on that day to perfume them­
selves and their men with incense; not only that, but they also 
were careful to make a cross over the perfumed incense seven times,
for they believed that this would safeguard them from envy, laziness 
7
and weakness. Moreover, the Christians were in the habit of pre­
senting their Christian and Muslim friends with different sorts of
1Madkhal, ii, *+8-^ 9.
2 _
For more details about Nayruz Day, see. Madkhal, ii, ^9; Subh,
ii, ^19; Khit, j, 269.
3Kb±t,. i, 266.
Ibid., i, 266, ^95.
^Madkhal, ii, 5^.
6Ibid.
^Madkhal, ii, 55.
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fish, lentils and eggs.'1' These examples give us a clear impression
of the friendly aspect of the relations between the Muslims and 
2
the non-Muslims. Sabt al-Nur was one of the festivals considered 
by the Christians and the Muslims together as a particular festival 
to be commemorated. The Muslims also followed the Christians in
4 _
the celebration of Christmas. There were also Yaum al-Ghitas,-? 
and * Id al-Zaytuna^ on which the Muslims were keen to share the 
Christian community’s commemoration.
Moreover, during the Mamluk epoch, the Copts were accustomed 
to celebrate each year a special occasion called the Feast of the 
Martyr C * Id al-SJb.ahTd). On that day they used to throw into the 
Nile a coffin containing a finger of an old disciple; they believed 
that if they did not do this the Nile would not flood. At that time 
they went to . ! Shubra to have a great com­
memoration, and the Copts of different classes from all the vil­
lages in Egypt used to come and join in the celebration of that 
feast. Many people of Cairo, of diverse categories, celebrated 
that occasion. Together, the Muslims and the Copts pitched their 
tents, rode horses and played and enjoyed themselves in various ways. 
It seems that this factual example makes clear that the difference 
in the religions, Islam and Christianity, had no deep effect on
K^hdj^ , i, 266. 
2
For more details, see Madkhal, ii, 55; Khit> • i» 266.
3
For more details,see Madkhal, ii, 56-58.
^For more details*see Madkhal, ii,58-59.
^Madkhal, ii, 59; Khit1 i» 265.
^Madkhal, ii, 59-60.
^Khit , i, 68-69; Suluk, i, 9/+l-9^2; Nujum, viii, 202-203.
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the building of human relations between the Muslims and the non- 
Muslims at that time.
Furthermore, it shows that the events which broke out in 
Egypt at the beginning of the fourteenth century were quite super­
ficial and,even if they brought unfriendly feelings between the two 
parties, that feeling was the result of circumstances and never 
the cause of any unjust act towards the other side. However,
Baybars al-Jashnakir worked to stop the Copts from celebrating 
the Feast of the Martyr and succeeded in his desire, although the 
Copts tried hard to change his mind.^
Later, in 736/1336* al-Na§ir Muhammad allowed the Copts to
2
enjoy that traditional event again. This gives us an idea that, 
although the Copts tried to regain permission to celebrate that
I
feast, v/ithout success, during the second reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad
they did not stop trying until they achieved their wish. This
means that the Copts in Egypt at the Mamluk time were careful to
practise their religion and to exercise their holy traditions.
The Jev/s, as another community, had their own festivals at
_
which they performed the liturgical rites, or held a ceremony.
New Year's day was one of the vital occasions which the Jews were 
careful to celebrate, and they called it *Id Ka*s Hisha, which 
means the feast of the beginning of the month.^ *ld Sumarya, or 
the Kabur, as the Jews used to call it, was a fast of twenty- 
five hours, although this was forbidden on Sundays, Tuesdays,and 
Fridays.-^
^Nu.jum, viii, 202; Tibr, 12.
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Besides these religious festivals such as *Id al-Mizalla,^  the 
Jewish Easter, *Id al-*Un?ara, and *Id al-Qarra^In, which the 
Jews used to celebrate, there were also other feasts on which 
they were accustomed to hold different kinds of ceremonies; for 
instance, *Id al-Fawz, and *Id al-Hunka.
(xii) Conclusion
The situation, as- we have seen, was exceptional for there 
were three sides. The Muslims, or the public, were the majority 
and, with their simple and pious minds, they were ready to take 
immediate action against any group tiying to change the peaceful 
condition of the state. The non-Muslim community was the second 
side and they eagerly desired to have a normal life but it seems 
they had to try hard to accomplish their desire. Thirdly, there 
was al-Nafir Muhammad himself, who found himself in a difficult 
position between these two groups, the majority and the minority, 
of his subjects, but who never departed from his firm intention of 
following his established internal policy. The necessity for him 
as a ruler of a great kingdom, and as a legal sovereign who had 
suffered two hard experiences regarding his accession to the throne, 
was either to practise a strong policy respecting the internal 
affairs of his kingdom, or expect to face another critical condition
~^Subh, ii, -^26; Khit » ii> ^ 731 ^79*
2Subfr, ii, ^27; Khit, ii» W .
3Subh, ii, k27; Khit, ii»
L
IguLt, ii* ^73.
3gubh, ii, ^27; Khit, ii* ^ 73.
6SubtL, ii, ^28; Khit, ' ii. ^ 73.
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which might pull out by the roots the establishment of the house 
of Qalawun as a ruling family.
It is likely that al-Na§ir Muhammad regarded his subjects, the 
Muslims and the dhimrras, impartially, and prevented his Mamluk emirs . 
from affecting his clear judgement respecting his relations with 
his people. It could be also worth saying that the conduct of the 
Mamluk rulers was often better than the law demanded, and it seems 
fair to mention that the relations between al-Na§ir Muhammad and the 
dhimmls were friendly and faithful. Obedience and discipline must 
be strictly and relentlessly enforced, and the rule of justice must 
also be observed.
Furthermore, concerning this part of the internal policy of 
al-Nagir Muhammad, there was the status of the scholars, who were 
powerful and effective but not always strong enough to affect al- 
Na§irfs thought or attitude towards his people.
The diplomatic relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the 
Christian countries was the most remarkable, if not the most import­
ant, aspect which affected and was effected by the situation of the 
dhimmls. Al-Na$ir respected the friendly relations with the Christian
countries, and he was always careful during his reign to cement 
these relations for political purposes, economic benefits and 
historical development.
It appears that al-Nasir was naturally competent to handle 
the local conflict between his subjects, Muslims and dhimrras, with 
skill and knowledge of the requirements of an efficient state 
established in a land belonging to people of different religions. 
Moreover, it seems that all-Na?ir Muframmad was always hopeful of 
remedying old and deeply rooted vices. In order to fulfill his 
desire to have his people live together in peace and safety, al-
220
Na§ir Muhammad did his utmost to find the causes of that conflict 
and to handle every cause with the most suitable treatment.
It seems as if al-Nagir Muhammad succeeded in reaping the 
fruits of his exertions when a new period began in the course of 
729/-7^0/l328-1339. It was a time of friendship and close re­
lations between his subjects. Consequently his fame and popularity 
began to spread with great rapidity.
In general, al-Na§ir Muhammad was kind to ail Egyptians,
Muslims and dhimmls, and he worked to please the two parties as 
much as internal and external affairs permitted him. This aspect 
of mutual celebration by the Muslims and the dhimmis of all festivals 
and feasts of the two parties might be a good illustration of the 
development of the friendly association between the two sides in 
the third reign of al-Na^ir Muhammad.
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Chapter V 
THE BEDOUIN REVOLTS
(i) The early contact
In discussing the Bedouin revolts it is imperative to know the 
factual number of the Bedouin tribes during the period under- consideration. 
Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umarl states that there were many Bedouin tribes 
in Elgypt.^ Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari cites that there were several 
tribes in Upper Egypt; he also gives a brief account of internal 
affairs. Concerning the other parts of Egypt, Ibn Fa$l Allah mentions 
the names of some tribes who lived in Egypt, especially in the frontier 
regions, throughout the Islamic period until al-Na^ir Muhammad’s third 
reign, including the families who held the internal office of governor-
ship (*imra). According to al-Qalqashandl, al-Hamadani records inI " *
detail the matter of the governorship (*imra) concerning the nomads 
of Egypt during the period under review.''’ According to Ibn Fa$l 
Allah al-'Um'ari one could have an idea of the condition of *imra
Zf
in Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and Barqa." In Uswan the affairs of 
management were in the hands of a powerful Bedouin emir called Sumra
cz
b. Malik" who succeeded in obtaining permission from al-Na§ir Muhammad 
to launch an attack against Habasha and the communities of the Blacks 
with the assistance of his powerful subjects whenever he found suit­
able circumstances. Moreover, al-Na$ir Muhammad wrote to the governor
^Ta/rif, 76; see also Subh, vii, l60.
2Masalik, iv, fols. 92b-100b. See maps, nos. V, VI.
•^Subh, iv, 67-68, 69-71. See maps, nos. V, VI,
Sb/rTf, 76, 77-78, 81-83. See maps > nos. V, VI.
^Al-Qalqashandl calls him elsewhere Sumayra instead of Sumra. See 
Subh, iv, T>8-69; cf. Subh, vii, 162.
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of Upper Egypt and to the other Bedouin tribes to support Sumra
in fulfilling his functions.^* Lastly, he must be put in command
2
of any region m  which he was successful. This statement should 
not lead us to understand that a Bedouin emir had managed to be 
vested with unlimited authority by al-Na§ir Muhammad because a 
deep investigation of this permission makes it easy for us to 
realize that the authorization serves,in the first place, al-Nasir
f
Muhammad's ambition to be a ruler of a state with internal security 
and, that there was no harm if one of the Egyptian provinces came 
officially under the power of a Bedouin emir who obeyed the high 
authority of the Mamluk court. There is a lack of evidence con­
cerning the carrying out of this permission during the reign of 
al-Na§ir Muhammad, but it is probable that it was allowed to become 
effective. .
On the other hand, it seems that al-Na$ir Muhammed wanted 
active warrior-chiefs in the frontier-regions for security and pro­
tection and, in order to achieve his desire, he worked to be on good 
terms with the Bedouins especially those who lived in the frontier 
regions.
Al-Qalqashandi quotes Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'UmarT and al-Hamadanl in 
their statements that there were also al-Gharbiyya in which the Bedouins were 
led by a family of Tayy*, al-Buhayra which was administered at the 
time of al-Nasir Muhammad by Khalid b. AbT Sulayman, and Fa’id b.Hiq- 
addam who were famous for their generosity, bravery and wisdom,'"’
^Ta*rlf, 77; Subh, iv, 68-69. 
^Ta*rTf, 77; Subfr, iv, 69.
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and Barqa in which a Bedouin emir called Ja'far b. 'Umar tried to
carry on with the function of supervising the internal affairs
of Barqa as an independent ruler. But it seems that al-Na§ir
Muhammad, being dissatisfied with the way the Bedouin emir handled
the affairs of the province, tried to put him to flight. When the
emir found himself in difficulty he himself went to the court of al-
Na§ir Muhammad for forgiveness and achieved his purpose.^*
■Unfortunately, al-QalqashandT does not give details about the
circumstances which forced that emir to yield to the Mamluk power.
But, on the other hand, al-QalqashandT’s information helps one to
assume that there were many tribes who lived in different parts of
Egypt during the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad. Some of these Bedouins
were careful to give their complete obedience to al-Na§ir Muhammad,
to fight under his supervision and to rule according to his orders,
while others v/orked hard for independence from the Mamluk authority.
For example, in the year 700/1300, the Bedouins of Upper Egypt re-
_ _2
belled against the government; therefore, as Baybars al-Mansuri
records, al-Nasir Muhammad sent him with Shams al-KTn Sunqur al- 
3Ashqar to bring peace and to return the situation to normal. There
4
they succeeded in accomplishing victory with great tribute. More­
over, Tbn Abi al-Fa£a’il, having joined the Mamluk troops against 
the Bedouins, notes that it was easy to overcome the Bedouins, and 
to bring them back to obedience.
1Ta<rif, 77-78; Subh, iv, 71.
2
Supra, 102.
■^ For his biography,see. Durar, ii, 177-178.
Zubdat, fols. 22.1b, 222a, 223b.
^Nah.j, iii, 38.
The question arises, here, what was the cause of that revolt? 
Firstly, it seems that the supervision of the activities of the 
internal affairs in Upper Egypt were too hard a task to he performed 
by one person, so that al-Na§ir Muhammad devoted three of his emirs 
to restraining the recalcitrance of the Bedouins. Secondly, studying 
the surrounding circumstances one gets the impression that the 
Bedouins accustomed to dwell on the boundaries of Egypt kept desiring 
independence and found in the Mamluks1 defeat by the Mongols in 
Wadi al-Khazandar in 699/1299 a. good opportunity which could serve 
their longing for semi-independence but, as we have already seen, 
it was difficult for them to stand against the Mamluk Sultanate, 
even at that difficult time in the Mamluk's rule. On the other 
hand, it might be that the defeat of the Mamluks was the cause of
I
that Mamluk campaign against the Bedouins to replenish equipment
p
and obtain sufficient supplies for a new war against the Mongols.
Immediately after, in the year 701/1301, Ibn Abi al-Fa$a’il
cites that another revolt occurred in Upper Egypt, while Baybars
al-Mansuri adds that the Bedouins caused a great disorder in
Upper Egypt, attacked the merchants, fought the soldiers of the
2
state and caused wide destruction. Furthermore, Ibn Taghr1 Birdi
3
confirms the statement and gives long details about this event. 
Subsequently, the contemporary historians and later ones agree that 
Sayf al-Din Salar and Baybars al-Ja.shnakir succeeded in capturing
the leaders of the revolt, killed many of the Bedouins, took possession
_ Li~
of Upper Egypt and spread the Mamluk power all over the regions.
^Durar, ii, 177; cf. Hasan, The Arabs and the Sudan, 102.
^Zubdat, fols. 231b, 232a; Nah.j, iii, 6l-62; see also Malik, fol.Wb;
Bayan, 129.
Nunurn1 Viii, 14-9-151; Cf. Hasan, loc.cit.
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This continuation of the Bedouin revolts during the. rule of al- 
Na§ir Muhammad gives us entire understanding of many aspects of 
the situation of the Bedouins in Egypt. Firstly, during the period 
under consideration, the Bedouins had a deep and common desire for 
independence, even internal independence; they at least wanted 
to live as was their habit, free, and far from any regulation which 
might put them under the authority of the Mamluks. Secondly, the 
Bedouins enjoyed a certain degree of power which helped them to 
continue fighting the Mamluks whenever an opportunity occured to 
their advance. Thirdly, it seems that it was difficult for the Mamluk 
court, especially in the early years of the reign of al-Na§ir Muframmad, 
to put the Bedouins under military power or a kind of political 
system directly connected with the supreme power in Cairo. Fourthly, 
these consecutive movements could be considered as internal revolts 
which might badly affect the political structure, the social structure 
and the economic activities too. In conclusion, al-Na^ir Mufciammad 
continued to try, either by diplomacy or by force, to put an end 
to these successive revolts by the Bedouins. On the other hand, one 
might say that having the Bedouins1 obedience was of great import­
ance for internal security, safety on trade routes and for the pro­
tection for pilgrims on their way to al-Hijaz. Therefore, al-Nasir 
Muhammad had to put the Bedouins, especially those of Upper and 
Lower Egypt and of *Aydhab, under his command and obtain their utter 
obedience.
(ii) The political and economic relations
One should not get the complete impression that the Bedouins 
were always a source of aggression during the period under study for 
they could also be, in practice, a great help to the Mamluk Sultan­
ate if. the. latter had to. face any sort.of difficulty, as happened
226
in the year 7H/13H when al-Nafir Muhammad wanted to conquer
Tripoli in North Africa. The Bedouins of al-Bu^ayra, hearing
of al-Nafir Muhammad’s campaign, hurried to join him and to take
_ 1
part in this military event for the sake of the Mamluk Sultanate.
These data of Jawahir al-Suluk are probably important for they 
help us to understand that the Bedouins could be a support to 
the military force for a political purpose concerning the show of 
power of the Mamluk Sultanate. But, unfortunately, the manuscript 
of Jawahir al-Suluk does not give further information concerning 
the position of the Mamluk court towards the co-operative standing 
of the Bedouins witn the Mamluk military force. One ,might correctly 
imagine that the Mamluk court willingly welcomed the indication of 
good will from the Bedouins for this was the first time in al-Nasir 
Muhammad's third reign that such participation had occured and it 
might also be followed by total co-operation between the two sides 
for the good of the country. But it appears that the Bedouins1 thought 
and desire for a semi-independent condition were always active as we 
could easily notice through the step which was taken by al-Nafir 
Muhammad when he marched in 711/1311 towards Upper Egypt in order 
to restore those parts of the area which had been damaged by the 
Bedouins and after a series of successful fights returned to 
Cairo
Accordingly, it seems that, in times of political trouble,^ 
al-Na.fir Muhammad regarded the Bedouins in Upper Egypt as a heavy
^Jawahir, fol. 223b.
2Ibid., fol. 226b.
^Suluk, ii, 99i 104, 107-111.
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burden on the Mamluk rulers and that is why he went in person 
to Upper Egypt to restore order. Besides, it may be worth 
stating that the Mamluk government had, even for a short period, 
to deal with the Bedouins' affairs to stabilize the state. In 
716/1316 there was another Bedouin incident, this time in the 
desert of * Aydhab, the important port on the east side of Egypt 
on the Red Sea, where they broke out against the Mamluk Law. There­
fore al-Nasir Muhammad sent a military force, well organized, and 
led by six emirs of highest rank, who managed to overcome the 
dissidents and came back to Cairo in success.'*'
The only comment which can be made here is that the large 
numbers of the Bedouins encouraged them to continue their revolts, 
and the great distance between their settlements on the different 
borders of Egypt and the centre of government made circumstances 
more helpful for them to carry on rebelling against the Mamluks 
with different types of revolt, such as sometimes a revolt of
economic aspect by cutting the annual tribute which they paid to 
2
the government, or a revolt of political aspect such as when they
3
announced, more than once, that they liked to be self-governing.
Lastly, it might be worth mentioning that *Aydhab was an important
kport through which the pilgrims travelled to al-Hijaz. At the same 
time, * Ay dhab was a busy and active port for the products from
■*Tor * Ay dhab under the Mamluk rule, see Hasan, op. cit., 7^-82.
2 - . .In Jawahir, fol. 227a, it is stated:
 ^ q —■*»«♦ * & I J > I , v ...Ljr, * ! ^  ^  j S Lw_aJ I IL L J I j ,   ^ *1 ^*1
&j-& LiiJ I L- 4 m ni 11 J^L 1^ l^xl*9 # Lw Imj *■— 1 Jsm
* (JjjaJ
cf. Hasan, op.clt., 76-7B.
3 _
Nu.jum, viii, 1^9.
■L......................................................... ...........
Khitat, i, part II, 356; see also Tuhfa, i, lV7, 169-170.
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1 _ 2India, Yemen and al-Hijaz. A Mamluk administrator used to be
■z
appointed by the Sultan to handle the local affairs of *Aydhab.
In fact, it was a series of attempts made by the Bedouins
on different parts of the Egyptian borders to put their wish to
live independently into action. On the other hand, all the Mamluk
efforts which had achieved success against the rebellious Bedouins
had temporary effect; and the most effective evidence which might
confirm this statement was the new aggressive act by the Bedouins
soon after a successful quelling of a revolt, which was something
the Mamluks had to face with a stronger force and a well organised
army. This was in Rajab 713/December 1313 when the Bedouins in
Upper Egypt acted against the rule of al-Na§ir Muhammad. For
example, -they cut off the merchants' way and stopped paying the 
— 5kharaj. As soon as al-Na§ir Muhammad heard about the Bedouins' 
attitude he marched from Cairo pretending that he was going hunting 
while in reality he meant to surprise the Bedouins with a sudden 
attack and, at the same time, al-Nagir Muhammad sent his emirs 
through two parallel ways to blockade the Bedouins to promote the 
success of the attack.^ Subsequently, al-Nasir Muhammad came back 
victoriously to Cairo in Ramadan 713/March 131^ bringing with him
a monetary fine and many captive Bedouins who either were imprisoned
7 8or used for building bridges. Miqdam b. Shammas was one of the
~*~Khitat, i, part II, 337.
^ I n f r a , 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 .
^Khitat, i, part II, 338.
4
For details concerning the Mamluk relations with Nubia during 
the period under consideration, see Hasan, op.cit., 117-121.
Malik, fol. 73b; Suluk, ii, 192; Nu.ium, ix, 36.
6Malik, fol. 73b; Suluk, ii, 12.9; Nu.ium, ix, 36.
7Malik, fol. 73b; Suluk, ii, 129; Nu.ium, ix, 36.
g
For his biography, see Durar, iv, 336-337.
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most important Bedouin leaders who were captured during this
campaign; he was powerful, rich, and had four hundred slave
girls, eighty sons and a large number of servants.'*' He was of
high position among his people so that al-Na§ir Muhammad, after
having him imprisoned in the Citadel of Cairo for a short time,
released him, giving him money and corn to start a new life in the
2
town of al-Na§iriyya on the canal of Alexandria, where he settled 
3
with his family.
This data proves that the Bedouins under Mamluk rule paid 
an annual tribute (kharaj) as a symbol of obedience towards the 
ruling class, and that the withholding of this payment could be 
considered as a revolt against the existing rule which required 
immediate_treatment either by diplomacy or by force.
On the other hand, the Bedouin leaders probably regarding 
this payment as an aspect of submission, tried, as soon as they 
found themselves rich, pov/erful and of great importance, to 
prevent the annual kharaj to show their desire to be free of 
Mamluk administration. It seems also that al-Nasir Muhammad con­
sidered the payment of the kharaj to be of vital importance for 
the authority of the Mamluk state. Consequently, this analysis 
might give us a reasonable explanation of why al-Na§ir Muhammad 
made this widespread attack against the Bedouins. The other 
specific cause which urged al-Na§ir Muhammad to fight the Bedouins 
of Upper Egypt was the need for security on trade routes for the 
sake of the economic condition of the Mamluk Sultanate. Therefore,
Suluk, ii, 129; Durar, iv, 357; Nu.ium, ix, 36.
2
For the canal of Alexandria,see Suluk, ii, 111-112.
3
Suluk, ii, 129; Durar, iv, 357.
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extensive security should have been provided on trade routes,
especially in Upper Egypt on the roads which were followed by
the merchants to *Aydhab. This would be accomplished , probably,
by putting the rebellious Bedouins under Mamluk power either by
diplomacy or with force. Besides, it was, as we have seen, useful
for the Mamluk government to have the captive Bedouins in Cairo to
use them for building work (*umran or tajnxr).
Another episode of this kind occurred during al-Nasir
Muhammad’s rule in 719/1319i when the Bedouins of Barqa on the
border between Egypt and Tripoli cut off the zakat and revolted
against the ruling power.^ In fact, they were led by one of their
2
emirs, Ja'far b. *Umar. Seemingly, al-Na^ir Muhammad immediately
3
sent his troops under the leadership of Aytamush to suppress the
kBedouin insurrection.
It might be worth noting that Aytamush was one of the supporters 
who paved the way for al-Na§ir Muhammad to claim the throne for 
the third time. Aytamush left Cairo with his army for Ja'far 
b. 'Umar and his devoted men. It was two months march from Alex­
andria but, fortunately, Aytamush found a Bedouin guide who showed 
him a way in thirteen days only, for one hundred dinars and a promise
^Suluk,ii, 190-91; Durar, i, 337.
2
For his biography,see Durar, i, 337.
3
Supra, 106. *
^Sulu1 ii, 191; Durar, i, *f23.
5
Durar, i, ^23.
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of an’igja' from the Sultan. This Bedouin guide was ignorant of the 
purpose of the campaign and was careful to lead Aytamush and his 
troops to their destination. The Bedouins of Ja'far b. 'Umar were 
surprised to see themselves suddenly surrounded by the Mamluk army 
and immediately announced their loyalty and obedience to al-Na^ir 
Muhammad, but Aytamush insisted on delivering the order of al-Nagir 
Muhammad the next morning in the presence of Ja'far b. *Umar him­
self. 2 Therefore, the armed soldiers remained on horseback for
the whole night in case there might be a sudden attack by the
3Bedouins under cover of the darkness of the night. The next morning
Ja'far refused to show himself to Aytamush and his army; consequently
Aytamush made a great assault against Ja'far and his men who stood
ready to drive them back. But it appears that Aytamush succeeded
in defeating the rebellious nomads after nineteen battles, taking
their cattle and camels and killing many of them while the others
if
fled to the western lands.
Furthermore, Aytamush was careful to keep the women and the
children in peace and safety, and to set six hundred captives free
before hi left with his troops to return to Cairo. In addition,
the Mamluk forces were on their six day journey to Cairo, bristling
5
with arms for fear of capture in a surprise attack. In conclusion,
~*~Suluk, ii, 191.
2Ibid.,
3Ibid.
Ibid.. ii,. 191-192.
^Suluk, ii, 192.
al-Nasir Muhammad was glad to know the news of the victory. He 
took a fifth of the booty and divided the rest between the fighters.^
A week later Ja'far b. 'Umar came to Cairo and went to Bak-
_ 2 _tamur al-Saqi asking for his protection (’ istijara). The latter
welcomed Ja'far b. *Umar and managed to obtain the forgiveness of 
al-Na§ir Muhammad for him. Lastly, a meeting was arranged between 
al-Na§ir Muhammad and Ja'far b. 'Umar at which the latter announced 
his ’complete loyalty to the Mamluk authority and his readiness 
to fulfill all obligations required of him.^ On his part, al- 
Nasir Muhammad presented him with gold and valuable gifts, and 
appointed him officially as emir over his people on condition that 
he paid the annual tribute punctually, without delay or excuse, 
which Ja'far sincerely did until his death.^ This case, however, 
is an actual proof of the Bedouin character concerning their con­
tinuous fight for freedom of rule. Apparently, they were powerful 
and heavily armed, therefore it seems that they believed that 
they should endeavour to live independently, and not as subjects 
of the Mamluk Sultanate. Probably they were so powerful that the 
Mamluk troops hardly succeeded in triumphing over their devoted 
groups. Pegarding the position of al-Nasir Muhammad, one might 
infer from his action with the Bedouin leaders that he wished their 
obedience and sincerity and that is why he granted their leaders
1Ibid.
2
Supra, 133. >
3Suluk, ii, 192; cf. Ta'rTf, 77-78; Subfr, iv, 71.
L
Suluk, ii, 192; Durar, i, 537.
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semi-independence by decree. On the other hand, the Bedouins had to
show their subjection in two ways: firstly by acting according to
the Mamluk rules and by keeping every obligation respecting their
loyalty to the Mamluk power. Secondly, to be careful in paying
the annual tribute on time as a practical symbol of their submission
to the Mamluk regime. Hence, in discussing the specific causes of
the above mentioned episode we find that there was a similar cause
to that of the Bedouin revolts in Upper Egypt, that is, the annual
tribute which the nomads had to pay to the government for the public
treasury.- it was of great importance therefore for economic reasons
as well as being a symbol of political subjection.
The second cause' was the need for camels foruse in the army,
for transport and trade. This leads us to the attitude of al-
Na§ir Muhammad towards the Bedouins of El Muhanna and El Fa$l
who lived in the eastern frontier regions of Syria and who were
respected by al-Na^ir Muhammad because of his great love of horse;
1
he paid large sums of money to obtain the best kind of horses.
Besides, al-Na§ir Muhammad was very knowledgeable on every matter 
2
concerning horses. Moreover, because al-Nasir Muhammad was
extremely fond of, mainly, Arab horses, he granted Syrian nomads
— i 3such as El Muhanna aid El Fa£l large pieces of land ( iqta* s), gave
their women most valuable articles of gold and silver as well as
if 5
expensive clothes of silk, all this to supply him with good hc-r-ses.
^Suluk, ii, 323-326, 330; Nujum, ix, 167.
^Suluk, ii, 326, 329; Nujum, ix, 167-170.
^Suluk, ii, 326-327; Nujum, ix, 167.
^Suluk, ii, 527-328, 529; Nujum, ix, 168.
^For details, see Suluk, ii, 525-530; Nujum, ix, 167-170.
Thus in name and practice the loyalty of the Bedouins to the Mamluk 
Sultanate would he fulfilled. But it is noteworthy that to win a 
victory over a Bedouin tribe did not mean that all the Bedouins 
on Egyptian land would be loyal to the Mamluk regime for it 
appears that the contrary was more correct. It seems that the 
Bedouin revolt would be shortly followed by another revolt by 
another Bedouin group in a different province. It appears that 
the first revolt encouraged others to follow and make another4
attempt at an active movement for freedom of administration. Be­
sides, it seems that being severely punished by the Mamluk troops 
used not to be always considered as a good lesson by other Bedouin 
tribes and that is why there was a series of successive Bedouin 
revolts during the period under review. Therefore, what happened 
in *Aydhab in 719/1319 might be a good example for this analysis 
and thus, in order to have a reasonable look at the factual situation 
it is better to start with the condition of al-Na§ir Muhammad when 
he thought that a reasonable policy should be practised with the Bedouins 
in their active and successive movements against the law especially 
during the period under study. It seems, however, that cir­
cumstances helped al-Na^ir Muhammad to accomplish his plan when 
the Bedouins of 1Aydhab rebelled against the administrator (shadd)
there and killed him.'*' At once al-Na§ir Muhammad despatched some
2 « _ 3
of his emirs, including Eqush al-Manguri, 'AIT b. Qarasunqur,
c T4- —  VEqush al- -Ltris, others with an army to establish order m
^uluk, ii, 194. Cf. Hasan, op.cit., 78-79. We find that the word 
Wall is used for administrator.
p —
[He is named as Aqush, see Durar, i, kOO.
^ Supra, 125.
if..............- ..................................' .........
.He is naned as Aqush,see Durar, i, 399.
235
that province. Apparently the military mission succeeded in obtain­
ing order and Aqush al-Man?uri, who was appointed the governor of 
Uswan province, settled in *Aydhab.^
This tracing of political contact and military struggle might 
easily give one the impression that violence was the only aspect 
from which the Mamluk-Bedouin .relations might be described. Hence, 
although there is a lack of information about economic intercourse 
between the Mamluks and the Bedouins one might say that there was 
a commercial connection between the two"sides, especially in times 
of war. Probably the common specific cause made the Mamluk govern­
ment considerably concerned to obtain peace in the Bedouin regions 
in Upper and Lower Egypt, in the different Egyptian frontier- 
regions and in the fringes of the Mamluk state such as the Nubia 
frontier, Barqa and *Aydhab was protection of trade routes, Hajj 
and safe transport. Thus the economic factor played an important 
part in the Mamluk-Bedouin relations.
Besides, al-Na§ir Muhammad used to write to the Bedouins on the
frontiers and the Bedouins of Upper Egypt asking them to come to
2Cairo with what camels they had for sale. In order to be more pre­
cise it might be useful to take what happened in the year 725/1324, 
for instance, as a proof for the above statement; it was also when 
al-Na§ir Muhammad was engaged with military preparations for a 
campaign to the Yemen in 725/1324. Therefore he was careful to order 
the Bedouins in the provinces of al-Sharqiyya and al-Gharbiyya in
3Upper Egypt to come to Cairo to supply the campaign with camels.
^Suluk, ii, 194.
Supra, 233.
^Suluk, ii, 260.
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This example could be useful in giving us an idea about the 
trade co-operation between the Mamluks and the Bedouins. At the 
same time, it might let us assume that the same had been happening 
during every war respecting the Mamluk regime throughout the 
period under consideration.
It was not long before a new revolt broke out in Upper Egypt, 
highway robbery started and a forcible apprehension of goods began.
In order to have a considerable discussion concerning the reasons 
which made the Bedouins take that action against the Mamluk rule 
it is better to study the circumstances of the existing regime 
during the period under review. Firstly, the bad situation in al- 
Hijaz which emerged suddenly because of the disturbance and the 
understanding which was incident between the governors there.
For example, the murder of the emir Aldamar (d. 730/1331)^ and his 
son by the governor *U^ayfa b. Abi Numayy and his troops in a
fight happened because of al-Na§ir Muhammad’s personal demand that
_ 3
one of his enemy who was in al-Hijaz on pilgrimage should be killed.
And also because of the continuous fighting among the members of
.......................  Zf...............  _
the 51 Numayy family for power. Thus the situation in al-Hijaz was
far from stable. Therefore it is natural to assume that the govern­
ment would be busy and diverted to some degree from other affairs. 
That they were engaged with an internal political problem^ could
^For his biography see, Durar, i, *+07.
2
For his biography see, Durar, ii, *+33-**36.
■^ For details see, Suluk, ii, 323-323? 328; Durar, i, *+07.
^Suluk, ii, 329? 331; Durar, ii, 111-112, *+33-^ 36. See also Subfr, 
iv, 273-27*+.
^For more details see, Tuhfa, i, 87-9*+? 99-101, l*+3-l*+8.
^Suluk, iij 329. .................................................
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be regarded by rebellious Bedouins as giving an opportunity for 
an immediate movement against the Mamluk regime. Secondly, having 
new governors in some provinces could be considered by the re­
bellious subjects of those parts as a helpful factor for the governors 
did not know the cunning methods of the Bedouins, nor did the Bedouins 
understand the system which would be practiced by the new governors.
So it is probable that the condition was an assistant factor for 
risking revolt. Seemingly that was the situation with the new governors 
in some provinces in Upper Egypt.^
Probably al-Na§ir Muhammad, realizing the danger of this Bedouin
revolt in 731/1330’ sent immediately for the governor of al-Sharqiyya,
2
Zaljiyya, bestowed a robe of honour upon him and dispatched him to
3
take over Upper Egypt and to use force to make peace. Consequently
the governob with strength and force began, to fight and defeat the
rebellious emirs and their followers and succeeded in establishing
order over the whole region. Lastly, he became the only governor
kwho was obeyed and followed.
(iii) Conclusion ...........
It seems that the Juhayna tribe which settled in Upper Egypt
5
with other Bedouin tribes desired to take power in Upper Egypt, 
but on the other hand having semi-independence on a region of Egypt
1Ibid., ii, 331. 
^Supra, 72.
^Suluk, ii, 333. 
^Ibid.
^Bayan, 128-129.
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means threats of division for the Mamluk Sultanate in a period 
of strong power and a regime of solid foundation.' Apparently 
the Bedouins both in the eastern and the western borders or in 
Upper Egypt did not want to pay taxes to the Mamluk government 
and desired to be the rulers of the land they dwelt on, and the 
only demonstrators who had to deal with their affairs. Thus the 
specific causes for these continous Bedouin revolts were of poli­
tical and economic aspects; therefore no tax obligation would 
have been accomplished, and no ruling subjections confirmed in 
different ways. But it appears that the Bedouins in time and 
experience understood the impossibility of having that desire 
accomplished for they always had to fight and the fight often 
ended with a defeat and another period of subjection to the Mamluk 
regime. Consequently there was a period of peace and friendship 
during the late years of al-Na§ir Muhammad's reign. 1
In fact, the Bedouins were more loyal to the region and the 
land they lived on than to the government and that is why they 
always had a part to play during ’ time of necessity for the 
sake of the land and the regions they resided in between its boundaries. 
On the other hand, it appears that the Mamluks knew that the Bedouins . 
had always desired to establish a semi-sultanate of their own, 
especially because of their being Arabs, and yet they thought that 
they had the right to be the governors of the country and not sub­
jects under the rule of foreigners. Therefore, the Bedouins were 
badly treated by the Mamluks, and al-Na§ir Muhammad strictly tried 
to put them under his order. Moreover, it seems that al-Nagir Muhammad 
never regarded the situation of winning a victory over the Bedouins 
as a purpose of practising a strict system with them so that 
their life and social condition soon returned to normal and an
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opportunity might appear for them to have a new attempt for semi­
independence with freedom of internal rule. Subsequently, 
military and political troubles could be fitting circumstances of 
which the Bedouins should take advantage for auspicious movement.
There was a long series of fights between the Bedouins and the 
Mamluks during the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad for different achieve­
ments and contrary aims. Yet peace was settled, and friendly co­
operation took place in the common relations of the Bedouins tribes 
and the Mamluk administration during the last ten years of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad’s rule.
Seemingly, al-Na^ir Muhammad practised a policy of three 
aspects towards the nomads. Firstly, diplomacy to gain their loyalty 
and obedience. Secondly, friendship to promote their respect for the 
Mamluk government at the time of good relations. Thirdly, force in 
difficult times when conflict became necessary for internal security 
and protection in regard to the Mamluk Sultanate.
r
2^0
Chapter VI 
THE TAXATION SYSTEM
(i) The Taxation Structure
In dealing with the reforms concerning the taxation system 
which were founded by al-Nasir Muhammad, it is significant to have 
first a clear picture of that system during the period under con­
sideration. It seems that taxes during this period could be divided 
into two categories: firstly the kharaj, secondly the mukus.
Under the first category there were different kinds of taxes:
(i) Khara.i al-Ard, the tax which used to be levied on 
different productsand the Sultan had the right to impose the
kharaj soon after the Nile flood reached the level of 13 dhira*
* 2 3when all cultivated land was covered by water. Tax clerks
(kuttab al-kharaj) supervised the yearly assignment of the land
covered by water to the cultivators. Once the crops had been planted,
the bureau officials (mubashirun) came to find out the details
respecting the land, the crops, the taxes in fixed amounts and the
names of the cultivators. All this information used to be recorded
_ k —m  a paper called the qundaq. Thus the qundaq would contain the
names of the cultivators, the quantity of the crops and the fixed 
amounts of taxes. The assessment (almukallafa) used to be submitted
^Nihayat, viii, 2*f3; Khitat, i, part II, l8^ f.
2 _For details about the cultivated land, see Nihayat, viii, 2^7-233;
Subfr, iii, A5O-V52; Khitat, i, part II, 179-183.
S^ub^ i, iii, ^32; Kbitafr, i, part II, 184.
L
Subh, iii, +^38.
5Ibid.
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to the farmers, informing everyone of the exact amount of
tax he ought to pay.^" It seems that it was the custom for this
kind of kharaj tax to be levied on cultivated land of various
degrees of fertility. The other kind of land tax, mal al-kharaj
or kharaj al-zira*a, used to be collected in cash (*ayn) in
2fixed amounts per faddan, or in kind. Regarding taxes on products
of cultivation al-Qalqashandl mentions in his statement kharaj dues
3 _
calculated in money, and the fixed amounts of taxes per faddan on
L\.
some kinds of products. . Moreover, it*might be worth stating 
that it was possible in Egypt during the period under study for 
the tax in kind to be paid, not only for the crops on which the 
tax was actually levied, but also on another. Al-QalqashandT
includes inhis data the rates of exchange (badal) between the
v
-  5mentioned products on which the kharaj was levied in kind. Accord­
ing to al-QalqashandT the usual price of one irdabb of wheat was 
15 dirhams and that of one irdabb of barley was 10 dirhams. The 
Mamluk sources say that the tax on a faddan of wheat was 37^/2 
dirhams, and the tax on every faddan of barley was 25 dirhams.
It appears that nothing was written on the subject of the rate 
of exchange of lentils, and there was nothing for sesane, rape 
or flax.*^
^Ibid.
^Subfr, iii, 452-^53.
3
For more details about the prices of crops, see Subh, iii, ^7-^88.
4
Sufrh, iii, 452-^-53; see also Rabie, The financial system of 
i&ypt, 75-76.
Subh, iii, ^55; see also Rabie, op.cit., 76.
^Snbh,iii, Vt7; cf. Suluk, ii, 253.
^Subh, iii, ^55.
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(ii) Pasturage, a tax on pasture-land, was imposed, according 
to al-Maqrizi, in a well organised manner; diwan al-mara*i used
to send yearly a superintendent (mushidd or shadd) with several
witnesses (shuhud) and a clerk (katib) to record the number of
livestock, and the assessment varied from one place to another.^
This way of collecting tax on pasturage used to occur yearly after
2
the Nile flood had receded, and the pasture-land was fully used.
A tax on pasture-land could also be paid as a fixed tax (Zariba
■z
muqarrara) annually, according to the quantity of livestock only.
(iii) Industry: The sugar presses varied, in quality and in
quantity, from one place to another in Egypt, as well as from one 
province in Lower Egypt to another in Upper Egypt. There is a
lack of evidence about the amount of tax collected from sugar presses. 
This tax was abolished in 715/1315 by al-Nasir Muhammad.^ In 733/
1333 al-Nashu, the controller of privy funds (nagir al-khass), 
checked the amount of sugar delivered by the sugar presses to 
the dar al-qand on behalf of the emirs. Although sugar manufactured 
by the emirs had been exempted from tax by al-Na§ir Muhammad, al- 
Nashu reimposed the tax, and its subsequent yield reached, in one
day, the amount of 6,000 dinars, which encouraged al-Nasir Muhammad
7 —to abandon his previous policy of exemption. In 738/1337 -8 al-Nashu
K^hifrafr, i, part II, 191.
^Nihayat, viii, 262; Khitat, i, part II, 191.
•^ Khitat, i, part II, 191.
Z.
Nihayat, viii, 264-263.
^SuL:uk, ii, 131; Nu.ium, ix, 47.
^Supra, j ■
^Suluk, ii, 380.
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discovered that Awlad Fu$ayl in Malawi in Upper Egypt had 
manufactured about 1^,000 qintar of sugar in one year, but paid 
tax only on 1 ,000 qintar. Al-Nashu declared all the sugar in
question, plus an additional 8 ,000 qintar, confiscated on behalf
_ 1 of the Sultan.
(iv) Minerals: There were three important minerals which
were exploited in Egypt during the period under study and which
had been of great value to the public treasury (bayt al-mal).
Firstly emeralds which were,according to al-QalqashandT, actively
mined until the latter time of the third reign of al-Na§ir 
2
Muhammad, when this was neglected, probably because the expense
of exploitation became too high a burden. This mineral source
of revenue near Qus had its own bureau officials (mubasfiirun) and
commissioners (*umana’ ), who supervised the exploitation of
emeralds (zumurrud), and thereafter either sold them for the
benefit of the royal privy purse (al-khaza*in al-sultaniyya), which
3
had a Mamluk emir for supervision and care, or kept the most
4 5precious pieces in the royal privy purse, for royal use. Conse­
quently, it appears that emerald mines were considered as the 
personal property of al-Na§ir Muhammad and an important source of 
revenue for the royal privy purse.
Secondly, alum (al-shabb): according to al-Maqrizi the beds
of alum in the desert of Upper Egypt were exploited,^ the alum
1Ibid., ii, ^31.
2Subh, iii, 286 , 309, **39.
^Nihayat, viii, 213-217.
Zj.
For details about khaza’in al-Jawhar, see Khitat, i, part I, 261-266.
T g i h  ...... m u .  m  11 in ,i ■■ ■! araw»»«.i*
^Subh, iii, ^39.
6Khitat, i, part II, 19^ +.
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being transported to the banks of the Nile at Qiis, 1 khmim, Asyu£ and 
BahnascL^and to Alexandria during the Nile flood.^ The dlwan used
to pay 30 dirhams, and sometimes less, for a qintar laythi of
2 ^ _ 3
alum, while the selling price went up to A and even 6 dinars.
Tu.j.jar al-Rum, that is merchants from Byzantium or the European
Christian countries in general, used to buy alum in Alexandria at
_ — Aa price between b and 6 dinars per qintar .jarwi. While in
Cairo, felt makers and dyers used to buy 80 qintar .jarwi annually
1 _ 5at the price of 6 / 2  dinars.
Natron, which is a naturally occurring product is a compound
of sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate. It was mined in al-
Tarrana inaLButayra province and in al-Faqusiyya in alHSharqi.yya
province. According to al-Qalqashandi, the cost of production
was only 2 di rhams per qintar, while its selling price in Cairo
rp
and Alexandria was 70 dirhams. Al-'Umari states that the natron 
exploited in the 100 faddan , Birkat al-Natrun in al-Buhayra province,
g
yielded a revenue of about 100,000 dinars. Even if this figure
is exaggerated, there is no doubt that natron provided al-Nasir
9
Muhammad with a considerable amount of money. .......
~*~Subh, iii, 288; Khitat, i, part II, 19^.
^Subh, iii, V?9; Khitat, i, part II, 19^.
^Khitat, i, part II, 19^.
b
Ibid. I could not trace the exact measures of weight of either a 
qintar Layth.T or a qintar .jarwi; however, Qintar: 100 ritl, 99^/^ 
pounds avoirdupois, see W.Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Cir­
cassian Sultans, ii, 39.
^Khitat, i, part II, 19^ *, cf. Subfo, iii, b60m
Sublii iiii 287-288, A60; Khitat, i, part II, 19^.
^Subh, iii, A60.
o
Ta/rif, 173.
9Rabie, op.clt., 86.
(v) Zakat: Al-Qalqashandi says that merchants and others 
had to pay 3 dirhams on-each 200 dirhams on entering the city, 
but were otherwise unhampered in the pursuit of their trade there, 
and not further taxed if they returned within the tax year, which 
was 10 months, with the same amount of goods. The number of tax- 
free visits was restricted to four and the Karimi merchants had
to pay a yearly zakat in every city in which they traded in spices 
(Karim or Euhar),^
_ 2
(vi) The JawalT was the annual tax which the dhimmis used to
pay. Subsequently al-Nasir Muhammad appointed the nazir who had
to carry out that yearly collection with the assistance of some
superintendents (shaddun), workers ('ummal) and witnesses (shuhud).
However, help given by two dhimmis, collectors of the tribute
(frashir al-jizya), one a Christian and another a Jew, was of great
necessity.^ The hashir had to give a full list of names of people
in his community to pave the way for complete collection. That
if
used to be done in Cairo and Fus£at every year. Moreover it might 
be worth noting that, until the time of the Nagiri rawk, the
.1 a wall was sent to diwan al-Mufrad, but in making the rawk the
-  - 5.jawali became part of every province's kharaj, or one almost
might say that it was changed into a local tax which was collected
^Subh, iii, 46l; see also Khitat, i, part II, 193-194. For details 
regarding the karimi merchants, see an article by S.D.Goitein,
"New Lights on the beginnings of the karimi merchants", J.E.S.H.O., 
i, 173-184 (1938.
/
2 _ _In Egypt the term Jawali was used as a synonym of jizya, see E.I,,
103 (1st ed.): ii, 361 (2nd ed.).
x
Subfr, iii, 462.
4
Niha.yat, viii, 242; Subh 1 iii, 462.
Suluk, ii, 130, 169; Khitat, i, part I, 160; Nujum, ix, 4^-44.
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by the muqta*. Seemingly, the above change concerning the way 
of collecting the ,jawali v/as made mainly for the benefit of the 
dhimmis,^ Consequently that change allowed by al-Nagir Muhammad 
could be taken into account respecting his attitude towards his 
non-Muslim subjects. It might be also that al-Nasir Muhammad 
wanted the j awali to be part of the muqta's' duty for their 
personal advantage.
(vii) Wajib al-dhimma: During the period under consideration
there was a tax imposed on the imports.of dhimmis called 'ushr.
It was usually 10 per cent, decreasing to practically 5 per cent
during the necessary time, or perhaps abolished, according to the
3
welfare of the country. Moreover this tax was in the form of an 
internal toll in three ports, Alexandria, Damietta, Ikhmlm, and 
in the city of Misr (Fusta£). Furthermore, sometimes an amount 
of 35 dinars v/as taken as a tax on goods valued at 100 dinars, 
and was decreased to 20 dinars, in both cases it was called khums.y 
In addition, if the dhimmi merchants left for their countries and 
returned to Egypt within the tax year (which v/as 10 months), with 
the same amount of goods, they were not taxed at all.^ Furthermore
it might be worth noting that wajib al-dhimma was a part of the
7 8 9kharaj al-hilali or the mukus. This tax _ was paid by the dhimmis.
*4?abie, The financial system of Egypt, 111.
^Subh, iii, 463.
3Ibid.
k
Ibid; Khitafc, i, part II, 197.
^Subh, iii, 463-464; cf. Khita^, i, part II, 194.
^Subh, iii, 463.
^Khitat, i, part II, l84.
^For 'details about al-Sana al-hilaliyya, see Subh,- xiii* 54.-........
9Subh, iii, 463; Kjiitat, i, part II, 197.
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(viii) The Mawarith al-hashriyya: If someone died and there 
were no heirs, or even if there were heirs who were not entitled 
to the whole of theinheritance, the whole wealth in the first case,
Qalgashand! states that there was diwan al-mawarith which had to
deal with affairs concerning the mawanth. NSzir diwan al-mawarith
used to be appointed to his office by a royal order, with several 
assistants, superintendents and clerks to help him in fulfilling 
his duties.^
Ewan al mawarith used to register daily the names of those 
who had died during the day, until late afternoon; names of the 
dead after that time would be added to the register of the following 
day. Two copies of the registration would be made each day, one
handed to the diwan al-wizara and the other to the controller
— — 3of financial bureaux (nazir al-dawawin).
This routine was followed in Cairo and Misr (Fustaf). Con­
cerning other Mamluk provinces there were other directors (mubashirun)
who had to collect the wealthof the dead who had no heirs, and to
  Zj.
send that amount of money to the privy purse (diwan al-Sul tan), or
— — 3 —(diwan al-Khass). It appears that the mawarith al-hashriyya were 
frequently unfairly collected. For example, in 737/1336, the royal 
Manluks complained that the bestowal of their clothing (kiswa) 
was delayed. Consequently al-Nasir Muhammad ordered al-Nashu, the 
nagir al-Khass, to grant their demand, together with 20,000 dinars.
^Subh, iii, 46^ -; Khitat, i, part II, 197.
or its residue in the second, would go to bayt al-mal.^ Al-
Subh, iii, 464-
details about diwan al-kha?9 » 
4^2: iv, 30; 'Suluic,ii» ^  / i3
£h as s, see
■2^713^0, Nujum, ix, 76.
2k&
Al-Nashu, in order to fulfil al-Nagir Muhammad’s decree, commanded 
al-Tayyibi, the nazir diwan al-mawarith, to collect the amount of 
5,000 dinars from the estates of the deceased.*^ Hence the whole 
estate of Najm al-Din Muhammad al-’ls'ardi^ (d. 737/1337)^ was 
taken, although he had a wife, a son and a daughter who were his 
heirs. Thus one geis the impression that the law of diwan al- 
mawarith had been put into action illegally. Furthermore, al- 
Tayyibi instituted a complicated procedure to seize the property 
of deceased persons on behalf of diwan al-mawarith. In the case 
of a person of social position, his son, in order to inherit his 
wealthy had to prove that he was his legal heir, and had a right 
to a part of the legacy. Thereafter he had to obtain his share 
from the treasury of the diwan al-mawarith for which he had to wait 
so long that he finally received nothing. In 738/1337 al-Na§ir 
Muhammad, desiring to bring reform and to abolish the cause of 
corruption, prevented the chief juc^e from writing reports respect­
ing the inheritance-of an estate (mah$ar bi-istihqaq mirath) without 
his permission. In conclusion, the condition worsened, and the 
heirs were deprived even of having the chance to prove their 
relationship. 6
1Suluk, ii, kl3-klk.
^Suluk, ii, klkm 
3
No biography is found.
^Suluk, ii, 4lA.
5Ibid., V55-^36.
6Ibid.
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(ix) Mukus al-karimiyya were dues to be collected from 
Muslim and dhimrru merchants from Islamic territories such as the 
Red Sea, Yemen and al-Hijaz, to be transferred by the Nile to Fus£a£.^
There were also other ports, Qusayr, al-Tur, Suez, where merchandise
_ 2
imported by Karimi merchants used to be taxed as well. The value
of the tax on KarimT merchandise was about 10 per cent, including
3
a part of the goods.
(ii) The reform of taxes
In 715/1315 al-Nasir Muhammad cancelled about twenty-four 
taxes. Those taxes were important sources of revenue in Cairo and
4
other Egyptian provinces. The maks of sahil al-ghalla was a tax 
levied on corn brought to Cairo, where corn was taxed before it 
was sold. According to Ibn Taghri Bird!, this tax caused injustice 
to the people, for many officials, sailors (nuwa.tiyyat al-marakib),
corn measurers (kayyalun), superintendents (mushiddun) and clerks
_ 3
(kuttab), were involved in collecting that tax. Therefore it seems
that everyone was extremely eager to benefit from it. The official
tax per irdabb was 2 dirhams, and an additional ^/2 dirham for the
Sultan. The total was estimated at 4,600,000 dirhams a year, and
was conferred in the form of iqta* on four hundred muqtacs of
Mamluk emirs and a.jnad al-halqa, the share of each ranging from
approximately 3 ,000 to 10,000 dirhams for a soldier of a.jnad al-
6
halqa and 40,000 to 100,000 di rhams for a Mamluk emir.
^,Subh, iii, 468.
2Xbid., iii, 469-470.
^Ibid, iii, 470. For more information, see an article by W.J.Fischel, 
"The spice trade in Mamluk Egypt", J.E.S.H.O., i, 157-174 (1958).
L
Malik, fol.80a.
^Nuium* ix,- 45;- -see .also Sulnk, ii., 15P;, cf.# S.J.Shaw, The^  Financial 
Tvrn'PArirn ristrativo Or /:anization and Development of Ottoman Egypt 
31 7_~7~~'7r pp. T^jO'Xtrinceton, Nev/ Jersey, 1962).
6Bulb!:, ii, 150; Khit-at, i, part I, 105; Nu.jurn, ix, 44-45.
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Respecting the affairs and the achievements of males sahil al-
ghalla, there was a diwan in Bulaq where sixty men, either controllers
(nuzzar), or clerks (kuttab), or accountants (mustawfun) had to
fulfil the duties of that diwan with ahout thirty soldiers for
support and supervision. The corn of all the provinces had to be
sold there.^ Al-MaqrTzT states that the observers gained great
profits through carrying out their work in diwan saiiil al-ghalla;
and goes on to say that the people suffered painfully from that
situation, while Ibn Taghri Bird! confirms al-Maqrizi's statement
by noting that big fines were imposed and unjust accusations brought
2frequently at the time of purchase.
The Mamluk sources state that al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the
tax of maks sa^il al-ghalla in 715/1315 to save the people from great 
3
trouble. Consequently the price of wheat decreased starting from'
Zf
the day of abolition. But it seems that al-Nasir Muhammad re­
introduced maks safcil al-ghalla, for it was noted that in 72^/1324
_ 5
al-Na§ir Muhammad cancelled maks saftil al-ghalla in Egypt and Syria.
There was also the tax of half the brokerage (nisf al-samsara) 
which was a tax collected from each broker (sjmsar or dallal). It 
was 2 dirhams brokerage on each 100 dirhams, 2 per cent, one dirham 
for the Sultan and one for the simsar. Subsequently the simsay  ^
in order to save his share, tried to have first his dirham and 
afterwards the dirham of the Sultan.^ Apparently al-Nasir Muhammad
^Khifrat, i, part I, 158; Nu.jum, ix, V?.
2 _
Suluk, ii, 150; see also Nu.jum, ix, Khitat, i, part I, 158.
^Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol. 80b; Thamln, fol. 131a; Suluk, ii, 150; 
Khitat, i, part I, 158; Nu.jum, ix, d-5.
Zj. _
Nu jurn, ix, ^5.
^Infra, 256-257.
6Suluk, ii, 151; Nu.jum, ix, *f5; cf. Tadhkirat, fol.'68k;' Jawahir, 
fol.235b; Khitat., i, part I, 158-195,' 177*
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knowing that the simsars were using dishonest methods to keep their
shares, cancelled the tax of nisf al-samsara in the year 715/1315
Ibn Taghri Bird! records that a great sum of money was obtained
through that tax, and it became an important source of revenue for
2the salaries of a.qnad al-halqa.
Rusum al-wilayat or rusum al-wulat were collected on behalf
of the (wulat > commanders (muqaddamun) and police (shurta),
to be used for paying the soldiers (jund), salaries. It used to
be collected as a fine imposed on every house of ill-fame in the
3
cities and towns and on the immoral men in the markets. The Mamluk
sources record that for the sake of protecting the sanctity of the
home from disgrace, al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the tax of rusum al-
k
wiiayat in 715/1515.
Muoarrar al-su.jun was a tax of about one hundred dirhams which
had to be paid by every prisoner at the moment of his arrest, even
if he were to be released after a short time, as well as the fine
5 _
that every prisoner had to pay. Al-Maqnzi states that it was only
6 7six dirhams. Moreover, there was a tax farmer (flamin) who was
obliged to collect that money from the different prisons to be used
g
for the payment of state officials. In 715/1515 al-Nasir Muhammad
9
abolished that tax.
^Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol. 80b; Thamin, , fol. 131a; Suluk, ii, 151;
Khitat, i, part I, 15$; Nu.jum, ix, 45/
2 _Nu.jum, ix, *f6.
^Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nujum, ix, *l6.
L
Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol. 80b; Thamin, _ fol.131a; Suluk, ii, 151;
Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nu.jum, ix,~rP5T
c _
Nujum, ix, ^6.
^Suluk, ii, 151.
7 —-Fo-r daman and dami-n, - see- E-. I-. , - i, llkk- (2nd Ed.) . .........................
g
Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nujum, ix,
/Dur-ri ix, 236; Malik, fol.SOb; Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, part I,Nu.jum,ix,kG.
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Muqarrar al-hawa’is wa*1-bighal was a tax imposed in all the 
cities and provinces in Egypt. Every wall and muqaddam had to give 
a certain amount of money every year to bayt al-mal; it was about 
five hundred dirhams for the cost of every mule (baghl) . 1 According 
to Ibn Taghri BirdI there were several muqta*s who had to levy 
that tax and who were corrupted in that they took some of the col­
lected money for their ownpurse, and some for the royal purse,
-  2
besides the fixed amount which had to be carried to bayt al-mala 
Al-Nasir Muhammad abolished that tax in 715/1315.^'
Muqarrar tarh al-fararlj was a tax cancelled by al-Nasir 
Muhammad in 715/1315. Apparently the rulers made the rearing of 
chickens (al-fararlj) a kind of state monopoly. It seems that the 
muqta* had to supervise this compulsory co-operation. Subsequently 
poor people, widows and orphans suffered painfully from injustice; 
also, all chickens had to be brought from the tax farmer (flamin) 
and the unauthorised sale of chickens was forbidden by law. Conse­
quently one gets the impression that the abolition of this indirect 
tax was a great relief to these people.
Muqarrar al-fursan was a tax exclusively for the personal in­
terests of the horse-soldiers (al-fursan), the (wulat and 
commanders (muqaddamun); it was, in fact, a kind of personal oblig­
ation which had to be fulfilled by the subjects by giving presents 
and gifts to officials of high rank. Great sums of money were 
levied, and the poor people were forced to pay three times as much
‘'"Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nujum, ix, -^6.
2 „Nujum, ix, k6.
■'’Malik, fol. 8la; Suluk, ii, 151; Khitafr, i, Part I, 159; Nujum, ix,
Ll
Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol. 8la; Tadhkirai,fo[.68a; Khitat, i, Part I,
159; Nujum, ix, 46-^7.
^TarlKkirat,' fol.68a'; ' Suluk', ii, 151;' Khitat; i,'Part I, 'Nujum; ........
3.x, *47.
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as the fixed amount, 3 dirhams for one dirham.^  This was an
example of the iniquity which the people of that time had to face
during the early years of the period under study. Al-Nasir
Muhammad abrogated that tax in 715/1315. In the same year, al-
Nasir Muhammad also repealed the tax on the sugar presses, which
3
has already been mentioned.
Concerning the wedding taxes (rusum al-afrah), no-one knows
the date of its introduction, but it was collected all over the
country by damins, and was abrogated by al-Nasir Muhammad in 715/
4
1315.
Taxes on ships (jibayat al-marakib): every ship on the Nile
was obliged to give a fixed amount of money, which varied from one
_ 5
ship to another, called muqarrar al-himaya. In reality that sum 
of money was paid by the passengers, the poor and the rich, regard­
less of their financial condition. This tax was abolished by al- 
Na§ir Muhammad in 715/1315.
Moreover, al-Nasir Muhammad annulled many other taxes in the 
same year, 715/l315> such as, firstly dumman tujib in Egypt which
^Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nu.jum, ix, 47.
2
Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol.8la; Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, part I, 
159; Nujum, ix, T f T  ----- — ^
^Malik, fol.8la; Thamin, fol.131a; Suluk, ii, 151; Khitat, i, 
part I, 159; Nujum, ix, 4-7.
L
Malik, fol. 8la; Tadhkirat, fol.68a; Thamin, fol.131a; Suluk, 
ii, 151-152; Khitat, i, part I, 159; Nujum," ix, 47.
^Suluk, ii, 152; Khitat, i, part I, 159-160; Nujum, ix, 47. For the 
term himaya, see an article by Cl. Cahen in E.I., iii, 394 (2nd ed.).
^Malik, fol.Sla; Tadhkirat, fol.68a; Suluk, ii, 152; Khitat, 
i, part I, 159-16(7; TTLrfCTrfr, ix, 47.
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referred to the taxes levied by damins from slaves (*abid) and
slave girls (jawarl)who were prostitutes.'*" Secondly, kashf
2marakib al-Nuba which v;as similar to the above tax. Thirdly,
shadd al-zu*ama*, and huquq al-sudan which are, unfortunately, not
-  3 -explained in detail by the Mamluk historians. Fourthly, fouquq
al-qaynat: this was a tax which used to be collected by muhtar al-
4tashtikhana from the prostitute (baghaya). Sometimes we see that al-
Na§ir Muhammad abolished a tax which had already been abolished by
him a few years earlier; seemingly these taxes had been re-introduced
either because the state was in need of money in a time of war,
famine, or high prices, or because al-Na$ir Muhammad, for the sake
of his. popularity, re-introduced the abolished taxes in order to be
able to abrogate them a second time.
Muqarrar al-masha*iliyya was payable on permits for the
cleaning of public baths, houses, schools and other buildings. The
owner of the building was not allowed to remove rubbish from any
building belonging to him without the presence of a tax farmer
(flamin) who used to give permission for collection and impose high
taxes. Fortunately this tax was repealed by al-Nasir Muhammad in
715/1315. He also abolished in the same year a tax which was paid
by the engineers (muhandisun) and chiefs of police (wulat al-
— 6aqalim); it was called mutawaffir al-jararTf.
~*~Malik, fol.8la; Suluk, ii, 152; Nu.jum, ix, 48.
o _
Suluk, ii, 152; Khitat, i, part I, 160; Nu.jum, ix, 48.
~Z
Suluk, ii, 152; Nujum, ix, 48.
4Jawahir, fols. 235a~b; Suluk, ii, 152; Khifrat, i, part I, 160; 
cf# Nujum, ix, 48.
5
Durr, ix, 286; Suluk, ii, 152; jOiitai^ , i, part I, 160; Nujum, ix, 48. 
^Malik, fols, 80b-8la; Suluk, ii, 15?;. Nujum, ix, 48.
Other taxes were abrogated by al-Nasir Muhammad in 715/1315
such as tax on the price of wollen cloaks (thaman al^aba^a)
_ _ 2tax on travellers (zakat al-rafrhala) and tax on grooms (rikwat
_ x
al-suwas).
Moreover, al-Na§ir Muhammad also repealed in 715/1315 qawad 
al-khayl, 'idad al-nakhil, muqarrar al-manashir, the payment for 
the dead or absent person. But there is no further detail re­
specting the abolition of the above taxes in the contemporary sources
Other taxes of less importance were abolished by al-Nasir Muhammad
— — — 5in 715/1315. For example, jinayat al-shasha, shadd al-feukkam,
tax on animal skins (qata’i* al-‘urban), tax for protection on 
roads (daman al-tariq), salt tax (daman al-milh), and tax for 
beekeepers (huquq al-nahhalin).^
It seems that al-Nasir Muhammad exerted every conceivable 
effort in order to fulfil a long series of abolitions regarding 
local taxes either in cities like Fusfat and Cairo, or in districts 
and provinces in Lower Egypt and in Upper Egypt.
According to the Mamluk historians one could understand that 
the people were extremely pleased and grateful when the royal de­
crees concerning the abolition of taxes were announced all over 
Egypt. 7
Apparently this long series of tax abrogation was not confined 
to this period of al-Nafir Muhammad's rule, 715/1315. The Mamluk
^Nihayat, xxx, fol. 91; Barr, ix, 286; Malik, fol.8la; Suluk, ii, 
152: Nujum, ix, kS.
^Nihayat, xxx, fol.91; Malik, fol. 8la; Tadhkirat, fol.68a; 
cf. Suluk, ii, 152.
•^Nu.jum, ix, ^8.
^Durr, ix, 286; Malik, fol. 8la; Thamin, fols. 131a-b.
^1 could not 'trac'e 'the meaning of' these- two- taxes;...............
6l>urr, ix, 286.
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historical sources confirm that further abolition of taxes had
been accomplished by al-Na§ir Muhammad during later years. For
instance, tax on wheat (maks al-qamh), which was repealed by al-
Nasir Muhammad in 720/1320,^" salt tax (maks al-milh)? which was
abrogated in 721/1321, the abolition of which had a remarkable
effect on the price of salt; the price of every irdabb of salt
3
decreased to only 3 dirhams instead of 10 dirhams. Furthermore
the people were allowed to bring salt, for their own use, from
salt works (mallahat) without any kind of obligation or distinction.
Seemingly, depending on the above statement, one gets the
impression that it was forbidden to bring salt from the mallahat
without certain regulations being put into operation. Therefore
as soon as those regulations were cancelled the people set out to
— — 5bring salt from the mallahat. Again in 72^-/1324 we see that al- • 
Nasir Muhammad abolished maks sahil al-ghalla^ which had already
n _
been cancelled in 715/133 5* Apparently al-Nasir Muhammad had
reintroduced that tax during the years 715/1315-72^/132 ,^ either
to provide money, or for the sake of the Copts who were considerably
g
interested in keeping that tax for personal reasons. Here it 
^Tadhkirat, fol. 76b.—r— --
p
Suluk, ii, 203; Nu.jum, ix, 62.
^Suluk, ii, 203; Nujum, ix, 62.
k
Suluk, ii, 203.
^Ibid.
f
Tadhkirat, fol. 8la.
7
Supra, 250,
g
Nujum, ix, 5^.
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might be worth noting that in the same year 72^/132^, al-Nasir
Muhammad abolished maks safril al-ghalla in Syria, besides a large
number of other taxes. 1 Moreover, other taxes in al-Hijaz were
cancelled by al-Nagir Muhammad in the years 719/1319 and 722/1322
2
when he was there on a pilgrimage.
3
Thus it was a comprehensive plan concerning the abolition 
of many taxes carried into effect by al-Nasir Muhammad to achieve, 
probably, many purposes. Firstly, to help his subjects by the 
repeal of those taxes which covered almost everything, and which 
they had to pay under any circumstances * Secondly, to protect 
the people from the maltreatment which they suffered at the hands 
of tax collectors; it was a practical aspect of injustice.
Thirdly, to provide social freedom for the people respecting daily 
life and individual independence. Fourthly, it seems that there 
was also a certain political advantage for which al-Nasir Muhammad 
accomplished this abolition of taxes; it was for the sake of his 
popularity in the eyes of hissubjects.
Ibn Taghri BirdI believes that the abolition of taxes is a 
bold act accomplished by a determined Sultan, al-Nasir Muhammad, 
for the welfare and good of both the people and the state.^ Probably 
by this tax reform al-Nasir Muftammad succeeded in attaining 
popularity among his people. The question arises here, did al- 
Nagir Muhammad fulfil that tax reform to gain popular support, or 
did he want, by means of that deed, to reward his subjects who 
had stood by him many times during political crises which he had
1Mukhtasar, iv, 92; Duwal, ii, l80.
2^8
faced throughout his second reign, and he was still enjoying 
that feeling of approval and support during the period under study? 
Concerning this point, it seems that al-Nasir Muhammad desired to 
achieve two aims. Firstly, to reward the people for the attention 
and help that they had given him. Secondly, al-Nasir Muhammad was 
eager, by that bold and determined act, to have popular support, 
and to cement his privileged position among the Egyptians. Hence 
that was the situation regarding the relationship between al- 
Na§ir Muhammad as a ruler of great power and his people who were 
in great need of his care and protection.
On the other hand, that extensive abolition of different 
taxes accomplished by al-Nasir Muhammad for the purpose of reform 
caused a decrease in State revenue. The question arises here, 
what kind of substitutes was al-Na^ir Muhammad considering for this 
economic situation? It appears that al-Na§ir Muhammad had in mind 
many alternatives for other sources of revenue to fill that financial 
gap.
Firstly, the NasirT rawk: it is imperative here to state
that at the same time as al-Nasir Muhammad began his scheme concern­
ing the tax cancellation in 715/1313* the work regarding the NasirT 
rawk had already been started and, in accomplishing that work 
great changes would occur, both in the amount of State revenue and 
in the assignment of cultivated land. The NasirT rawk will be 
comprehensively studied under the next subtitle, but one might say 
that the making of the NasirT rawk was of great significance for 
the tax reform.
^For details, see Suluk, ii, 66-67* 71; Nu.jum, viii, 173.
^Suluk, ii, 356.
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Secondly, al-Na^ir Muhammad paid much attention to agriculture. 
It appears that he realized the importance of farming and the need
for irrigation, and that is why he worked hard for the cultivation
1 _ 2 of land, to build bridges, and dig channels (qanawat). For
instance, al-Nagir Muhammad paid great attention with regard to
the agricultural land of al-JTza through the cultivation of the
land and irrigation, so he built a causeway (jisr) and an arched
bridge (qantara) in every part, levelled the land and supplied
the field with regular and sufficient irrigation: this work took
two months to accomplish. Large tracts of land were cultivated and
k
planted to establish farms and fields for crops.
Other neglected land in al-Sharqiyya province and in Fuwwa
district was given as iqtaV^ to the a.jnad to be cultivated and
planted according to the iqta* system in the Mamluk Sultanate,
5
and that land gradually became useful agrarian fields. Al-Na§ir 
Muhammad ordered that a dan should be built in al-Sharqiyya to
6supply the cultivated land with enough water throughout the year.
_ 7
Consequently, the kharaj of al-Sharqiyya increased greatly.
^For details concerning building bridges, see Subfo, iii,
Khitat, i, part II, 179-lSO; Nujum, ix, 190.
^Nujum, ix, 190.
3Ibid.
Zf
Ibid.
5
Nujum, ix, 191.
c
Ibid., ix, 191-192.
^Ibid. , ix, 192.
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Unlimited care was paid by al-Na§ir Muhammad to cultivation 
in JazTrat al-Fil, and every part of Egypt was provided, according 
to his royal command, with a sufficient number of embankments 
(jusur) and canals (tura*), and no place was disregarded by him."*' 
Moreover, al-Nasir Muhammad was eager to visit these different 
places regularly for supervision and attention. He was extremely
2
anxious not to leave any place without reclamation and cultivation.
According to Ibn Taghri Bird!, al-Na^ir Muhammad was deeply
concerned about the reform in every estate, province, district,
town, village and particularly with causeways (.jusur), canals and 
3
dams. According to Ibn Taghri Birdi al-Nasir Muhammad never
forgot that the money of bayt al-mal was, in the main, kept for
help and reformation concerning the economic administration,
k
social structure and building.
In conclusion, the kharaj of Egypt was considerably increased
5
during the period under study. Similar attention was given by al- 
Nasir Muhammad to the cities, the provinces and the villages of 
Syria.
Thirdly, the role which had been played by money in these 
varying circumstances.
The only evidence which could confirm that the value of money 
was of importance with respect to the increase of revenue, is in 
the writing of Ibn Taghri Bird! when he states that in Mu^iarram 72^/ 
December 1323* al-Nasir Muhammad ordered that the people should
~*~Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
^Ibid.
k
Nujum, ix, 192-193.
^Ibid. , ix, 192.
use fulus (fels-money), in their exchange, in a kind of
rotl (rati) that every rotl of fulus makes two dirhams, and at
the same time he issued a royal order that fulus must be minted
and every fils must equal about one dirham.^  Accordingly 200,000
2
dirhams were minted and distributed among the people.
Immediately afterwards, a royal ordinance was announced
that al-Na^ir Muhammad wanted.to be acquainted every day with the
official paper regarding the income from his personal interests
and property, and the extent of the daily expenditure, which he
3
wanted to supervise.
Depending on the above statement, one might say that there 
was a lack of confidence concerning the relationship between al- 
Na^ir Muhammad and his own civil servants (mubashirun), as well
i
as his desire to be his own master concerning the financial admini­
stration. According to Ibn Taghri Bird!, great amounts of money 
were obtained in consequence of the preceding orders commanded by
k
al-Na§ir Muhammad.
On the other hand, the clerks of the dawawin were extremely
distressed by the loss of money which they had suffered by handling
_ 5
the Sultan's affairs by unlawful methods.
It seems that there were some indications of mismanagement 
and maladministration in the field of finance and taxation; al- 
Na§ir Muhammad, knowing about this corruption, tried as much as he 
could to reform the bad aspects and to exterminate the roots which
~*~Ibid. , ix, 77; see also Suluk, ii, 233.
2 * fNu.jum, ix, 77; cf. Suluk, ii, 253; E.Ashtor,MDebat sur lfevolution 
economico-sociale de l tEgypt a la fin du moyen hge, a propos del1 
d'un livre recent", J.E.S.H.O., xii, 102-109 (1959).
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might cause any kind of incorrect behaviour in the different
fields of administration.
Fourthly, it appears that al-Nasir Muhammad was not satisfied
with what he had achieved by extensive aoolition regarding taxes
on people of different professions and of varied social categories,
and he worked to remove the offices whose holders had collected
those different taxes either lawfully or by force and injustice.
To fulfil his intention, al-Nasir Muhammad abolished the offices of
the controller of the province (nazar-nazir), and the office of account-
1
ant of finances in the provinces (’istifa’-mustawfi).
It is apparent, however, that a royal decree 
was issued by al-Nasir Muhammad concerning the abolition of the 
offices of the province controller and the finance accountant in 
the provinces. Thereafter that ordinance was put into action in
all the provinces and the districts of Egypt, except tnose in
_ 2
which the Sultan had personal interests. Thus the peqole in Egypt
became free from the daily injustice relating to tax collection
which they had suffered at the hands of administrators (mubashirun),
................  3 ..................  h ......................
controllers (nuzzar), accountants (mustawfun) and cVneJ[s °1 
?oV\ce (wulat).5
Thus, by fulfilling the four factors, the NasirT rawk, the 
cultivation of land, the reform concerning the evaluation of money, 
and lastly the abolition of some important offices in the financial, 
administrative and taxation fields, it seems that al-Na^ir Muhammad 
would be able to make substitution for the decrease of State income
^Jawahir, fol. 131b; Suluk, ii, 133; Khitafr, i, part I, 160; Nu-jum, 
ix, 48.
2
~Suluk, ii, 133; Khitat, i, part I, 160; Nujum, ix, 48; infra.
^For.the,office of,province nazar for financial and tax affairs, see 
Nihayat, viii, 299-300.
ifFor the office of province mustawf.i for collecting taxes, see Nihayat, -
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which might he the result of the tax repeal. Furthermore, it 
might he worth stating that al-Nasir Muhammad achieved these 
imperative reforms after a considerable passage of time, about 
six years, of his third reign. In other words, al-Na§ir 
Muhammad began this essential series of reforms when he was 
assured that his political position and diplomatic power would 
not be affected by that fundamental change, and the new policy 
concerning the privy purse and the public treasure on one hand 
and the strong Mamluk oligarchy in the economic administration 
on the other hand. Thus, being certain of a strong foundation from 
the political pant of view, and confident of his strong will, al- 
Nasir Muhammad continued with his reforms and changes in that 
field of activity with undaunted energy, as if he was sure that 
M s  great deeds would be crowned by success.
(iii) The irasiri rawk.
The ITa^iri rawk wMch was inaugurated by the royal orders in
Sha'ban 713/November 1313 was the second rawk in the Mamluk sultan-
1 _ _ 2ate, the Husarni rawk being the first.
It seems that al-Nasir Muhammad wanted to know the exact 
extent of Egyptian land. On the other hand, it appears that M s  
main object was to strengthen M s  position by two means, firstly 
by weakeMng the powerful condition of the Mamluk emirs by decreas­
ing the extent of their iqta*s; secondly, by cementing M s  power
viii, 301-303.
5 ___
For the office of district wall who had to supervise the accomplish­
ment ofthe taxation system, see Nihayat, viii, 298.
1Malik, fol. SOb.
• ^ For the Piusami rawk., see Zubdat, fols. 198b-199"b; Suluk, 1 ’ 8*fl-
• 8b6 ;- Nfitat, i».part I, .1371 T^bie; op.,cit„, .32-33..............
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by increasing the size of the Sultan’s iqta* khass. To accomplish
the above plan, a new reassignment of the iqtacs was necessary.
Thus, according to the data contained in the writings of the Mamluk
historians, the Nasiri rawk became a step of great significance.'*'
In the last ten days of Shacbah 715/Noverober 1315 al-Nasir Muhammad
2
ordered the rawk to be started. The Mamluk historical writings
confirm that al-Nasir Muhammad was eager to decrease the profit of
_ 3 —the iqta* land in money (khubz) of the Mamluk emirs belonging to
the previous powerful governors, Baybars al-Jashnakir and Sayf al-
4 'Din Salar. That is to say, the Nagin rawk had a personal purpose
greatly desired by al-Na^ir Muhammad, probably to consolidate his
own position politically and economically. The evaluation of khubz
—  5 6was between 800 and 1,000 mithqal for every Mamluk yearly. Al-
Maqrizi states that it was between one thousand dinars and eight
7
hundred dinars for every Mamluk annually.
However, it seems that al-Nasir Muhammad found this re­
assignment unjust or unfit for his changing situation as the supreme 
power in the Mamluk Sultanate during the period under consideration. 
Therefore al-Nasir Muhammad thought to deprive those emirs of their
khubz by force, but he postponed his intention for fear of dissension 
8and civil strife.
^Nu.jum, ix, 42.
^Durr, ix, 285; Malik, fol. 80b; Nahj, iii, 255; Suluk, ii, 146; 
Khitat, i, part I, 157; Nu.jum, ix, 42; Husn, ii, 300.
For the term khubz, see Poliak, "Some Notes on the Feudal System
of the Mamluks'’, J.R.A.S. (1937)1 p.99? In. 6.
Suluk, ii, l46; Nujum, ix, 42; cf. Pabie, op.cit., 53.
5 _
Mithgal is 4.25 (4.25720 grams, 13 ounces, see W. Popper, loc.cit.
6Suluk, ii, 146; cf. Nujum, ix, 42.
7
Khitat, i, part I, 137.
^SulHk, ii, 146: Khitat, i, part I, 157; Nujum, ix, 42.■ '  * m m ,  rr ■ --\i . .r -
2o3
Consequently al-Nasir Muhammad, according to the advice of 
Fakh \r al-DIn Muhammad b. Fa$l Allah, head of the army department 
(na^ir al-.jaysh), issued his royal command concerning the rawk of 
the Egyptian land.'*' In order to fulfil the royal ordinance many emirs
were sent to different provinces and districts to start this work;
—  _  _  2
for instance the emir Badr al-DIn Jankall b. al-Baba (d.746-1343)
who was sent to al-Gharbiyya, with Aqul al-Hajib and the scribe 
- 3Makln al-DIn Ibrahim b. Qarwyna. Another deputation was despatched
to al-Sharqiyya, the emir Aydqmur al.Khafclrl (d. 738/1337)» Aytamush
al-Mutiammadl (d. 733/1332)^ and the clerk Amin al-DIn Qarmut.^ To
al-Manufiyya, in Lower Egypt, and to al-Bu^ayra, the emir Balban
al-Sarkhadl (d. 7 3 0 / 1 3 2 9 ) Turn^ay al-Qulunjiql, Muhammad b. Turn-
8tay and Baybars al-Jamdar. Another delegation was sent to Upper 
Egypt.
In order to keep in touch with these emirs, and to have personal 
supervision, al-Na§ir Muhammad himself went to Upper Egypt and spent 
tv.o months there.^ Immediately these emirs, clerks and land
^"Suluk, ii, l46; Khitat, i, part I, 137; Nu.ium, ix, • 1
CO-0”
2Supra, 84, 1S6.
■Z
Suluk, ii, 146; Khitat, i, part I. 137; Nu.jum, ix, 42.
Zf
For his biography, see Durar, i, 429.
■^Supra, 106.
6
Suluk, ii, 147; Khitat, i, part I, 138; Nu.ium, ix, 42._
7
For his biography, see Durar, i, 494.
o
Suluk, ii, 147; Khitat, i, part I. 138; Nu.ium, ix, 42.
^Suluk, ii, lzf7; Khitat, i, part I, 138; Nu-jum, ix. 43.
^Malik, fol. 80b; Suluk, ii, 49; Khitat, i , part I. 138; Nu-jum, ix, 43
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surveyors began their work in all the Egyptian provinces and 
districts.Every group started by immedia.te meetings with the 
grand shaikh (shaykh) of the province, the guides (dalils), 
the brokers, the surveyors and the judges, to study the records 
of every province. Subsequently they had to know the extent 
of the province or the district ±1 faddan, its yield, its *ibra;
A
a term used in Mamluk Egypt to signify the weight of the
a
dirhams collectively, after making divisions of them, and the
share of every one of the troopers (a.jnad) in money, in crops,
3
and in livestock. They also had to survey the area and many
2f
copies were written. Similar surveys were carried out in every 
part of Egypt, so that it was easy at the end to differentiate
between the khass of the Sultan, the iqta*s of the ernirs and
5 _
of the troopers. Lastly, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad, Controller
of the Army, being supplied with all the lists concerning almost 
everything of that local survey and field work, had a meeting 
with As1ad b. Amin al-Mulk TaqI al-DIn (d. 7l6/l3l6) the Con­
troller of financial bureaus (nagir al-dauila) to assign certain
_ 7 •
areas of the important provinces and cultivated land to the Sultan.
8 (<When the making of the rawk, being completed; cadastral survey of
^Suluk, ii, 149; Khitat, i, part I, 158; Nu.jum, ix, 43.
2 _The function of dalil in Mamluk Egypt is to give the names of the
farmers of the cultivated land, which would be measured, see Suluk, 
ii, 1^9) fn.3.
^Suluk, ii, 149; Khitat, i, part I, 158; Nu.jum, ix, 43.
^Zettersteen,64; Nah.j, iii, 255; Malik, fol. 80b; Suluk, ii, 149;
Nu.jum, ix, 43.
^KMtat, i, part I, 158; Nu.jum, ix, 43.
6Eor his biography, see Durar, i, 359.
^Durr, ix, 286; Suluk, ii, 149-150; Khitat, part I, ,15.8;, Nu.jum, ix,, 43.,
^In 711/1511 the first Syrian rawk had been accomplished by order of 
al-Nasir Muhammad, see Jawahir, fol. 226b.
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the Egyptian land and the redistribution of land between the khagS 
and the emirs iqtaks; al-Na§ir Muhammad began to put into action 
the final step concerning the completion of the rawk.^  Consequently 
the *ipra of Upper Egypt was 6,223,433 dinars jayshi, and the *ibra
_ -x
of Lower Egypt was about 3i333»808 dinars .jayshi.
Figures found in the Kitab al-tuhfa al-saniyya by Ibn al-
Jl'an indicate that the data provided by the Nasirl rawk were
copied, without modification, from its registers, until the end
4
of the fifteenth century or even later.
In Dhu *1-Hijja 713/April 1316 al-Nagir Muhammad held court
to distribute the authorisations of assignment (mithalat) to the
_ 5
emirs, the officers of the halqa and the a.jnad respectively. The
Mamluk assignment, denoted as iqta*, khubz, or mithal, was a
source of revenue temporarily conceded by the state to a horse-
soldier or emir and bringing an average yearly income corresponding
to his military grade.^
Having everything ready, al-ha^ir Muhammad accomplished the
distribution of iqta*s according to a strict organized method that
every two emirs . . of the first grade.(muqaddami al-halqa) ........
had a day to receive with the troops, under their supervision,
 7
their mithalat. On that day al-Nasir Muhammad used to call every
n
^In 713/1313 al-Nasir Muhammad issued his second royal decree concern­
ing the rawk of the Syrian land (al-rawk al-Shaml) which had been 
completed within a few months. For details, see Suluk, ii, 127.
Subsequently there was a rawk in Aleppo in 723/1323- Nor details 
see Suluk, ii, 264.
2Saniyya, 3.
"'ibid. , 4.
4
Rabie, op.cit., 33*
■^ Durr, ix, 286; Nahj, iii, 233; Malik, fol. 80b; Suluk, ii, 13^;
Nujum, ix-, 31-
^Poliak, Feudalism jn Emypt, Syria, Palestine and the Leoanon 1230—I;) 00, l8. 
7Suluk, ii, 134; Khitat, i ,• part I±, l'6l; iiiiiliii’ 3x, 31-
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mugfra* by his name to ask him about his origin, his social position,
his experience and even about the small things concerning the status
of the muqfra* in the state."'" According to Ibn Taghri Birdi the
distribution of the mithalat v/as of great importance in throwing
light on the personality of al-Na§ir Muhammad that he was knowingly
aware of military affairs of the Mamluk army, and cognisant of the
2
social condition of his subjects. Besides al-Na§ir Muhammad was 
keen to forbid the recommendation of a mugfra* by any emir. He 
wanted to prevent patronage by any but the Sulfran and he was ex­
tremely careful to warn the emirs not to turn the mithalat handed 
3
to them. That careful personal investigation was also followed
by al-Na§ir Muframmad with his royal Mamluks and troops (*asakir)
to ascertain the name of the Mamluk, his origin, his former owner,
the date of his arrival in Egypt, his participation in battles, his age
_ Zf
and the length of time which the Mamluk had been at fribaq. If the
_  5
Mamluk were honest, he would be justly rewarded} Furthermore, al-
Nasir Mufriammad allowed the old Mamluks or troopers to choose be­
tween khubz or a yearly pension, about 3,000 dirhams, except the 
disabled troopers wno were obliged to accept the yearly pension 
without choice.^
"'"Suluk, ii, 15^; Khifrafr, i, part I, 15^; Nujum, ix, 51.
2 _
Nujum, ix, 51; see also Suluk, ii, 15^.
•^Malik, fol. 80b; Nujum, ix, 5^.
^Suluk, ii, 155; Khifrafr, i, part II, l6l; Nujum, ix. 52. (The
term fribaq, pi. fr abaci a, is a military camp in the Citadel of Cairo 
where the young Mamluks used to be trained and taught)see Suluk, 
ii, 156, fn.2.
^Suluk ii, 155; Nujum, ix, 52.
6 _
Suluk, ii, 156; Khifrafr, i, part II, l6l; Nujum, ix, 52.
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Thus, at the end of the distribution in Mu^iarram 7l6/March 
1316, which lasted about a month, al-Nagir Muhammad succeeded 
in saving 200 iqta*s~} Concerning the large iqta*s of the troopers 
belonging to Baybars al-Jashnakir, Sayf al-Din Salar and other emirs 
who had acted against al-Nagir Muhammad, these i q t a * s were cancelled 
and added to the Sultan's privy purse (al-khasg) . 2
Subsequently every emir was clearly informed that if he re­
turned his mithal or complained acout it he would be beaten, im­
prisoned and deprived of his khubz. In addition, all the Mamluk
emirs were forbidden to speak with the Sultan about any matter 
concerning the condition of any trooper or Mamluk and related at
3 _ - kthe same time to the rawk. Consequently, ten qirats of Egyptian 
land, which was divided into twenty-four qirats, became iqta* khass 
for al-Nagir Muhammad, while the rest, fourteen qirats, were re- 
assigned as iqta*s to the Mamluk emirs and the troopers (a.jnad).
The parts belonging to the Mamluks of Baybars al-Jashnakir, the 
Burjiyya, such as JTza province, al-Kawm al-A^ imar, Manfalut, al- 
Marj and al-Khusus, became part of the khasg.
Apparently neither the emirs nor the ajnad were pleased with 
the distribution of the iqfra*s and they earnestly desired to speak 
to al-Nasir Muhammad about this matter but they were afraid of his 
anger and vividly remembered the trouble they would face if they dared
^Malik, fol. 80b; Khitat, i, part II, l6l; Nujum, ix, 53.
2 _Suluk, ii, 156; Khitat, i, part II, l6l; Nujum, ix, 53.
^Suluk, ii, 156; Khitat, i, part I, l60; Nujum, ix, 5^.
^^Lrat is of any unit, see W. Popper, op.cit., 36.
K M  tat, i, part I, l60.
^Suluk, ii, 1531 158; Khitat, i, part I, l60: part II, l62.
«—» >■!■■■■■ ■ f i r " ? .  > ■«■■■■
270
to pronounce one word.'*" Hence one might say that the cadastral
survey and the resulting distribution of assignments which were
made in about five months, showed significant changes and proved
that the primary aim of al-Nagir Muhammad in accomplishing this
bold and determined act, the rawk, was to consolidate his own
position in the state; besides the revenue of the Mamluk Sultanate
was reorganized to the advantage of the Sultan. Moreover, the
gift (al-hadiyya) imposed on the inhabitants of every province
and district for the welfare of the mugta* and the ,jawali tax
were included in the yield of ~each iqta*. Furthermore, al-Nasir
Muhammad granted portions of different villages instead of a whole
village, and small portions of several scattered villages instead
of a great portion of a single village; all this had been done
for the purpose of weakening the power of the Mamluk emirs and in-
3
creasing their expenses. In addition, the jiyafa imposed on the 
farmers (fallahun) was calculated in the ibra for each iqta .
It seems that a number of the provinces which became a part
of the khass did not become subject to the cadastral survey of
5 6 _ 7the Nagiri rawk, such as al-JTza, al-Kawm al-A^imar and al-khugug,
all in Upper Exjypt. The only reason for this, probably, was that 
al-Nasir Muhammad wanted to put those powerful parts under his com­
mand and for his own purse, to strengthen his political position
^Suluk, ii, 156-157; Khitat:, i, part II, 162-163; Nujum, ix, 5^-55.
^Khi^af, i, part I, l60: part II, l6l.
'^ Khi'tat, i, part I, l60. 
k
Suluk, ii, 150.
^Saniyya, 138.
^Ibid., lAl.
7 Ibid.-, 185..........................................................
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in upper Egypt, fearing that the Mamluk emirs might use this 
large part for aggressive revolt against al-Nasir Muhammad.
(iv) Conclusion
Through the preceding study concerning the tax reform and 
the new cadastral survey of the Egyptian land, the impression is 
that al-Nagir Muhammad's third reign was a brilliant period in 
Mamluk histoiy. Al-Nasir Muhammad initiated the first half of 
the fourteenth century's prosperity by reorganizing the state 
finances. The Egyptians generally enjoyed economic security. The 
tax reform and the reorganization of State finance served to con­
centrate control of the Mamluk emirs and the tax revenues in the 
hands of al-Nasir Muhammad.
The taxation system was organized by al-Nasir Muhammad to 
be closely tied to political considerations. In reality the policy 
which had been practised in making the Nasiri rawk was of active 
military responsibilities respecting especially the a.jnad. In 
both a military and social sense the tax reform and the NagirT 
rawk was against the greed of the officials, and at the same time 
to rebuild the disorganized economic structure. The fundamental 
reasons for those agricultural, economic and administrative functions 
were to augment the financial resources of the Sultan, to strengthen 
his political position at the expense of the emirs, and lastly to 
attain popular support for him. Probably the tax reform by al-Nagir 
Muhammad was a bold effort for the welfare of the population. His 
efforts as a determined Sultan continued to minimise the political 
and economic positions of the emirs and officials to be less effective 
and to be more tied to the central government by direct regulations, 
by effective control of their i q ta * s, and to put them under strict
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lawful supervision, all for the greater advantage of the Sultan.
Seemingly the people became no longer under the yoke of 
abuses and forced taxes. Besides the changed circumstances gave 
the people the opportunity of direct appeal to justice for protection 
and for a lower cost of purchases. In addition, it became impossible 
for the Mamluk emirs to acquire personal control over the general 
economy of any village or to put the people at the mercy of their 
demands and their greed. Al-Nasir Muhammad's fiscal policy could 
be regarded as the turning point in ending that series of monopolies 
accomplished by the Mamluk emirs at the expense of the peqle and 
in reinforcing the dominant position of the Sultan.
Thus the reorganized structure of taxation served to better 
the local status of the people and to validate that situation in 
finding a socially and financially suitable aspect of freedom.
Probably there were many other factors which helped al-Na§ir Muhammad 
to put his fiscal plan into action andielated, at the same time,, 
to the entire condition of the Sultanate, the political stability, 
the well organized society, the active and flourishing economy, 
the immense revenue of the State, the controlled bureaucracy, 
the fabulous standard of living and lastly, the loyalty to al-Nasir 
Muhammad's power. Besides, it might be worth noting that al-Nasir 
Muhammad enjoyed political advantage through that long series of 
tax abrogations. Seemingly, it was for the sake of his popularity 
that al-Nasir Muhammad carried out this abolition of taxes. Probably 
it is worth noting that the deeds accomplished by al-Na§ir Muhammad 
in 715/1315 concerning the taxes which used to be levied from differ­
ent sources, even immoral ones,have social significance in throwing 
some light upon the personality of al-Na$ir Muhammad and his attitude 
towards Islam as a faith and law for co-operative and respectable life.
Chapter VII 
FAMINES AND EPIDEMICS
(i) Famines and epidemics before al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign
In discussing the role of famine in Egypt between 709/1305 and 
7^0/13^1 it is imperative to study the diseases which.occurred there 
in various degrees of intensity during the period under consideration, 
for it is difficult to study one of these connected aspects without 
throwing some light on the other. On the other hand, although the 
third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad did not suffer exhaustively from 
these two phenomena, the period was of the greatest importance be­
cause of the care taken for the sake of the country in dealing with 
these factors. But it is important to follow the historical steps 
concerning events in these matters before giving any kind of judg­
ment. Moreover, it might be important to understand the status of 
the Mamluk historians in discussing these aspects of life. For 
example, the famine which happened between 69^/129 -^ and 696/1296  
had a deep effect on the stability of the Mamluk Sultanate as the 
price of every irdabb of wheat went up to one hundred and twenty 
dirhams while the normal price wa.s twenty five dirhams.^  The price
continued to increase until ’’one irdabb of wheat became one hundred
2
and sixty dirhams". Obviously the price of an irdabb of wheat 
increased six-fold.
^Turkiyya, fol. 20b; Muluk, viii, 199; Jawahir, fol. 209i>;
Suluk, i, 813; Ighathat, 33; Nujum, viii, 57.
2 _
Nujum, viii, 57; cf. Suluk, i, 813; Ashtor, Histoire des prix 
et des salaires dans 1'orient medieval, 295.
2 7k
Date Product Normal price Temporary increased price
694/1294 wheat 25 dirhams'*' 150 dirhams^
barley about 15 " 5 100 **
beans about 10 M ^ 110 11 8
695/1295 wheat - 190 n 7
barley - 120 11 8
beans - 120 11 9
Immediately after this increase in prices which still con-
tinued^disease spread all over Egypt in a frightful way so the
number of dead became thousands per month. This disaster, which
happened in Egypt during the Sultanate of Kitbugha (694-696/1294-
1296), could be considered one of the most influential events
11concerning the annual overflowing of the Nile, disease,which 
occurred through lack of food, the rise in prices and the greed of
^Nujum, viii, 97; cf. Ashtor, op.cit., 293.
^Jawahir, fol. 59\>; Turkiyya, fol. 20b; Suluk, i, 8l0; cf. Muluk, 
viii, 199; Ighathat, 33. .
3Cf. Suluk, ii, 813-814; Ashtor, op.cit., 301.
^Jawahir, fol. 39b; Turkiyya, fol. 20b; cf. Suluk, i, 813;
Ighathat, 33.
5Cf. Suluk, i, 813; Ighathat, 33; Ashtor, loc.cit.
Ighathat, 33.
7
Ighathat, 33; cf. Jawahir, fol. 39b.
o
Jawahir, fol. 39b; Ighathat, 33; cf. Suluk, i, 813.
^Jawahir, fol. 39b; Mul.uk, viii, 208; cf. Suluk, i, 8l3> Ighathat, 34 
^°Muluk, viii, 208; Ighathat, 33; Nujum, viii, 57.
VI lor more details, see Turkiyya, fol. 20b; Muluk, viii, 199-212;
' Jawahir-, fols-. 209a*-b; Suluk , ■ i, 8l4-8l5;• Ighathat, 31-38;..........
Nu.jum, viii, 57.
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the merchants.^
Lastly, Kitbugha ordered that all the poor people should
be divided among the rich emirs to be cared for and supported.
Accordingly, some of the emirs had to feed one hundred poor people,
others had to take care of fifty, feeding them either with meat or
cakes according to the social position of every emir in the Mamluk 
2regime.
The question which might be worth answering here is in re­
gard to the stand of the Mamluk historians towards this event. It 1 
seems that the Mamluk historians mostly agreed that the decrease
in the annual inundation of the Nile was the cause of this extensive 
3
famine.
Later, in the year 700/1300, an indirect and limited famine 
occurred; this was during the second reign of al-Nasir Muhammad 
when the cattle in all parts of Egypt were wiped out by epizootic 
(waba*). This had a deep effect on the economic life in the Mamluk 
kingdom in that the price of money became very high and the prices 
of food went up. But, unfortunately, Ibn AbT al-Fajla’il does 
not give details respecting the effect of this limited famine upon 
the society.
k few years later, in 706/1306, Ibn Iyas mentions another rise 
in prices when he states that there were decreases in crops with a 
high level of prices and that the people became worried, especially
1Ighathat, 33, 36.
2Ibid., 3 .^
•^Turkiyya, fol. 20b; Muluk, viii, 199* 209; Jawahir, fol. 209a; 
Suluk, i, 817.
if
Nah.n, iii, 30-
2 ?6
when the price of a flat loaf of bread (raghif) became one silver 
dirham. But luckily, after a short time, the situation returned 
to normal.^ This statement gives us an understanding of the 
importance to the people of finding food in the markets at normal 
prices; any change, however small, could cause great worry to 
the people and could deeply affect the exchange of goods in the 
markets. Besides, it seems that the political trouble which 
emerged as an obvious result of the conflict which continued be­
tween Baybars al-Jashnakir and Sayf al-DTn Salar could be considered 
as a helpful factor in the fluid situation of 70S/l3>06.
(ii) Historical analysis of trouble periods
However, it seems that the internal affairs concerning this 
subject during the period between 706/1306 and 709/13091 when Baybars 
al-Mansuri states that the flood of the Nile was late and a few days 
later the level of the water decreased. Immmediately after the
3
price of wheat went high and the people became worried about this. 
Concerning this matter of rise in prices, some historians believe 
that the reason for the rise is to be found in the unstable move­
ment respecting the flood of the Nile, as well as the drought 
which the people had to suffer that year, 709/1309. Consequently, 
the Mamluk emirs, realizing the importance of high costs, refused 
to sell the crops which were already reserved in their granaries,
^Ibn Iyas, Bada’i* al-zuhur, i, 1V7.
^Suluk, ii, 22-26,
^Zubdat, fol. 266a,
/f __
I b i d . :fols. 266a-b; Nuzhat, fol. *fla; Suluk, ii, 35; Nujum, 
ix, 10; May/rid, 56.
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However, Aydamur al-KhafTrT (d. 738/1337^ the steward (ustadar),
ordered his directors to keep a sufficient amount of the crops
in his storehouse for only a year and to sell the rest to the people
2
at a suitable price. It could probably be understood from this
that the Mamluk emirs used to store great amounts of crops in
their granaries until a time of drought or high level of prices,
either to have a supply for themselves in critical times or to sell
3
at an expensive price.
In other words, the natural circumstances of Egypt materialisti­
cally served the greed of the Mamluk emirs in two different ways. 
However, the prices increased regularly so that the price of one
irdabb of wheat became fifty dirhams, and that of an irdabb of barley
4
or of beans twenty dirhams. The normal price of one irdabb of 
wheat at that time was fifteen dirhams and of one irdabb of barley
t
5
ten dirhams. Probably the price of one irdabb of beans was about
five dirhams. Apparently the lack of food in markets and shops
and the higb cost caused disease which diffused among the people
£
in Cairo and in all the provinces of Egypt. Many people died,
7
especially because of the plague, notably the Namluks of the emirs.
Surra.' 265.
2 _Nuzhat, fol. +^la; Suluk, ii, 35.
3
Cf. Lapidus, Muslim cities in the later middle ages, 51-52.
4
Suluk, ii, 55.
^Subfr, iii, H7.
Zubdat, fol. 268b; Nuzhat, fols. A-3b-44a; Suluk, ii., 55.
^Zubdat, fol. 268b; Ashtor, op.cit., 272; Ayalon,"The plague and 
its effects upon the Mamluk army',’ JRAS, 19^ +6, 68.
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Dr. Ayalon believes that the losses caused by epidemics were sus­
tained largely by the Mamluks of the ruling Sultantherefore, if 
we know that the Mamluk state did not experience great epidemics 
during the third reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad we can understand 
that this was an important factor in enabling the Mamluk state to 
attain considerable power in the period under study.
The author of Nuzhat al-Insan notes that in Jumada,. 1,709/
October 1309 the names of abotfc sixty dead were usually registered
every day at diwan al-Mawarith, besides the number of people who
were found dead in the BImaristan, in different parts of Cairo, in
2
the desert and, lastly, in the countryside of Lower Egypt. It 
could be accepted that lack of water, both in the Nile and in the 
ground, caused the lack of crops and the high level of prices. 
Subsequently, hunger and famine spread in every part of Egypt and 
was the direct cause of the plague.
Although there is a lack of information concerning the change 
which may have occurred in the economic and political situation in 
Egypt during the period under study, one might say that the political 
building and the economic structure were affected by the social 
condition. Furthermore, the economic and political life affected 
the temporary status of the Egyptian society during the period under 
review. In order to express our views precisely, we should take 
a brief look at the political position of the Mamluk regime at that 
time. It appears that the Mamluk regime was going through a hard 
spell in its history; it was the time when al-Na§ir Muhammad
^"Ayalon , op.cit^., 71. 
^Nuzhat, fols. 4-3b-V+a.
was very much engaged in preparing for his return to Cairo as
Sultan for the third time, and his own master, while Baybars
al-Jashnaklr (d. 709/1309)“*" was fighting for his life, in the
2
first instance, and his royal power. This situation was deeply 
affected by the critical and social position of the famine and 
the plague. The people connected the two factors and felt that 
the short and fruitless reign of Baybars al-Jashnaklr was the 
reason for the decrease in the inundation of the Nile in that 
year, 709/1309.^
On the other hand, it appears that the crucial state of 
Egypt during the time of the famine and disease affected the 
stability of the political construction so that it became easy 
for al-Na§ir Muhammad to overcome the difficulties which would 
stand in his way to the throne, while it was hard for Baybars al- 
Jashnakrr to face ,'the political problem, the advance of al-Na§ir 
Muhammad from Syria to Cairo, the economic trouble,the famine and 
the plague and the social act against him at the same time.
Furthermore, it seems that the maladministration in the 
offices of the state made the situation of the society worse, 
and greatly affected the political, economic and social affairs of 
the state, for example, the office ofV\cege^ gy*c-y(hiyabat al-Salfana)
Supra, 14.
^Suluk, ii, 32.
•^ Nuzhat, fol. *fla; Suluk, ii, 33; Mav/rid, 36.
bSuluk, ii, 6l, 71.
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Probably the third factor which might have adversely affected 
the unstable position of the society from different points of 
view was the fear of a new Mongol invasion against the Mamluk 
Sultanate.'
Lastly, one might staue that, besides, the natural factor - 
the annual flood of the Nile which could sometimes have a deep 
effect upon the stability of economic life - there were also other 
factors which could be ancillary reasons, if not direct causes, 
for any change that might have occurred in the Mamluk regime.
(iii) The drought and the extra flood
Perhaps it is noteworthy that kasr al-khalT.j which is mentioned 
in most writings of the Mamluk historians as the festival 
which was celebrated when the Nile was at a moderate (mu*tadil)
i
level and not during the difficult time, for example the year 
709/1309.^  The question arises here, what was the function of
kasr al-khalij? And the answer would be that kasr al-khalij was
_ 2
connected with the Nilometer (Maqyas al-NTl ).
The Nilometer was a marble column of eight pieces positioned 
to facilitate the gathering of the waters of the Nile at the time 
of flood. The Nilometer was divided into twenty two parts, each 
part called dhira*; it seems that, in the lower part, or the first 
twelve dhira*, every dhira* was divided into twenty eight pieces,
each piece called igba*, while in the higher part, ten dhira*, each
< <3dhi ra * was divided into twenty four parts, each part called igba .
^Zubdat, fol. 266b; Nuzhat, fol. -^la; Suluk, ii, 33.
p
For more details about Miqyas al-NIl, see Khi£a£, i, part I, 102-10^ 
Husn, ii, 220.
K^hiipat, i, part I, 103.
togY— i 1 .
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It seems that, when the level of the annual flood of the Nile
reached sixteen dhira', kasr al-khalT was carried out, as on
2
official celebration of the flooding of the Nile. During different
period Egypt built several Nilometers but the only one which the
3
Mamluks kept in use was the Nilometer of al-Raw£a. It seems that
the level of the Nile used to rise during the month of June and
continue to rise throughout July and August until reached its
level of "seventy dhira*11 at the beginning of September, when the
waters began to decrease.
The day of the accomplished flood became to be regarded as
an important occasion which all the people were accustomed to 
Zf
celebrate, and the height of the water level used to be announced
5
to the people every day in the streets of Cairo. This data proves 
that it was essential for the people to know the annual flood level * 
of the Nile during the time that it normally occurred, since, if 
the flood came late or was less than the usual level, it meant 
great worry and fear of drought, high level of prices and, lastlyr 
famine, which might bring disease and a period of trouble.
Seemingly, not only drought could cause a period of trouble 
and anxiety,^ but also an increase in the flood level of the Nile 
could be a cause of great damage since the overflow might destroy 
surrounding buildings and nearby towns so that it would be difficult
i* part I, 10^.
2Ibid.
^Khjtat, i, part I, 102-105.
S^ubfcL, iv, 7^-^ -8; Khifrafr, i, part I, 10A-105.
For more details,see Subfr, iii, 297.
^There was such dreadful famine along the eastern borders of ..Syria 
in 7l8/l3l8 that the people ate corpses. See Mir*at, iv, 257; Duwal-, 
ii, 174............................... ' ......... " ................
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to save the inhabitants, as happened in the year 717/1317.1
It is likely that this happened a few years later when the
level of the Nile greatly increased in Sha'ban and Ramadan of 72^/
July-August 132*f. Ibn Kathlr notes that there had not been
such an increase in the level of the Nile for a hundred years,
3
and tnat it was very useful for the land.
Consequently, the preceding historical review helps one 
towards the impression that drought and the unstable political 
situation might influence the economic field; the contrary also 
could be the case if one studies the steady political position 
and normal condition of the flood in 726/1326, where we could 
see that there was a reduction in prices in Egypt, that the price 
of one irdabb of wheat became eight dirhams and that one irdabb of 
barley or beans (ful) was half this price.^ The second factor which 
could be noticed, and is worth noting, is that famine and disease - 
did not always exist in parallel, for one can see the occurrence of 
one without the other, an happened in 727/1327* when disease spread 
all over Cairo in spite of the flourishing economy of the third 
reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad. The third aspect which must be stated 
here is that there was another reason which might effect the economic 
conditions, unrelated either to the Nile or to the political situation. 
This was the state of agriculture in Egypt during the period under
^Bjdaya, xiv, 82.
2
In the same year the. level of prices in Syria was so high that al- 
Nasir Muhammad ordered that wheat should be sent from Egypt to Syria 
immediately; subsequently the price reduced. See Mir*at, iv, 270-271.
•^Bidaya, xiv, 112.
Burr, ix, 320.
^Suluk, ii, 278.
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review, and how any waste or loss in the agricultural field could
have a bad effect upon the economic life of the state, as happened
in 7 2 8 / 1 3 2 7 and again in Ramadan 738/March 1338.^
It seems that there was a high level of prices in Egypt with
a different outcome from what had already occurred in high cost or
famine during the reign under consideration. Probably this started in Jum- 
— — 3ada, II, 733/January 1336 when the price of one irdabb of wheat, 
which a few days before, had been normally priced at fifteen dirhams, 
became twenty, and went on to become thirty and, eventually, seventy
4
dirhams before finally disappearing from the markets. The same
happened to other crops such as beans, because the price of one
irdabb became fifty dirhams and the price of five pounds of bread
had to be one dirham because of the lack of wheat; therefore
matters reached alarming proportions when it was difficult to find
5
bread in any market. Apparently al-Nasir Muhammad, realizing the
aggravation of the problem, especially when he found that the emirs
held a monopoly over crops, sent for an immediate meeting with the
emirs and ordered the Wall,'All b. Hasan al-MarwanT,^ to solve
the matter and ensure that the bakers sell bread at a reasonable 
7
price. Subsequently, the Wall arranged to have four of his assistants 
^Ibid., ii, 300.
p
Zettersteen, 197.
•^Suluk, ii, 398; cf. Ighathat, 39.
Turkiyya, fol. 30b; Suluk, ii, 392, 39^5 ^hathat, 39.
^Suluk, ii, 39^; Ighathat, 39.
6Eor his biography, see Durar, iii, 40-4l.
n
Suluk, ii, 39^; cf. Lapidus, op.cit., 32.
at the door of every bakery for protection, and punished several
bakers for having kept the bread from the people or for selling
1
it at a high price. Furthermore, al-Na^ir Muhammad wrote to the
different Syrian provinces to send at once to Egypt what they had
of stored wheat and, at the same time, a Royal Decree was announced
all over Cairo that no irdabb of wheat was to be sold for more
than thirty dirhams and, if any one acted against the terms of
2
the ordinance, a heavy punishment would be inflicted on him.
It appears that it was for the sake of his subjects that al-Nas'ir 
Muhammad held the meeting with the emirs, asking them to sell what 
they had of wheat in their storehouses according to the lawful 
price already pronounced during the month of Rajab/February, and 
that he did the same during the next month, Sha'ban 736/March 1336.
Seemingly, the order of al-Nagir Muhammad was neither satis­
factory to nor pleasant for the Mamluk emirs; therefore they 
commanded their directors (mubashirun) to hold back what crops 
they had in their granaries and to try to sell part of the stored
crops secretly at a high price, say, sixty or seventy dirhams for 
4
every irdabb. Secretly and successfully the emirs accomplished
their plan, but only for a while. Al-Nasir Muhammad soon heard
5 _
about this. Immediately al-Na^ir Muhammad sent for Diya* al-Din
Yusuf b. Abi Bakr b. Muhammad,^ who was famous for his nobility
~*~Suluk, ii, 394; Ighathat, 39.
^Suluk, ii, 394.
^Ibid.; Ighathat, 39.
4__ _
Suluk, ii, 394; cf. Lapidus, op.cit., 31.
^ Suluk, ii, 394.
6
No biography is found.
of character, appointed him to he the Mufctasib of Cairo, and
2
asked him to be strict in his duty with the errdrs. It seems that 
the nomination of Diya’ al-DTn was of great importance, notably 
when he started checking the granaries of the Mamluk emirs, re­
gistered how many irdabb thej had, gave every emir a sufficient
amount of wheat to last until the time of the next crop, and began 
selling the rest in every granary regularly at a price of thirty
~Z
dirhams for every irdabb. Moreover, in Sha'ban, al-Na$ir Mu&ammad
opened his storehouse and sold his stored wheat at twenty five
k
dirhams for every irdabb.
Subsequently, when the Muhtasib Diya* al-ETn was informed
_ 3 - 6that the directors of the two emirs, Qawsun and Bashtak, had
sold some of the stored wheat in the granaries of the two emirs at 
more than the lawful price, he sent for them, beat them with strong
7
cudgels, and explained the whole matter to al-Na§ir Muhammad. Con­
sequently, al-Na§ir Muhammad was furious and shouted at Qaw§un in 
the presence of other emirs, "How dare you! Do you want to pull 
Egypt apart against me? And how could you act against my decree?" 
Furthermore,. al-Nasir Muhammad insulted and angrily abused Qawsun 
so that none of the emirs dared to speak, especially when al-Na§»ir 
Muhammad asked for the steward (ustadar) of Qawsun, who came at
1
For this post, see Subh, iv, 37.
^Suluk, ii, 39^.
^Ibid., ii, 393.
4
Ighathat, 39.
uMrnJ im m t . I .
Supra, 42.
^ Supra, 154.
^Suluk, ii, 393.
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once,to be severely beaten in Ids presence. In conclusion, one might
record that, starting from that day, no emir would dare to think
'2
of opening his granary without the permission of the mufrtasib.
In addition, when Diya* al-DTn was told that the emir 
3
Tashtamur al-SaqT‘ (d.7^3/13^2) had brought out four hundred
irdabb of wheat from his granary for sale without permission of
the market inspector (muhtasib), the latter warned Tashtamur that,
if he did not take the wheat back to his storehouse, ^dya, al-
DTn would.inform al-Na§ir Muhammad. Hence, it seems that that
warning was enough for Tashtamur al-SaqT to obey the request
of Diya’al-DIn. Moreover, concerning the role of al-Na§ir Muhammad
towards this social trouble, it might be worth noting that he wrote
to the Wu-Lcit- 0f the provinces of Egypt telling them to start
immediately to collect crops in the different parts of the state
and to send them at once to Cairo and ask the owners of those crops
5
to come to Cairo to be paid thirty dirhams per irdabb of wheat.
At the same time, a Royal Order was announced all over Cairo 
that every one who had grain and tried to hoard it would have it 
confiscated. Furthermore, al-Na^ir Muhammad knew that the soldiers 
used to have crops and sell them partly and regularly at meal­
times. but, after the royal announcement, some of the soldiers 
sold what crops they had while others held their stored sheaves
1
Suluk, ii, 393; cf. Lapidus, op.cit., 33.
2Suluk, ii, 393.
^Supra, 130. I 
b
Suluk, ii, 393.
Ibid. , ii, 393-396; cf. Lapidus, op.cit., 32.
^Suluk, ii, 396.
back. However, this was known through some of their colleagues
and they were either plundered by the mob or confiscated by the
Vain. Thereafter, a guard was appointed at the door of every
bakery to witness the quantity of flour which the baker was using
for the daily bread, and to give a report concerning this to the
ValT at the end of every day. Accordingly, it was easy to deter-
3mine the average amount of flour used daily in Cairo. Consequently, 
after this strict investigation, the ValT knew the exact needs of 
every bakery; subsequently, the wheat which had just been collected 
from all over the country was divided between the bakers of Cairo 
according to their needs. Thus, the problem of shortage of bread 
was solved.^
From the above statement it could be understood how a social 
problem connected with the economic life of the monarchy on one 
side, and with the rural and public life on the other, might be 
regarded by some greedy officials as a fruitful opportunity of 
which extreme advantage could be taken. Cn the other hand, it 
shows the extensive administrative discipline in the Mamluk regime 
during the period under consideration. Dr. Lapidus says ’’the 
emirs and even the Sultan himself, however, were rarely content to 
let their revenue depend on the conditions of local supply and de­
mand, but rather sought to control and exploit the grain market
5
for the sake of further profits.u The preceding facts confirm
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the above statement concerning the attitude of the emirs, but the
position of al-Nagir Muhammad, which has already been mentioned,
gives a different impression with respect to his stand during the
times of famine or high prices. Probably, he acted for the sake
of the state and the people and not for his personal revenue.
Apparently, at the end of Rajab 736/March 1336, four thousand
sacks of wheat arrived in Cairo from Syria, and more came from Upper
Egypt jTal-Sh^arqiyya, al-Gharbiyya and al-Buljayra. Besides that,
the owners of crops were personally afraid of the high power and
2
worked to sell their wheat. 'It appears that these subsequent events 
helped to ameliorate the critical situation. Lastly, in RamadSn 
736/April 1336, the new crop came, the prices of different crops
3
were lowered, and the people enjoyed a period of standard prices. 
Immediately.after, the annual inundation of the Nile occurred; 
thus the flood indirectly marked the end of that troubled time.
It seems that the part which was played by al-Na§ir Muhammad 
could be considered as a vivid proof of his sense of responsibility 
for his people, their needs and their convenience. In words and 
power he worked for the sake of his subjects and to solve the prob­
lem of famine. Apparently he ensured that every ordinance issued by 
the Royal Court was practiced by him as well as by his emirs and 
officials of high rank. In addition, al-Nasir Muhammad was strict 
in having his ordinances concerning the famine and its solution 
carried' out,especially by his emirs of high posts, as an example
^Suluk, ii, 396.
^Ibid.
•^Turkiyya, fol. 30b; Ighathat, 39.
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to others of lower classes. Besides, he made much effort to have
all his subjects co-operate without delay to find a suitable
solution for their common problem, and to make them understand
that it was not the problem of the poor people only, but was, in
reality, a problem of the country and its people who should work
with the existing regime for their own good.
However, there is also the stand that al-Nasir Muhammad took
in 733/1338 when a Royal Order, was issued that, at Bulaq, the hollow
between two points on the bank of the Nile should be strongly
dammed to keep the waters from overflowing on to the land to the
east. Great damage could be caused by the strong current of the
Nile during the flood period.^ Also, al-Na§ir Muhammad commanded 
2
al-Khalij al-Kabir to be dug in the middle of the Nile between 
Bulaq and Cairo, from south to rorth, and between JazTrat al- 
Raw£a and the land of al-JTza, from east to west. It seems that 
the main function of thisccwvA. would be to stop the fast flowing 
water from rushing towards Bulaq and causing great destruction.3 
These two precautions taken by al-Nasir's order might be 
regarded as two vivid factors which could clearly illustrate his 
deep care and support for the welfare of the country which he was 
ruling.
(iv) Conclusion.
It appears, as we have already seen, that the period under 
study witnessed many aspects concerning famines and diseases. Hence, 
there must be reasons which might have played a direct and effective
part in the existence of those aspects of life. Firstly the finding
T 1---   — ----- _________
Suluk, 1 1 , 449-450; Nujum, ix, 124-128.
^It is sometimes called Khalij Tvkhur.
^Suluk, ii, 4-30-A31; Nujum, ix, 124-128.
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of the counterfeit money in the markets.'*' Secondly, the maladministration
in internal affairs, as happened in 736/1335. Thirdly, a natural
factor connected with the annual inundation of the Nile, when there
would be either a year of drought or an extra flood which might cause
3
great damage to the agricultural land.
There are also other factors which might have affected the 
economic and social life concerning famines and diseases, such as the 
internal trouble, or the personal struggle between the Mamluk emirs 
and their factional parties, the lack of peace and safety in the 
country, the sudden death of the Sultan and a military defeat of 
the army. These factors could cause a famine followed by extensive 
disease, but this did not occur during the period under consideration. 
However, the factors regarding counterfeit money, the maladministration 
and the flood of the Nile had a deep influence upon the economic and 
social aspects of life during the period under review.
Apparently these factors worked together to cause great 
economic trouble and social worry and the resulting unrestful situation 
could gradually and indirectly cause a difficult time of famine and 
disease. Subsequently, one might say that natural, economic and 
political factors could have extensive effect on the lack of food; 
therefore, high price levels could occur in all parts of the country 
under the Mamluk regime and might lead gradually to famine and dis­
ease aftwards, especially among the middle class and the poor people. 
Moreover, the Mamluk historians did not always care to give a
~*~Suluk, ii, 392. See also Rabl', The financial system of Egypt, 189-197. 
2&uiuk, ii, 381, 382, 385, 390-391, 393-394.
3 _
Nujum, ix, 10.
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sufficient analysis of famines and diseases which occurred 
during the period under study. It seems also that the political 
structure might be deeply influenced by the economic condition.
Besides, any change occurring in the economic field might have 
a remarkable impression on the political and social aspects.
It is also because of the factors previously mentioned 
that the economic condition was unstable, therefore the Mamluk 
emirs, realizing the reality of the situation, worked to obtain 
enough crops in their granaries for times of difficulty. Through 
this the Mamluk emirs could achieve two purposes: to get crops
for their own needs and to sell the rest at a high price. But, 
on the other hand, al-Na^ir Muhammad, understanding the danger’ of 
the whole situation, tried hard to fulfill different functions 
for the sake of his poor people, either by issuing ordinances con­
cerning the limitation of the price of food in the markets to a 
reasonable level for the poor, or by establishing structures affect­
ing the annual flood of the Nile for the purpose of saving inhabited 
areas from destruction. There is also the great care respecting 
qiyas al-Nil at the time of flpod, which could be an effective 
proof of the attention which was paid by the Mamluk government to 
that main source of life.
Lastly, it seems that some reduction in revenue was caused 
by the death of workers and sellers but, on the other hand, the 
effects of famine and disease upon the revenue of the Mamluk regime 
during the third reign of al-Nagir Muhammad were small because of 
the stability and settlement of the economic activities.
In conclusion, it might be worth noting that al.-Nasir 
Muhammad succeeded in building a powerful structure in both the
political and administrative fields so that the famines and 
epidemics which occurred in the Mamluk Sultanate during the period 
under review did not affect what al-Nafir Muhammad worked hard to 
achieve.
Seemingly, al-Nagir Muhammad's third reign was in many ways 
striking, mainly concerning the economic organization, and, of 
al-Na§ir Muhammad himself was perfectly ready.to expend his efforts 
to be efficient and competent in official procedure. Consequently, 
the ruling class succeeded in possessing extensive wealth and in 
proving very familiar with the official routine.
Therefore, the administrative structure and the political 
situation of that reign, which was the most sophisticated environ­
ment of Muslim civilization, were hardly affected by the famines 
and the epidemics of the period under consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
From the fore-going study of the internal affairs of the 
Mamluk Sultanate during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad, 
the following points emerge.
Throughout the regime of the Mamluk Sultans the throne 
tended to go to the strongest contender among the ruling class 
of emirs: a hereditary monarchy was never established. Only
through force of personal prestige was al-Nasir Muhammad able 
to compel the emirs to respect the hereditary principle, and 
then only with difficulty because of the private armies which 
the emirs had at their disposal. Thanks to these private 
forces and to their immense personal wealth, the emirs were 
able, by changing their allegiance from one contender to 
another, in effect to elect and depose the sultans. The fate 
of a deposed Sultan was not usually severe: it might be to
become a provincial governor (as in the case of Kitbu^jja), 
and in the state of permanent rivalry among the emirs it was 
possible for a man such as al-Nasir Muhammad, who combined 
diplomatic and political acumen with military prowess, to 
enjoy power more than once. Political power of any 
significance, then, was normally restricted to the Sultan, 
his vicegerent (an office as dangerous as it was important), 
the emirs, and the Mamluk soldiery (ajnad al-halqa).
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The political role of the Cairene populace was normally 
restricted to celebrating the accession of a new Sultan or the 
deposition of an unpopular one.
Theoretically, the authority of the Sultan came with the 
receipt of the *~ahd of the reigning Caliph, whose role despite 
the pomp with which it was surrounded consisted solely in 
giving a colour of legitimacy to the rule of the Sultan, whose 
virtual prisoner he was. Indeed it seems probable that the 
very survival of the Caliphate was due simply to the desire of 
the Mamluk rulers, even those as powerful as al-Nasir Muhammad, 
for the support which the prestige of the Caliphate could lend 
them. Though the policy of al-Nasir Muhammad for political 
and personal reasons was to prevent the immense prestige of 
the Caliphate from being converted into real political 
influence, he was none the less careful to preserve the 
institution.
The administrative system of the Mamluk Sultanate was 
centralised, the most important administrative departments 
(dawawin) were situated in Cairo. For administrative purposes, 
the country was divided into provinces. Each province was 
under the control of local chiefs of police (wulat al-aqalim). 
of police.. (w~ali) was responsible for the protection of the 
anal from interference, external or internal. Not every *amal,
A chief
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however, had its own wali and some willyat were further sub­
divided into smaller units.
The chief of police in Cairo was responsible for the 
defence of the city and the prevention of crime and political 
agitation. The governor of the city, with a civilian force at 
his disposal, was responsible for the prevention of fires, 
rioting, and the maintenance of public order generally 
(including the enforcement of laws against the manufacture and 
distribution of alcoholic drinks and the cultivation and 
consumption of hashish), Misr (Fustat) had its own governor.
In addition a muhtasib was responsible for the proper conduct 
of markets. The administration of the provinces was super­
vised by two inspectors (Kashifs), for Upper and Lower Egypt 
respectively. The appointment of such officials was carried 
out personally by al-Nasir Muhammad himself. Such 
administrative posts were not necessarily permanent appointments: 
the holder was liable to dismissal, imprisonment, exile or 
execution on the merest suspicion of incompetence or dishonesty.
The key to the understanding of al-Nasir MuhammadTs seemingly 
contradictory policy towards the Mamluks lies in understanding 
that, in order to retain and extend his personal power, he 
deliberately strengthened the position of his adherents and 
steadily enlarged his retinue, but at the same time was ruthless
in destroying any of his supporters *7ho seemed to present a 
personal threat. To this end he was prepared to sacrifice 
friendship, loyalty and devoted service. Besides this, the 
execution of wealthy emirs and the confiscation of their 
property was a useful way of increasing the Sultan's own 
wealth, an end to which al-Nasir Muhammad (who created the 
office of nazar al-khass especially to manage the privy 
purse) was notably devoted. Though he made extensive use of 
the advice of the emirs, and found it politic to give them 
the appearance of power, he was careful to retain real control 
of affairs in his own hands. It must be remembered that 
al-Nasir Muhammad, having twice been Sultan in the past, had 
considerable experience of the power of the emirs and of the 
ways in which it was used. To counter-balance this influence, 
he courted the favour of the populace, and seems as a result 
to have been able to rely on its support. At the same time 
he was able to buy the support of powerful emirs with wealth 
confiscated from other members of their class. However, 
while undermining the power of the emirs, he was careful 
not to do so openly, for fear of the reaction which this 
might provoke. Thus, he pursued a policy of consolidating 
his own position, while fostering the illusion that no major 
re-distribution of political power had taken place.
This combination of determination, ruthlessness and subtlety
enabled him to enjoy absolute power for 32 years. Thus, as a 
result of al-Nasir Muhammad*s intrigues, Egypt and Syria 
enjoyed a long period of political stability during which an 
efficient administration was able to develop and function.
The policies of the Sultan with respect to his humbler 
subjects was characterised by an anxiety to promote the 
prosperity, and to this end he was active in encouraging 
harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim. He was also anxious to 
prevent the development of any mutual grievance between his 
subjects which might be exploited against himself. Thus, while 
favouring the dhimmis more than was strictly required by Muslim 
custom, he was careful to reassure the Muslims that no serious 
change in their relative status was intended. In promoting 
good relations between the various communities he seems to have 
enjoyed a considerable measure of success since we hear of them 
joining in celebrating the festivals of each other’s faiths.
He further secured the loyalty of the dhimmis by cultivating 
friendly political and economic relations with Christian states.
A less tractable problem was that presented by the Juhayna 
and other Bedouin tribes who had settled in Upper Egypt, and 
were intent on living independently of the rest of the country, 
and on setting up their own Sultanate. These Bedouin were a 
constant source of trouble to the Mamluks since they were
always ready to take advantage of the internal troubles of the 
State to assert their independence. By assiduously cultivating 
their friendship, and relentlessly putting down their rebellions, 
al-Nasir Muhammad was able by the latter years of his reign to 
subject the Bedouins to his administration.
In matters of taxation, his policy was one of rationali­
sation and the imposition of central control over the admini­
stration of the iqta* s and of subjecting their allocation more 
closely to considerations of military efficiency. The income 
of the emirs from the sale of agricultural produce (ibra) was 
subject to fluctuation owing to natural causes and also owing 
to neglect and inefficient use of the land. The redistribution 
of the land under the Nasiri rawk went far towards ensuring a 
more economical use of land. Thus, in the case of Kawm al- 
Wadan in Lower Egypt the Cjbra was increased, after the rawk,~ 
from 500 to 800 dinars, while at Tabrina in Lower Egypt, the 
increase in the work-force resulting from the rawk led to an
T —
improvement in ibra from 500 to 750 dinars. It would seem 
that the functioning of the rawk was beneficial to the farming 
community. Evidently the holders of iqta^s had previously 
found the exactions of the State burdensome, while the farmers 
had complained of the treatment at the hands of the emirs and 
of the abuse of their office by tax-collectors. The more direct
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control over the tax-system initiated by al-Nasir Muhammad had 
the effect of eliminating many of the malpractices of minor 
officials and of ensuring easier access to justice for those 
seeking redress for unjust exactions. So successful were the 
reforms that the Sultan was eventually able to abolish certain 
taxes altogether, thus further increasing his popularity with 
the people at large and securing his position.
Thus, though the prosperity of his third reign was not 
however completely untroubled, and the stability of the Mamluk 
state was from time to time threatened by various inter-acting 
natural and social troubles (notably the circulation of counter­
feit money, variations in the annual flooding of the Nile, and 
the outbreak of epidemic disease), nevertheless al-Nasir Muhammad 
succeeded, through the efficiency of his administrative machine 
in stabilising food-prices and preventing the hoarding of grain 
by the emirs to minimise the effects of natural disasters on 
the population.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY
In order to have a just evaluation of the sources consulted 
we cite their authenticity, the list of manuscripts and the reason 
for which these manuscripts were consulted.
The work of Tarikh Salatin Misr wa*1-Sham wa Halab by Ibrahim 
Mughlatay begins with the events of 532/1137. The writer lived 
during this period and was a contemporary of al-Na§ir Muhammad. The 
work relates to the first rule of al-Na§ir Muhammad and concentrates 
on the political movements such as the Ashrafiyya movement against 
the emir Sayf al-Din Kitbugha. Ibrahim Mughlatay lists high ranking 
officials both in the government and in the Mamluk army. He writes 
obituaries of important people. When he speaks of the reign of Lachin 
he concentrates on the activities of the Mamluk army, events of ad­
ministrative importance and the relationship between the Sultan and 
the Mamluk oligarchy. Concerning the second reign of al-Na^ir Muhammad, 
the writer continues the same method with regard to administrative 
changes, political plots and military conflict; however, he mentions 
these matters briefly, especially those movements outside Cairo such 
as the Bedouin revolts. The work is vital for the study of the ad­
ministration of the period.
Mughlatay was careful to mention everyone concerned in the ad­
ministration in Egypt. He mentions briefly the sultanate of Baybars 
al-Jashnaklr and then he comes to the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad. 
It is obvious from his work that he was an eye witness of the events 
which he describes.
From written accounts it is evident that the writer was a 
military commander and that he held this position during the last 
years of al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign.
301
1
d.jL_ *J! !j 4J   ( I LIsj <j I ) I 5
He wrote these accounts in chronological order, stating the facts 
without comment.
He is careful to mention the diplomatic relations between 
other countries in the East and the West,
He refers briefly to the internal reforms in Egypt. The work 
is important to the understanding of the-attitude of al-Na^ir Muhammad 
towards the 'Abbasid Caliphate.
The work ends with the death of al-Na§ir Muhammad in 7^1/13^1 
and the accession of his son, Abu Bakr, to the Mamluk Sultanate.
The work of Shams al-DTn al-Shuja'i, Tcjrlkh al-Sulfran al- 
Malik al-Nasir Muhammad wa-banih begins with the events of the last 
years of the third reign of al-Na^ir Muhammad from the year 737/1336. 
This work concentrates on the events of the Mamluk Sultanate between 
the years 737/1336 and 7^3/13^2 and is important for an understanding 
of the activities of the military within the Mamluk Sultanate and 
outside, for example, in Asia Minor, al-Hijaz and Syria.
The Mamluk chronicles and biographies make no mention of the 
author, in spite of the importance and the precision of his work.
The importance of the work lies in the detailed information 
respecting the central administration in Cairo and the local admini­
stration in the Egyptian provinces. Al-Shuja'T is careful to dis­
cuss with great precision the diplomatic relations between the Mamluk 
Sultanate and the Mongols in Iraq and Persia, Asia Minor and Byzantium. 
Al-Shuja*! gives detailed accounts of the various courts, for example, 
the court of II Khan. From these we deduce Egypt's relationships with
.^fols., 6,lb-62 a.
\
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other countries.
The work is vital to the thesis for the light it sheds on the 
internal reforms within Egypt. It has been of great assistance in 
understanding the relations between al-Nasir Muhammad and the Mamluk 
oligarchy, for example, the relationship between al-Nasir Muhammad 
and the emir Tankiz al-Husami, and also al-Nashu, but not in such 
detail. Al-Shuja'i states that al-Na^ir Muhammad was an astute 
politician and discusses in detail his shrewd methods of dealing 
with the powerful emirs and with the 'Abbasid Caliphs which have been 
studied in detail in the thesis.
Finally, the work is important in clarifying the final stages 
of al-Nasir Muhammad' s reign in 7^1/13^1 and the accession of his 
son, Abu Bakr.
The work of Ibn Fa$l Allah al-'Umari, Masalik al-absar, Paris 
Ms. 2328, is one of the primary sources of information for this 
period because al-'Umari was the confidential secretary of al-Na^ir 
Muhammad, therefore he was able to observe closely all that occured 
at the court, and to handle all vital documents. Al-'Umari mentions 
incidents to which no other chronicler refers and from his writings 
it is evident that he was a supporter of al-Nasir Muhammad. Later 
historians quoted and copied his writings.
Volume IV of Masalik al-absar is an important source of in­
formation concerning the distribution of the Bedouins. Hence this 
work has been of unique value for this thesis, for Chapter VI in 
particular.
Volume II of Masalik al-absar, Paris Ms. 2323, refers to the 
administrative division of Egypt during this period and, therefore, 
was of primary importance for this thesis, particularly for Chapter 
tt The volume contains detailed information about the administrative
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division of Egypt from 715/1315 onwards; therefore no study con­
cerning the administrative division of Egypt during this period 
would be complete without reference to this work.
The work of Zubdat al-fikra fT tarikh al-hijra, by Baybars 
al-Mansuri, begins with the events of the year 655/1257 and ends 
with the incidents of 709/1309; therefore the work is important 
to the subject of this thesis, particularly for the introduction 
concerning the political plots and the periods of usurpation which 
occured during the first and second reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad. 
Besides, it is vital to learn the attitude of the Syrian governors 
towards al-Nasir Muhammad and of his preparations to restore his 
position and to become the sole ruler ofthe Mamluk Sultanate. Con­
sequently, the work is indispensable in order to understand the 
political background of the Mamluk Sultanate at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, especially since we know that Baybars al-Mansuri 
himself was a contemporary Mamluk emir and witnessed the events of 
this period.
The work of Shihab al-Lan A^ irnad b. ' Abd al-Wahhabi Nihayat 
al-arab fi funun al-adab, volume 3 1> is vital with regard to the 
early years of al-Na§ir Muhammad's third reign. It has been of great 
use concerning certain aspects of this period, such as the position 
of the. non-Muslim subjects in the Mamluk Sultanate, which is studied 
in this thesis. This chronicle helps us to study the relationship 
between the non-Muslim subjects and the Muslims, the conflict which 
occured between the two sections and the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad 
towards that situation.
This work has also been important with regard to the political 
situation of the Mamluk Sultanate during this period and the atti­
tude of al-Nasir Muhammad towards the powerful emirs.
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The work of Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, *Uyun al-tawarikh, is im­
portant for this period. This chronicle begins with the events of 
688/1289 during the reign of Qalawun and contains details until his 
death and the accession of his son, Al-Ashraf Khalil, to the throne.
When al-Ashraf was assassinated al-Nasir Muhammad's first 
reign began. Thereafter the chronicle is important for knowledge 
of the; political situation of the Mamluk Sultanate at the beginning 
of the fourteenth century. When Ibn Shakir mentions the internal 
events he provides a political analysis with essential details, and 
presents them in chronological order, i.e. he gives, therefore, 
dates, the most important events of the year, and biographies of the 
people who died in that year, as did al-Maqrizi in his chronicle,
Kitab al-suluk li matrifat duwal al-muluk.
I
Ibn Shakir mentions the reign of Kitbugha and the important 
events, for example, the famine. He also mentions the reign of Lachin, 
who instigated the cadastral survey of the Egyptian land (al-rawk al- 
HusamT). Subsequently, Ibn Shakir records the death of Lachin and , 
the second reign of al-Nasir Muhammad. This was vital as it sheds 
light on the political situation in tne Mamluk Sultanate and on the 
open conflict between the Mamluk emirs.
Ibn Shakir also records the subject of the dhimmis and the atti­
tude of the Mamluk government, against them in the year.700/1300, and 
the position of al-Nasir Muhammad towards the whole event. Ibn Shakir 
also gives details concerning the attitude of al-Nasir Muhammad against 
Sayf al-Ein Salar and Baybars al-Jashnakir.
This chronicle.is important for the knowledge it contains of 
the third reign of al-Na§ir Muhammad, the internal affairs of Egypt 
during this period and the political situation of the Mamluk Sultanate
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at that time. Being provided with this chronicle is vital for a 
study concerning the affairs of the Mamluk Sultanate during the 
three reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad, in general, and the third reign 
in particular.
The chronicle of Dhayl mir,at al-zaman by Musa b. Muhammad al- 
Yunini (d. 726/1326) is a main and primary source for any study con­
cerning this period. It contains comprehensive history regarding 
the first and the second reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad and the first 
years of his third reign, when he became‘his own master. With the 
end of each year al-YuninT gives brief biographies of the distinguished 
persons who died during that year.
This chronicle has been useful for every chapter of this thesis 
because: firstly, it contains detailed information respecting this
period; secondly, al-Yunini was an eye witness and was a contemporary 
of al-Nafir Muhammad. This work has been of vital importance with 
regard to details included concerning the high power in the Mamluk 
Sultanate, the position of the Marnluk oligarchy, the attitude of al- 
Nasir Muhammad towards the powerful emirs and the military activities 
of the Mamluk army.
Concerning the chronicle of Abu Muhammad 'Abd Allah b. As*ad al- 
Yafi'T, Mir*at al-janan wa *ibrat al-yaqgan f i  ma*rifat frawadith al- 
zaman wa taqallub ahwal al-insan, this contains brief records of the 
three reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad, therefore it has been useful in 
almost every part of this thesis.
On the other hand, al-Yafi'T gives long biographies of the people 
who died during this period; consequently, this work is important in 
throwing light on the part which had been played by these people and 
which had affected the internal situation of the Mamluk Sultanate.
Since he was a contemporary of al-Nasir Muhammad, al-Yafi'i's
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chronicle is important in studying the relationships between al- 
Nasir Muhammad and the powerful emirs on the one hand, and the over­
reaction of the Mamluk emirs against al-Nasir Muhammad and his 
dictatorial policy on the other.
The chronicle is important also for the study of the relation­
ships between the Mamluk Sultanate during this period and the Bedouins 
of A1 Muhanna and A1 Ea£l in Syria, on the one hand, and the relation­
ships with India, Il-Khan, North Africa (Bilad al-Maghrib) and Yemen, 
on the other hand.
Last, but not least, the chronicle is vital to the study of the 
history of the Mamluk Sultanate during the Ba^ri period because it 
contains over-all record of that period.
The chronicle of al-Hasan b. *Abd Allah al-Safadl, Nuzhat al- 
malik wa*1-mamluk has been useful for the study of the subject of 
this thesis; it helps us to learn the reality of the political and 
social situation in the Mamluk Sultanate during this time. In his 
chronicle, al-Safadl concentrates on the most important events of 
each year; for example, in the year 69^/129^-j he mentions the claim 
of Kitbugha to the throne, the appointment of Lachin as vicegerent 
(na’ib al-Saltana), the arrival of the Oirat Mongol tribesmen in 
Egypt and the dreadful famine which occured during that time.
Although al-Safadi writes only briefly about the general situation 
in the Mamluk Sultanate he gives detailed information about the im­
portant events; therefore, this work helps in the achievement of 
a comprehensive picture with regard to the internal affairs of Mamluk 
Egypt during this period.
The work of al-Hasan b. 'Umar, Ibn Habib, Durrat al-aslak fi 
dawlat al-Atrak, is valuable to this thesis as it contains a detailed
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study of the three reigns of al-Na^ir Muhammad. Ibn Habib records 
events in chronological order during this period. Although this 
work opens with the events of 6^8/12^0, it concentrates on al-Nasir 
Muhammad's three reigns. It is essential to the understanding of the 
political development of the Mamluk Sultanate, and foreign relation­
ship between the Mamluk regime and other countries, for example, 
Il-Khan, and the political plots to overthrow al-Nasir Muhammad.
TarTkh al-Salatin wa?1-* asakir is an anonymous work and begins 
with the events of 702/1302 after the Mamluks succeeded in defeating 
the Mongols in Syria or, in other words, with the early years of the 
second reign of al-Najir Muhammad. Although the work is anonymous 
it is obviously contemporary. The anonymous writer refers to al- 
Na§ir Muhammad as the reigning Sultan and was apparently acquainted
B
with events taking place at court, such as the presentation of am­
bassadors. He refers briefly to the most important events taking 
place in the Mamluk Sultanate, for example, the activities of the 
Mamluk army either in Asia Minor or against the Bedouins.
The work is important for its detailed accounts of the missions 
from various states, for example, Venice, and mentions the reasons 
for which they came; therefore the work is vital for an understand­
ing of the relationship between the Mamluk Sultanate and foreign 
countries. The work is written chronologically and mentions the 
most important events, such as the conflict between the different 
Mamluk factions, and the embassies from Byzantium, II Khan, Nubia, 
Yemen and Aragon for establishing friendly co-operation, thereby 
shedding light on the situation at the court.
This chronicle notes the abdication of al-Nasir Muhammad j_n
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708/1308 and the accession to the throne of Baybars al-Jashnakir. 
Al-Na§ir Muhammad retired to al-Karak where later he prepared to 
return to power by intriguing with the Syrian governors. Henceforward, 
the anonymous writer concentrates on the internal affairs of the 
Mamluk Sultnate, for example: the return of al-Nasir Muhammad to
power, his attitude towards Baybars al-JashnakXr, and his plot to 
starve Sayf al-ETn Salar to death.
The chronicle gives detailed accounts of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, 
the attitude of the Caliph towards Baybars al-Jashnaklr and how he 
gave him the first and the second diploma (*ahd) in which he permitted 
Baybars to fight al-Nasir Muhammad, and then the attitude of al-Nasir 
Muhammad towards the Caliph al-Mustakfl. In studying these accounts 
it is obvious that the anonymous writer was an eye witness of these 
events. This work contains an authentic copy of the diploma (*ahd) 
which was given by the Caliph to al-Nasir Muhammad to permit him to 
rule. In this diploma (*ahd) v/e find the Caliph supporting al-Nasir 
Muhammad's return to power. Therefore this work is of vital import­
ance for this thesis in which we study the situation of the 'Abbasid 
Caliphate during this period. This chronicle is the sole work which 
mentions this diploma (*ahd) and it is the final statement made in 
this chronicle.
Nuzhat al-insan fl dhikr al-Muluk wa*l-a*yan is an anonymous 
work referring to Mamluk history from 633/1237 onwards. This work 
is vital for this thesis since it contains details concerning: firstly, 
the three reigns of al-Na§ir Muhammad; secondly, the usurpations by 
Kitbugha, Lachin and Baybars al-Jashnaklr; thirdly, the plots against 
al-Na^ir Muhammad organized by powerful emirs. The work terminates 
with the events of the year 873/1^+68.
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The work of Taqv/Tm al-buldan al-Mjsriyya fT al-a'mal al- 
Sultan.iy.ya was carried out by the order of al-Ashraf Sha'ban (76 —^ 
778/1363-1377). It contains a complete description of the admini­
strative division of Egypt after al-rawk al-NasirT in the year 715/
1315; therefore it has been of great importance in the study of the 
administrative division of Egypt during this period because this did 
not change at the reign of al-Ashraf jSha'ban. It seems that this 
work was carried out in the year 778/1375* but unfortunately the 
writer is anonymous. Nevertheless, presumably al-Ashraf was sure 
of the writer's reliability so that he put him in charge of this 
work.
Concerning the study of the administrative division of Egypt 
during the period under consideration, the work is important for 
the knowledge of the basic administrative divisions of Egypt at this 
time, the 'ibra of the provinces (aqallm) and of the agricultural 
land, the distribution of Egyptian land among the Mamluk emirs, the 
quantity of al-khass al-Sultani and the most important centres for 
economic activities. All this is necessary in achieving a reliable 
study of the administrative and economic situation of Egypt during 
this period, especially concerning the extent of Egyptian land and 
its value.
The work of Tarikh al-dawla al-Turkiyya begins with the early 
years of the Mamluk Sultanate and ends with the events of the year 
805/1^02; therefore it contains details with regard to the three 
reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad. Subsequently this chronicle is import­
ant in order to learn the political situation in the Mamluk Sultanate, 
especially as it appears that the anonymous author of this work was 
an eye witness of this period and died at the beginning of the fifteenth 
century.
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This chronicle has been of vital importance in the study
concerning the political state and the open conflict among the
Mamluk oligarchy which has been studied in the introduction and
the chapter concerning political plots. The chronicle sheds light
on the attitude of al-Na^ir Muhammad against the powerful emirs,
l)7n
for example, Sayf al-DIn Salar, Sayf al^Karay, Baktamur al-Jukandar 
and Tankiz al-HusamT. In conclusion, the work is important in order 
to give a clear picture concerning the struggle for power between 
al-Nasir Muhammad and the Mamluk oligarchy.
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